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Abstract 
Fallout sampling and other nuclear intelligence techniques were the most important 
sources of United States strategic intelligence in the early Cold War. Operated as the Atomic 
Energy Detection System by a covert Air Force unit known as AFOAT-1, the AEDS detected 
emissions and analyzed fallout from Soviet nuclear tests, as well as provided quantitative 
intelligence on the size of the Russian nuclear stockpile. Virtually unknown because the only 
greater Cold War secret than nuclear weapons was intelligence gathered about them, data on the 
Soviet threat produced by AFOAT-1 was an extraordinary influence on early National 
Intelligence Estimates, the rapid growth of the Strategic Air Command, and strategic war plans. 
Official guidance beginning with the first nuclear test in 1945 otherwise suggested fallout was an 
insignificant effect of nuclear weapons.  Following AFOAT-1’s detection of Soviet testing in fall 
1949 and against the cautions raised about the problematic nature of higher yield weapons by the 
General Advisory Committee, the Atomic Energy Commission’s top scientific advisers, 
President Harry Truman ordered the AEC to quickly build these extraordinarily powerful 
weapons, testing the first in secrecy in November 1952. In spring 1954, the second test of an 
American thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb, CASTLE BRAVO, produced more than 7,000 
square miles of potentially lethal fallout deposition near its ground zero, as well as contaminating 
people and fish in a notorious fallout radiation exposure incident. These tests also produced 
residual fallout that intensified every spring as it returned from the stratosphere. In April 1954, J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, formerly scientific director of the Manhattan Project and chair of the 
AEC’s GAC, was permanently stripped of his clearance to handle classified information, 
ostensibly for failing to display sufficient enthusiasm during development of this weapon. This 
hearing was effectively a sham that served as a proxy for Air Force efforts to silence his 
concerns and those of a secret AEC study named GABRIEL, warnings that in the event of war 
the problematic nature of the cumulative fallout from these weapons would afflict the 
populations of both the victim and the aggressor as they contaminated the global environment. 
The transnational public outcry in the years that followed the CASTLE BRAVO fallout incident 
put intense pressure on political leaders to end testing. The deciding factor at the White House 
proved to be several instances of fallout contamination of the food supply involving wheat and 
milk. Tellingly, this was due to the limited fallout from testing alone. This data provided an 
empirical basis to underwrite earlier cautions that general nuclear war would yield no winner, 
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only varying degrees of loss. Utilizing the high-altitude capabilities of the U-2, the data that 
proved the need for caution was provided to researchers by the Air Force. No longer as useful a 
secret, the military, too, came to see fallout as an issue that unnecessarily problematized their 
reliance on nuclear weapons. To blunt efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban, the Air Force 
pursued underground testing to forestall continuing fallout that would raise deeper questions 
about the viability of nuclear war itself. Rather than a mere propaganda problem, as it was often 
seen by officials, fallout proved to be a practical limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. The 
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty that resulted ended most atmospheric testing, but not the 
possibility that fallout could some day contaminate the planet. 
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Chapter One: Introduction/Thesis Statement 
The objective of this study is to critically examine the significant, if often little 
understood effects of fallout and other data gleaned from Soviet nuclear weapons production and 
testing on United States national security policy and strategy as the nation’s predominant 
strategic intelligence sources during the first two decades of the Cold War. The ionizing 
radiation of fallout revealed vital secrets as an integral by-product of testing nuclear weapons 
even as it became the subject of intense public controversy in the nineteen-fifties; less well 
known, but still detectable, were other effects the production and testing of nuclear weapons 
generated that revealed much about the Soviet stockpile. Fallout became an intractable problem 
for policy makers, both as an acute threat to human life and as a chronic, fundamentally 
inescapable limit on the use of nuclear weapons. The focus in fallout’s treatment in Cold War 
historiography has centered primarily on analyzing its narratives as psycho-social studies of 
fearful public perceptions, yet evidence demonstrates that inside the government ending fallout 
was a data-driven decision.  
The United States Air Force’s Fallout Legacy 
Fallout sampling and analysis was only one technique among several that served as 
sources of nuclear intelligence; these included seismology, infrasound, electromagnetic pulse and 
others adopted from the frontiers of science.
1
 Reports on the Soviet nuclear effort generated by 
Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) and its predecessor organization, AFOAT-1, 
played a major, yet largely unexamined role in shaping the strategy, policy, tactics, and force 
structure of the U.S. Air Force. Buttressed by its invocation of scientific authority and in the 
absence of more authoritative intelligence about the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces, Air Force 
analysts made worst case scenario interpretations based on this data, disproportionately 
influencing the first decade of the national intelligence estimate (NIE) process managed by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
2
 The Air Force’s reporting on its secret, effective, but 
sometimes flawed use of fallout and other effects generated by fissile material production and 
weapons testing tended to maximize the Russian threat to engender support for the American 
                                                 
1
 United States Air Force Technical Applications Center, A Fifty Year History of Long Range Detection, The 
Creation, Development, and Operation of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System (Patrick Air Force 
Base, Florida:  Headquarters, AFTAC, September 1997), 57-142. 
2
 While “worst case” was my own analysis based on life experience of the default mode of Air Force intelligence 
analysis, this personal assessment was reinforced by William Burr’s virtually identical critique in the National 
Security Archive’s synopsis text of reports posted on the April 1950 Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico Air Force 
Commanders Conference, Item 3, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/special/. 
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response to it. This established a feedback loop of secret and public information that served as 
the primary driver of the nuclear arms race.
3
 In the process, Air Force analysts distorted the NIE 
process by faulty assumptions they made about fundamentally accurate data. The global nuclear 
intelligence network, known as the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) operated by 
AFOAT-1/AFTAC, eventually proved equally adept at verifying arms control treaty obligations 
and violations. Although the Air Force resisted diplomacy as an unwelcome limitation on it 
planning and operational flexibility, most dramatically in serving as among its reasons for 
hounding Robert Oppenheimer from public service, the intelligence it produced in preparing for 
war eventually proved at least as efficacious in preventing nuclear war.  
Historiography, Evidence, and Argument 
Nuclear weapons and intelligence organizations are long-time staple subjects for Cold 
War historians, yet the potential insights found by treating them as closely linked entities – 
nuclear intelligence – remain largely unexplored by historians.4 In large part, this historical gap 
was a result of continued secrecy restricting availability of source material surrounding the 
exploitation of the empirical effects of fallout for intelligence purposes and the general 
sensitivity of any intelligence operations associated with nuclear weapons.
5
 Nonetheless, it is 
                                                 
3
 Prompted by secret intelligence findings in reaction to Soviet efforts, the Pentagon then made budget requests to 
Congress to acquire improved weapons to meet the perceived threat. The Russians then read newspaper accounts in 
the American open press of the appropriation and acquisition process, leading them to improve their own game, 
which was then in turned discovered by the West, keeping the unvirtuous cycle of the arms race turning. 
4
 A select few monographs published in the last two decades examine specific aspects of nuclear intelligence 
operations and are discussed in Appendix C as well as cited when they provide essential insights. First among them 
is the seminal work in the field by Charles A. Zeigler and David Jacobson, Spying without Spies: Origins of 
America’s Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), a history of the development of what 
became AFOAT-1 up to the detection of Joe-1, the first Soviet test. While this project focuses on the Air Force 
effort, it also attempts to relate the influence of nuclear intelligence across the spectrum of U.S. national security 
policy. Providing the best wide view of the role of nuclear intelligence in the larger national security community was 
written by Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran 
and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006). Additionally, despite a troubled bilateral relationship across 
many other aspects of the nuclear complex and the Anglophobic AEC Chair, Lewis Strauss, there was a close 
relationship regarding the tracking of fallout and krypton-85 in particular between the Americans and British. In a 
field largely to himself so far with British nuclear intelligence was Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear 
Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). All have a 
special focus and unique limitations. None pursue the policy links between nuclear intelligence and fallout as a 
problem, despite the intimate connection between these two distinct, yet intertwined topics. 
5
 While most classified information is theoretically subject to downgrading and eventual declassification according 
to its age, this usually does not apply to the topic area of nuclear intelligence. Nuclear weapons-related information 
is designated as Restricted Data, which is exempt from age-related declassification and controlled by the Atomic 
Energy Commission and its successor organizations. These declassifications are cataloged in a guide, currently the 
RDD-8 (Restricted Data Declassification Guide -8) edition, http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/decl/rdd-8.pdf. Other 
aspects of nuclear intelligence may be classified as Sensitive Compartmented Information or part of a Special 
Access Program, sometimes regarded unofficially as “above Top Secret” classification. An additional complication 
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now possible to assemble a critical review of fallout’s strategic and policy significance from a 
composite of sources. 
It is important to understand the basis of the Air Force’s adjustment of strategy to the 
perils of fallout was not simply made to save face, but instead was based on facts and data 
persuasive to the U.S. military, as well as the president and his advisers. Tracing fallout’s effects 
on the national security policy making process provided extensive signs of its influence, 
including changes in military strategies, choice of weapons and tactics, and an eventual decision 
to support an end to fallout from the Atomic Energy Commission’s testing of nuclear weapons. 
Most telling was discovery of the atmosphere’s very limited capacity to serve as a buffer 
against fallout held aloft. Once believed to serve as reservoir or repository, where fallout pumped 
into the stratosphere by thermonuclear explosions could safely decay before falling to return to 
the troposphere, by 1959 Air Force U-2 samplers operating in support of the CROWFLIGHT 
program brought back fallout samples confirming a significant percentage of testing fallout fell 
back into the troposphere below within the first year.
6
 There fallout quickly became subject to 
the scavenging effects of rainout and gravity bringing it to earth.
7
 Additionally, global circulation 
patterns returning fallout to the troposphere also concentrated its deposition along and roughly 
five degrees on either side of 45 degrees North latitude, roughly from Portland, Oregon across 
the upper continental United States through St. Paul to Boston, at rates eight to ten times heavier 
than it if evenly distributed surface deposition occurred.
8
  
                                                                                                                                                             
is that much of the record of relevance here was created prior to the current permutation of SCI and SAP governing 
regulations and may be grandfathered with unique restrictions into current classification compartments.   
6
 Lester Machta, oral history transcript, Nils Bohr Library, American Physical Institute. CROWFLIGHT was an 
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project program in support of Willard Libby’s Project Sunshine at the Atomic 
Energy Commission. Libby’s theory of dispersal and extended residence time that allowed fallout to decay to safer 
levels was undermined by soil samples indicating accelerated deposition times for global stratospheric fallout, as 
well as circulation patterns that concentrated its deposition across the United States. The U-2 provided the means to 
readily access the stratosphere to gain the samples needed to verify with data what was actually happened to fallout 
at high altitude. Several high altitude shots in the U.S. nuclear program were salted with identifying isotopes to 
differentiate it in research into detection of nuclear explosions in space  
7
 While gravity plays a big role in fallout deposition from the atmosphere, rainout was noticed as a factor in 
removing fallout from the atmosphere as early as the CROSSROADS BAKER shot (23 kilotons, 24 July 1946). 
Detonated ninety feet underwater, the huge amount of water the blast vaporized then generated local storms from the 
resulting condensate, releasing the water as rain that cleansed the atmosphere by bringing much of the fallout with it. 
The net effect was intense local fallout, which contaminated the test fleet so heavily the scheduled third shot planned 
for CROSSROADS was cancelled, and very limited success in capturing only weak fallout samples away from the 
Bikini Island test site. 
8
 Lester Machta, oral history transcript, Nils Bohr Library, American Physical Institute. The most intense deposition 
was along 45 degrees North, but extended on either side of that line by about ten degrees of latitude. 
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How was it possible to evaluate AFOAT-1’s influence on national security policy and 
decision making with the limited archival record available? Details are often scarce, but the 
general picture is nonetheless clear once AFOAT-1 is located in its role in the complex web of 
intelligence and strategy that served the Air Force’s military and organizational needs as the 
service built its strategic forces over its first decade of existence. Information about the Soviet 
nuclear complex collected by AFOAT-1 was the best available evidence for the Air Force 
intelligence reports that underwrote the vast expansion of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). 
The Air Force was an organization driven by a variety of management metrics that measured 
performance and effectiveness. Following detection of the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949 there 
were no more important statistic driving the Air Force’s own growth than those offered by 
AFOAT-1’s measurement of the growth of the Russian nuclear weapons stockpile. Besides 
fallout providing qualitative insights into Soviet weapon design, monitoring atmospheric levels 
of krypton-85 provided the window needed to track and record their plutonium-239 fissile 
material production with accuracy of within five percent by 1951.
9
 
In the case of fallout, it is not hyperbole to argue fallout’s role in the history of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons program and its influence on strategic policy is the most significant remaining 
largely unexamined factor in Cold War national security history.  The material reality of nuclear 
weapons, because of their potential to create devastating blast and fire effects, seemingly created 
national security through their capacity to deter attackers. Beginning with Gar Alperovitz’s 1965 
revisionist examination of the decision to use nuclear weapons on the Japanese, a half-century of 
debate inside and outside the profession examined that construct and the Cold War strategy and 
decision making that followed.
10
 Buried in secrecy by its role as an intelligence source, the Air 
Force also saw fallout as an existential threat to SAC, most infamously as the carefully concealed 
impetus to the 1954 Oppenheimer hearing.
11
 Fallout proved to be the central physical constraint 
                                                 
9
 Memorandum by R. C. Maude and D.L. Northrup, AFOAT/1, for Mr. Robert LeBaron, Deputy to the Secretary of 
Defense for Atomic Energy, "Notes on Technical Cooperation with British and Canadians in the Field of Atomic 
Energy Intelligence," 21 March 1951. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB7/ae1-1.htm. Appendix B 
provides an approximation of the amount of fissile material produced annually and thus available for detection. The 
general trend in techniques used by AFOAT-1 was increased accuracy as methods were refined, but no similar 
memos for later years has yet surfaced to confirm this was the case with krypton-85 analysis. 
10
 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American 
Confrontation with Soviet Power (London: Pluto Press, 1995 edition). 
11
 Fallout was not the only source of conflict between Oppenheimer and the Air Force, but it proved to be the only 
point that was forbidden for witnesses to mention during the hearing itself, even as it clearly was the main point of 
contention that tied together much of the AEC’s shaky case to revoke his security clearance. See Chapter Two. 
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on the arms race. The story of fallout thus explains how the government went from knowing and 
ignoring its potential risks to finally eliminating its threat during peacetime by ending 
atmospheric testing in less than two decades.  
Official representations were combined with conventional wisdom about fallout to 
cultivate the belief fallout was an unanticipated, inconsequential inconvenience. This served to 
disguise fallout’s significant role in the daily routine of national security; in several secret 
reevaluations of strategy and policy; and in a key role forcing policy makers to confront the 
multiple constraints it placed on the use of nuclear weapons. While change in national security 
policy regarding nuclear weapons sometimes came in response to various popular mobilizations 
against fallout from testing, in fact these policy changes were often significantly catalyzed by 
secret empirical evidence about the risks it posed. Already knowledgeable about fallout’s use for 
intelligence purposes and its threat when used in war from his military service, Dwight 
Eisenhower confronted a growing body of evidence as president congruent with public opinion 
on the need for a far more cautionary approach to radiation exposure than atmospheric testing 
provided. Facts and opinion both forced Eisenhower to act, even as these facts were withheld to 
prevent their undermining public perceptions of the military utility of nuclear weapons.  
This dualistic concept of fallout and bombs as an essentially linked and self-limiting 
system may at first blush be controversial, especially for revisionist historians who struggled to 
reintroduce human agency to Cold War narratives of war and peace in order to escape the ruts of 
commemorative history.
12
 Evidence gleaned from fallout’s influence on policy and strategy 
                                                 
12
 A common conservative theme warns against the influence of revisionist historians in the academy and elsewhere. 
While a persistently common criticism of history going back to the Greeks, in fact the basis of the profession is 
constant, informed revision of the current view of the past, otherwise it would quickly fall into the stale 
Scholasticism of the early Middle Ages. More specifically in the case of United States and international history 
much of the current iteration of conservative thought on revisionism traces back to reaction to Gar Alperovitz’s 
ground-breaking 1965 Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American 
Confrontation with Soviet Power (London: Pluto Press, 1995 edition).  Alperovitz’s conclusions were disturbing, but 
much of the antipathy was based on his questioning the uses made of air power and nuclear weapons, which had 
remained largely submerged in secrecy in the first two decades of the nuclear era amid the ideological constraints 
imposed by the Cold War confrontation. The central cultural example of this tendency was the symbiotic 
relationship between the Strategic Air Command and Hollywood, most famously in the guise of Jimmy Stewart who 
was both star of the movie, Strategic Air Command, and an Air Force Reserve officer, eventually rising to the rank 
of Major General. Stewart was also one of the twelve founding members of the Air Force Association. The best 
example of the persistence of the bomb’s cultural capture was the controversy that erupted in 1995 over a planned 
exhibit of the Enola Gay, the B-29 that bombed Hiroshima, at the Smithsonian Institute to commemorate the 50
th
 
anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Air Force Association led a massive campaign to 
pressure the Smithsonian to alter the exhibit. 
http://www.airforcemag.com/magazinearchive/enolagayarchive/Pages/default.aspx.The American Historical 
Association pushed back, arguing that such an exhibit required contextualization of the competing views about 
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demonstrated that governmental response to its effects was at least as much based on empirical 
phenomenon that sparked a fundamental crisis of strategy as it was a case of official response to 
mistaken or unreasonably fearful public perceptions.
13
 Rather than undermining the agency of 
human actors, this treatment of fallout actually underlines transnational resistance against nuclear 
weapons by providing a material basis for those concerns. Fallout meant failure of deterrence 
held potential for harsh correction, a reminder that fallout acted on both sides of this equation, by 
its absence and in its presence, on the attacker as on the attacked.  Deterrence was not guaranteed 
by but instead was undermined by nuclear weapons, because understanding fallout’s threat 
tended to encourage hesitancy, rather than certainty about their use. Recognizing the interaction 
of its empirical effects with socio-political pressures as a significant force affecting national 
security policy brings the argument about fallout back full circle to reinforce the conclusion any 
use of nuclear weapons is a highly impractical solution for achieving national security goals in 
virtually any conflict scenario.  
The goal here is not to privilege one class of evidence or mode of interpretation against 
another, but to shape the narrative in a more holistic way, to reassess the physical world’s effects 
and constraints on human beings and their relationships with nuclear weapons. Evidentiary gaps 
remain due to persistent security classification, requiring some limited use of hypothesis and 
measured speculation to cross back and forth between what we know and what still requires 
identification, confirmation, and contextualization to construct a useful narrative. The goal is to 
organize what is known through an iterative process to bring into focus areas of inquiry about 
what remains masked about fallout in the history of nuclear weapons while using this missing 
narrative to inform the broader context of Cold War history. Like an incomplete spreadsheet, 
much can be determined from understanding the architecture of formulas by interpreting adjacent 
evidence that is visible or is suggested exists, even if the exact values forecast in some fields 
remain occluded. The questions raised are as important as those answered. 
Historiographic arguments about the meaning and significance of nuclear weapons 
suffered from the absence of a reasonably complete contextual understanding of the wide scope 
                                                                                                                                                             
nuclear weapons, rather than reducing it to a sterile and simplistic explanation of the technological triumph that 
resulted in the destruction of two cities with two bombs. http://www.historians.org/publications-and-
directories/perspectives-on-history/december-2003/historians-protest-new-enola-gay-exhibit. 
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or belief.” (https://www.libraries.psu.edu/psul/researchguides/edupsych/empirical.html) For a more detailed 
explanation of its use here, see Appendix C. 
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of fallout’s embedment in the military-industrial-scientific-technological complex.14 A vacuum 
of facts maintained through the security classification system fostered an intentional misdirection 
in the archive that disguised fallout’s critical role in Cold War intelligence and national security 
policy, leading to a historical focus on individual and social perceptions and beliefs about fallout 
as the means to gain a critical perspective on fallout; the nuclear intelligence effort in general 
was even more obscure. While public anxieties exerted significant political pressure on the 
United States government, fallout’s empirical effects played a far more significant role than 
previously understood in forcing an end to atmospheric testing.
15
 Demobilizing fallout as a major 
irritant that caused ordinary citizens to involve themselves in geopolitical affairs removed much 
of the pressure it placed on national security policy that was dependent on nuclear weapons.
16
 
Initially resisting President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s quest for a total ban on testing, historian 
Robert Jacobs pointed out how important ending fallout became to those in the Pentagon. The 
military eventually conceded the limits it imposed, even as they sought to preserve nuclear 
testing by continuing the practice underground for decades after the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (LTBT).
17
 The other face of this decision was that it ended access by independent 
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Stanford University Press, 2007), 230-232. Green argued the military-industrial- scientific-technological complex 
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of public concern into account. These empirical factors also include the direct effects of radiation exposures from 
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16
 Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 1954-1970 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 439-441, 442-465. Wittner argued that disinterest in disarmament, 
despite the success of the 1963 LTBT in the decade after its signing “was a central irony” of movements to resist 
nuclear weapons. Primarily, he attributed the decline in organized resistance to nuclear weapons to a variety of 
organizational issues. In summing up, Wittner argued that traditional scholarship focused too much on nuclear 
testing, with it serving as an analogue for people uncomfortable with the idea of actually resisting nuclear war and 
the horrors it magnified. Here the argument draws an unavoidable direct line from testing to war, but along the way 
encounters what it hopes are the useful tools for activists and citizens to conduct their own nuclear narratives with 
greater confidence.  
17
 Robert Jacobs, The Dragon’s Tail: Americans Face the Atomic Age (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
2010), 1-11, 84-98, 120-121. Jacobs draws a direct line from the end of fallout to the apparent slackening of 
motivation to anti-nuclear activism among Americans. Given that most Americans were far more likely to confront 
fallout in their paper or on television than they ever were to encounter a nuclear activist, this suggests a cultural 
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researchers to new fallout and the evidence it provided. Fallout was the binder for this testing-
related oppositional cultural formation, yet factual information about it was surprisingly scarce 
as political resistance to it faded away just as independent civilian research began to study its 
effects. Public communication and civil defense programs about fallout, which could be 
charitably characterized as more likely to reassure in the present than to be useful under nuclear 
attack, also quickly withered as if the conceptual threat faded, the empirical risk should, too.
18
 
The problem of public fallout anxiety might have been solved for policy makers, but fallout 
remains a problem while nuclear weapons remain.  
Missing Evidence 
The shadowy absence of fallout from a significant role in many Cold War nuclear 
narratives was intentional; illumination of the far more complex role it played in the history of 
nuclear weapons presents a significantly different account than what was described to the public 
about it and the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Fallout and associated nuclear intelligence 
capabilities form a meta-narrative that synergizes what is known about nuclear weapons with 
what has remained intentionally vague or unknown. Unpacking fallout’s history here seeks to 
improve an existing network of narratives by amplifying themes that convey the meaning of the 
past more effectively, especially one so consequential as the problem of nuclear weapons, rather 
than to suggest the wholesale overthrow of what was known about it to this point.  
Empiricism ultimately guided the decision to end fallout, in the process shifting the 
emphasis of American intelligence efforts away from their too narrow field of strategic vision 
focused on nuclear weapons. The wisdom of Eisenhower’s seemingly abrupt decision to let 
fallout fade away instead of adding to it was reinforced during the brief but intense resumption of 
atmospheric testing early in John F. Kennedy’s presidency. The decision to end atmospheric 
                                                                                                                                                             
explanation is at least as likely as a political explanation for a waning of efforts to control nuclear weapons. Jacobs 
argued the narrative culture of the Cold War could be divided into what came before 1963 and what came after.  
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 Andrew D. Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development during the 
Early Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2001), xiii; Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: Americans Families in 
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The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
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that no “exercise of managerial rationality” could overcome “the problems created by radioactive contamination 
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testing represented a sudden reversal by the Air Force, fallout’s most stubborn supporter to that 
point.  This followed the service’s role in forcing out on trumped-up charges J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, from his subsequent post as chair 
of the General Advisory Committee, the top science advisers to the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Ironically, the Air Force’s decision to support an end to fallout from testing was motivated by the 
very same need that earlier caused it to hound Oppenheimer from government service: it sought 
to insulate its nuclear forces against the political erosion that might arise from critical scientific 
narratives that fallout made possible. The Air Force feared the potential for a fallout debate to 
condense around the sheer impracticality of fighting a war resulting in thousands of megatons of 
thermonuclear yield, a conflict the evidence strongly suggests Oppenheimer was unwilling to 
walk away from, ultimately at the cost of his career. Sending Oppenheimer into a silent, forced 
retirement was an attempt by the military to solve what they believed was a perception problem, 
but data subsequently proved fallout’s threat was all too real.  
What Is at Stake 
The primary arguments of this project revolve around fallout serving consecutively, then 
simultaneously, as a secret, a problem and a limitation on the Cold War nuclear arms race. While 
“the Bomb” exerted a broad range of influences on the ways people saw and interacted with its 
brooding image and potential to interrupt postwar life, it was its invisible, inevitable fallout 
stubbornly exerting its influence that made it the primary defining factor in how people 
conceptualized nuclear weapons, even though this influence was often reduced to a narrative of 
subjectivity.
19
 Evidence of fallout’s empirical effects remains incomplete, because much of the 
best data available on fallout remains classified in custody of the U.S. Air Force. Recent 
declassifications, such as the substantially complete transcript of the 1954 Oppenheimer hearing, 
facilitate evaluation of the mostly unsung strategic significance of fallout and nuclear 
intelligence in Cold War history. 
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As a secret, fallout served as the most vital and productive source of qualitative 
intelligence available on the Soviet Union’s most worrisome military capabilities in the first 
decade of the Cold War. It was equaled only by a parallel quantitative intelligence effort to track 
Soviet plutonium-239 production to determine Soviet fissile material inventories. Measurement 
of krypton-85, a radioactive indicator cryogenically processed from the atmosphere, tracked 
plutonium-239 fissile material production within the Soviet Union. Samples captured from 
Soviet test shots provided running inventories of the qualities and quantities of Soviet nuclear 
weapons.
20
 AFOAT-1 successfully detected the first Soviet test, termed Joe-1 (29 August 1949, 
22 kilotons) and virtually every subsequent test until testing largely ended in 1992.
21
 Both 
qualitative and quantitative in nature, inherently accurate, and conferring unusually persuasive 
scientific authority, the intelligence data produced by AFOAT-1 provided the essential 
evidentiary premise for the massive build-up of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC), 
the most powerful military force ever assembled, if sheer explosive force at its disposal was the 
yardstick. Fallout shaped the Cold War Air Force, while simultaneously undermining the 
premise of the service’s power – thermonuclear weapons. 
The argument here problematizes both the secret national security policy decisions 
facilitated by fallout in the early Cold War and the effects of this on policy makers in dealing 
with popular reaction to nuclear weapons and their fallout. While consequential external political 
forces mobilized by the fears of millions across the globe had significant political effects on 
nuclear weapons policy, a wide range of empirical evidence secretly demonstrated fallout forced 
the U.S. military to come to terms internally with the inherent limitations fallout placed on the 
use of nuclear weapons. At the same time it became a limitation on the arms race, fallout served 
as a globalized focal point for those opposed to nuclear weapons. Evidence of the political, 
social, and cultural effects of opposition to fallout on U.S. national security policy was extensive, 
even when it was not always successful in altering it, as Lawrence Wittner so eloquently and 
thoroughly treated in his three-volume work.
22
 Popular mobilization engendered by fallout was 
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effective in influencing policy change, not because of the numbers of votes opponents might cast 
– far more people globally opposed nuclear fallout than lived as voting citizens in the United 
States, with such concerns being closely tracked by the Operations Coordinating Board under 
Dwight Eisenhower – but precisely because the concerns people across the globe publicly voiced 
were reinforced by the preponderance of disturbing secret fallout data accumulating on President 
Eisenhower’s desk over the course of his presidency.23  Facing down public opinion is not 
uncommon for the executive, even in a democracy, but Eisenhower recognized ignoring public 
opinion in the face of fallout’s barrage of empirical constraints and factual determinations was an 
untenable position.  
In the context of his “lessons learned” speech on the perils to democracy posed by the 
military-industrial complex, Eisenhower’s 1961 warning of its danger to American democracy 
was an eerie echo of J. Robert Oppenheimer’s muffled 1950 plea for enough openness on nuclear 
matters so that a fully informed citizenry could have input on vital national security policy 
decisions.
24
 Oppenheimer’s complaint was virtually all that escaped from Harry Truman’s order 
of silence on any public discussion about the nation’s secret pursuit of thermonuclear weapons 
once he made the decision to do so against the scientific advice of the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s General Advisory Committee following the detection of Joe-1.25 The vital thread 
connecting the scientist’s interview and the president’s speech a decade apart was fallout. 
Fallout’s limits on the use of nuclear weapons did not arise from the design or efficiency 
of individual weapons, although it was possible to significantly reduce fallout by changes made 
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 See Chapter 2. The GAC was chaired by Oppenheimer. 
12 
 
in weapon design or by careful use of  set tactics of battlefield employment in order to minimize 
fallout.
26
 The cumulative threat of fallout in a nuclear war, given Air Force plans for massed use 
of nuclear weapons against hardened targets, created both a scenario likely to produce maximum 
fallout effects and an insatiable demand for fissile material from the AEC to accomplish the task. 
Calling it the “goddamnedest thing” he ever saw, Oppenheimer was shocked by a briefing on 
General Curtis LeMay’s early plans for thermonuclear warfare.27 Oppenheimer’s reaction to 
LeMay’s plans at this meeting was last straw for an Air Force leadership that long harbored 
suspicions about his political reliability. Their decision to act against him for his demonstrable 
lack of enthusiasm for their plans stemmed from this confrontation over the fallout issue, which 
evidence in Chapter Three will argue took root in the late 1949 conflict over development of 
thermonuclear weapons between the Air Force, Oppenheimer and the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s General Advisory Committee he chaired until 1952. 
Robert Oppenheimer was also among the first to realize the Air Force’s development of 
nuclear intelligence techniques proved verification capabilities that made arms control 
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agreements feasible. However, the combination of his cautions about the dangers posed by the 
copious amounts of fallout thermonuclear weapons would generate with the idea that such a vital 
intelligence system would be devoted to pursuit of arms control served only to goad into action 
those who helped purge him from government service in 1954.
28
 Fallout fundamentally limited 
the arms race because it imposed finite limits of tolerance for the use of nuclear weapons on a 
military command structure otherwise enthralled by the possibilities of unlimited destructive 
power inherent in thermonuclear weapons. 
Utility of Fallout as a Secret 
In the immediate aftermath of World War Two amid concerns other nations would soon 
undertake their own nuclear weapons programs breaking the American nuclear monopoly, a 12 
August 1946 memorandum written by General Curtis LeMay argued that the Air Force was best 
equipped to develop a nuclear intelligence capability.
29
 Like many others busy readying the old 
Army Air Force to transition into a co-equal, independent Air Force within a unified Department 
of Defense, LeMay assumed that the Soviet Union was intent on acquiring nuclear weapons, 
creating an urgent need for a system to detect what the Air Force saw as the eventuality Stalin or 
his successors would do so.
30
 In 1947, on the eve of the Air Force’s independence from the 
Army, LeMay authored a second memo for signature by the Army Chief of Staff, General 
Dwight Eisenhower, assigning the nuclear intelligence mission to the new Air Force.
31
 LeMay 
later commanded the Strategic Air Command (SAC) as the Air Force implemented the resulting 
                                                 
28
 Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, 449. “Oppenheimer…was intrigued when Vannevar Bush suggested 
that before this threshold [thermonuclear weapons] was crossed, perhaps Washington and Moscow should agree to a 
complete ban on the testing of any thermonuclear devices. Such a treaty would require no inspections, since any 
violation of the ban would immediately be detected.” While Bush and Oppenheimer were quite familiar with this 
concept due to their work in creating and nurturing AFOAT-1, like many Cold War historians Bird and Sherwin 
were largely unfamiliar with the significant role it was playing in the conflict between Oppenheimer and the Air 
Force, nor of the extent of the influence of the data on American national intelligence estimates of Soviet military 
capabilities. 
29
 Charles A. Zeigler and David Jacobson, Spying without Spies, 13. 50-51, 72. 
30
 Ibid, 145. In the late 1940s when research and development to establish AFOAT-1’s first networks was underway, 
nine percent of the available Department of Defense R&D funds for 1947 were devoted to nuclear intelligence, 
demonstrating how important this project was to the Pentagon, as well as the Air Force. While the intelligence value 
of observing all other nuclear programs is obvious, less obvious was the need to log and record any detection of 
radiation to create a database useful in discriminating fallout and other emissions of the primary intelligence target, 
the USSR, from other sources.  
31
 United States Air Force Technical Applications Center, A Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range 
Detection, frontispiece, 2-4. The National Security Act of 1947 gave rise to the CIA and thus structured the postwar 
American intelligence community, as well as the military services. Assignment of the nuclear intelligence mission to 
the Air Force reflected the service’s significant institutional interest in nuclear weapons and its ownership of the 
aviation resources necessary to locate and collect potentially useful samples. 
14 
 
plan for a global sampling system, operated by AFOAT-1, to conduct long range detection 
(LRD) against possible foreign nuclear explosions. After a brief stint as president of Colombia 
University, in 1953 Eisenhower returned to become LeMay’s civilian commander-in-chief. 
At the time he wrote the first memo, LeMay’s argument was based on the general idea of 
advancing air power by claiming certain areas of special expertise which land or naval forces 
were unequipped to conduct. In fact, in a happy coincidence, LeMay stumbled onto the fact that 
the mobility and spatial area covered by aerial samplers were far superior in effectiveness to 
ground-based stations at returning usable fallout samples for analysis. The Atomic Energy 
Commission and, later, the U.S. Public Health Service primarily relied on far less effective 
collection of fallout at fixed ground stations.
32
 This division of scientific labor, prioritizing the 
use of best practices in fallout’s collection for intelligence purposes while saddling scientific 
needs with decidedly second-tier methods, was a feature of fallout data collection throughout the 
first two decades of the Cold War. Instances where capture of samples aloft were conducted by 
the Air Force for scientific purposes, from close-in samples taken at test shots for weapon design 
diagnostics by the AEC to the CROWFLIGHT high altitude sampling done with the U-2 in the 
late 1950s, were examples of the service’s gatekeeper role to radiologically “hot” fallout.33  
Many historical treatments of nuclear weapons and national security strategy, when they 
directly discuss it at all, located fallout as of peripheral relevance, its effects attributed to often 
irrational perceptions of anxiety and fear.
34
 A prime example was Richard Rhodes’s Dark Sun: 
The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, where direct reference to it in the index is all but inscrutable. 
No listing in the index refers directly to “fallout,” “nuclear fallout,” “radiation,” or other 
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common alternative constructions that sometimes reference it in other works. Rhodes did not 
ignore fallout completely. Rather, Rhodes tracked the consequences of fallout on strategy and 
weapons development.
35
 Consciously or not, this historiographical approach to fallout tended to 
replicate questionable official guidance of the Cold War era about its inconsequential nature.   
One unique characteristic of fallout was that, even as it served as one of the most vital 
intelligence secrets of the Cold War, unlike virtually everything else about the American nuclear 
production and military complex, fallout simply could not be locked away securely. This 
inability to secure fallout’s tell-tale signature allowed the Air Force to exploit it for intelligence 
purposes. To secure continuing viable use of the technique required pretending fallout was 
inconsequential in hopes the target of interest continued testing in the atmosphere.
36
  
  With a fruitful first taste of success and a definite target, the Air Force continued to 
make discrete, nearly exclusive use of fallout for nuclear intelligence purposes until March 1954, 
when the CASTLE BRAVO fallout incident called unwanted, simultaneous attention to the Air 
Force’s sensitive intelligence resource and its highest priority weapon program.37 CASTLE 
BRAVO (15 megatons, 1 March 1954) was the second thermonuclear test and highest yield test 
ever conducted by the United States, unexpectedly rained down so thick it fell as a visible white 
dust of radiated coral sickened the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel, Fukuryu Maru (Lucky 
Dragon), while also causing the emergency evacuation of hundreds of islanders as well as Air 
Force weather observation personnel. As news of the disturbing events leaked out, Eisenhower’s 
insistence it was a “surprise” seemed nearly as disturbing as the actual results – even as Robert 
Oppenheimer, the Atomic Energy Commission’s leading scientist, was then at the point of being 
expelled from government service in significant part for warning fallout posed exactly this sort 
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of problem. Eisenhower’s claim was, at best, an inaccurate statement, given the White House 
ignored five years of warnings from knowledgeable scientists, including Oppenheimer, about the 
problematic volume of fallout thermonuclear weapons were likely to generate.    
In becoming a problem, fallout grew from a nuisance effect into a one that fundamentally 
eroded the credibility of nuclear weapons by calling attention to their lack of military utility 
under all but the most exceptional circumstances. In large part, it was the Air Force’s insistence 
on pursuing large inventories of these high yield thermonuclear weapons that defined the 
primary problem of general nuclear war – the tremendous volume of fallout suddenly created by 
the mass employment of such weapons, which would contaminate the atmosphere, land, and 
water, affecting virtually every life form and ecological niche on Earth.
38
 Presuming neither side 
was able to execute a limited, precise, and conclusive preemptive attack to disable the forces of 
the other, in order to quickly and successfully terminate hostilities with minimal fallout, the 
prospect of dangerous levels of cumulative fallout from any extensive or prolonged nuclear 
conflict threatened victor and victim alike, those who took sides and those who preferred to sit it 
out.
39
  Management of the public’s perception of fallout as a problem, rather than seeing fallout 
itself as the problem, was the focus of efforts by the Atomic Energy Commission to counter what 
the AEC saw as a largely subjective threat to nuclear testing posed by fallout.
40
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the fission weapons used in Japan near the end of World War Two – generate volumes of fallout that represent a 
dangerous threat to life even far away from the physical destruction caused near the point of detonation (Ground 
Zero). The SAC target planner’s math of nuclear destruction emphasized significant overkill by using multiple high-
yield weapons on a single target, in part to raise the possibility of destruction as close to 100% as possible on a first 
strike. Generally, after 1960 these became hardened targets, although weapon fusing anticipating the need for 
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regardless of yield or design.  
39
 After the first several hundred targets, the sheer numbers of weapons requiring disablement would result in heavy 
global scale fallout whether or not any weapons were fired in return.  
40
 Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear 
Weapons Testing, 1947-1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 43, 51. Hacker noted that the AEC’s 
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The independent Air Force was founded in large part based on the viability of nuclear 
weapons offering the capability of quickly and conclusively settling conflicts.
41
 Fallout as a 
secret sustained this belief, but fallout as a problem limited the utility of nuclear weapons by 
eroding the certainty of deterrence. Somewhat surprisingly, as documented by Benjamin Greene, 
it was the Pentagon, with the Air Force’s consent, that eventually proposed a compromise to end 
fallout to Eisenhower, an initiative that spoke volumes about the transformation of fallout from 
ultimate secret into a resolvable problem from the Air Force’s point of view.42  
First a Problem, Then a Secret 
U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay and Australian scientist Sir Mark Oliphant were, 
respectively, the midwives of nuclear intelligence and fallout, of fallout as a secret and fallout as 
a problem. Their starkly contrasting roles point to how fallout was a material actor that shaped 
and constrained the choices available to policy makers, yet attention to its exertion of power 
points more broadly the contingencies of its interactions within networks of social actors.
43
 
Oliphant and LeMay illustrated how gifted, if flawed, humans reacted to fallout in starkly 
different ways, laying bare its significance. The two were also indicative of the deep institutional 
knowledge about fallout existing among scientists and the American military from 1940 until it 
became an obvious public problem. Fallout may have surprised a largely misinformed public, but 
it was no surprise to a significant proportion of the scientific and military communities working 
with it in the course of their duties, many for nearly a decade by 1954. 
The years between the ill-fated test and Oppenheimer’s security hearing in spring 1954 
and the eventual test moratorium in late 1958 proved to be a liminal period, with fallout 
increasingly recognized as a limitation on the nuclear arms race. The enormous scale of 
destruction the otherwise conventional explosive and incendiary effects of nuclear weapons 
offered the essential military utility sought by the Air Force’s “big-bomb” war planners in the 
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Strategic Air Command.
44
 General LeMay objected to the very idea of limits on the conduct of 
warfare, conventional or nuclear, arguing nuclear weapons provided the only means to deliver a 
knock-out punch to a nuclear-armed opponent. 
Actually I think it’s immoral to use less force than necessary, than it is to use 
more. If you use less force, you kill off more of humanity in the long run, because 
you are merely protracting the struggle.
45
 
 
LeMay remained dismissive of the threat of fallout, a problem he worked around as 
adroitly as he did moral qualms about the conventional rain of ruin hundreds of B-29 bombers 
under his command unleashed on Japanese cities in the last year of World War Two. 
The whole purpose of strategic warfare is to destroy the enemy’s potential to 
wage war…Let us not forget how the site of the vanished, eradicated Carthage 
was sown with salt so that nothing would grow there….Radiation, 
perhaps?...Anything which will achieve the desired results should be employed.
46
 
 
General LeMay’s bluster carried the day in his own eyes, but his later actions in 
eventually implicitly consenting to end fallout, to be certain grudgingly made, to address the 
fallout problem ironically were, like his disingenuous comments about fallout’s effect on his 
command post, among the best evidence of fallout’s real world effects and the respect it 
demanded of those who at times seemed to treat it tritely.
47
 
While LeMay referred to thermonuclear weapons as “interim” ones on the path to what 
he hoped were ever greater efficiencies of destruction, their effects fit well with his philosophy 
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 Military utility is a broad concept that one source (the Pentagon’s Defense Missile Agency) defines thusly. “The 
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of the system. It is measured against the operational concept, operational effectiveness, safety, security, and 
cost/worth. Military utility estimates form a rational basis for making management decisions.” 
http://www.expertglossary.com/defense/definition/military-utility/source/dod-missile-defense-agency-glossary-v4. 
Here a simpler definitional question suffices. Is a weapon useable as well as useful? A useful analogy can be made 
to another type of weapon of mass destruction, biological weapons. A weaponized disease could be useful in 
incapacitating or killing an enemy force, but could also infect one’s own forces, as well as civilian populations. 
International norms and provisions aside, such a weapon might be useful, but its use would be questionable. 
45
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and washed away after a century or so in a dry climate. If Rome had used radiation, given the long half-lives of 
problematic isotopes like plutonium-239 (24,110 years) and carbon-14 (5,730~ years), Carthage would still be 
uninhabitable. 
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 LeMay, Mission with LeMay, 442. LeMay often cited the thick walls of a new command post built for SAC’s 
headquarters in Omaha as an example of how easily fallout could be defeated, but the very need to construct the 
expensive structure belied fallout’s supposed lack of consequence. 
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of delivering destruction on his targets with as much force as he could muster.
48
 LeMay’s direct 
role in the Air Force’s nuclear intelligence effort was relatively short-lived, if crucially timed and 
executed. Prior to becoming a highly motivated consumer of intelligence from AFOAT-1 as 
SAC commander, a unit he also helped create, his memos supported rapid development of Air 
Force nuclear intelligence capabilities, thus demonstrating an acute awareness of fallout’s 
potential utility. Evidence of just how useful can be found in his subsequent roles as SAC 
commander, then as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff and finally as Air Force Chief of Staff, the 
top-ranking military leader of the Air Force. These assignments found him uniquely placed to 
understand fallout’s implications for the Air Force and to take advantage of AFOAT-1’s 
reporting on Soviet nuclear activities. Similar to how radioactive isotopes function in medicine to 
aid discovery and understanding of natural functions and processes, LeMay serves here as a 
social tracer to aid in marking the spread of knowledge about fallout, its cultural and social 
influence, and its effective uses within the Air Force  
LeMay provides continuity and cohesion in relating a far-flung, complex story, even if 
this offers only a partial view of discrete parts of a much wider fallout narrative. In the case of 
military activities like those involving fallout in the 1940s and 1950s, provable knowledge of 
indoctrination into fallout’s implications for any reason not associated directly with test series 
operations or civil defense combined with one’s social position was an important marker of 
association with nuclear intelligence operations given efforts to closely control access to such 
knowledge in accord with the “need to know” principle. Due to extensive efforts to conceal 
nuclear intelligence operations, the evidence at hand is often sparse; certain individuals return 
repeatedly with known relationships and interests in this narrative, often accompanied only by 
sketchy or entirely missing information to better inform historians of their exact views or actions. 
Prior to what has become known in the last two decades about nuclear intelligence operations, an  
argument could be sustained that LeMay’s dismissive treatment of fallout as a threat was simply 
his assessment based on the limited state of scientific knowledge  available at the time. Once 
fallout as a secret is factored in, however, LeMay was provably cognizant of its promise. His 
enthusiastic embrace and promotion of long range detection as an Air Force mission, followed 
by his service in a position that maximized the benefits the Air Force gained from his use of this 
information, essentially shoots down the “ignorance theory” of overlooking its threat by 
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extensive evidence of fallout’s clear-cut military utility for intelligence purposes.49 Once that is 
factored in with fallout as a problem where it clearly undermined the military utility of 
thermonuclear weapons, the stakes over the meaning of fallout, whether or not it represented a 
limit on the conduct of war itself to LeMay, become clearer. 
LeMay’s Way 
A brief assignment in an unusual post at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio was 
among the most crucial in General LeMay’s postwar career. The little remarked upon research 
and development assignment immediately after the war may have seemed a bit far afield, given 
he came from a combat command assignment at the XXI Bomber Command on Tinian against 
Japan, pounding and burning it into submission with waves of conventional B-29 bombers armed 
with high explosives and incendiaries. However, his subsequent role in the delivery of the 
nuclear intelligence mission to the nearly independent Air Force made him only the second 
midwife of fallout. LeMay was there and fully engaged with the issue right at the beginning of 
fallout’s usefulness as a secret.50 After shepherding the nuclear intelligence mission to the Air 
Force, LeMay subsequently drew another frontline assignment as Commander, U.S. Air Force, 
Europe (USAFE), quickly followed by his best known assignment, commander of the Strategic 
Air Command. His philosophical approach to airpower and nuclear weapons encapsulated the 
motivations and opportunities for the Air Force to fashion fallout and other data collected for 
nuclear intelligence to secretly serve in support of SAC’s enormous budget requests.  
Oliphant at Fallout’s Beginning 
The Air Force’s enthusiastic embrace of fallout for intelligence purposes came about only 
after science established fallout was a substantive problem. At the birth of fission weapons as a 
theoretical concept, fallout from a uranium bomb was discussed by refugee physicists Otto 
Frisch and Rudolf Peierls in the very first calculation published of the resulting reaction and its 
fission products. In reflecting on two brief papers that Australian physicist Mark Oliphant, the 
co-discoverer of tritium and nuclear fusion, encouraged Frisch and Peierls to write, Richard 
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 Chapter Two discusses LeMay’s close involvement with the research and development of long range detection 
through the testimony of one of his aides in this work, General Roscoe C. “Bim” Wilson, at Robert Oppenheimer’s 
1954 AEC personnel security hearing. 
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Rhodes drew on their descriptions to place fallout as akin to a sickly Siamese twin conjoined to 
the blast effects of such an explosion.
51
 
A byproduct of the explosion – about 20 percent of its energy, they thought – 
would be radiation, the equivalent of “a hundred tons of radium” that would be 
“fatal to living beings even a long time after the explosion.” Effective protection 
from the weapon would be “hardly possible.”52 
 
A second paper, designed as an executive summary of the first, more technical paper laid 
out the potential consequences of this yet-unnamed radioactive hazard. 
Owing to the spreading of radioactive substances with the wind, the bomb could 
probably not be used without killing large numbers of civilians and this may make 
it unsuitable as a weapon for use by this country [United Kingdom].
53
 
 
Rhodes noted Frisch and Peierls presciently recognized “it was already clear to two 
intelligent observers that nuclear weapons would be weapons of mass destruction against which 
the only apparent defense would be the deterrent effect of mutual possession.”54  What Rhodes 
elided was the clarity with which the two also recognized the bomb’s radioactive by-products, 
not yet termed fallout but clearly recognized as a threat. Rhodes missed that Frisch and Peierls 
saw this proto-fallout as the primary driver of deterrence. Fallout set such weapons apart from 
conventional ones; this property was directly and intimately connected to deterrence. 
…it must be realized that no shelters are available that would be effective and 
could be used on a large scale. The most effective reply would be a counter-threat 
with a similar weapon.
 55
 
 
The paper was somewhat pessimistic about the theoretical potential of shelter, but correct 
that shelter systems eventually were seen as too expensive and politically impractical. After 
encouraging the pair to compose and circulate the papers, Oliphant added a cover letter making 
clear “that the whole thing must be taken rather seriously” given the potential for the Germans to 
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develop such a weapon.
56
 The Frisch and Peierls papers, fundamental to the theory of fission 
weapons, made it absolutely clear fallout would be an inevitable, consequential effect of nuclear 
weapons, however inconvenient or technically problematic it made their use in warfare.  
Oliphant’s taciturn scientific remarks show that what became known as fallout was a 
defined problem area years before the Manhattan Project itself began. Oliphant passed through a 
wartime experience that included service with the Manhattan Project, but was expelled from it 
for his supposed lax attention to security. Nonetheless, the fact that he went on to play a key role 
in facilitating independent fallout research after his postwar return to Australia was an ironic 
testimony to how the inevitable curiosity of science made the secret use of fallout for intelligence 
purposes a perishable secret. It was simply too obvious a method to remain concealed 
indefinitely. The one great nuclear secret beyond government control was also one that any 
nation or scientist could likewise engage in by monitoring fallout so long as testing in the 
atmosphere continued to release it into the environment. Oliphant had no ulterior goal in his 
encouragement of Hedley Marston’s fallout research after his return to Australia. Based on 
similarly mundane scientific principle to facilitate publishing an obviously pertinent set of 
information, it was certainly informed by intervening events, including the notorious 1954 
CASTLE BRAVO incident. By 1957, a locally notable, but otherwise obscure Australian 
academic, Marston, documented and sought to publish his findings on the spread of fallout from 
British testing in Australia.
57
 Marston’s work with iodine-131 demonstrated to the Western 
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intelligence services that fallout research as a viable field of scientific inquiry would increasingly 
dog their work so long as atmospheric testing continued. Marston’s was not a direct challenge to 
fallout’s use for intelligence purposes, but its exposure of sensitive information gleaned from 
iodine-131, one of the most useful of all isotopes for intelligence purposes found in fallout, was 
one of the transnational effects of fallout’s international mobility and its sparking rapidly 
spreading interest and knowledge in nuclear subject areas across the scientific community.  
Oliphant was just one among thousands of scientists who served in the Manhattan Project 
and hardly alone in his misgivings about the outcome. These actions did not go unnoticed by the 
Air Force as it formed up into an independent service. The formation of RAND Corporation to 
provide carefully screened scientific consultation was one response, with its first employee, 
David Griggs, later serving as Air Force Chief Scientist – and apparently being on call virtually 
the entire time in between to observe J. Robert Oppenheimer as potentially disloyal.
58
 Griggs 
was intimately involved in the Air Force’s inquisitional institutional distrust of Oppenheimer, 
which saw the service play a major role in events leading up to Oppenheimer’s 1954 AEC 
security hearing. Fallout proved on further review to be far more than a tangential subtext in the 
transcript in light of what is now known about the context of the hearing amid the Air Force’s 
vigorous campaign to discredit and banish Oppenheimer.
59
 The Air Force saw those concerned 
                                                                                                                                                             
the British Australian test series in the mid-fifties, Titterton was also secretly in command of the British nuclear 
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about fallout as the problem, rather than fallout itself. This willful myopia about fallout on the 
part of the junior service sustained dead-end policies like its quest for high-yield thermonuclear 
weapons to provide an expensive, vastly dangerous capability for overkill. Some Air Force 
leaders even contemplated pre-emptive war based on securing and then using that stark 
American advantage, views that found expression at the Air Force commanders conference at 
Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico in April 1950.
60
  
Like many other Western scientists uncomfortable with the military’s embrace of nuclear 
weapons, Oliphant avoided direct, public challenges to the bomb-friendly political establishment. 
The access and prestige held by virtue of his position as founder and first chair of the Australian 
Academy of Science, among other qualifications, were contingencies serving, along with the 
quick spread of radiochemical analytical techniques through the scientific community due to 
Eisenhower’s contemporaneous “Atoms for Peace” program, to aid Oliphant’s later 
encouragement of independent research by Marston. The results of Marston’s research led to 
embarrassing revelations about British governmental veracity on fallout when its bomb test 
organization tried to foist apparently invented data on the Australian public. In themselves, 
Oliphant’s actions, in 1940 and 1956-57 did not directly threaten the work of the Manhattan 
Project, AFOAT-1 or its British equivalent.
61
 However, the results of Oliphant’s support of 
Marston’s work demonstrated fallout was a secret too big to hide and already moving quickly 
toward obsolescence as a source of intelligence by 1957, when the first deep, contained shot 
RAINIER (1.7 kiloton, 19 September 1957) was triggered nearly 900 feet below ground at the 
Nevada Test Site (NTS).
62
  
What Would LeMay Do? 
Opening a window through LeMay’s eyes about something he never directly discussed 
publicly, but certainly utilized, is necessary precisely because this topic was so far off limits that 
most conversations the general had about it were likely conducted with the expectation they 
                                                                                                                                                             
despite passages where various witnesses talk around what they seem to treat as an extraordinarily sensitive topic. 
The topic of fallout proved too sensitive for the AEC to discuss directly at the hearing. 
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would never be publicly disclosed.  The question of “What would LeMay do?” frames a window 
into an otherwise intentionally obscured area of Air Force history during the Cold War. Much as 
fallout and krypton-85 provided useful tracers that shown a light into the “denied areas” of the 
Soviet Union for AFOAT-1, LeMay was a leader whose philosophy,  opportunities, placement at 
the scene, and essential interest in the metrics of destruction provided the means to evaluate the 
value of fallout and nuclear intelligence to the Air Force in 1949, as well as to explain why by 
1959 that value eroded to the point where the Air Force concluded fallout was no longer worth 
the political and military costs, if not the public health burden it imposed on the planet. 
While not strictly a numbers game, the Air Force, in general, and SAC, specifically, were 
numbers-driven organizations. Every small advantage that could be statistically eked out was 
documented, digested, and discussed by analysts and planners.
63
 The details of AFOAT-1’s role, 
while at the present largely undocumented beyond its recently declassified unit histories, were 
the key, initial part of the answer to the central question of countering the enemy’s most 
powerful capabilities.
64
 What were the qualities of Russian weapons and how many did they 
possess? SAC was built to counter the threat outlined by AFOAT-1’s reports on Russian nuclear 
weapons, so its staff, and General LeMay as its commander, were intimately familiar with the 
findings in AFOAT-1’s reporting on Soviet weapon stockpiles.65  
The Russian stockpile inventory described by AFOAT-1 was all the more important 
because nuclear warfare, at best, presented very limited defensive opportunities against attack. 
The only sure defense was to destroy the opponent’s weapon systems “on the launcher” – or 
better yet, before they arrived there – to prevent their use. In essence, a good defense was only 
possible with an aggressive offense, creating a use-it-or-lose dynamic that guided SAC war 
planners toward the massive initial use of thermonuclear weapons that made fallout an 
intractable problem.  AFOAT-1’s reports on Soviet plutonium-239 production allowed analysts 
                                                 
63
 While he served in the Air Force with AFOAT-1/1009
th
 SWS, the author’s father subsequently worked as a 
“manpower engineer” analyzing human factors through time studies by means of the familiar model of Taylorism, 
including earning an MBA through the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) to support computer-based 
analysis of efficient work practices. Such accumulations of modest incremental gains were typical of the Air Force’s 
dogged pursuit of high performance standards. 
64
 The NARA facility in College Park, MD also holds a small collection of declassified AFOAT-1 and Project 
Sunshine documents.  
65
 AFOAT-1 worked closely with SAC on a number of issues, most notably its outreach to offer aid to SAC’s 
primary warfighting mission in the case of hostilities. The most salient example was its capability to verify points of 
detonation of both U.S. and Soviet weapons, which was limited at first but became more accurate as the EMP and 
seismic systems were improved over the course of the 1950s. See “Warfighting” chapters in the AFOAT-1 1947-
1953, 1954, and 1955 unit histories. 
26 
 
to inform SAC of roughly how many weapons it needed to counter and destroy. A major 
weakness of first generation intelligence collection systems like the AFOAT-1- operated AEDS 
was its ability to locate targets was limited. That limitation plagued the ability of systems like the 
AEDS to answer questions the data they produced raised. Questions about the accuracy of the 
Air Force’s conclusions about Soviet strategic forces led to the imagery revolution in intelligence 
that produced the U-2 and put reconnaissance satellites on the way to the launch pad as the 
decade drew to a close.  
LeMay argued SAC discovered the Soviet Union was weak enough to defeat before 
anyone else realized it, perhaps as a curious rebuttal to demonstrate he was somehow on top of 
the bomber and missile “gap” issues before they fell apart publicly as an analytical concoction 
based largely on pressures to build up SAC. LeMay suggested this would have been opportune 
time for a preemptive attack, but he claimed the window of opportunity passed quickly and was 
missed.
66
 His real problem was locating targets for his bombers in an age before imagery became 
available. Because of AFOAT-1’s work, LeMay was well-aware of the numbers of Soviet 
nuclear warheads his bombers needed to destroy, even though it took imagery to resolve that the 
Soviet Union’s capability to deliver them proved far weaker than Air Force analysts believed. 
These analytical mistakes by the Air Force often are written off as simply SAC’s aggrandizing 
the enormous resources it required, but it was based on accurate and deeply troubling 
intelligence data, which adds considerable nuance to this aspect of the Cold War confrontation.  
The depth of the Air Force’s devotion to fallout was recalled in the bitter recriminations 
that flowed from General Thomas S. Power, Curtis LeMay’s successor as SAC commander, after 
atmospheric testing first ended near the end of 1958 with a temporary moratorium while 
negotiations for a permanent ban continued in Geneva. Arguing his case in March 1959 to the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Power insisted Americans needed to be offered a stark choice 
between fallout and insecurity.
67
 
…[T]he JCS should request the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to 
launch a campaign to persuade the American people that fallout from nuclear 
weapons tests was a negligible hazard compared to the peril that would result 
from failure, through insufficient testing, to maintain an adequate nuclear 
deterrent.
68
 
 
By 1959, fallout’s influence on policy could not be denied. Power’s seemingly poorly-
timed, retrograde plea was ignored as the Air Force leadership, including his old boss General 
LeMay, grudgingly chose to free the service of its too close an association with fallout by 
agreeing to take testing underground. Following ten years of struggle to first hide, then market 
fallout as a symptom of security, by 1959 Air Force leadership embraced the anxiety of those 
concerned about fallout by realizing that it could define peace – and effective deterrence – 
simply by its absence.
69
 Thus, the Air Force’s shift to support an end to fallout added a starkly 
realistic mandate to SAC’s slogan, “Peace Is Our Profession.”  It was a decision made easier by 
the declining intelligence value of a sampling system which by then clearly defined a mature and 
robust Soviet nuclear program. The incremental value of the intelligence gained versus the 
capital invested faded with each new test in Kazakhstan or on Novaya Zemlya.   
LeMay believed deterrence arose from an enemy’s fear of the consequences of war, 
which he attributed to the physical destruction by blast and fire common to both conventional 
and nuclear explosives.  
We must have more than enough to deter them. More than you think is enough to 
deter them…We started out years ago to build a decisive power tailored around 
our possession of nuclear weapons…We must keep that overwhelming 
superiority…It won’t come from sitting around and crying stalemate…70 
 
Arguably, the intentionally public nature of the often bellicose expansion of SAC’s 
destructive capabilities appeared to drive Russian reaction to match American efforts with its 
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own. Deterrence is a two-way street; failure to compete in such situations was seen as a sign of 
weakness, a perception LeMay and his Russian counterparts likely shared. While the intelligence 
justifying it remained secret, basic information on military budget allocations and weapons 
acquisitions was then published in the West’s relatively open press, in effect publicly throwing 
down the armored gauntlet that formed part of SAC’s symbolic shield in front of the Russians. 
Another result in the mixed record of LeMay’s pursuit of deterrence was to encourage the 
Russians to expend comparable efforts to present at least a credible response to what they saw as 
a threatening enclosure by American arms. While deterred from war itself, there seems little to 
justify the notion the Russians were deterred from preparing for war – or that the net effect of 
those additional Soviet nuclear weapons somehow increased the national security of the United 
States. Given the hair-trigger, irrevocable nature of a nuclear-armed missile launch, the 
thousands of additional Soviet launchers built in response to the vast SAC expansion, itself based 
on erroneous interpretations of AFOAT-1 data, and the Soviet propensity for bureaucracy to 
overcome effective control, LeMay’s over-the-top build-up of SAC actually undermined national 
security, leaving the adversaries just one accidental missile launch shy from conclusive proof of 
that until the end of the Cold War. 
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Chapter Two: Fallout – Hidden in Plain Sight 
How Are the Problems of Long Range Detection and Fallout Related? 
In the first decade after its birth in 1945, fallout remained – mostly – a secret. Used for 
intelligence, the restrictions fallout later placed upon contemplated use of nuclear weapons 
significantly affected the expected military utility of these otherwise tremendously destructive 
weapons. In effect, fallout became a self-limiting property of nuclear weapons. Fallout became a 
significant factor causing rational actors with nuclear arsenals to back away from military 
confrontation involving these weapons. The limited, but still significant fallout from testing led 
to adoption of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the first major arms control initiative 
of the Cold War.
71
 Just fourteen years after the USSR broke the American nuclear monopoly and 
despite confrontations stretching from Berlin to Cuba and even deep into the heart of the Soviet 
Union via U-2, a consensus emerged between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States to end fallout created by testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. 
Fallout and a variety of other radiochemical and geophysical phenomena served to 
facilitate a secret intelligence mission the Air Force termed long range detection (LRD), 
conducted by a network of systems and techniques collectively called the Atomic Energy 
Detection System (AEDS).
72
 Established as an interim organization in the same year as the 
independent Air Force, AFOAT-1 was known to those who needed to know simply by its office 
symbol, although it also used the nearly as arcane 1009
th
 Special Weapons Squadron (1009
th
 
SWS) when necessary to identify itself operationally to other military units. Other organizations 
in the government, primarily the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), shared responsibility for 
nuclear intelligence during the Cold War with AFOAT-1, but the AEDS was the primary source 
of intelligence on the Soviet nuclear program. The Air Force alone among them was unique in 
devoting vastly more resources to this mission, but as the junior military service it was also the 
only one existentially dependent on the subject of interest that generated it, nuclear weapons.  
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A sharp disjuncture between the first two decades of fallout’s existence was noted by one 
of the early theoretical strategists of nuclear war and deterrence, Bernard Brodie.
73
 Brodie was 
shocked and taken aback in early 1955 when the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission published its 
report on the 1954 CASTLE BRAVO/Lucky Dragon fallout incident, the most significant and 
best documented acute radiation exposure of the Cold War.
74
 Familiar with many of the early 
Cold War’s most sensitive secrets due to the nature of his work evaluating strategic war plans for 
the Pentagon, Brodie was nonetheless surprised that the government so openly conceded 
fallout’s now publicly apparent contribution to the “strategic problems” of the day. 
Until two weeks ago, I would have said that there was only one piece of really 
basic information vital to an appreciation of the strategic problems of the future 
that was still being withheld – that concerning ‘fallout.’ Now even that 
information is in the public domain.
75
  
 
Beyond the negative publicity associated with the CASTLE BRAVO incident, why was fallout’s 
lost secrecy suddenly a problem, given it was produced at numerous other nuclear tests over the 
course of the previous decade, including at the first and only previous thermonuclear test, the 
experimental IVY MIKE device (10.4 megaton, 31 October 1952)? Despite his insider 
knowledge, Brodie’s shock on reading the admissions in the CASTLE BRAVO report came 
about because it was an encounter with something mysterious, yet already around – even 
possibly in him – fallout.  
Fallout was far from familiar before 1954. Cultural images depicting the nature of atomic 
destruction and fire in Japan were common after 1945, yet most of these images depicted a 
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marked similarity to the effects of conventional weapons, emphasizing the vastly increased scope 
of physical damage created by nuclear weapons.  
The virtually unfathomable phenomenon of fallout, a nuclear weapon effect 
simultaneously far more difficult to communicate visually and subject to a mysterious official 
opaqueness, provided little basis from which to conjure a compelling graphical image. Spencer 
Weart’s theoretical approach in his 1986 Nuclear Fear: A History of Images argued that Cold 
War anxieties about nuclear weapons fed largely irrational fears of nuclear power. Weart argued 
that these exaggerated portrayals in turn created distorted clichés of the risks posed by nuclear 
power. These distortions were communicated through visual images in movies and other sources 
of popular culture.
 76
 While this argument makes sense for what are referred to here as 
supraconventional weapon effects, it breaks down when applied to fallout. The term 
supraconventional refers to the effects of nuclear weapons, such as blast and fire, which are 
essentially similar to conventional weapon effects except for their geometrically larger scale. In 
contrast, fallout was an extraconventional weapon effect. Extraconventional weapon effects, in 
contrast to supraconventional effects, are primarily radiological effects and, secondarily, other 
medical effects, e.g. flash blindness, uniquely associated with nuclear weapons.
77
 Given fallout 
itself was all but invisible and during the era of atmospheric testing effectively was an actual 
wartime effect taking place in peacetime, fear of it in the present was qualitatively different than 
a more generalized future fear of nuclear war. Moreover, evidence presented here will argue 
policy change was forced on the government, not solely by the subjective fears of the public, but 
in large part by the empirical effects of fallout, raising significant questions about the 
complexities of application of Weart’s theory to fallout itself.  
The prospect of atomic-scale destruction and the ambiguous nature of fallout was 
profitably mined for literary fodder in the postwar nuclear information vacuum and then sold to 
readers whose shared anxieties about nuclear war were nonetheless demonstrated by the 
popularity of postwar fiction liberally dosed with radiation. Fallout was mysterious, but hardly 
anonymous.  In secret, fallout clearly distinguished nuclear weapons from conventional weapons, 
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but over nearly a decade of a secret life that saw it used as a vital source of intelligence, the 
nature of that relationship and fallout’s meaning remained publicly, intentionally ambiguous.  
Ray Bradbury’s dystopian 1953 novel, Fahrenheit 451, offered an example of how the 
ambiguity of fallout sharpened the drama of the narrative, even when the mechanism and scope 
of its risks remained obscure. Bradbury cagily played upon the evils of the nuclear age by 
invoking fear of the unknown, a reliable narrative hook for drama, letting the reader’s 
imagination define what fit as fearsome, rather than attempting to depict any single image as 
universally horrifying. Bradbury’s novel described a network of secret knowledge co-existing 
inside a state at war, echoing all-too familiar resistance to the Cold War’s polarities of 
Communism and McCarthyism. In the novel, members of a mass, grassroots resistance 
movement held forbidden knowledge as complete texts in their memory. This circumvented the 
ongoing physical destruction of books as the state sought to monopolize all information for its 
own benefit; the novel’s concept paralleled fallout’s hidden, yet revelatory nature in relation to 
the weapons that produced it.  
As the novel neared its end, Bradbury’s protagonist, Montag, gazed on a city as it fell 
under attack by horrendous weapons. 
And the war began and ended in that instant…The first bomb struck…He blinked 
once. And in that instant, saw the city, instead of the bombs, in the air…Montag 
watched the great dust settle and the great silence move down upon their world.
78
 
 
Before 1954, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations waxed optimistic about the potential 
for nuclear power. Just as most politicians did, artists like Bradbury imagined apocalyptic 
nuclear attacks, but depicted the resulting effects as quite similar to those of conventional 
weapons, only magnified in scale. In these Cold War novelizations, art paralleled the perceived 
reality of life.  
Official reassurance that radiation from testing was a negligible effect of little 
consequence was part and parcel of larger cultural forces seeking to normalize nuclear weapons 
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and fallout, contributing to the cultural militarization of Cold War society and family life 
identified by Elaine Tyler May. 
One new requirement for the professional homemaker was expertise in dealing 
with the possibility of nuclear war…A major goal of these civil defense strategies 
was to…help fortify the home as a place of security amid the cold war.79 
 
The combination of total war and nuclear weapons brought about two competing visions of 
American culture. The U.S. government promoted an ideological, pervasive, nuclear-armed 
unitarianism of its own to confront and contain the threat of global Communism, with NSC 
Directive 68 as its guiding philosophy.
80
 Fallout as a problem threatened this vision of nuclear 
weapons as essential guarantors of national security. Because of the service’s dominant role in 
shaping nuclear strategy, fear of fallout came to be seen by the Air Force as a competing, 
pervasively subversive force sapping the political energy required to resist Communism.
81
 Tyler 
May’s identification of its invasion of the home demonstrated its pervasiveness. The Air Force’s 
assignment of ideological value to fallout demonstrated the fundamental depth of fallout’s 
influence behind the scenes. 
For the most part, indifference to fallout ruled. Prior to 1954’s CASTLE BRAVO fallout 
incident with the Lucky Dragon, the few public reports about radioactive debris created by 
nuclear testing treated it as known and manageable effect of little importance.
82
 Members of the 
U.S. military were taught fallout was a short-lived, inconsequential by-product of nuclear 
weapons. A wallet-size 1950 summary card of nuclear weapons effects reflected the United 
States military’s official marginalization of fallout as a threat. The card provided assurance 
radiation from fallout produced by nuclear weapons was “So small it is not a hazard. Disregard 
it.” 
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Figure 1: “Effects: Air Burst of Atomic Bomb”83 
Fallout was hard to detect and unlikely to cause widespread harm in the limited quantities 
generated by testing relatively low yield fission weapons. This served to conceal its vital use for 
nuclear intelligence prior to 1954.  
In the Beginning: Proving Basic LRD Techniques 
The 1946 CROSSROADS test series provided the first opportunity for long range 
detection (LRD) of nuclear weapon effects. CROSSROADS initiated a continuing intimate 
association between nuclear test series and research and development in support of LRD, with 
the AEC’s weapons program test shots serving as open air laboratories for many aspects of the 
military’s research and development program in nuclear intelligence. 
 Sonic detection utilizing a Navy-developed system showed some promise at the 
TRINITY test shot in July 1945, but lacked the range needed to detect explosions within the 
USSR. The atmosphere channeled sound for remarkable distances, but required a detection 
system placed at a constant 45,000 foot altitude, a height only possible to sustain at that time 
through balloon-borne sensors.
84
 Research on specialized constant altitude balloons made out of 
the new plastic, polyethylene, provided a vehicle useful for other high altitude atmospheric 
research purposes, even though the MOGUL program, provided inconclusive results.
85
  
Aerial radiological sampling showed much greater promise at CROSSROADS. Drone 
aircraft were used to limit the unfathomed hazards to humans from radiation exposure, 
penetrating the cloud of the first shot, ABLE, followed by manned aircraft tracking the cloud out 
some 500 miles. Samples were collected during 357 sampling flights at longer ranges, and then 
forwarded by aircraft to an army office in Berkeley, California. Neither the aircrews nor the 
employees of the Standard Oil Company laboratory doing the sample analyses knew anything 
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more about their source.
86
 This policy of compartmentalization, a legacy of the Manhattan 
Project to preserve secrecy, continued as a constant feature of the LRD program. 
Results from the second CROSSROADS shot, BAKER, suggested a different view of the 
utility of LRD. BAKER was an underwater shot and caused such intense contamination of the 
test site facilities and ship-borne support units that the third shot of the series was cancelled. 
Despite intense local fallout, BAKER saw little in the way of its fallout detected beyond the test 
site itself. Untested techniques had much to do with the relative elusiveness of the fallout cloud 
from BAKER. The mixed results pointed out how much was still to be discovered about fallout 
and LRD, leading to the conclusion radiological methods, while feasible, were probably only 
effective at ranges of 2,000 miles or less, and only if accurate weather data was available for the 
intervening area,
 
clearly inadequate for detecting an explosion deep within the USSR. 
87
  
Bureaucratic and funding disputes about the feasibility of LRD research and development 
were protracted, centering on the prospects of different lines of research (radiological, seismic, 
and sonic) and the overall priority to be given in implementing the results to configure an 
operational LRD network.
88
 This complex work was one example of projects the Research and 
Development Board (RDB) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered and reviewed. Because it 
controlled military scientific and research funding, the RDB became the battleground for the 
contending forces shaping the future direction of LRD. The successful discovery of the first 
Soviet nuclear test, Joe-1 (29 August 1949, 22 kilotons), in September 1949 removed the 
bulwarks to funding, but created hard feelings between the military and many scientists that 
persisted due to perceptions among the Air Force that some reviewers, most significantly J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, down-rated LRD proposals the service felt should have drawn support.  
Resistance to funding the needs of the new intelligence organization was largely due to the 
austere funding climate of the late 1940s. Nonetheless, proposed funding for LRD research and 
development amounted to nine percent of total military R&D spending in 1947, an indication of 
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the high priority attached to LRD from the beginning.
89
 With LRD a still unproven concept, 
Defense Department reviewers remained cautious in investing its limited research resources. 
Despite the reluctance of others, the newly independent Air Force retained faith in the 
concept. This work took place within the Special Weapons Group (SWG), a subordinate unit of 
the Air Force deputy chief of staff for material. The Air Force SWG represented Air Force 
interests associated with nuclear, or “special,” weapons working in coordination with the Armed 
Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), the military’s coordinating unit with the AEC. The 
military services also organized the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee (JNEIC), an 
oversight group that worked in coordination with the CIA’s Nuclear Energy Branch.90 While the 
other services had an important role to play, at its founding in 1947 the leading role among the 
military services in collecting and analyzing fallout, along with other forms of LRD, was 
assigned to the Air Force shortly before its independence, fitting with General LeMay’s 
argument that aircraft could greatly facilitate detection that was approved through an order by 
General Dwight Eisenhower.
91
 
The Air Force SWG established an office in its material branch called AFMSW-1 (an 
office symbol standing for “AF=Air Force, M= Deputy Chief of Staff for Material, SW=Special 
Weapons Group, Section One”) on 14 December 1947 with the mission of conducting Air Force 
LRD research efforts at the upcoming SANDSTONE test series, as well as developing an interim 
LRD network.
92
 SANDSTONE provided the AEC with “a laboratory with space”93 to test new, 
more efficient weapons designs, while LRD R&D was added in order to calibrate 
instrumentation and techniques useful in development of a permanent LRD network.
94
  
Code-named FITZWILLIAM, the AFMSW-1 program at SANDSTONE was organized 
by AFMSW-1’s technical director, Dr. Ellis Johnson, a pioneer in the field of operations 
research. Johnson relied on two different sectors, supporting military units and outside 
contractors, which came to characterize how the relatively small LRD organization operated on a 
global scale. First, AFMSW-1 called on the Air Force’s Air Weather Service (AWS) and the 
Army’s Signal Corps, along with other government resources to fly aircraft and staff ground 
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stations during FITZWILLIAM. To provide support for the necessary radiochemical analysis 
services, AFMSW-1 contracted with a private company, Tracerlab of Boston, Massachusetts, 
since AEC radiochemists were already fully committed to its weapons development program.
 95
  
While a highly classified military project, the Air Force relied on an extensive, diverse 
network of security-cleared contractors and research institutions to develop the AEDS in 
conjunction with military and DOD civilian personnel. Security clearances created a virtual 
community composed of those with the special access to hold them. However, participants in the 
small group also actively sought out new ideas and collaborations in the wider scientific 
community, although direct approaches were generally made only to those properly cleared to do 
the work. This tactic forsook much of the benefit scientific discourse could bring wider 
knowledge of particular problems to bear upon, but it avoided the issues of too-independent 
science that surrounded the first use of nuclear weapons on Japan.
96
  
FITZWILLIAM’s tasks were extensive. Nineteen different projects, ranging from further 
work with the partly-proven aerial radiological sampling technique to a rather speculative 
attempt to observe the flash of a nuclear explosion reflected from a dark region of the moon, 
were scheduled in an area that stretched from Tokyo on the west to Frankfurt, Germany in the 
east and from the latitude of Point Barrow, Alaska south to the latitude of the Panama Canal. 
Five weather reconnaissance squadrons flying WB-29 sampler planes (466 missions for a total of 
4,944 flying hours over the course of FITZWILLIAM’s three shots) were supplemented by a 
network of 67 ground stations, supported by four analytical laboratories run by Tracerlab.
97
 
There were three objectives for the radiological sampling experiments. One was to 
determine how large a sample was needed in order to effectively analyze it. For the first time, 
gaseous samples were taken to supplement the debris caught on filters. Noble and other gaseous 
isotopes played a key role as nuclear intelligence sources. Second, techniques useful for tracking 
fallout plumes were developed, in order to maintain contact with them to capture better samples 
over long distances. The third objective was to determine if ground-based sampling could 
                                                 
95
 Zeigler and Jacobson, Spying without Spies, 118-123. Johnson solved the Navy’s problem of consistently high 
rates of torpedo failures, then worked on programs increasing the effectiveness of air operations against Japan. 
96
 Upon learning the operational use of the first nuclear weapons was imminent, a significant number of Manhattan 
Project scientists appealed to President Harry Truman to restrict its use to a purely military target or for 
demonstration purposes. They formed the core of what was known as the “scientists movement” 
97
 Ibid, 128-129. 
38 
 
effectively substitute for more costly aerial sampling.
98
 Even with the substantial priority the 
nuclear intelligence program held, researchers were already being pushed to effectively minimize 
the resources needed to accomplish the mission. The results of aerial sampling were considered 
superior to those taken by ground stations, and it became the primary sampling method used by 
the Air Force. Significantly, the use of relatively ineffective ground stations was considered 
adequate when later used as a method by the AEC and other civilian users for monitoring the 
spread of fallout. This differential in capabilities suggests this was not a result of funding 
shortages, but a purposeful restriction on the quality of the data available for fallout research. 
Sonic, seismic, and a variety of other geophysical phenomena produced by a nuclear 
explosion were studied. Coordinating the vast variety of different observations was a global 
precision timing system. The timing of the tests, unlike at CROSSROADS, was not announced 
in advance, in order to deprive the Russians of an opportunity to make experimental observations 
similar to those AFMSW-1 planned at SANDSTONE.
 99
  
The possibility that each American test gave away secrets to the Russians took some time 
to sink in. Testing in the atmosphere inevitably compromised sensitive design information, as the 
tests’ documentation by FITZWILLIAM revealed. Why, despite fallout’s potential for an 
enormous security breach the Air Force and the AEC both were quickly cognizant of, was so 
little done prior to the 1963 LTBT to sharply limit testing fallout? In the short term, the answer 
was the Air Force likely knew the Russians could make no more than a token effort to recover 
samples or draw data from American tests in Nevada, in comparison to the fact American 
intelligence stations surrounded the Soviet Union to capture samples with relative ease. In the 
beginning, the secrecy of nuclear testing conveyed the illusion the tell-tale signs of a nuclear 
explosion could be hidden by simple discretion. FITZWILLIAM proved the fallacy of that 
belief, a secret that was of great initial significance, but which proved to have a short half-life. 
Aerial sampling at SANDSTONE was of two different kinds, conducted under much 
higher security levels than at CROSSROADS.
100
 Close-in sampling of the rising stem of the 
explosion cloud was done by B-17 drones, unmanned remote control aircraft that flew through 
the most dangerous portions of the cloud to collect samples in the immediate aftermath of the 
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explosion.
101
 This precaution was taken to avoid exposing pilots to the still mostly unknown 
effects of radiation, although four of the servicemen that collected the exposed filters from the 
aircraft after they landed received serious beta radiation burns due to a lack of proper procedures. 
Analysis provided a baseline composition of the radioactive isotopes generated in each 
explosion, because “radiochemistry furnished the key to finding bomb efficiency,” a necessity 
for SANDSTONE’s primary objective of proving new bomb designs.102 This work had 
application to assessing the progress of the U.S. weapon development program, but it was also a 
key feature of developing radiochemistry useful for analysis of future samples from foreign tests. 
An “Accidental” Breakthrough in Search of “The Right Stuff”?103 
Longer range sampling of the downwind fallout plumes was done by Air Force Air 
Weather Service WB-29s. These lumbering converted bombers were fitted with specialized 
weather instrumentation; probes were installed in their noses and “bug-catcher” filter holders 
located on top or bottom of the fuselage identified radiation as present and collected the samples 
on filter paper. One of these aircraft was said to have “accidentally” penetrated “a finger” of the 
main cloud of SANDSTONE ZEBRA (the third and last shot of this series); the flight’s 
command pilot, Lt. Colonel Paul Fackler noted, “no one keeled over dead and no one got sick.” 
The incident served as an opportunity for Fackler to argue for the greater effectiveness of 
manned samplers over the primitive drone technology of the late nineteen-forties and early 
nineteen-fifties. In a dual role as radiation safety monitor aboard the aircraft, the aircraft 
commander allowed it to continue through the cloud for some forty minutes, which indicated a 
more determined effort to be in the wrong place than a simple oversight in flying through a cloud 
“finger.” Based on the still-unproven radiation exposure standards of the day, the aircraft 
fuselage appeared to provide enough protection for the crew, leading to substantial abandonment 
of the unreliable drone aircraft in future test series in favor of more reliable piloted samplers for 
all but the most intense areas of radiation sampling within the plume. The results were greatly 
improved; the weakest sample at SANDSTONE proved much stronger than any taken at 
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CROSSROADS. 104 The change traded greater efficiency versus increased human exposures. 
While attributed to accidental discovery in the official history, later evidence strongly 
suggested the incident was staged by the Air Force in its eagerness to improve on the limited 
performance of the drone fleet and advance the state of the art in fallout sampling. At the heart of 
this story as the aircraft commander and safety monitor was University of Illinois graduate Paul 
Fackler. Born in Tolono, Illinois in 1915, Fackler took his B.S. degree in 1938. Fackler then 
enlisted in the Army Air Corps at Chanute Field in Rantoul, Illinois. An exceptional pilot, 
Fackler spent the bulk of World War Two training other pilots. In 1946, Fackler was assigned 
command of the air element at CROSSROADS, impressing his superiors enough they put him in 
command of the 55
th
 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Very Long Range).
105
 By 1948, 
Fackler commanded the 514
th
 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, tasked with establishing 
procedures for the air element of the interim network, the Air Weather Service, that became an 
essential supporting element in the Atomic Energy Detection System  (AEDS) operated by 
AFOAT-1.  
A colleague later recalled an alternate account from the official one that pictured Fackler 
as “inadvertently” entering the cloud, dismissing the official narrative as not in accord with his 
understanding of Fackler’s skills as an aviator. 
Upon landing, Fackler discussed the penetration with Col. Cody, the assistant 
Rad-Safe Officer for Operation SANDSTONE.  It is obvious that Fackler thought 
that manned cloud penetrations were possible, perhaps even desirable.  I wonder 
just how inadvertent this penetration was.  From all accounts, Paul Fackler was a 
very good B-29 pilot.  I have not heard of too many inadvertent things happening 
while he was at the controls.  Let's just say that he may have been pushing the 
envelope a bit.
106
 
 
The circumstances strongly suggested Fackler fabricated a ploy designed to create a positive 
record to justify sending the Air Weather Service’s and other samplers into radioactive plumes, 
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an idea reinforced when Fackler later appeared commanding samplers at a later test in a film 
designed to reassure aircrews about the safety of the task at hand.
107
  
Most of the other experimental techniques, including a moon-bounce experiment (hoping 
to see the flash of a nuclear explosion on earth reflected from the moon) and the MOGUL 
balloon-borne sonic detection system, gave disappointing results. Ground-based sonic techniques 
showed promise, but still lacked adequate range (with detection out to 1,700 miles) to detect an 
explosion deep within the USSR. Despite all of SANDSTONE’s shots taking place on towers to 
limit the amount of local fallout, seismic techniques provided surprisingly effective detection out 
to 500 miles. The big success was the improvement in aerial radiological sampling, with airborne 
Geiger detectors tracking the debris cloud while giving up to a thousand times more sensitivity 
than from the ground, proving the value of aerial sampling aircraft in tracking the drifting plumes 
of fallout. An aerial sample gathered near Tripoli, Libya, 12,000 miles away, proved sufficient 
for effective analysis.
108
 The results encouraged the Air Force to focus its research and 
development funding on aerial sampling and seismic techniques. The tests clearly demonstrated 
the ineffectiveness of a wholly ground-based detection system, which was destined to sharply 
limit successful sample collection for access to data required for civilian research in this area. 
Oppenheimer and Long Range Detection: From Fallout Skeptic to Believer 
Beyond proving long range detection was a workable idea, another concern with the 
reliability of radiological sampling was also resolved by FITZWILLIAM. J. Robert 
Oppenheimer theorized a high-altitude explosion might be used by the Russians to evade 
detection, since there would be no ground debris to be sucked up and transmuted into fallout, 
with the bomb itself vaporized in the fission reaction. Dr. Frederick Henriques of Tracerlab noted 
Oppenheimer’s concern and made calculations that indicated the agglomeration of the gaseous 
materials in the debris cloud as they cooled would nonetheless produce detectable debris. 
Samples from FITZWILLIAM were observed with just such microscopic shiny, spherical bomb 
debris. From this, Dr. Johnson concluded in a report sent to the AEC that AFMSW-1 would 
likely be able to detect an atmospheric explosion by the Soviets, no matter what the burst 
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height.
109
 This proof of concept showed the only thing standing in the way of a radiological 
debris detection capability from sea level to space was a vehicle capable of carrying the sampler 
filters, as it was impossible to conceal such an explosion.  
Despite concern about Soviet efforts to conceal test shots by firing them at high altitude 
or in a rainstorm (to cause a “rain-out” effect, similar to what happened unintentionally at the 
CROSSROADS BAKER shot, limiting the spread of fallout away from ground zero), the 
consensus of the U.S. intelligence community was the Russians were likely to use a tower shot 
for initial testing, just as the United States did at TRINITY, in order to minimize local fallout 
while maximizing opportunities for experimental observation. Observations of FITZWILLIAM’s 
three shots proved the viability of airborne sampling to detect radioactive debris from a nuclear 
explosion, while suggesting other supplementary techniques were viable, but needed more work. 
One important result was to clarify the future role of xenon-133 monitoring, which could 
determine whether the Soviets were producing fissile material. Prototype cryogenic collection 
systems flew on samplers at all three shots of SANDSTONE.
110
 First used to monitor German 
nuclear efforts at the beginning of the U.S. nuclear intelligence program during the Manhattan 
Project, xenon-133 was initially known to be emitted by operating plutonium production 
reactors. Later, it was determined explosions of nuclear weapons also created xenon-133. 
Moreover, Ziegler and Jacobson indicated an “unknown adsorption process” was scavenging 
xenon-133 from the atmosphere. This made it an unreliable source for monitoring Soviet fissile 
material production, shifting interest to krypton-85 as a result of sampling at SANDSTONE.
111
  
The following explanation for the change to sampling krypton-85 appears to account for 
this “unknown adsorption process.” A noble gas generally chemically unreactive with other 
elements, xenon-133 has a total half-life of just over seven days, but its decay transformed it into 
stable cesium-133, changing the composition of the samples taken into an element, cesium, 
which is chemically active in the atmosphere, unlike xenon or krypton, also a noble gas.
112
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Cesium produced by the decay of xenon-133 quickly reacts with air, accounting for the 
scavenging effect which removed xenon-133 from the atmosphere. Likewise, while the half-life 
of xenon-133, followed by rapid analysis of the samples taken, was adequate for aerial sampling 
against Germany, the geographical extent of the Soviet Union meant potential xenon-133 
samples would already have largely decayed into chemically reactive, but non-radioactive, 
cesium before they reached areas where they might be sampled and analyzed.  
Krypton-85, on the other hand, has a half-life of 9.4 years; samples were subject to 
minimal decay that might affect analytical use of this radioactive, yet chemically inert gas and, 
thus, affect the accuracy of the estimate of the rate of Soviet plutonium production. Additionally, 
the longer half-life of krypton-85 made possible continuous monitoring of its concentration in 
the atmosphere to refine previous estimates of plutonium production, making these estimates 
more accurate the longer the krypton-85 monitoring continued. Because these technical reasons 
made its measurement less difficult and more productive than xenon-133, krypton-85 became the 
primary isotope of interest to AFMSW-1 in estimating Soviet plutonium production rates. By 
early 1949, it was quite likely the first efforts in the USSR to produce plutonium-239 were 
detected by the United States, leading to a heightened sense of alert by the Air Force’s Interim 
Surveillance Research Net, eventually rewarding the effort with detection of Joe-1. 
Another significant result from FITZWILLIAM was somewhat speculative, but appeared 
to have occurred based on information available from sources other than Ziegler and Jacobson. 
They assert efforts to measure ionospheric effects were cancelled due to interference between the 
experimental ionospherograph at the test site and the control channels for the drone planes used 
for sample collection.
113
 However, the Army Signal Corps operated a worldwide network of 
ionospherographs by this time, mainly for the purpose of predicting the best frequencies for 
shortwave radio circuits, but also for research purposes.
114
 The Army Signal Corps was also a 
part of the Interim Surveillance Research Net.
115
 The Signal Corps operated the sonic detection 
system (from 1948 to 1969) for AFMSW-1 (and its successors, AFOAT-1 and AFTAC) with this 
system being co-located at many Signal Corps listening stations with ionospherographs. 
Although the first claimed use of radio frequency techniques for nuclear intelligence was in 
1953, it was possible that operators of the two adjacent Signal Corps systems at one or more of 
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these sites noticed a correlation between data each received during the FITZWILLIAM 
experiments and brought it to the attention of AFMSW-1.
116
 
The deteriorating international political situation in 1948 (including the Berlin Blockade 
and the Czechoslovakia crisis) increased the pressure on decision makers to deploy an interim 
system based on airborne sampling techniques. AFMSW-1 was meant to be a development 
organization, with a plan that called for a two-year research program. Combined with the 
deteriorating international situation, the successes of FITZWILLIAM resulted in reevaluation of 
the original plans. A stopgap airborne sampling network was put into operation immediately, 
while research went forward on supplementary methods (acoustic, seismographic, etc.)  
At the same time, the secrecy of the military’s nuclear intelligence efforts, reinforced by a 
decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accelerate the date for a complete operational system 
from 1951 to 1950, grew increasingly opaque to the AEC. Lewis Strauss, first a commissioner, 
later chair of the AEC under Dwight Eisenhower’s administration, was often credited with being 
the father of LRD in the limited extant references in historical literature on the topic, primarily 
because of a series of nagging memos he wrote on the subject. Ziegler and Jacobson made clear 
his concerns about military foot-dragging had far more to do with the military keeping Strauss, 
along with the rest of the AEC, in the dark about the actual status of LRD system development 
efforts for security reasons, rather than any lack of effort.
117
 Strauss, an investment banker who 
served in the Naval Reserve as an intelligence officer, had been an advocate of LRD since his 
appointment as an AEC commissioner. The series of increasingly questioning memos (which 
took the form of nagging letters to Dr. Ellis Johnson of AFMSW-1) addressed what he 
considered military dalliance in setting up a LRD system.
118
 The reality was the military was 
already constructing a wall of secrecy around its nuclear intelligence efforts, one which 
intentionally isolated the AEC from anything other than limited, need-to-know knowledge about 
the military’s fallout collection efforts. This established a mostly one-way flow of information 
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from the AEC to the military as it began construction of the Atomic Energy Detection System 
(AEDS).  
Brigadier General Don Yates of the Air Weather Service saw LRD as an opportunity to 
bolster the case for funding his command’s mission of weather reconnaissance. In the era before 
satellites, weather observation and prediction in remote areas and over the oceans was produced 
by synoptic observations, in which aircraft flew daily missions on a fixed track, gathering data 
from the same approximate location at the same time to produce daily data for forecasting. With 
some of the AWS’s WB-29s (weather reconnaissance variants of the B-29) equipped with 
sampling equipment from testing, Gen. Yates felt the AWS’s ongoing work provided ideal cover 
for LRD to operate, along with providing essential support for the daily flights needed to assure 
the kind of coverage necessary so that evidence of a nuclear explosion would not be missed. 
Yates hoped the high priority attached to nuclear intelligence meant its funding could provide a 
stable source of support for other AWS missions, which were accomplished by observations 
made by flying the synoptic tracks in search of nuclear debris.
119
 Yates volunteered the AWS as 
ready to accept the LRD mission, but little else is known about the decision which initiated 
WHITESNAKE, as the AWS portion of the overall LRD surveillance program was originally 
known, since most of these discussions were in “verbal form [only,] for security reasons.”120 
Even where relevant documents are available in declassified form, the spotty evidence available 
is representative of the need for historians to evaluate and inferentially render accounts based on 
commonsense interpretations of the historical record. The results, if not all the reasoning, were 
obvious: the mundane repetition of the synoptic missions of the AWS provided an ideal cover for 
LRD operations while the nuclear intelligence mission underwrote a substantial part of routine 
AWS operations. New intelligence requirements generated the need to hastily initiate operations 
given the high priority of nuclear intelligence. The Air Force has a rich tradition of such 
improvisational efforts for work of lower priority than LRD, with the Interim Network another 
example of how such ad hoc efforts were frequently relied upon by the Air Force. 
While the Air Force moved forward in great secrecy building its interim LRD network, 
approval for funding the extensive research plan initiated by Dr. Johnson languished in the 
bureaucracy. The National Security Act of 1947 established the Research and Development 
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Board (RDB) to manage and prioritize military research and development programs to avoid 
duplication and waste, but overall R&D languished in the austere postwar funding climate. At 
the same time Dr. Johnson’s staff was carrying out the experimental work connected to 
FITZWILLIAM, he also was planning the operational LRD network. After several rejections by 
the RDB, Dr. Johnson became frustrated to the point he resigned in protest over the onerous 
process of approval.
121
 Dr. George Shortley briefly succeeded Johnson as technical director of 
AFMSW-1 and updated the proposal to included expanded emphasis on seismographic research 
in the wake of the FITZWILLIAM project results, along with further research to determine 
overall Soviet nuclear material production via analysis of noble gas (krypton-85) samples. Since 
the most obvious way for the Soviets to avoid detection by radiological air sampling was to test 
underground, seismic detection became a constant Air Force anxiety despite a record that 
showed virtually no evidence of such efforts for another decade. However, the Air Force felt 
seismic detection should be a high priority in order to have a comprehensive and redundant 
monitoring system.
122
 The AFOAT-1 unit history, written in retrospect and not published until 
June 1954, cast the requests for more documentation to justify the research needs by the 
Pentagon’s RDB as hostile interlopers. 
Consequently all those who for any reason – lack of confidence in the feasibility 
and value of an LRD system, [line of text redacted] or a genuine desire to put the 
government on a policy of economy – desired to hinder the AFOAT-1 program 
could do so by pointing out that only limited funds should be invested in a 
questionable venture and one which had no high priority attached to it. 
 
Seismic research thus received the bulk of research and development funding under the proposal 
in the hope seismography could soon complement the now proven air-sampling technique. The 
frustrations of Dr. Johnson were representative of the increasingly conflictual relationship 
between the military and science. However, it was the eventual success of this nuclear 
intelligence program that played a part in reviving the Pentagon’s faith in working closely with 
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science – on the military’s terms – after the political fallout caused by the dissension of the 
Manhattan Project’s scientists over nuclear weapons policy faded.  
While the seismic research proposal worked its way through the Pentagon’s bureaucracy, 
the Air Force moved ahead in anticipation of eventual approval of the LRD program by moving 
AFMSW-1 resources to operational status and redesignating the organization AFOAT-1 (like 
AFMSW-1, an office symbol representing “Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 
Atomic Energy Office, Section One”) on 28 August 1948.123 AFOAT-1 began operating the 
Interim Surveillance Research Net in the wake of FITZWILLIAM, integrating most of the 
equipment and ground stations participated in experimental operations into the interim 
operational network at minimum cost.
124
 
Meanwhile, the RDB was far from finished in its review of the LRD research proposal. 
As the Air Force pushed ahead with the LRD R&D program and interim network, it scrambled to 
cover ongoing costs by creative accounting while the program awaited formal approval. Two 
different panels (the Loomis Panel, named after its chair, Alfred L. Loomis, and the Boner, or 
IO-7, Panel, named after one of its members who had previously served on the Loomis Panel) 
reviewed the LRD research and development proposal. Both panels complained about a lack of 
guidance from the DOD on the priority that should be attached to the project, the scope of the 
research (since air-sampling was proven, the need for other techniques was questioned), and 
pressures from Harry Truman’s White House to reduce spending on research and development 
which lacked a proven need. The Boner Panel recommended the government use conventional 
intelligence methods, such as human agents, even though the USSR had already proven resistant 
to such tactics because of the insular, tyrannical nature of Stalin’s regime. Importantly, the panel 
supported the use of technical means (krypton-85 monitoring) to detect fissile material 
production, but discouraged continued research investment in LRD of nuclear explosions.
125
 
Doyle Northrup, AFOAT-1’s new civilian technical director, fought for full funding of 
the Air Force’s proposal, which included seismic and sonic research to complement and 
corroborate airborne sampling. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) endorsed the main proposal 
for an interim surveillance network, they undercut the Air Force’s proposal for seismic and sonic 
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research by downgrading the need for proof of the location of any putative Russian explosion to 
the rather more simple task of merely locating it within the Soviet sphere of influence if it should 
occur, rather than requiring a highly accurate fix on the test location. It was possible that the JCS 
were influenced by the Army, who may have felt the capability it provided to the Interim Net 
with its sonic detection system (and, possibly, its ionospherograph network) was an adequate 
supplement to airborne sampling, although it provided only a limited capability to give accurate 
direction-finding information. The proposal languished in review under the Truman 
administration’s austere funding regime well into the summer of 1949. The Boner Panel finally 
issued its report on the LRD proposal on 1 September 1949, calling for a reduction in the scope 
of the Air Force’s research program to concentrate LRD on the proven technique of airborne 
radiological sampling. On 14 September, the DOD’s Management Committee issued a stop-
order to limit expenditures by the Air Force to what they felt the RDB would approve based on 
the restrictive Boner Panel report.
126
 Stunning news soon broke, making the proposed reductions 
in LRD funding moot. The quick discrediting of the Boner Panel’s recommendations at the end 
of a long frustrating review process reinforced the Air Force’s desire, also driven by Cold War 
security anxieties, to work only with scientists who clearly supported its programs, while 
screening out those it perceived as questioning its goals. 
Joe-1: Verification of LRD Capability 
Accounts vary of the 375
th
 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron’s RB-29 flight on 3 
September 1949, which detected the first Soviet nuclear shot (known within the Air Force as Joe-
1, in reference to Stalin.) The official history of AFTAC refers to it as “a routine, 13.5 hour, 
‘reverse LOON CHARLIE’ mission,” a conclusion echoed by several other accounts relying on 
this official source, including Ziegler and Jacobson.
127
 Other sources tell a more nuanced story 
indicating AFOAT-1’s Data Analysis Center (DAC) was ordering “special” missions based on 
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other intelligence indications.
128
 Charles C. Bates and John F. Fuller vaguely refer to some of 
these missions being “vectored,” or directed, to fly at specific times and on specific tracks other 
than those typically used.
129
 These conflicting versions of AFOAT-1’s best documented 
operational success strongly suggest the historical significance of this event was more 
complicated than previously reported. The series of alerts shortly before the discovery of Joe-1 
suggested it was more than simply a lucky day on a routine mission, as accounts in AFTAC’s 
commemorative history portray. Institutional perspective also played a role, as the official 
narrative was strongly influenced by the belief that fallout sampling was the paramount, 
irrefutable method of monitoring, with other sources of intelligence serving in a secondary role. 
Jeffrey Richelson recounted CIA and British intelligence agents interviewed refugees and 
scientists fleeing Eastern Europe after World War Two, who provided considerable evidence the 
Russians were engaged in efforts to obtain and refine uranium, especially from known, very rich 
deposits located in Czechoslovakia. Along with these human sources, Richelson observed the 
United States collected considerable communications intelligence on nuclear topics before 
September 1949, but available declassified documents seem to indicate communications 
intelligence provided no specific smoking gun.
130
  
Robert A. Mann, apparently working from 375
th
 and Alaskan Air Command monthly unit 
histories, related a more nuanced account indicating AFOAT-1 had prior knowledge a Soviet test 
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was imminent.
131
 On 19 August 1949, the 375
th
 was ordered to fly a LOON SPECIAL mission, 
looping down to the end of the Aleutian Islands and back to Eielson, instead of continuing on to 
Japan, ten days before the 29 August explosion of JOE-1.
132
 Based on average wind velocities, 
Mann estimated an alert on this date indicated a belief a Soviet explosion occurred as early as 13 
August, five days before the alert was ordered on 18 August. Although the alert indicated daily 
flights were to be made, apparently negative results from this initial LOON SPECIAL mission 
led to the following missions being cancelled. Even with the cancellations, another interesting 
report was made by Alaskan Air Command: 
In response to a request by HQ USAF, a report was submitted concerning unusual 
radar, barometric, light, sound, and earth shock incidents observed through the 
period 21-22 August. Although only conjecture, it was believed that this was to 
amplify reports of the explosion of an atomic bomb by the Russians.
133
 
 
Mann made a significant observation by pointing out the conflict between the 375
th’s original 
alert, which implied a relatively early date and distant location for the first Soviet shot, and the 
later more general alert for the entire Alaskan Air Command, which implied that any such shot 
would be obvious from “physical natures [which] would allow manifestations to reach Alaska in 
a period of time ranging from instantaneous (light) to hours (sound) after the explosion.”134 
Ziegler and Jacobson asserted flatly sonic detection did not “alert” AFOAT-1, but it was 
unclear how they formed this conclusion. Apparently, data from the sonic stations (only two of 
which were within 1,800 miles from the Soviet test, the range which these detectors were known 
to provide at this time) did show an anomaly confirming the explosion when examined after the 
fact.
 135
 Apparently, sonic data was not responsible for the alerts issued in Alaska.
 
 
Likewise, since the first alert indicated a need to be on the lookout for immediate 
phenomena from a possible Russian blast, it suggested an indication by the ionospheric network 
was possibly the source of an erroneous alert. Obviously, accurate data for an immediate alert 
could not have been provided prior to the actual date of Joe-1’s detonation, 29 August. Likewise, 
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the skeletal, incomplete, and uncalibrated seismic system that was a part of the interim LRD 
network could only have yielded accurate data in a retrospective examination of information 
collected. Among the many secrets of LRD, the instantaneous detection capability of ionospheric 
detection (EMP) was especially sensitive and possibly the source of detected suspicious 
signals.
136
 
The alerts were likely not based on ‘just guessing.’ There were at least three more 
possibilities to account for this series of alerts in Alaska before the first reported indication of 
Joe-1 was discovered. The first was information gleaned from communications intelligence, the 
monitoring of traffic on shortwave and other radio frequencies. Although the National Security 
Agency was not yet in existence, the military services maintained their own signals intelligence 
units after World War Two (which would eventually come under direction by the NSA after its 
formation in 1952.) It was possible the Soviets were indiscreet about the upcoming test or 
communicated about it on a circuit they believed was immune from monitoring. Such a slip up 
was at odds with the extraordinary secrecy associated with the Soviet nuclear project. 
Another possibility was that some still unsung human source could have tipped off the 
United States to an imminent test. The United States was seemingly less successful in recruiting 
high-profile human sources than the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but it was also quite 
possible that the CIA may still be concealing the identity of a successful agent who pulled off 
such an intelligence coup. Failed spies often become infamous, but the best ones do their work 
undetected and unsung. Finally, krypton-85 monitoring may have been adequate to determine the 
Russians had created enough plutoniun-239 to indicate they were prepared to test in the near-
term. In any case, this historical puzzle remains one deserving future attention in the broader 
field of Cold War intelligence history, as its low profile and suggestive problematization of 
seemingly settled fact point out an area in which more complete information from the classified 
archives is necessary to resolve it.  
The first Soviet nuclear explosion occurred the same day, 29 August, as Crew 5A’s initial 
attempt at flying the reverse LOON CHARLIE track back to Alaska, but was cut short by engine 
failure after leaving Yokota AFB, forcing an emergency landing at Misawa AFB in northern 
Japan. After repairs on 3 September 1949, First Lieutenant Robert C. Johnson and Crew 5A took 
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off from Misawa, overcoming these problems as the mission launched successfully in route to 
Alaska. Unknown it at the time, four and a half hours after take-off, the filters in the “bug-
catcher” on their WB-29 began encountering debris that were later determined to originate from 
Joe-1. The weather officer of Crew 5A continued changing filters out of the “bug-catcher” every 
three hours on the flight. On arrival at Eielson AFB, the filters were handed over to the crew 
debriefing officer who passed them onto the AFOAT-1 representative, who took them to a secure 
facility only accessible to its personnel.
137
 This separation between the AWS collectors and the 
AFOAT-1 analysts preserved compartmentalization, an important aspect of controlling the 
spread and use of information about nuclear intelligence within the Air Force itself. 
At the restricted AFOAT-1 compound, the filters were placed into a new device called a 
wrap-around counter, installed just a month before. The wrap-around counter surrounded the 
samples with a one foot thick lead shield to screen out cosmic and background radiation, 
allowing its Geiger counter to produce more accurate radiation counts from the sample filter. The 
standard for an alert to be issued based on observed readings was reduced from 100 counts to 50 
counts per minute when the wrap-around counter was first installed. The second filter exposed 
on the flight registered 85 counts per minute. This news was passed to the DAC in Washington, 
which logged it as Alert 112 (an alert first codenamed VERMONT by AFOAT-1 once a “hot” 
sample was confirmed.) After encountering a number of previous false alerts, due to such causes 
as volcanic activity or natural variations in radioactivity, this time was different.
138
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At AFOAT-1 headquarters, the DAC ordered several actions to verify the sample. First, it 
was regularly re-measured. Plotting the continuing activity of these interval readings formed a 
recognizable radiation decay curve, indicating the sample likely contained bomb debris. Part of 
the sample was dispatched by aircraft (swift transportation was necessary so that the lab could 
quickly ascertain the rapidly changing mix of isotopes in the captured debris as they underwent 
decay) for analysis at the Tracerlab facility in Berkeley, California. With the rough location of 
the debris plume established by the first “hot” sample, more “specials” were ordered into the air 
on tracks stretching from Hawaii to Alaska to obtain further samples. One sample returned a 
count of over 1,000 decays per minute, well above the AFOAT-1 alert level, adding weight to 
the belief the sample was bomb debris. By plotting the decay curves of the various isotopes of 
barium, cerium, iodine, molybdenum, neptunium, ruthenium, silver, yttrium, and zirconium in 
the sample, laboratory analysis of the samples revealed their isotopes shared a “birth” date, 
confirming their origin in a nuclear explosion, rather than in a reactor accident.
139
 
Nearly 100 “specials” were eventually launched in response to the initial alert, capturing 
more than 500 samples. The drift of the debris was tracked around the world, resulting in a 
hurried decision to notify the British to gain as complete a picture as possible of this first Russian 
blast. Technically a violation of the Atomic Energy Act’s restrictions on sharing nuclear 
information with other nations, it was a choice of obeying the law or losing part of the most vital 
intelligence data of the postwar era.
140
 Legal restrictions imposed by Congress might handicap 
AFOAT-1’s mission, but were discreetly put aside by the military in the interest of expediency. 
By 20 September, AFOAT-1 issued Technical Memo No. 37 attached with another memo 
from Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg concurring with its conclusion the 
samples showed consistent data pointing to the explosion of a nuclear weapon “over the Asiatic 
land mass during the period 26 August 1949 to 29 August 1949.” This information was 
                                                 
139
 Zeigler and Jacobson, Spying without Spies, 204-205. Ziegler and Jacobson provide the details of the detection of 
Joe-1 not otherwise attributed to other sources in this passage. While many radiochemistry reactions overlap 
between those found in fission explosions and the slower, controlled reactions in a reactor, except at startup the 
reactor’s mix of isotopes will have different birth dates because of the continuing nature of the reactor process 
versus the instantaneous creation of isotopes in a critical mass reaction. Thus, isotopes found in a reactor explosion’s 
“hot” sample will show a wide range of decay half-lives, while those found in a fallout sample will track back to one 
specific time and date. 
140
 Ibid, 203-7. This project outlines the subject of isotopic analysis and how it reveals information on weapon 
construction and efficiency in Appendix A. More information about the issue of overcoming legal difficulties to 
coordinate with the British, Canadians, and Australians, see Hewlett and Duncan, 261-314, for the background up 
through 1949. 
54 
 
forwarded by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson to President Truman, a formal notification 
as follow-up, as the president had been verbally briefed on developments since the first 
indication it was fallout. Advisers urged him to make a public announcement, but Truman held 
off, hoping the Russians would announce it themselves, thus preserving secrecy about U.S. 
nuclear intelligence efforts.
141
 As time passed without any announcement from the USSR, 
Truman concluded the Russians were apparently hoping to keep Joe-1 secret. 
With so many in the U.S. military, plus the British, knowing about a confirmed Soviet 
nuclear explosion, Truman chose to make a public announcement. The revelation was necessary 
to build public support for military expenditures, reversing the austerity trend of postwar defense 
budgets, in order to meet the perceived threat posed by loss of the United States nuclear 
monopoly. Providing a substantive justification for its mission, the intelligence scoop of Joe-1’s 
detection electrified Air Force leadership, giving the service a particular reason to see benefit in 
such an announcement, while also suggesting keeping the event secret would be a fruitless 
enterprise. Subsequently, the Air Force’s intense interest in thermonuclear weapons, the need it 
saw for a rapid expansion of its forces, and the aggressive tone of its commanders conference at 
Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico in the spring of 1950 the week after NSC 68 was 
promulgated all sprang from the service’s embrace of nuclear power as its foundational prime 
directive. Funding an appropriate response to the Soviet advance necessitated its public 
recognition by the United States.  
On 23 September 1949, Truman’s statement that “…within recent weeks an atomic 
explosion had occurred within the USSR…” was issued to the press, revealing not just the 
existence of the Soviet bomb, but also implicitly acknowledging existence of the U.S. nuclear 
intelligence effort.
142
 The vagueness of the announced timeframe was intended to conceal the 
precision with which AFOAT-1 was able to detect the timing and location of the blast, along 
with the unit’s specific existence, from the Soviet Union and the U.S. public. The announcement 
immediately eliminated the doubts raised by the Boner Panel, firming up AFOAT-1’s budget 
outlook along with those supporting units like the AWS associated with its mission.
143
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Party Crasher 
Circumstances which confirmed some of AEC commissioner Lewis Strauss’ security 
concerns about coordination with the British also came into play at this time, although the 
problem did not become obvious until later.
144
 The representative of MI6 in Washington (the 
British foreign intelligence liaison to the U.S. intelligence community) rotated home in early 
October 1949 just as the initial furor over Joe-1 settled. His replacement was Kim Philby, who 
was quickly brought up to date on current events, including the detection of Joe-1.
145
 Even as the 
U.S. government maintained a strict public silence on the sources and methods used to detect 
Joe-1, Philby’s importune presence most likely meant the Russians were quickly informed of 
AFOAT-1’s mission and the basic details of its role in nuclear intelligence. 
Philby eventually came under suspicion of spying after the 1951 defection to the Soviet 
Union of two of his Cambridge colleagues, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. The CIA supplied 
evidence to the British (who already had him under suspicion) about Philby’s duplicity in June 
1951 asking that he be immediately recalled. Thus, the agency was well aware of the fact that the 
secret existence of the U.S. nuclear intelligence program was likely compromised to the Soviets 
no later than June 1951.
146
 While it was all but certain Philby revealed AFOAT-1’s debris 
sampling operations to the Russians, there was no evidence he possessed knowledge of the 
krypton-85 plutonium production rate sampling program. A March 1951 memo indicated 
AFOAT-1 only then began to seek a change in the law to allow them to coordinate work to 
collect and analyze krypton-85 emissions with the British and Canadians, so details of what 
became the NOMINATION program were unlikely available yet to purloin.
147
 Philby’s betrayal 
would not be publicly confirmed until his own 1963 defection.  
AFOAT-1, and its successor, AFTAC, were largely carefully concealed from the 
American public until the 1980s. In ironic contrast, between Truman’s announcement and 
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Philby’s treachery the Russians knew almost from the start the nuclear intelligence capability of 
the U.S. was effective – and why. Subsequent announcements of most Soviet tests by the United 
States, without disclosing the source of this information, regularly reinforced this fact to the 
Soviet Union until atmospheric testing ended by mutual agreement in 1963. The Russian 
response was to ignore the issues raised against it diplomatically and test anyway, given that it 
faced no significant domestic public pressure over its own role in fallout from testing, unlike 
governments in the West. These juxtapositions of secrecy about fallout, East and West, share 
remarkably similar spaces in terms of their mistrust of their own citizens. The most extreme 
example was the April 1954 AEC personnel security board hearing that stripped Robert 
Oppenheimer of his security clearance, in part over the bizarre charge that he was attempting to 
somehow impede or disarm SAC.
148
 Such responses were emblematic of how both governments 
found the topic of fallout troubling, if for different reasons, refusing to admit publicly what they 
understood the other knew by furtive means.  
GABRIEL: Can the United States Take Preemptive Action? 
What was the basis of Air Force anxieties over fallout posing a threat to their weapons? 
Following detection of the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the Air Force pushed the Atomic 
Energy Commission into a race to develop thermonuclear weapons over the objections of its 
Oppenheimer-chaired General Advisory Committee (GAC). The AEC also initiated Project 
GABRIEL in 1949. Project GABRIEL specifically explored fallout as a constraint on nuclear 
war, with its first estimates suggesting a cumulative expended yield total of as little as 60 
megatons was dangerous, even if dispersed on a global scale. With the later development of 
thermonuclear weapons, this level of fallout was subsequently exceeded several times on an 
annual basis during the era of atmospheric testing.
149
 Even the premise of a study that nuclear 
war faced inherent limits was an alien and threatening concept to LeMay and his cohort of Air 
Force general officers. By 1953, GABRIEL seemed destined for oblivion, even after the 
cautionary limit was increased in November 1951 to 2,000 megatons.
150
 This suggested 
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GABRIEL’s calculations were revised to accommodate the premises of war planning in 
anticipation of massive fallout produced by thermonuclear weapons.
151
 GABRIEL’s basic 
research question about the limits of nuclear war remained anathema to the Air Force, yet the 
study was repurposed and folded into a separate secret compartment to continue under Project 
Sunshine in 1953.
152
 As Oppenheimer, James Conant, and Lee DuBridge prepared to step down 
as the last three original members of the GAC in 1952, they wrote two statements, one for the 
public and one for the president, reflecting on what was achieved and the challenges facing them 
in the future. The statement pointedly called attention to the findings from GABRIEL.
153
 Like 
Oppenheimer’s concerns about fallout, GABRIEL’s premises were something to suppress, rather 
than address forthrightly. Despite the findings of Project GABRIEL, the embarrassment of 
CASTLE BRAVO, and a growing accumulation of other factors, the Air Force’s unrequited 
passion for high-yield thermonuclear weapons continued onward for nearly a decade afterwards, 
while taking down Oppenheimer and goading the Russians to match the rapid expansion of the 
Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC) as best they could with their own strategic forces.  
GABRIEL’s suppression, as well as Oppenheimer’s ordeal, was consonant with the Air 
Force’s initial belief it could continue to keep fallout’s dual significance as a vital intelligence 
resource and as a potential limit on war a secret, despite the international uproar following the 
CASTLE BRAVO fallout incident.  Oppenheimer’s direct role in connection with the Project 
GABRIEL study remains uncertain, as do any specifics of the Air Force reaction to it given the 
sparse documentation available. While the continuing pursuit of thermonuclear weapons might 
                                                 
151
 With the first thermonuclear explosion, IVY MIKE in 1952, producing a yield of 10 megatons, a 60 megaton 
limit on wartime fallout suggested the possibility SAC might be asked to go to war with just six bombs. Even the 
revised limit of 2,000 megatons implied a war utilizing just 200 bombs with yields equivalent to IVY MIKE. While 
no such limit was known to have been explicitly proposed, such logic seemed to drive the accusations by several Air 
Force witnesses at the AEC’s 1954 Oppenheimer security hearing that the scientist was bent on disarming SAC. 
152
 The RAND conference appeared to be a vehicle to limit and repurpose the influence of GABRIEL, in part by 
subsuming it into Project Sunshine. Project Sunshine sought to document the accumulation of strontium-90 in living 
beings and the environment. Most infamous for its global hunt to acquire infant skeletons, Sunshine became public 
in 1957 as the AEC fought perceptions of fallout risk by invoking scientific authority. Sunshine was directed by 
Willard Libby, who later won a Nobel Prize for discovering carbon-14 dating of ancient objects. Libby also served 
as an AEC commissioner during most of the 1950s. The quickly rising stockpiles of both East and West soon made 
even the 2,000 megaton model a limited selection of potential destruction and radiation. CASTLE BRAVO’s 1954 
confirmation that “dry” thermonuclear weapon designs were practical along with global plutonium-239 inventories 
in excess of 10,000 kilograms by 1957 brought nuclear wars an order of magnitude greater within the realm of grim 
possibility. See Appendix B. 
153
 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 499-500, 518-519. In fact, GABRIEL continued at an 
even higher classification, oddly either subsumed by or as the overall umbrella under which Libby’s Project 
Sunshine operated, depending on the reference to it. 
58 
 
seem like folly, given what is known now about the extent of the 1954 incident, the 
government’s attempt to downplay the significance of its fallout fit the Air Force’s pattern of 
trying to reserve fallout’s documentation for its own benefit. The hidden hand of classification 
resulted in the continuing vacuum of evidence that played out as a persistently superficial 
treatment of fallout in analysis of nuclear strategy and various other areas of Cold War 
historiography.
154
 The prevalent tendency to focus on subjectivities in studying the meaning and 
significance of fallout during the Cold War was in large part a result of the intentional 
suppression of empirical data about it due to its status as a vital intelligence source, but also 
GABRIEL’s finding that fallout would impose limits on the conduct of nuclear war.  
Consumer Choice and Construction of Popular Perceptions of Fallout: 
Marketing National Security Policy 
The initial postwar image of the friendly, helpful atom, was aptly illustrated by a 
returnable glass beverage bottle: Tomboy soda – It’s Atomic! 
 
Figure 2: “Tomboy Soda Bottle, 1948”
 155
 
Popular culture, as many historians observe of the immediate post-war era, placed trust in 
the capacity of science to deliver a better future. Yet, “…fear works. It’s what our brains 
remember.” Fear is used to drive consumers towards a product by playing on the anxieties of 
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what might happen if they do not purchase it.
156
 Sales of fallout shelters, the ultimate antidote to 
atomic anxieties served up only minor relief as an “architecture of failure.”157 Marketing 
products by citing their war time effectiveness or through a reference to nuclear power connected 
them to the cutting edge of science and technology, seeking to persuade consumers to buy in 
order to link their lives to the benefits and security of the Atomic Age – or to suppress its 
obvious anxieties.  
The image of health presented on the back of the 1948 Tomboy soda bottle was an 
example of the insidious penetration of nuclear positivism into postwar American culture. 
Embracing preparation of their off-spring for an atomic future was essential to reassuring some 
American parents that the brighter future promised by Tomboy soda’s Midwestern appeal to 
atomic optimism, even accompanied by the gathering clouds of Cold War, and offered little to 
indicate the problems of atomic power might be greater than its perceived benefits. 
The cultural fabric of the Cold War arms race was nearly seamless, given it was 
interlaced with an era of intense expansion of hegemonic consumer culture in the United States 
and projected from its shores. In ways similar to those used in marketing other products, citizen-
consumers were frequently asked to “buy in” to national security policy. What seemed a perfect 
product to guarantee national security, nuclear weapons, due to fallout became an increasingly 
more difficult sale as a defective concept that threatened the user as well as the target. Elaine 
Tyler May observed the basis of perceived intrusion by nuclear weapons. 
The family seemed the one place where people could control their destinies…a 
source of meaning and security in a world run amok…[and] gone frighteningly 
insecure.
158
 
 
Public response to policy initiatives was closely assessed by those in leadership, in turn 
serving to influence their own subsequent decisions. Eisenhower sought “candor” as a standard, 
but remained fearful of public reaction on many nuclear topics, with the White House files 
bulging with various levels of concern in flying memos between psychological strategy experts 
like C.D. Jackson, a director of Time-Life. The fallout incident threw them for a loop, perhaps 
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best expressed in a memo from a CIA staff representative on the Operations Coordinating Board 
to Elmer Staatz of the OCB discussing the futility of management of public reporting of the 
CASTLE BRAVO fallout incident. 
If OCB [Operations Coordinating Board ] were to advise along the line of playing 
down the horror aspect, I doubt if success can be achieved. We should have 
learned from the Ivy experience that attempts to suppress unclassified information 
are not successful.
159
 
 
  For the historian, popular reaction to fallout provided a means to assess “buy-in” by 
citizens in support of national security policy in an age when open protest and effective 
resistance to government policy was a distinctly marginal activity. Gallup polls gave insight into 
what those on the OCB feared and what made Eisenhower reluctant to apply candor to the 
problem of thermonuclear weapons. A poll released on 9 April 1954 asked “What do you think is 
the most important problem facing this country today?” Some 56% thought one of several 
answers likely impacted by news from CASTLE BRAVO reflected their opinion.
160
 Some 33% 
of Americans feared there was a “good chance” their community would be attacked by 
“hydrogen bombs.”161 By July 1954, 59% agreed there was “much danger of world war.”162 
Fallout framed an alternative conception of nuclear weapons as insecure, instead of inspiring 
feelings of security. Public reaction to the problem of radiation created a difficult marketing 
challenge for those constructing American national security policies that by 1960 were 
dependent on nuclear weapons. Like a new drug with unpleasant effects, the United States 
government realized selling the public on nuclear weapons required suppressing the perceived 
threat of fallout, with the process of locating the Nevada Test Site (NTS) as a telling example of 
an attempt to redefine the fallout problem out of existence by invoking professional and 
scientific expertise.
163
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Investigation into the “branding” and marketing of policy provides a means to assess 
nuclear weapons. Recent research on consumer decision-making demonstrates 90% of this 
process is subconscious.
164
 While interrogating the archival record provides substantial data, the 
role of the subconscious in forging cultural history reminds us it also shared a role among those 
who created those documents. The subconscious affected how they might have been “sold” on 
certain policies, in how they feared the public would react to certain information that conflicted 
with what they were sold or told, and in how they could persuade the public to support their 
policy decisions, often based on limited or fabricated information. These conscious acts were 
embedded in the context of the surrounding culture, what it might accept and what it might reject 
for reasons both practical and political. This suggested why the OCB’s efforts, as well as similar 
initiatives by the AEC, to rely on carefully selected sets of factual refutations of danger from 
fallout fell far short of their target to persuade the public. Nonetheless, they provide evidence of 
how the view from within the national security bureaucracy continued to regard fallout as a 
propaganda problem rather than a practical limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear Radiation: From Safe to Scary 
What became in effect an implicit policy to avoid addressing questions about the long 
term consequences and uncertainties associated with the risks posed by left the threat posed by 
fallout’s extraconventional effects an open question.  Fear of fallout was of limited significance 
to shaping beliefs about radiation during the first decade of nuclear era.  
Cultural evidence demonstrated fallout’s surprisingly marginal role in constructing 
conceptions of nuclear war during the early Cold War prior to March 1954. Bowman Gum of 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania produced sports trading cards, as well as more militaristic cards, such 
as “U.S. Navy Victories.” Others included the 1954 “Power for Peace” series, a name that 
seemed to play on Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative, although its subjects included a 
wide array of conventional weapons. Bowman’s 1951 “Red Menace” series of bubblegum 
trading cards, a series also described on the card’s back as the “Children’s Crusade against 
Communism,” profited specifically from invoking fear of nuclear weapons in a world where the 
United States no longer held a nuclear monopoly.  Illustrating the supraconventional narrative 
nuclear weapons were embedded within before the outbreak of wide public concern about 
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fallout, “Putting Out Atomic Fire” argued that “Fire, in fact, is one of the great dangers of an 
atomic attack.”165 The card’s illustration showed fire personnel in fire boats desperately fighting 
a sea of fire.
166
 This image corresponds with Lynn Eden’s assessment in her 2004 work, Whole 
World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation; fire was an 
important effect of nuclear weapons that was commonly associated with strategic bombing 
because of World War Two memories, but was later given short shrift in order to try to limit 
concerns about nuclear war in urban areas.
167
 One of the more widely distributed civil defense 
leaflets of the Truman era, “Atomic Blast Creates Fire,” reinforced the message fire was a 
principal threat of nuclear weapons.
168
 Certainly of concern as one of the supraconventional 
effects, fire takes on a different, more complex meaning when used as a distraction from what 
the government regarded as more pernicious fears about fallout inherent in nuclear weapons. 
Another example produced by Bowman Gum, “Atomic Doom,” depicted a family fleeing 
destruction as another fiery explosion takes place in the background. 169 Except for the shape of 
the background explosion, nothing depicted hinted at radiation. The card’s text surprisingly made 
no specific reference to nuclear weapons, presuming the front image conveyed adequate meaning 
in the limited space available on a trading card, but clearly referenced the war in Korea, as well 
as invoking the Cold War’s echoing call to arms against “weakness.” 
What can we do so that it won’t happen? We can work to add more power to 
America and the United Nations. We can go all out in making the free world 
stronger than the communist world. And we can continue to work for peace. But 
the Reds must not mistake our goodwill for weakness.
170
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Emphasis on fire reflected several aspects of civil defense planning that directed concerns away 
from fallout toward more mundane forms of destruction. Given there was little the average 
person could do about blast effects, fire was often fixated upon as the problem most amenable to 
solution and thus effective in reassuring the public they could do something to protect their 
families. The political context of the era also implied doubters, dissenters, or the unenthusiastic – 
whether regarding civil defense, efforts to develop technology like thermonuclear weapons, or 
simply living a “trashy” lifestyle – might be engaged in giving aid and comfort to “the Reds.”171  
Other unofficial resources directed citizens away from radiation as a source of anxiety. 
The March 1951 issue of Popular Science carried advertising promoting marketing tie-ins to 
civil defense, including one for Harley-Davidson Hydra-Glide motorcycles, which provided a 
somewhat misleading message their product qualified you to “join your local civil defense 
program,” implying a Harley rider would have a leg up over other cyclists vying to serve, despite 
the motorcycle’s lack of protection against atomic doom of any sort, except for a helmet.  
In the same issue was an article by the inimitable Michael Amrine entitled “How to Build 
a Family Foxhole” that specifically disclaimed a need to prioritize radiation as a threat.  
First, you should know that what is to be feared most in atomic attack is not 
radiation, but the more familiar forces of heat and blast…Don’t buy a Geiger 
counter. Unless you’re an expert, it will probably only confuse you. Don’t buy a 
radiation “remedy.” The only help for radiation injury is rest and blood 
transfusion.
172
 
 
Besides the title’s invocation of the oft-repeated conventional weapon trope, it also reiterated the 
common civil defense theme of household cleanup to limit the chance of fire. Amrine posed and 
quickly answered an essential question, “What should I do about radiation protection? Stop 
worrying.” Amrine said nothing about shielding, as would inevitably figure in discussions about 
fallout shelters, repeating the official line based on assessment of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
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attacks that most of the danger was from prompt radiation, not fallout, that occurred only in 
locations suffering fire and blast damage to the extent survival was questionable anyway.  
Amrine’s message conveyed an optimistic view of humankind’s ability to survive in the 
atomic age. Survival depended on a few practical tips any family could take action upon, an 
easily digestible form of nuclear “Hints from Heloise.” Another article in the same issue 
described “How Atom-Pile Men Tame ‘Hottest’ Stuff,” reminded readers American scientific 
and technical know-how controlled any threat posed by radiation.
173
 Repeated implicit messages 
to anxious consumers conveyed a singular message. “Stop worrying!”  
Confusing messages about fallout and related topics in the literature issued in the 
immediate aftermath of Soviet’s first nuclear tests were largely attributable to a lack of national 
coordination in the civil defense hierarchy before 1954. Andrew Grossman attributed some of the 
unhelpful confusion in early civil defense messaging about radiation as due to the fact “postwar 
planners adapted the decentralized American state structure to fit a particular kind of postwar 
expansion of central-state power.”174 This dynamic was clearly illustrated in the multiple editions 
of “Six Survival Secrets for Atomic Attack,” published under the aegis of local advertisers in 
many different communities. It appeared in a wide variety of formats, from brief pamphlets to 
playing a part in more lavishly illustrated civil defense-oriented advertising circulars. Many of 
the latter were published by American Radio Publications of Peoria, Illinois. A 1953 version, 
called America on Guard: A Citizen’s Hand Book, was sponsored by radio station WJIM along 
with a local business, Michigan Sheet Metal Works, both of Lansing, Michigan.
175
 Its contents 
reflected a wide range of national security anxieties of the time, as nuclear war represented the 
ultimate invocation of insecurity in order to sell a product to relieve the associated anxiety. 
Of particular relevance here was these publications’ strong language in support of 
American free enterprise, often framed as an appeal to “You – A Stockholder in U.S.A.” along 
with statements by Eisenhower and Val Peterson, the chief of the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration. Radiological warfare was mentioned, citing the authority of a certain Professor 
[Louis N.] Ridenour of the University of Illinois who cautioned to treat it as a possible threat, 
with the author then clearly pointing to the disruptive powers of radiation voiced elsewhere in 
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the fears of civil defense bureaucrats. “The primary purpose of such warfare would be the 
disruption of community and industrial life.” “Radioactive residues” was the term preferred by 
the anonymous authors to “fallout” and these would prove “impossible to detect without special 
instruments and personnel.” Certainly the ill effects they depicted were primarily social and 
cultural, even if driven largely by what was seen as an individual, unrealistic fear of potential 
health effects, not the statistically-distributed harm they imposed across populations. The booklet 
used a variant on a “six secrets” theme, the final one arguing “Do not spread rumors. Enough 
confusion will exist without adding to it.” The remaining text consisted of more detailed 
information on various civil defense problems and a message from J. Edgar Hoover on how to 
help the FBI protect the nation from subversion, then yet again reminded the reader to “not 
circulate rumors…”176 By providing poor, sketchy information on fallout, the government left a 
gap that was filled by development of a marketplace of ideas about nuclear weapons and their 
fallout that it then sought to suppress, hoping to displace rumor and discourage loose talk about 
radiation by branding such discourse as unpatriotic, if not quite subversive in itself. 
While presented through business sponsorship of various kinds, the origin of the “six 
secrets” theme followed release in June 1950 of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons by the AEC, as 
cited in the California edition of Survival under Atomic Attack. Like the Detroit and privately 
published New York editions, all contained the “six secrets” in a centerfold or other arrangement 
that allowed them to be carried or posted as a reminder for easy reference in an emergency.
177
 
Each included a discussion of radioactivity in a far more optimistic tone than discussions later 
commonly encountered in civil defense literature.  
The narrative reflected the official position of minimizing commentary on fallout, even as 
the term itself was again avoided, this time in favor of “lingering radioactivity.” The text pointed 
readers towards continuing emphasis on supraconventional effects, but conceded the existence of 
extraconventional effects. “Radioactivity is the only way – besides size – in which the effects of 
A or H bombs are different from ordinary bombs.” Then readers were reminded “we actually 
know much more about radioactivity and what it does to people than we know about infantile 
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paralysis, colds, or some other common diseases.” An analogy followed, arguing radioactivity 
and sunburn were similar, in that a small exposure was normally not a serious problem, unless “it 
covers your whole body, it can make you very sick, or even sometimes cause death.” Perhaps 
wearing a hat and sunscreen might help with both? After more discussion underplaying many 
aspects of radiation risk, best summarized as “you would still stand a better than even chance of 
making a complete recovery,” the reader was informed. 
[P]eople fortunately are not very likely to be exposed to dangerous amounts of it 
in most atomic raids…regardless of all you may have heard or read…Thousands 
of bombs would have to be set off in the air before serious ground contamination 
would be found over really large areas…[not a single Japanese casualty] was 
caused by the lingering kind. Explosive [or prompt] radioactivity caused them 
all…We must not lose our heads just because radioactivity is reported as 
present.”178 
 
The scale of extraconventional effects was clearly governed in the human imagination by the 
relatively low yield of early fission weapons. Instead, for civil defense as with the Air Force, the 
emphasis was on the significance of the threat posed by supraconventional effects. 
Beyond Bradbury’s Benign Dust: Prologue to Nuclear Catastrophe 
Ray Bradbury’s dust might simply have been dust, but its sudden onset and ominously 
omnipresent ambiguity near the conclusion of Fahrenheit 451 suggested he intended to tap the 
anxiety created by the threat of ill-defined nuclear destruction in order to stretch it beyond mere 
allusion to an obvious biblical reference and the already-familiar, in form, if not scale, of 
supraconventional weapons effects.  It was not just popular culture; blast and fire also remained 
the primary bomb damage metrics used by the United States military to assess destruction. 
Strategic airpower’s use of conventional weapons en masse in World War Two left behind 
images of pulverized cities, swimming in the dust of the grim, physical chaos wrought by these 
weapons on Hamburg, Dresden, and other cities. Similar images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were distributed relatively quickly after the attacks even before the Japanese surrender, along 
with less journalistically-interesting pictures of quite similar destruction in Tokyo caused by 
incendiary bombs.
179
 Regardless of the means, images of a destroyed Japan, including Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, showed marked similarities with the destruction imposed on European cities. 
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Other than lacking the continuous piles of bricks left behind in Europe, images of 
supraconventional atomic destruction looked much like that wreaked by conventional weapons.  
The Air Force portrayed the difference between conventional and atomic weapons as 
quantitative and based largely on efficiency of destruction offered by nuclear weapons, i.e. the 
capacity to destroy a city with a single weapon versus requiring use of thousands of conventional 
ones. Focusing on the large, quantitative differences between nuclear weapons and chemical 
explosives avoided drawing attention to their primary qualitative differentiator: the significant 
role of radiation in the form of fallout produced by fission (and later, by neutron induction from 
fusion reactions.) While the meaning of the two nuclear weapons of August 1945 demarcating 
the Nuclear Age from everything before remains controversial, there is now little disagreement it 
was the qualitative nature of these weapons that established a boundary between them and 
conventional weapons, between weapons profligately used and those whose use dare not be 
risked or repeated. 
Nonetheless, while the revolutionary aspects of the U.S. entry into the “atomic age” were 
heralded as a scientific breakthrough resulting in victory, the results of the attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki shared a cultural space of destruction with conventional weapons marked by strong 
themes of continuity, casting nuclear weapons as simply the latest increment of destructive 
technology. Use of this new weapon depended upon the same marginalization of ethical and 
moral concern that rationalized the area bombing of civilian urban areas with conventional 
explosive and incendiary ordnance during World War Two. Striking evidence of this continuity 
was encapsulated in the first American nuclear war plan produced by Major General Lauris 
Norstad a little more than a month after the strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Sent to General 
Groves at the Manhattan Project for production planning purposes, Norstad advised that the 
USAAF required 123 of the new bombs, at a minimum. An attached map detailed the target list, 
66 targets within the Soviet Union (at that moment ostensibly still a military ally), with an 
additional 22 in Manchuria, then under Soviet occupation to displace the defeated Japanese. 
Fifteen urban industrial areas were priority targets scheduled to be hit by three bombs each, with 
39 weapons the minimum and 204 the “optimum” needed to carry out what was clearly a pre-
emptive attack, given the Soviets had neither nuclear weapons or a strategic air force to deliver 
them. Norstad’s plan also called for an additional 20 weapons to provide for various 
contingencies, with further options driving the optimal number to some 466 if production 
68 
 
permitted their availability. Norstad was blunt in asserting the Air Force’s desire, but in assessing 
the weapon there was a single omission, no mention of radiation, the single qualitative 
characteristic that set these weapons apart from conventional explosives. 
The characteristics of this weapon are such that it cannot be regarded as “just 
another bomb.” These bombs are very expensive, cannot be produced in mass, 
require special storage conditions, require highly technical shipment and assembly 
procedures, and must be assembled and placed in the objective by highly skilled 
and specially trained personnel.
180
 
 
In describing the context and importance of the document, Alex Wellerstein opined. 
…from the perspective of the immediate postwar, it still seems like quite a lot.  
And its very ambitiousness was a sign of things to come.
181
 
 
Groves’ response continued on to confirm that it was not a scientist, but another military officer 
who first formally suggested to the Air Force that limits applied to atomic warfare. 
…my general conclusion would be that the number of bombs indicated as 
required is excessive.
182
 
 
For the Air Force, the assumption that these weapons were similar to conventional ones 
in all but their scale was present at its birth and would take strong evidence to overcome. 
Thus, in the context when it was released as a novel in 1953, Bradbury’s depiction of 
nuclear war in Fahrenheit 451 bore a striking similarity in all but scale to the merciless, 
anonymous destruction wrought from the sky with conventional weapons familiar to those who 
endured it in World War Two – and apparently already imagined for the next war. Bradbury’s 
use of the “dust to dust” imagery applied beyond the obvious, ominous biblical reference, 
marking it as the sort of useful literary device every writer treasures in clarifying the 
organization and meaning of a huge project as it draws to a close. But Bradbury’s dust, even if 
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one were engulfed by it, was seemingly benign, or at least not yet particularly feared by those 
who survived its creation. For instance, it might represent the birth of the new from the past as 
part of the cycle of life. Such a vision of harmless, perhaps even fertilely ominous dust raining 
down as the optimistic climax of a future nuclear conflict demonstrated how oblivious people 
were to the dangers of fallout during the first decade of nuclear power. 
CASTLE BRAVO Makes Fallout a Public Policy Problem 
Just a year after Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 was published, stark facts began leaking out 
about fallout.  On 1 March 1954, the test shot, CASTLE BRAVO (15 megaton yield), sent lethal 
levels of fallout over more than 7,000 square miles surrounding the test site carved out of the 
atolls of the Marshall Islands in the remote Pacific Ocean. A policy debate over the meaning of 
fallout was already well underway within the secret institutions governing national security 
policy before the crisis broke into public view with the return of the fishing vessel, the Lucky 
Dragon, to its port in Japan, its entire crew sickened by their exposure to CASTLE BRAVO’s 
fallout plume.  
As it lost its cloak of official secrecy, fallout began a transition to widespread public 
perception of it as an unmanageable problem. In their Washington Post column of 27 September 
1954, political gossip columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop called attention to its uniquely novel 
destructive property, highlighting public recognition of the newly-realized dangers of fallout, the 
major extraconventional effect of nuclear weapons.
183
  
The super-super is quite different. Its radiation effects altogether transcend its 
blast and fire effects. A five-megaton super-super will destroy a circular area of 
300 square miles by fire and blast. But it will probably expose an area of 6000 
square miles to lethal radiation.
184
 
 
Worse, the threat from fallout was practically invisible, unlike the drifts of dust portrayed by 
Bradbury as physically visible, but no more than ambiguously radioactive. CASTLE BRAVO 
translated its ethereal nature, making its intense fallout immediately tangible to the Japanese 
fishermen, even though its presence for the most part could only be described by means of 
radiation monitoring instruments.
185
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Addressing fallout’s cumulative effects in the event of a general nuclear war on both 
personal and national security was another matter entirely. Something like radiation, usually 
possible to detect only through the act of reading a meter, that then required complex cognitive 
processing to establish its meaning, seemed strangely incapable of creating terror as an image. 
What appeared more relevant in discussing the social meaning of fallout were the effects of 
individual engagement with the meaning of fallout and how it would affect individuals should a 
nuclear war ever come to pass. In other words, did the concept of national security sustain belief 
in one’s personal security or undermine it? In a cultural space filled by images, as described by 
Weart, specific ideas about fallout seemed a weak reed in analyzing the full range of effects 
creating nuclear fear. Images must be taken into account, but new evidence makes possible a 
more holistic appreciation of fallout’s influence. Arguably, if exploring the power of imagery to 
foster and internalize nuclear fear was valuable, then exploring the juncture between that visible 
history and the capacity of the absence of an image to cloak fallout suggests useful insights, too. 
Unraveling secrecy’s distortion of the visible effects of fallout is an opportunity to illustrate a far 
more dynamic role for fallout than previously described. The goal is not simply to reveal secrets, 
as tantalizing as some may be, but to use these new perspectives to explain the influence of the 
role and significance of fallout and nuclear intelligence on historical events. Turning back from 
CASTLE BRAVO for now, understanding its marking the ominous exit of fallout from its secret 
life – from absence to presence – requires further exploration. 
Theories of Nuclear Fear and Deterrence 
Fundamental laws of physics made fallout an indivisible part of the basic character of the 
hydrogen bomb, acting as an effective limit on what seemed at first like the virtually unlimited 
capacity of this type of weapon to unleash thermonuclear destruction.
186
 Such weapons could 
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always be made larger, but there was no way to make them without fallout.
187
 Somewhat 
counterfactually, if a nuclear weapon could be made without fallout, it would simply be the 
much larger conventional weapon the Air Force originally preferred to believe it possessed; the 
use of nuclear weapons in conflict would likely be, if not common, far from non-existent in the 
years since August 1945. With fallout, one is forced to confront the grim realities of the Bomb 
and the constraints it imposed on conflict.   
Spencer Weart’s argument about the power of images to skew the factual narrative of 
nuclear power was weakest precisely at the most important point he argued – since it was all but 
invisible, public perceptions of fallout were not based on images so much as ideas conveyed 
across the spectrum of human communication. Portraying the cloaked role of radiation in a 
photograph or other image remains artistically difficult. Despite the arguable failure of a 
metaphor about images to stick to something physically invisible as radiation, Weart’s point 
certainly applied the power of images to convey depictions of the physical destruction produced 
by supraconventional nuclear weapon effects.  
Michael Sherry noted how even the most sympathetic accounts of the bombings, like 
John Hersey’s 1946 Hiroshima, suggested “symbols like the mushroom cloud substituted for 
realities which Americans could only understand second-hand.”188 Sherry wrote in terms of 
Americans’ general isolation from the supraconventional horrors of twentieth-century war. Yet, 
his point also applied even more cogently to the hidden extraconventional risks of fallout. As 
factors precipitating nuclear fear, the sadly commonplace visible depictions of physical 
destruction actually worked to skew the cross-current of images this produced. Taken together, 
the misleading message to Americans was that atomic bombs were little different except in scale 
from the familiar destruction of far less powerful conventional munitions, a portrayal that 
persisted long after the first clear indications of fallout’s threat emerged publicly in 1954.  
Sherry made several other general points about the Cold War’s nuclear nature that 
similarly apply to fallout’s specific role in the argument here about its determinative centrality to 
American nuclear strategy. Sherry described how initial fear of atomic power was “transferred 
                                                                                                                                                             
to 95% cleaner in some cases) on an individual weapon basis, the sheer numbers of weapons likely to be used in 
general nuclear war would nonetheless generate cumulative fallout on a massive scale. 
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from the bomb to the Soviets” in the process of rendering the vast expansion of American 
nuclear forces politically palatable to the public. The awful dependence on nuclear weapons also 
created problems of “morale and credibility.” Both problems were aggravated and magnified by 
fallout. Sherry did not place the fault so much on fallout as on the generally problematic nature 
of nuclear weapons, citing Brodie’s 1959 injunction that “One use of it [the nuclear sanction] 
will be fatally too many.” If deterrence was the only possible use of nuclear weapons and the 
threat was similarly uncertainly constrained, how credible and stable was the atomic standoff?  
Yet if the threat was not credible, what use did America’s atomic weapons have, 
and what risk did the country run of committing the fatal error of 
“appeasement”?189 
 
This was the fork on which American nuclear strategy was spitted upon. Instead of one tine as 
“east” and one as “west,” it was more accurate to say one tine consisted of the supraconventional 
effects and the other was extraconventional effects. While only nascent in its revelation of what 
Brodie considered the last big secret of nuclear weapons following the CASTLE BRAVO 
incident, eventually fallout’s net effect would boomerang atomic fear from the Soviets and back 
onto the weapons themselves, not at all the intended direction. Likewise, efforts to normalize 
atomic weapons invoked their supraconventional effects to apply newly elastic ethical norms of 
total war to the use of nuclear weapons for strategic bombing.  
Fallout as an Ethical and Legal Problem 
The AEC and Pentagon shared multiple needs to suppress information about the 
radioactive nature of extraconventional effects, which ranged from the potential for legal 
liability, the AEC’s initial concern, to the Pentagon’s need to create a legal fiction to differentiate 
what it saw as legitimate use of weapons of mass destruction from illegal WMD use.
190
 
Arguably, the Pentagon had a formal point, given its argument that nuclear weapons fell within 
the bounds of internationally accepted postwar norms of warfare, in which the conduct of the war 
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by the U.S. military played both explicit and implicit preponderant roles in defining; by this 
yardstick, indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons against civilian populations was different only 
in its efficiency in comparison to essentially similar indiscriminate violence inflicted on civilians 
caused by conventional explosive and incendiary weapons.
191
 Thus, the Air Force’s argument for 
the utility of its nuclear weapons was dependent on the exclusion of two important factors: the 
general lack of critical review after World War Two of the problem of collateral civilian 
casualties caused by all types of weapons used in strategic bombardment, whether conventional 
explosive, incendiary, or nuclear; and General Leslie Groves’ careful suppression of references 
to ethical parallels between chemical agents and biological weapons and exposures to radiation.  
The Universality of Conventional Destruction and the Moral Question of Radiation 
Moral issues aside, mass bombardment of civilians with conventional armament was an 
accepted norm in Europe long before “Little Boy” detonated over the city of Hiroshima on 6 
August 1945.  Thus, images found in magazines like Life portrayed a sanitized version of the 
fearsome punishment inflicted on enemy populations, suggesting a somewhat different universal 
norm where tolerance of destruction of civilians was established as legitimate in World War 
Two. Regardless of its proximate cause, first-hand accounts from returning occupation troops 
were reconstructed in remembrance as those involved began to put the pieces of what happened 
together over the decades that followed.
192
 Images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, normalized in the 
context of familiar destruction, operated in parallel with the United States government’s 
intentional suppression of information about radiation effects to create a distinct public 
impression that nuclear weapons were simply a way to efficiently package enormous destructive 
potential into a single bomb. This was not coincidental, but part of a larger effort by the 
Pentagon to constrain hard questions about radiation effects produced by nuclear weapons as 
worrisomely akin to violating international norms governing chemical weapons.  
A recent article by Sean Malloy pointed out fear of eventual public reaction caused 
General Leslie Groves, military commander of the Manhattan Project, to actively work to shape 
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favorable public opinion about atomic weapons by suppressing reports of radiation sickness, 
small numbers of which appeared in the press in the first weeks after Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were bombed. Malloy found these efforts “were part of an evolving campaign by American 
officials to downplay or deny the fatal and lingering radiation effects inflicted by nuclear 
weapons.”  
Indeed, despite the best efforts of Groves and his successors, radiation effects 
ultimately became central to the widespread understanding of nuclear weapons as 
uniquely terrible and have likely contributed to the formation of a nuclear “taboo” 
that has helped check their use since 1945.
193
 
 
Malloy’s conclusion located the origin of secrecy about fallout in the leadership and practices of 
the Manhattan Project, thus linking the focus on subjectivities of fallout to an extensive secret 
history of limiting access to factual information about fallout and problematizing the belief it was 
hidden primarily because it was a source of potential political and ethical embarrassment. 
Groves, his commanders, and their successors placed great stock in a sanitized public image of 
the bomb, motivated primarily by the need to keep the project secret and the potential for legal 
questions to arise about the bomb’s effects.  
During the decade after TRINITY, Groves’ successors serving on the Military Liaison 
Committee, which coordinated the efforts of the AEC with the military’s requirements continued 
to believe references to radiation and its risks undermined the Pentagon’s efforts intended to 
facilitate the conventionalization of the bomb. Soft power advocates arguably give credit to 
fallout for sparking large-scale political and social mobilizations; in response, fallout quickly 
became a globalized concept, thus applying pressure to slow the arms race and acting as a 
counterforce to the Cold War’s momentum towards confrontation.194 Thus, the decades-long 
public relations conflict between the bomb builders and those who represented public opposition 
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to nuclear weapons was framed as largely fought along subjective lines, often leaving depictions 
of Cold War history reduced to a struggle over morals, perceptions, and beliefs. While they 
certainly contributed, it remains an open question whether these popular initiatives of resistance 
were sufficient cause to bring about the tangential change required to end fallout and check the 
fatalistic momentum of the Cold War. From Weart to Wittner, the historian’s emphasis remained 
the subjectivity of human reaction to fallout, even in the limited presence of facts and science, 
which largely, and sometimes purposefully, remained missing in action. It was as if people could 
not get to know fallout better, so everyone just decided to gossip about it.  
Supraconventional versus Extraconventional Weapons Effects 
Part of Brodie’s concern over revelation of fallout’s existence in the 1955 AEC report on 
CASTLE BRAVO was prompted by fallout’s creation of a need to revisit his previous work on 
strategy, which like most such work prior to 1954 was based solely on the supraconventional 
effects of nuclear weapons.  Brodie’s views largely reflected the U.S. military’s own view of 
nuclear weapons as simply a more efficient means of delivering destruction conventional 
weapons previously provided.
 
 Despite his shock at the post-CASTLE BRAVO report’s public 
revelations about fallout, Brodie was simply among the vast majority who missed the fact that 
substantial revelations about fallout occurred a year earlier during the spring 1954 AEC hearing 
that led to revocation of Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance, even though the term itself 
was apparently banned from the proceedings.
195
  
Thus, this work acknowledges the empirical power of the supraconventional effects of 
nuclear weapons, even while concentrating its analytic gaze across multiple networks of political 
and social power to focus on the more subtle but equally significant risks of extraconventional 
effects.
196
 One goal is demonstrating fallout’s potent, clear-cut role in the policy market failure 
of nuclear weapons. Fallout set boundaries on the behaviors of those who controlled nuclear 
weapons, who found their perceived control of nuclear weapons and the state power flowing 
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from them considerably less absolute and markedly more inflexible than initially perceived, 
because fallout’s extraconventional effects acted as an integral limitation on the utility value of 
the supraconventional military effects of nuclear weapons. 
Compartmentalization and Insider Knowledge 
Brodie’s compartmentalization from a holistic understanding of fallout’s influence on the 
policy he studied, despite the high level clearance required for his work, was a common feature 
of the first decade of fallout’s service as an intelligence source. While the Soviets showed few if 
any signs of concern their fallout was monitored by AFOAT-1, the official story of fallout’s 
benign and inconsequential relationship to nuclear weapons served to protect fallout by 
regulating access to information about it under a strict “need to know” regime. Using techniques 
officially described under the rubric of long range detection (LRD), the work of AFOAT-1 
began with a tall order – “detecting atomic explosions anywhere in the world.” On receipt of 
General LeMay’s memorandum recommending assignment of the mission to the Air Force, 
Army Chief of Staff General Dwight Eisenhower concurred with LeMay just days before the 
Army Air Corps became independent from the Army with the organization of the Department of 
Defense under the National Security Act of 1947.
197
 At the very beginning of the American 
effort to detect Soviet nuclear explosions, two of the central characters in the uses made of long 
range detection, the core topic of this project, were clearly both on the same page about its need 
and importance to national defense. While evidence of their currency and understanding of the 
scope of their cognizance over time of the specifics of LRD remains sparse, both Eisenhower and 
LeMay were engaged in assignments that kept them aware of its vital importance throughout 
their careers. They serve here in the role of social tracers providing evidence of fallout’s 
changing meaning within the policy making apparatus of the U.S. government.
198
 While by 1955 
Eisenhower and LeMay wielded the most powerful military forces in global history, what is 
remarkable about what might superficially seem at first to be “big man” history was the way in 
which fallout drained away and constrained the power presidents and generals initially believed 
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nuclear weapons afforded the military. Fallout crafted a secret counter-narrative of scientific data 
and knowledge, complementing from above the voices from below that were raised against 
nuclear weapons as documented by Wittner, Miller, and others.
199
 The experiences of the 
president and SAC commander as related here reflected the hubris of belief that one can truly 
control nuclear weapons. Instead, these weapons dictated constraints on their possessors roughly 
equal to what was conferred by their empowerment. 
Constructing National and Personal Security In Spite of Fallout 
CASTLE BRAVO’s raising the issue of fallout danger implicitly questioned a 
constructed landscape of safety and national security relied on by the nuclear weapons 
bureaucracy to facilitate their use of the technology, just as the impetus toward strategic bombing 
created its own ethical justification for that technology in the course of World War Two.
200
 
Following Joe-1, the AEC came under tremendous pressure to develop fusion weapons, creating 
political conditions, in part focused on the carefully concealed policy significance of fallout, 
which eventually led to the end of J. Robert Oppenheimer’s career in government service.201 The 
same set of contingencies also put pressure on other AEC projects.  
A prime example of the struggle over fallout’s meaning was the location, establishment, 
and operation of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) as a continental U.S. base for nuclear testing 
beginning in 1951.
202
 The idea of a continental test site was originally the military’s, based on a 
secret report the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned in 1948. That proposal was rejected by the 
Atomic Energy Commission unless a “national emergency” necessitated detonating nuclear 
devices upwind from populated areas. The Korean “police action” soon provided just the 
opening needed to throw caution – and fallout – to the wind.203 From the beginning and with 
only the most basic of information on its potential threat in hand, the AEC’s major concern about 
using NTS was the risk posed by fallout, which the AEC viewed as the “major constraint on 
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testing in Nevada.” Tellingly, regardless of its location, the Commission noted any “test program 
meant risk. Absolute safety could only result from an end to testing…”204 Likely more salient at 
the time of the decision, one risk that received little attention past the initial siting of NTS was 
that of the Russians obtaining fallout samples. It was a definite possibility, with the proposed 
alternative location to NTS located in the Carolinas. That near-coastal site also held the potential 
for fallout to drift up the coast to the populous Northeast.  
While a better choice for security reasons than the Carolinas, fallout from testing in 
Nevada dropped radioactive debris across wide swaths of the United States.
205
 Importantly, it 
provided a sparsely populated interval to allow the most intense radioactivity of test fallout to 
decay before it reached more populated areas in the Midwest and East Coast. Given later events, 
the AEC’s initial opposition to use of NTS, followed by its later disinterest in the matter of the 
risks and consequences of fallout, amounted to acquiescence to the Pentagon, suggesting the 
military persuaded the Commission it was okay with not only liberally dose those in the military 
with radiation, but potentially civilians, too.
206
  It also suggested the military’s historical 
obstructionism in limiting access to fallout studies by refusing to declassify data from the time of 
its most intense deposition remains telling, given there appears to be little in the way of actual 
security concerns to prevent such a release, even as questions about the extent of the health 
impacts of fallout persist. 
Shields Warren, who as director of the AEC’s Division of Biology and Medicine earlier 
managed the GABRIEL study and was a central figure in setting early AEC radiation exposure 
policy and practice, gave his blessing to the initial operation of the NTS by chairing an informal 
group called the Jangle Feasibility Committee.
207
 Picking figures out of the air, as seemed to be 
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the case with radiation exposure standards in general, the deeply-divided panel recommended 
allowing testing of kiloton-class devices at NTS, based on their view that the limited fallout they 
produced would not exceed these arbitrarily chosen standards. It should be noted that no other 
studies were ever conducted that raised the basic issue of whether the NTS should be used for 
atmospheric testing, let alone at considerably higher yields.
208
 Given Warren’s involvement in 
GABRIEL and the AEC’s initial 1949 rejection of a continental test site except on an emergency 
basis, this suggests the premise it developed of a 60 megaton global wartime limit on fallout and 
the fact that anticipated testing in Nevada would come nowhere near that limit played a 
substantial role in the decision, given the paucity of other supporting evidence for the safety of 
atmospheric testing in the continental United States. 
Controlling fallout at NTS depended on a strategy that relied on natural processes to 
dilute the dangers of fallout as it drifted across most of the continental United States. 
Unfortunately, a parallel range of natural processes also exist that concentrated fallout’s 
radioactivity through bioaccumulation, global atmospheric circulation, and other means. Despite 
the obvious opportunities testing provided for a range of useful studies about exposure to fallout 
and the Pentagon’s capacity to arrange for study of a vast array of military nuclear projects, it 
was remarkable how little experimental interest was demonstrated by either the military or the 
AEC in studying fallout’s impact on living environments outside the laboratory during the time 
of atmospheric testing.
209
 This suggests a token, solitary role for Project Sunshine’s obsessive 
focus on strontium-90 as a distraction from or substitute for more substantive research. 
While the AEC said little in public about its concerns over the safety of the decision 
forced on it by the military with what became the Nevada Test Site (NTS), it nonetheless then 
proceeded to treat the main problem with radioactive fallout as one of public relations, rather 
than public health, anticipating a thorough discussion of the issues would needlessly stir up fears 
                                                                                                                                                             
inevitably relatively dirty because of the resulting direct fireball contact when shot. It appeared that, like GREEN 
RUN at Hanford in 1949 (to be discussed), the military wanted training, research, and development opportunities for 
AFOAT-1’s nascent seismic and other networks that enjoyed the logistical advantages of a continental U.S. location. 
The primary seismic system training locations were at Lowry AFB outside Denver and its advanced seismic training 
and R&D efforts conducted at several locations in Wyoming. 
208
 The highest yield atmospheric test conducted at NTS was HOOD (74 kilotons, 5 July 1957). 
209
 Karl Z. Morgan and Ken Patterson, The Angry Genie: One Man’s Walk through the Nuclear Age (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Ernest Sternglass, Secret Fallout: Low Level Radiation from Hiroshima to 
Three-Mile Island (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). Morgan was regarded as the “father of health physics” and was 
a longtime AEC employee at Oak Ridge. He later turned cautionary about radiation. Sternglass raised concerns 
about demographic evidence of fallout across populations in the early 1960s. 
80 
 
among the public. The AEC was also concerned the drain on military resources due to the 
Korean War threatened future testing needed for weapons development.
210
 Ultimately, the AEC 
acquiesced to what it previously viewed as the problematic demand for a continental test site, 
essentially allowing military and financial considerations to overrule the AEC’s reluctance to use 
it based on the potential hazards of fallout to the civilian population. While garnering far less 
attention than Oppenheimer’s ordeal, choosing the location of what became NTS was just as 
fraught with many of the same pressures to ignore the implications of fallout as the decision to 
pursue thermonuclear weapons and later purge the AEC’s chief scientist.  
Despite choice of a site near Las Vegas, Nevada for NTS, the AEC’s director of military 
application grumbled about its limitations, “No site within the United States can be considered a 
completely satisfactory alternate to overseas sites…” because of the requirement to minimize 
fallout exposures. Limiting the maximum yield of tests conducted in Nevada, along with a 
program to reassure “the general public…by judicious handling of public information,” were the 
AEC’s primary means of dealing with the problems created by detonating nuclear weapons in the 
desert upwind of the heavily populated regions of the United States.
211
 In contrast, what the AEC 
saw as a public relations problem in Nevada was apparently seen by the military as a public 
relations opportunity to demonstrate the controllable nature of nuclear power that made it “safe” 
for use on the battlefield. Following Paul Fackler’s “initiative” as a sampler pilot at 
SANDSTONE, his example of an implicit claim about the relative safety of fallout exposures 
arising from the apparent lack of ill effects after exposure also applied to use of NTS for testing 
as next in a series of situations where military-sponsored or mediated events more explicitly 
asserted such claims. This later included the maneuver of troops across contaminated areas 
shortly after numerous test shots and the 1957 test of the nuclear-armed Genie air-to-air rocket 
just overhead of a group of volunteers.
212
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Once the imagined terrain of “safe” testing at NTS was constructed and approved, 
pressures continued to test still more powerful weapons there.
213
 Los Alamos director Norris 
Bradbury raised questions about the standards Warren’s group recommended, noting their lack 
of scientific basis. Bradbury worried undertaking the tests without solid predictive evidence 
risked the AEC’s reputation if fallout moved off-site, a fact already known by the military to be a 
foregone conclusion with any atmospheric testing. Disingenuously, Warren’s group came back 
with a standard raising the allowable level of airborne radiation activity to more closely reflect 
the likely impact of test fallout, while limiting the need to make mandatory closures when 
detectable radiation inevitably moved off-site.  
Besides expressing concerns about pressures on military personnel at test events to take 
shortcuts leading to higher exposures, this change roughly coincided with the revision in 
GABRIEL’s estimates of the maximum tolerable global yield expenditure limit for nuclear war 
from 60 megatons in 1949 to 2,000 megatons in 1952.
214
 The AEC’s concession on the 
theoretical limits of nuclear war apparently reflected an effort to maintain a semblance of 
exposure standards to meet new military requirements anticipating wide use of thermonuclear 
weapons and a high tolerance for fallout. The quiet burial of such concerns with the birth of 
Sunshine following the pledges of confidentiality extracted from researchers at the 1953 
GABRIEL conference was indicative of how the military believed it could keep fallout at bay as 
a problem – secrecy. The problem persisted, with one exasperated AEC health division leader 
arguing in 1957 the military sought to ignore test organization limits, believing exposures that 
“might hurt other people do not to apply to Air Force personnel.”215 
Assumptions that the threat of radiation exposure from fallout should focus on relatively 
stronger beta and gamma radiation initially led the AEC and the military to ignore what would 
prove to be the most troublesome part of fallout – seemingly weak alpha activity from particles, 
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lower yields as testing was constrained by growing concerns about off-site fallout exposures. In a reminder that 
yield was not everything with regard to fallout, at NTS the dirtiest shot of all was HARRY (32 kilotons, 19 May 
1953). Through the end of testing there in 1958, the total radiation exposure from NTS by one method “estimated 
that a cumulative total of 85,000 person-roentgens of external gamma ray exposure occurred. Of this, Harry 
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but which represented a far more potent threat if inhaled or consumed.
216
 In part, this focus was 
adopted because the crude instruments of the day were effective in measuring beta and gamma 
radiation, while they had difficulty accurately measuring alpha activity.
217
 However, these limits 
were adopted mostly because the threat of alpha fallout was poorly understood by those 
responsible for establishing radiation exposure standards.  
This problem of assumptions based on a substantive lack of data was part of the 
questionably named practice of what was and still is known within the industry as “rad-safe,” a 
shortened term for radiological safety practices applied to health physics. Bart Hacker 
contemplated the implications of the term throughout his comprehensive tome, Elements of 
Controversy, which examined the AEC’s efforts to track and limit radiological exposures during 
the era of atmospheric testing. Hacker observed quite plainly, in contrast to J. Samuel Walker’s 
later assertion it never occurred, that “[t]hreshold thinking shaped early safety codes.” Hacker 
argued “permissible exposure” was the term in common use in the 1950s, adding “social-
political” to the list of other factors that exerted a powerful influence on what were supposedly 
strictly constructed objective standards of radiation exposure.
218
 Hacker’s perspective illustrated 
why, whatever “rad-safe” meant to those who used or heard it, it was not really based on 
evidence, hard science or thoroughly vetted best practices, but on a set of best guesses designed 
to facilitate widespread use of nuclear energy. Using the word ‘safe’ was undoubtedly intended 
to reassure workers and the public testing was supposedly conducted in safety, but it certainly 
disguised the fact that behind the scenes a political elite was choosing to determine policy and 
frame it with science as an acceptable level of risk in ways that depended on optimistic 
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assumptions that far exceeded the state of scientific certainty about the long-term effects of 
radiation exposure. Hacker’s exposition on the use of the term rad-safe pointed to abuses of 
discourse frequently found in distortions of language in support of the U.S. nuclear program.  
As Foucault might surmise, this manipulation of language was an internal construction of 
a sector of the scientific intelligentsia designed, in part, to disguise their ignorance about fallout 
from the public.
219
 Rad-safe as a term was language about nuclear weapons designed to reassure 
the public – in fact, to market to them the concept that nuclear power in general was safe – as 
well as to reassure those who actually worked with nuclear energy it was utilitarian technology 
under human control. By extension, this logic likewise reinforced the tendency of some, 
including many in the Air Force, to imagine nuclear weapons could be treated as simply larger, 
more efficient versions of conventional weapons, thus presented no problem delivering more 
bomb tonnage on target could not solve, just as it did during World War Two. 
GABRIEL, Military Utility, and the Surprisingly Stark Limits of Cumulative Fallout 
Shields Warren’s actions during the Manhattan Project prefigured his postwar decisions 
and marked his dive into the relatively shallow scientific basis of determining human radiation 
exposure standards.
220
 Under Warren’s direction, the GABRIEL study in 1949 first suggested 
cumulative nuclear explosions of 60 megatons yield or more would lead to serious contamination 
of the atmosphere.
221
 This was a relatively large total yield within the context of the limited 
supply of stockpiled fission weapons available in 1949.
222
 Development of thermonuclear 
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weapons after 1949 changed the premise of exceeding 60 megatons yield to a far more likely 
circumstance in the event of war – the first experimental thermonuclear device (IVY MIKE, 1 
November 1952) alone had a yield of 10.4 megatons (or about 500 “nominal” bombs) or about 
one-sixth of the fallout needed to create global peril, based on Warren’s 1949 prediction.223 With 
the enormous yields made possible by thermonuclear weapons, virtually any significant war 
between combatants utilizing them bore the potential to poison the global environment with 
fallout in short order. Even the cumulative yield from typical vigorous Cold War era test series 
imposed significant risks, if the original 60 megaton limit in GABRIEL was observed.
224
  
The prospect of wider public knowledge of the conclusions found in GABRIEL held the 
potential to effectively undermine the military utility of arsenals and the political utility of war 
plans that relied on use of hundreds or, as it turned out, thousands of nuclear weapons. Such 
dangers raised grave, fundamental doubts about the feasibility of defense planning based around 
the dubious strategy of the use of massive numbers of nuclear weapons, which was effectively 
the core strategic concept laid down in the Air Force’s war plans. Shields Warren was cognizant 
of this troubling limitation of nuclear weapons, while at the same time he acted with substantial 
influence on policy decisions made to allow their testing in the atmosphere upwind of large 
populations. Given Warren’s prominence in the bureaucracy, his established role as researcher, 
participant and expert observer from the wartime years on, and the specific problematizing of 
nuclear war the report’s prediction laid out, the limits GABRIEL set on nuclear war were in stark 
conflict with the post-JOE-1 goals of the Air Force.
225
 There would be casualties. 
                                                                                                                                                             
pursuit of weapons in the 100 kiloton class, achieved at GREENHOUSE in 1951. For weapons with a yield similar 
to that of the plutonium-239 weapon dropped on Nagasaki (20 kilotons), it would take 3,000 weapons to equal 60 
megatons; for 100 kiloton weapons, it would take 600 to equal 60 megatons total yield.  Since one 20 kiloton “Fat 
Man” could destroy any known military target at the time, the question became where can 3,000 targets be found in 
the USSR? 60 megatons represented only 4 CASTLE BRAVO-class thermonuclear devices. The U.S. nuclear 
weapon inventory was ~170 in 1949 or about 3.4 megaton total yield, most likely all of nominal or near nominal 
yield. The inventory grew to some 2,422 weapons in 1955, or about 47 megatons total yield if all were of nominal 
yield. However, emergency capability thermonuclear weapons first entered the stockpile in 1954, so the available 
total yield likely exceeded GABRIEL’s original 60 megaton limit at or soon after that point. 
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Yet Warren avoided suffering the fate of his better known colleague, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer. Warren appeared to read the tea leaves and adjusted his position on the matter to 
accommodate the shifting contingencies fallout created during the early Cold War. GABRIEL 
has drawn little interest among researchers, because the extant information about it remains 
sparse as with other empirical studies about fallout known to exist, but currently unavailable to 
researchers. GABRIEL’s role in the narrative marked an important turning point, opening more 
questions than it closed.  Largely ignored after being shunted aside to even greater secrecy as a 
compartment within Willard Libby’s Project Sunshine, a long-running, largely inconclusive 
strontium-90 dog-and-pony show originally billed as its successor study, GABRIEL’s 
preliminary findings suggested the idea of general nuclear war with thermonuclear weapons was 
a highly impractical strategy and that a large part of SAC’s planned arsenal was therefore 
superfluous in terms of military utility.
226
 At the same time, Oppenheimer, engaged with 
developing the use of fallout for intelligence purposes and generally familiar with GABRIEL’s 
conclusions as chair of the AEC’s General Advisory Committee, was gaining interest in the 
implications of the issue, which President Truman’s decision to pursue the “super” effectively 
ignored.  
On the face of it, Truman’s order of silence ostensibly covered the entire thermonuclear 
project; in practice, it was primarily an order to set aside comment on the fatal conceptual flaw in 
that decision – fallout. The near-complete silence on the topic by Oppenheimer and others that 
persisted prior to the spring of 1954 was a product of not only fallout’s use for intelligence, but 
also because Truman’s order was applied to stem discussion of the only aspect of the weapon 
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itself that was controversial. Those it applied to knew that fallout was its primary target.
227
 For 
those under the weight of a security agreement, that bar effectively extended for a lifetime, 
accounting in part for the relative “gap” in Oppenheimer’s personal comments on the topic to the 
end of his life. With window-dressing stripped away, it was clear his most consequential conflict 
with the Air Force was over the issue of fallout. 
Exposure: Informed Consent and the “Buchenwald Touch” 
Planning for the use of significant quantities of nuclear weapons to meet wartime 
requirements meant the military needed to understand the more immediate effects exposure to 
radiation would have on soldiers, sailors, and airmen, as well as to inform civil defense planners 
of the measures required to protect civilian populations exposed to nuclear blast and the resulting 
fallout. In addition, some proposed weapons systems would require military personnel to be 
exposed to radiation in the normal course of their duty, even in peacetime. These included 
support for programs to develop nuclear-powered submarines, portable nuclear reactor power 
plants, and, incredibly, nuclear-powered bombers. Such aircraft would utilize only minimal 
amounts of shielding in order to be light enough to fly, subjecting their crews to intense radiation 
likely to far exceed even the AEC’s relatively untested exposure standards.  
In April 1949, the Air Force pushed the AEC to do experimental work to serve as the 
basis “to tell a group of pilots that ordinary human beings had been voluntarily exposed” to as 
much as 150 roentgens of radiation, a figure that far exceeded the radiation exposure standards of 
the day.
228
 Another participant in the AEC’s deliberations over support for human exposure 
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studies, apparently conceding both the scientific unknowns and the pressure the AEC suffered 
from the military, acknowledged “the problem [was] something larger than” a medical problem – 
it was a political problem.
229
 The pressure to paper over the fallout problem gave even Shields 
Warren, a man once described by Merrill Eisenbud of the AEC as “patriotic enough to lie,” 
pause; Eisenbud noted Warren’s disapproval of the human exposure experiments needed for such 
research.
230
 The Pentagon’s Committee on Medical Sciences withdrew a proposal for human 
experimentation in the face of Warren’s objections, but the proposal would later resurface, with 
Warren taking a more flexible position on such matters. 
During a meeting in May 1950, the Committee explicitly reconsidered the experimental 
protocol proposal in light of the American Medical Association’s guidelines on the use of human 
subjects issued in 1946 during the Nuremberg trials. The guidelines clearly called for informed 
consent by every test subject. Military officers present were troubled by this ethical requirement, 
with one arguing they already had already established a precedent with an “experiment involving 
over 200,000 people in the Nagasaki and Hiroshima areas…” in pressing Warren to change his 
mind and support the Air Force’s proposed human subject experiments.231 By this time, 
November 1950, the Korean War was underway, adding to the pressures on Warren to accept 
this decision.  
As with his contemporaneous decision to accede to the military’s “war emergency” 
request to locate NTS in Nevada, Warren’s decision took place within the landscape of war. 
Joseph Hamilton, one of his researchers, wrote Warren a memo urging whatever data was needed 
was best obtained through animal experiments. Hamilton argued “If this is done to humans…this 
would have a little of the Buchenwald touch.” Warren responded to efforts to gain his approval 
by noting, “It is not very long since we got through trying Germans for doing exactly this 
thing…”232 Thus, those responsible for regulating human radiation exposures in both the AEC 
and the military were fully aware of the implications of Nuremberg when it came to exposure of 
humans to radiation, whether by direct experiment or – perhaps less consciously because of their 
own considerable ignorance of its threat – by exposure to fallout. 
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In the odd ethical dance that went on between Shields Warren and the Air Force, outside 
factors apparently became the final determinant of the outcome. Scientists in the period who 
raised troubling questions about the direction of U.S. nuclear policy, up to and including Robert 
Oppenheimer, frequently either had their loyalty called into question or feared that it would be 
for offering their honest scientific opinion. Oppenheimer’s eventual fate was to have his security 
clearances pulled, effectively ending his government service and sidetracking his scientific 
career following the hearing in 1954; the gathering storm of suspicion severely curtailed his 
work even before that proceeding.
233
 Given the high profile such cases faced in a political 
atmosphere dominated by the excesses of McCarthyism, the circumstances of Warren’s 
resignation from the AEC and his subsequent employment in 1953 as a consultant to the Aircraft 
Nuclear Propulsion program (run by the Air Force’s School of Aviation Medicine) beg for 
further research, as do formal or informal reactions by the service related to his previous review 
of reports from GABRIEL.  
While Warren objected to conducting total body irradiation on healthy volunteers, Eileen 
Welsome observed he “apparently saw nothing wrong with the Air Force’s School of Aviation 
Medicine’s planned research on sick cancer patients.” Warren made an astonishing turnaround in 
his viewpoint on the ethical considerations he previously raised, making no objections to 
experiments on cancer patients that were clearly without medical benefit.
234
 The only difference, 
maybe even more damning in light of what he knew about the lessons of Nuremburg, was that 
these test subjects often were ill, largely poor and/or people of color, rather than the healthy 
military or other test subjects he objected to being abused previously.
235
 This reflected Warren’s 
limited view of the scope of application of these ethical standards, one that likewise guided him 
to overlook the rather obvious connection between exposing huge populations to fallout and the 
lack of informed consent inherent in doing so. It takes little speculation to imagine blossoming 
McCarthyism likely contributed to Warren’s weakening ethical and moral courage.  
In addition to the hundreds of thousands of Japanese who became the subjects of an 
experiment in human radiation exposure, it was remarkable how frequently people of color , 
women and those of lower class status found themselves the subjects of such testing in the 
United States. The first group, known as “radium girls,” was the subject of a long-running study 
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of their radiation exposure already well into its third decade by the early 1950s.
236
 The last 
radium dial painting plant in Illinois was only shuttered in the late 1970s.
237
 
Another case also involved Joseph Hamilton, who later wrote the “Buchenwald touch” 
memo to Warren. A test subject was given plutonium; his financial circumstances, Hamilton 
feared, were so bad because of his illness he might move away, threatening loss of valuable 
experimental data. Hamilton asked the Army to give the man, a house painter no longer able to 
practice his trade, a stipend to keep him tied to the project, but the Army refused, unless the 
money was regarded as payment for samples of the man’s feces and urine. As Peter Bacon Hales 
noted, the U.S nuclear program tied “the abstractions of language, social theory, and bureaucracy 
to mortal bodies.”238  
The first major military-sponsored radiation exposure study, conducted to support the ill-
conceived nuclear-powered bomber project, incorporated another aspect of the “Buchenwald 
touch.” It was headed by Herbert Gerstner, a former Nazi Party member smuggled out of East 
Germany under the auspices of the CIA’s Operation Paperclip.239 Perhaps a partial explanation 
of his ethical turnaround was offered by Warren in an interview, where he spoke of the era as 
being a “skittish time.”240 Whatever the motivation, Warren’s reverses on ethical issues in the 
U.S. nuclear program threw into high relief the short-term usefulness of purposeful ignorance 
about, not just the science of fallout, but the troubling ethical considerations that should have 
influenced construction, testing, and potential use of such weapons in the immediate post-
Nuremberg context. 
Krypton-85: Crucial Revelations and Strategic Confusion 
Following the scramble of activity Joe-1 initiated, AFOAT-1 entered the daily grind of 
monitoring samples for further evidence of fallout debris and gases from subsequent Soviet 
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tests.
241
 A more obscure but equally important part of its work was capture and analysis of 
krypton-85 in order to monitor the production of the primary fissile material used in nuclear 
weapons, plutonium-239, in the Soviet Union. A 1951 memo by Doyle Northrup of AFOAT-1 to 
the Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy described problems facing liaison 
work with the British on the krypton-85 project. Northrup advised that the Congressional Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) should be asked to “recommend the necessary changes in 
legislation to permit the exchange of information on production rates of krypton-85” with the 
British and Canadians. With the coordination of such a joint effort, Northrup asserted it was 
possible to estimate Soviet plutonium production within five percent of its actual value.
242
 With 
his tentative proposal, Northrup was engaged in an attempt to woo official approval for a closer 
relationship between the respective nuclear intelligence services following a string of postwar 
incidents and security violations involving spying by those cleared by the British for work 
involving nuclear weapons. 
Along with the fallout sampling, also controlled by AFOAT-1, the accuracy of the 
quantifiable estimates of Soviet strength provided by krypton-85 stood in stark contrast to the 
very limited intelligence available in this period on nearly every other aspect of Russian military 
power. There was not, however, a corresponding method useful for estimating Soviet uranium-
235 production, the other fissile material commonly used in weapons. For immature nuclear 
programs it was easier to separate uranium-238, the preponderant isotope found in natural 
uranium ores, from uranium-235 by irradiating the uranium mixture in a reactor. This converts a 
large percentage of the uranium-235 to plutonium-239.
243
 The plutonium-239 produced can then 
be chemically separated from the rod after it is extracted from the reactor. Further purification of 
the resulting mixture yields bomb grade plutonium-239 (greater than 93% pure) as fissile 
material. While complex, the process worked more cost-effectively with the available technology 
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than producing large amounts of weapons grade uranium by other methods, which required the 
technically more difficult task of isotopic separation of the otherwise chemically identical 
constituents of uranium, the U-235 and U-238 isotopes. The Soviet nuclear program’s direction 
largely corresponded to the plutonium-239 model, which was confirmed by AFOAT-1 analysis 
of bomb debris.
244
 Combined with the findings of the krypton-85 monitoring program, the Air 
Force was able to develop reasonably accurate estimates to track the total Soviet plutonium 
stockpile inventory very early in the Cold War.  
Ultimately, based on several false assumptions, the absence of more accurate 
information, and the need to justify funding the Strategic Air Command’s vast expansion, Air 
Force intelligence analysts used this generally accurate data to argue for massive increases in the 
U.S. force structure to address the worst-case Soviet threat they believed the krypton-85 
estimates outlined.  During most of the 1950s, in the absence of better quantifiable data, the Air 
Force essentially argued Soviet delivery system capabilities would track the size of this stockpile 
in relatively close accord with American practice. That assumption resulted in persistent and 
significant overestimates of Soviet delivery system capabilities based on the Air Force’s 
mistaken extrapolation from AFOAT-1’s otherwise relatively accurate data on the Soviet fissile 
material stockpile. Discovery of these failed intelligence assumptions eventually emerged in 
1957 under closer analysis supported by U-2 imagery returned by the CIA overflights of Soviet 
territory, when imagery began to supplant this prior nearly-exclusive reliance on the AEDS for 
this extraordinarily valuable and most basic vital insight into the Soviet nuclear threat. 
Krypton-85: Inert Insights in Intelligence 
When the U.S. nuclear monopoly faded away in the dying fireball of Joe-1 (or Pervaya 
Molniya – First Lightning – as the Russians called it), it galvanized an upward trend in defense 
expenditures as the Cold War deepened. Before the Strategic Air Command’s “atomic shield” 
against the Soviet Union was declared fully operational in July 1949, achieving LeMay’s initial 
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analysis demonstrated Russian weapons continued to be based primarily on plutonium implosion designs, uranium 
production could be inferred based on the limited roles typical played by uranium in these designs. Weapon 
designers also favored plutonium-239, because its neutron cross section made for a smaller, more efficient weapon. 
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goal on taking command, the fall of mainland China to Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army 
earlier in 1949 added impetus to the idea Communism was an expansive threat.  
AFOAT-1 obtained its surprisingly precise estimate of Soviet plutonium production by 
monitoring the atmospheric loading of krypton-85, an isotope all but non-existent in nature. The 
amount and rate of buildup of krypton-85 in the atmosphere was measured by a process that 
began with cryogenic whole air liquidfication of suitable samples at multiple locations. The tiny 
fraction of the vapor of intelligence interest in each sample was extracted as it boiled off through 
a top secret manifold plumbed to the output of an otherwise standard liquid oxygen generator 
unit. The amount of the isotope was estimated by totaling that emitted from Allied production, 
minus natural decay, and subtracting that amount from the global total detected by the samples. 
This arrived at an accurate estimate of the remaining factor, Soviet plutonium production.
245
 This 
crucial joint Anglo-American effort, survived the political fallout over security from the Philby 
affair and other incidents affecting most other aspects of nuclear cooperation during the 
remainder of Truman’s presidency and during Eisenhower’s first term. The program, called 
NOMINATION at first and then renamed MUSIC later on, continued jointly until 1958.
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The Nuclear Numbers Game and GABRIEL’s Implicit Limits on War 
When the GABRIEL study began in 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) began 
tracking cumulative yield from testing back to the start of testing.
247
 As with plutonium-239 
production, such statistics were fundamental to data-driven organizations like the U.S. Air Force 
and to scientific endeavors like the AEC, to the extent of their capabilities. For the Air Force, a 
global network of sampling aircraft provided a robust, mobile capability to gather samples.
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 AFOAT-1, Unit History 1947-1953, 164-176. This describes the start-up of the B/20 program that depended on 
the sometimes hazardous operation of liquid oxygen production units to obtain samples of krypton-85. 
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 The United States faced criticism over its use of United Nation’s trust territories it supervised in the Pacific for its 
high yield test shots, after the British were forced out of Australia following controversy over its testing of low yield 
devices due to controversy inspired in part by Hedley Marston’s revelation of official duplicity about British test 
fallout. Marston’s confrontation with the test authorities over publication of his research on iodine-131 deposition 
across Australia was noted in the Introduction and will be discussed again briefly in Chapter Two. While the test 
moratorium obviated the need for immediate implementation of the agreement, after atmospheric testing briefly 
resumed in 1961, the United States made use of Britain’s test range on remote Christmas Island for a series of high 
yield shots, while the British gained access to the Nevada Test Site for underground testing. 
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 By the end of 1949, there had been just ten nuclear explosions, the three wartime shots (TRINITY, Hiroshima, 
Nagasaki), five subsequent U.S. tests, and the single Soviet test.  While not as thoroughly documented as later tests 
would be, compiling the cumulative total at that point was a relatively simple task. 
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 While its mission was global, during its first decade AFOAT-1’s capabilities concentrated the AEDS around the 
periphery of the Soviet Union for greatest effect. Efforts to technically improve the data from which intelligence was 
derived through techniques other than fallout sampling,  continuing concerns about potential concealment of testing, 
93 
 
For the AEC and associated civilian agencies with an interest in fallout, like the U.S. Public 
Health Service, far more modest ground facilities largely limited to domestic locations provided 
a rather threadbare baseline of information in comparison to AFOAT-1’s capabilities. With 
krypton-85 monitoring of Soviet fissile material production, the Pentagon’s landscape of nuclear 
intelligence was illustrated by voluminous data on the qualities and quantities describing the 
Soviet weapons program. AFOAT-1 provided a constantly updated virtual snapshot of the 
world’s military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.249 The estimates of annual plutonium 
production and cumulative stockpiles in Appendix B represent an approximation of relative 
strength based on evidence that was available to be detected by intelligence efforts on both sides 
of the conflict.
250
 At the time, compilations of such information were extraordinarily secret, yet 
undoubtedly provided a basic scorecard for the Cold War shared among a tiny audience of top 
national security advisers, military commanders, and intelligence agency officials who possessed 
the need to know and appropriate high level clearances. Overall, the comparative data on 
plutonium-239 stockpiles and estimates of relative numbers of nuclear weapons presented a 
considerably different picture than the uncertain scenario of American weakness and peril in the 
face of Soviet strength often portrayed by Air Force boosters as justification for SAC’s enormous 
investment in nuclear weapons during the Cold War.  
In 1949, the United States possessed about 170 nuclear weapons, nearly all modestly 
refined near-copies of the weapons used against Japan in 1945. Tests at SANDSTONE the year 
before verified the designs of a second generation of nuclear weapons; these entered service 
following SANDSTONE, which tested prototypes with yields ranging from 18 to 49 kilotons.  
With a cumulative stockpile of approximately 550 kilograms of plutonium-239, 1949 found 
annual US plutonium production drift at its lowest ebb, totaling just 150 kilograms. The Soviet 
Union possessed a far more modest stockpile at the time of their first test that August, with an 
estimated 19 kilograms of plutonium-239 and just one weapon, the device tested as Joe-1, with 
perhaps one additional weapon. The 29:1 discrepancy ratio between the respective stockpiles for 
1949 closed sharply over the course of the next few years, although the American predominance 
in deliverable nuclear weapons remained unassailed prior to about 1970.  While General Douglas 
                                                                                                                                                             
and the rising potential for proliferation to other nations all contributed to the expansion of the AEDS. Truly global 
capability came with the launch of space-based surveillance systems in the early 1960s. 
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 Estimated data on fallout was provided in the 1957 and 1959 congressional fallout hearings. Conflicts within it 
and other uncertainties are explored in Chapter Three and Four. 
250
 Based on estimates, exact quantities may differ, but larger trends and relative positions are reflected by this data. 
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MacArthur’s saber-rattling threats to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War earned him an 
early retirement due to his insubordination against Harry Truman, they also goaded on North 
Korea’s ally, the USSR, which possessed roughly 80 bomb equivalency units (BEU) by 1953.251 
In 1952, the ratio of stockpile plutonium between the United States and the Soviet Union closed 
to about 3:1, then after 1957, it held relatively steady around 3:1,demonstrating the United States 
stockpile always held a substantial lead during the early Cold War.   
The four year period from 1953 to 1956 presented a somewhat different and more 
worrisome period, with the ratios between U.S./USSR plutonium stockpiles ranging from 2.6:1 
to 2.9:1. If there was any moment of relative American nuclear “weakness” during the Cold War, 
this was it. Rather than being behind the Soviets or even suggesting a putative future “gap” as the 
Air Force later chose to describe it, this four year period represented a slight convergence 
between two otherwise rather parallel lines. The United States held a substantive lead in 
stockpiled plutonium, as well as highly enriched uranium-235, until the 1970s. Soviet production 
of both ramped up substantially after 1965.
252
 By then, imagery set the secret, if not the public 
record straight, LeMay was retired, and an implicit decision to no longer maintain the substantial 
3:1 lead over potentially available Russian stockpiles. LeMay’s argument publicly embraced fear 
of American military weakness as justification for building a substantial, secret lead in nuclear 
weapons based on this false premise. The American position of preponderant military strength 
was never threatened by Soviet efforts based solely on their fissile material stockpile or nuclear 
weapons. By 1965, cumulative American plutonium-239 production reached nearly 53,000 
kilograms, a substantial advantage over the Soviet stockpile of some 18,000 kilograms.  
Putting aside the consequences of potential wartime use of these weapons inherent in 
such large stockpiles, the daily reality of fallout from testing as a wartime effect during 
peacetime was troubling for many. Yields from testing were often publicly described in vague 
terms, such as “Low yield” (less than 20 kilotons) or “Submegaton” (less than one megaton but 
more than 200 kilotons), although the specific yield of some shots was announced in a number of 
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 The term bomb equivalency unit (BEU) is used here to refer to the critical mass of Pu-239 required to produce a 
“nominal” yield, or roughly equivalent to the Nagasaki implosion weapon, or about 10 kilograms. “Critical Mass,” 
https://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/criticalmass.htm. Critical mass is a complex concept that goes 
beyond mere mass. See Hoddeson , et al, for the Manhattan Project’s struggles in defining it. Alex Wellerstein offers 
a useful short introduction: http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2015/04/10/critical-mass/. 
252
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and Stocks,” 26, 31, 49, 59. http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr10.pdf. 
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cases.
253
 Substantially complete data on test yields began trickling out in the face of 
declassification following the Cold War’s end.254  
With a substantially complete record of basic shot data from nuclear testing now 
available to researchers, it is possible to evaluate fallout trends in light of subsequent events. 
Generally, production of fallout is in direct relation to fission yield, although the exact mix of 
hundreds of isotopes potentially created  varies depending on design and burst height, which 
affects the amount of ground debris ingested by the fireball and converted to fallout along with 
components of the bomb. GABRIEL’s initial 1949 estimate describing fallout from 60 megatons 
of yield as the beginning danger point, but the Air Force’s dogged push for thermonuclear 
weapons drastically changed the mathematics of destruction and radiation associated with 
nuclear weapons. The Air Force counted on the destruction offered by supraconventional effects, 
discounting the extraconventional radiation of fallout as strategically significant. Why?   
If GABRIEL’s initial limitations had been observed once thermonuclear weapons of 10 
megatons or greater yield became available, such as IVY MIKE (10.4 megatons, 1 November 
1952) and CASTLE BRAVO (15 megatons, 1 March 1954), this would theoretically limit their 
wartime use to only a handful  of targets (four to six weapons for a total of 60 megatons.) 
Instead, the 60 megaton limit was revised sharply upward, apparently to reflect an 
accommodation with the realities of the Air Force’s determination to equip itself with a vast 
arsenal of high yield thermonuclear weapons.  This revision of GABRIEL’s putative estimated 
fallout limit to 2,000 megatons (or roughly 133 weapons with the yield of CASTLE BRAVO), 
was still too low to satisfy the aspirations of SAC war planners, given its anticipated  enormous 
force growth. LeMay scorned limits on the conduct of war, so was unlikely to be mollified even 
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 “Nominal Yield” is considered a device with one critical mass of material, which produces about 20 kilotons 
yield, roughly the same size as the Nagasaki plutonium-239 implosion device.  
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-2.html. 
254
 The Federation of American Scientists list provides a helpful recounting of the vague, varying ranges used to 
announce tests by the U.S. government by year at http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/nuclear/nv209nar.pdf. Test yields 
continue to be a sensitive matter. An appendix in a 2006 Department of Energy report on atmospheric testing listed 
test shots between 1945 and 1958. In explaining the omission of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons, their yields 
were carefully noted, but the list itself omitted the yields of all test shots! Terence R. Fehner and F.G. Gosling, 
Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2006), 203-219, 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOENTSAtmospheric.pdf. Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) notes “This is usually cited as the "official" US list.” 
Another complete version of the list including underground tests through 1992 is at 
http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/historical/DOENV_209_REV15.pdf. The compilations of test yields that 
do exist are unofficial and were constructed from multiple sources of varying accuracy.  
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by a more than ten-fold growth in GABRIEL’s suggested ceiling on the use of nuclear weapons. 
Following Robert Oppenheimer’s departure from the GAC, GABRIEL was then largely 
subsumed by being folded into a program whose threat to SAC seemed far more constrained, 
AEC Commissioner Willard Libby’s Project Sunshine. Libby concentrated on strontium-90, just 
one component of fallout and he avoided framing the objective of its research questions in terms 
of defining the limits of nuclear war. Sunshine was not without insights, but it squandered the 
momentum toward an educated conversation about the problem of cumulative fallout from the 
massed use of nuclear weapons the GAC initiated with GABRIEL. 
Suggestively, the 60 megaton cumulative yield GABRIEL defined on the limit for fallout 
in a nuclear war happened to correspond to the approximate total yield from all American testing 
reached by the end of the CASTLE series, a development path to thermonuclear weapons 
outlined by Oppenheimer’s GAC in parallel with GABRIEL. The level of total fallout produced 
by testing through 1954 suggests an experiment to test the hypothesis of GABRIEL by emitting 
the volume of fallout over a longer time while providing the opportunity to observe the 
consequences. Whether intended or not, exposure of the global population as experimental 
subjects was utilized in Project Sunshine’s inquiries in the effects of strontium-90. Given the 
awareness raised by some like Joseph Hamilton that experimentation with radiation on non-
consenting subjects carried the “Buchenwald touch,” the prior example of GREEN RUN, 
discussed next suggested a determination to press forward with fallout research based on this 
premise, but to keep it even more strictly concealed. Such a scenario would account for the GAC 
pursuing GABRIEL’s redefinition of war’s limits under Oppenheimer, then backing away to 
subsume it under Sunshine’s watchful waiting model intended to monitor the subtle signs of 
fallout’s health impacts. Whether it was an intentional experimental transition or one recognized 
as implicit only long after the fact by historians, atmospheric testing in connection with these 
studies represented an example of mass human experimentation without consent.  
From the totality of circumstances, the initial 60 megaton limit seemed to retain some 
intellectual force even after it was superseded by the more thermonuclear-friendly 2,000 
megaton limit. GABRIEL’s attempt to define the limits of nuclear war was seemingly dispensed 
with by the post-Oppenheimer narrowing of inquiry into fallout by the AEC to focus on Willard 
97 
 
Libby’s Project Sunshine.255 The pace of American atmospheric testing never exceeded 60 
megatons annually and ended at just over 156 megatons total in a final spasm that seemed to 
demonstrate relative restraint in the face of Russian profligacy.
256
 Certainly, intellectual curiosity 
about fallout motivated the AEC’s original fallout research priorities. Thus, it was remarkable 
the AEC narrowed its focus to strontium-90 and for the bulk of the decade showed little further 
interest in the troubling, specific issue of the limits of nuclear war raised by GABRIEL. 
Recalibrating GABRIEL to accommodate the anticipated enormous yields of thermonuclear 
weapons suggested enormous pressures being brought to bear on science by imposing secrecy to 
mitigate the effects of fallout. However, GABRIEL’s basic research question demonstrated that 
doubts about the implications of fallout were in motion long before CASTLE BRAVO’s rain of 
ruin forced the question into the light of day. The Oppenheimer hearing that followed also 
suggested the limits of scientific inquiry, although even there the message was muted by the 
apparent wholesale exclusion of its mention at the hearing, a problem taken up in Chapter Three. 
What seemed to be a decision by policy makers to swerve just over the 60 megaton limit 
(for total U.S. testing yield through 1954) by the end of the CASTLE series suggested an attempt 
to “prove” one way or the other that the unseen threat of fallout was inconsequential. This 
creation of another fallout fait accompli bore marked similarities with the siting of NTS so that 
fallout would be seen to “safely” drift across the United States and Paul Fackler’s decision to 
“accidentally” bank his sampler into the radiation plume at SANDSTONE to “prove” the safety 
of using piloted samplers instead of drones to collect very hot samples from close in sampling. 
The statistical certainty of harm in large populations described by radiation epidemiology meant 
that any ill effects that did occur would be delayed and difficult to link back to the exposures that 
precipitated cancer and other illness linked to radiation. In the immediate sense, the government 
was right, as thousands would no more suddenly be sickened or struck dead by fallout from 
testing than anyone in Fackler’s sampler crew was, whatever really happened that day in 1948 
with the Tolono native at the SANDSTONE test series. Effectively, no distinct policy decision 
was made to swerve the entire planet into a global fallout plume by adding the 48 megatons of 
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 Oppenheimer left the GAC in June 1952, in part to avoid the looming confrontation that eventually resulted in his 
1954 personnel security board hearing. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
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 See Appendices B and D. Russian testing lagged far behind the pace of the Americans in terms of numbers and 
yield until 1961. In an aggressive “fallout offensive” during the crisis years of 1961 and 1962, the USSR expended 
roughly 90% of its cumulative atmospheric test yield or nearly 200 megatons! 
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yield expended at the CASTLE series.
257
 Nonetheless, the coincidence between the GABRIEL 
limit in a study originally undertaken under Robert Oppenheimer’s General Advisory Committee 
chairmanship and the cumulative yield reached by the American thermonuclear testing program 
planned under his oversight suggests continuing interest in the limits of nuclear war. 
Calibrating
258
 
A critical analytical problem for AFOAT-1 to solve was the capability to differentiate 
between isotopes produced by plutonium production and those potentially generated by a reactor 
explosion or in the normal effluvia of reactor operation as part of the effort to obtain accurate 
estimates. Iodine-131 was of crucial interest to AFOAT-1 in understanding Soviet bomb design, 
because it was part of a decay chain crucial in determining the timing of a device’s detonation. 
However, iodine-131 was also produced in nuclear reactors during irradiation of uranium fuel 
rods to produce plutonium-239. The test of Joe-1 sparked many initiatives, including the Air 
Force’s pressure on the AEC for a crash program to develop thermonuclear weapons, which 
eventually forced the issue of fallout to the surface.  
The detection of Joe-1 resulted in efforts to further calibrate AFOAT-1’s detection 
capabilities and evaluate the AEDS network’s effectiveness under an experimental program 
called GREEN RUN. Carried out in December 1949 at the Hanford AEC plutonium production 
reservation in Washington State, GREEN RUN was part of a wider program called Operation 
BLUENOSE. BLUENOSE was the overall name for intentional releases of radioactive isotopes 
domestically for intelligence research and development purposes. In addition to the iodine-131 
releases at Hanford, other experimental work at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and at what is now 
known as the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory had the objective of 
developing and calibrating AFOAT-1’s monitoring system for krypton-85.259 If detection of 
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 Appendix D. Total yield from all U.S. testing at the end of 1954’s CASTLE series was just over 60 megatons. 
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 Karen Hallgren, ed., “Secrets, Lies and Operation Bluenose,” INEEL News, Volume 11, No. 6 (October 2000), 
http://home.earthlink.net/~edinst/publications/NEWS.Oct.00.htm. 
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krypton-85 was the sole objective of GREEN RUN, this indicated a goal only of determining the 
accuracy of methods to measure Soviet plutonium production. However, GREEN RUN, in 
addition to the release of krypton-85 included iodine-131. This demonstrated another objective 
for GREEN RUN: ensuring accurate differentiation and analysis of bomb debris from samples 
produced by reactor emissions or meltdowns. Data derived from detection and analysis of iodine-
131 and krypton-85 formed the basic radiochemical yardsticks AFOAT-1 used to qualitatively 
and quantitatively characterize radioactivity discovered drifting from the USSR.
260
  
To produce plutonium, uranium fuel rods are inserted into production reactors and 
irradiated in the controlled fission reaction of the pile sufficiently to change the required 
percentage of uranium into plutonium while ensuring efficient reactor operation. American 
practice was to withdraw the “hot” fuel rods and allow them to cool for a period of ninety days 
or more before further processing. This interval allowed most of the iodine-131 in the fuel rods 
(with its short half-life of eight days, produced along with plutonium in the rods as they were 
irradiated) to decay into an inert gas, xenon-131. The reduction in radiation from this cooling 
period facilitated their handling in subsequent processing. The irradiated rods were soaked in an 
acid bath to break down the fuel for further chemical processing. The origin of the name, 
GREEN RUN, was this processing of what were considered “green” rods, i.e. those previously 
considered too raw yet to process. The rods were instead cooled for a much briefer period before 
processing, in this case only sixteen days, or about two half-lives of I-131.
261
 The shorter cooling 
period speeding up plutonium production, but created a greater occupational and environmental 
hazard from the large quantities of iodine-131 it liberated.
262
 The AEC’s early concerns about 
radiation focused on relatively long-lived isotopes, so the iodine-131’a short half-life was 
apparently considered relatively safe when released for GREEN RUN. The problem was that, 
unlike the inert xenon-131 it would have decayed into if cooled longer, iodine-131 is very 
chemically reactive and easily picked up and integrated into living organisms by absorption, 
consumption, or inhalation. 
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 Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear, 142-143. Intelligence sources indicated that the Soviets allowed their fuel 
rods to cool only sixteen days, so GREEN RUN used the same interval to release the gases for this experiment to 
simulate Soviet practices. 
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 Given the low plutonium production numbers for 1949 in the face of detection of Joe-1, the temporary speeding 
up of Hanford production likely had a third goal: increased production in a time that might lead to war. 
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Previous descriptions of GREEN RUN connected it to nuclear intelligence efforts 
directed at assessing Soviet plutonium production rates.
263
 However, this was only part of the 
story. While most of the iodine-131 (half-life 8 days) produced in fuel rods changes into xenon-
131, about one percent of the iodine-131 changes to an isomer, xenon-131m. Xenon-131m is 
itself a radioactive isotope, instead of being a stable noble gas like other naturally occurring 
xenon isotopes. Xenon-131m has a half-life of twelve days, after which it decays further into 
ordinary xenon-131. The decay chain of iodine-131 xenon-131m xenon-131 provided a 
rather precise mechanism, with a combined twenty day half-life window of measurement, useful 
in determining how long ago the event that created the sample occurred. This calculation of the 
“age” since the sample was born was based on the relative ratio in a sample between iodine-131 
and xenon-131m.
264
 This phenomenon determined the length of time between the detonation of a 
weapon and analysis of a sample from it, as well as provided a means to differentiate between 
samples emanating from a reactor and those from an explosion.
265
 
Richard L. Miller’s account of GREEN RUN directly connected its purpose to calibrating 
the AEDS for bomb testing debris collection. Miller argued the military was “taken by surprise” 
after it detected Joe-1 and wanted to confirm whether there may have been earlier, undetected 
Soviet tests.
266
 Because GREEN RUN was a test to refine an existing capability of the AEDS, 
Miller’s account seemed at odds with the evidence of an already-operational system, with a 
global capability to issue alerts, needing only further refinement; this information was still 
classified and unavailable to Miller when he wrote in the 1980s.
267
 
While krypton-85 is produced by both plutonium production and by nuclear explosions, it 
was most useful for measuring the former because of its long half-life.
268
 On the other hand, 
                                                 
263
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while iodine-131 (and the resulting decay of it into xenon-131m, then into xenon-131) appears to 
be likewise produced by both processes, it is more useful in analyzing the resulting debris from a 
nuclear explosion because of its shorter half-life. Better knowledge of how the two processes 
were related in practice was needed to evaluate the data AFOAT-1 gathered about the Soviet 
nuclear program. On the other hand, most accounts of the detection of Joe-1 disputed its routine 
nature, suggesting it was a surprise. It may be the case the origin of the tip the Russians were 
close to exploding their first nuclear device was from krypton-85 sampling indicating there was a 
reactor operating in the Soviet Union long enough to produce fissile material for at least one 
weapon. Given the ambiguity over the significance of this indication of fissile material 
possession, prediction of the exact timing of the testing of any device constructed with it would 
have been outside the scope of such a report. However, despite its rather general nature, given 
the Air Force’s focus on the LRD mission this could very well account for the alert status some 
indicated was in effect at the time of Joe-1’s detection.  
Both the exact motivations for and results from GREEN RUN remain uncertain due to 
continuing classification, but for the AEDS as a whole, the technology of sampling and analysis 
acted in concert to quickly contribute to a remarkably informative picture of the balance of 
nuclear power between the two nuclear rivals. Subsequent to Joe-1 American politicians 
immediately began expressing public concerns about falling behind the Russians in nuclear 
strength, concealed by the subjectively inscrutable presence of what was popularly called the 
“iron curtain.” In secret, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of AFOAT-1 discovered instead a far 
more transparent, partially-permeable barrier conveying considerable information useful in 
developing an accurate picture of the Soviet nuclear threat.
269
 Objectively, the Atomic Energy 
Detection System revealed the Soviet Union’s nuclear program lagged behind American 
capabilities and resources.
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NOMINATION/MUSIC Soothes Congressional Restrictions 
The legal rigors of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (also known as the McMahon Act), 
complicated the Anglo-American relationship with its prohibitions on the transfer of American 
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nuclear secrets to foreign nations or individuals. Citing a variety of documents, including 
contemporaneous CIA reports, Michael S. Goodman documented a range of estimates derived 
from MUSIC data based on krypton-85 sampling indicating the American arsenal was up to ten 
times as large as the Soviet stockpile in the early to mid-1950s. Goodman then argued that 
1953’s Joe-4 test, the first Soviet nuclear weapon test with a detectable thermonuclear 
contribution to its yield, essentially made MUSIC obsolete, given “the fusion of light 
elements…[made it] virtually impossible to estimate Soviet stockpiles with any degree of 
certainty.”271 The advent of fusion weapons did complicate krypton-85 analysis and 
interpretation. However, given AFOAT-1 undertook GREEN RUN in part to address the need to 
monitor and differentiate between the sources that created these essential intelligence isotopes, 
the Americans encouraged the British to sustain the effort until 1958, indicating continued 
intelligence value in the program. Although thermonuclear weapons and the start-up of civilian 
power reactors complicated the calculations, the technique gave insight into otherwise 
inaccessible data on the Soviet stockpile. If it had been impossible to overcome problems created 
by the inherent radiochemistry associated with fusion, the 1952 American test, IVY MIKE, 
would have been a far greater determinant to it than the 1953 Joe-4 test, because its yield (10 
megatons) meant it production of krypton-85 was far larger than Joe-4’s (400 kilotons). The 
British also did not possess the advantage AFOAT-1 had of a complete set of samples from 
Soviet tests, which provided a database on which to calculate and adjust for the contributions of 
Soviet fusion weapons to the global krypton-85 pool. 
Thus, GREEN RUN should be seen as equally if not more directly tied, by virtue of its 
use of iodine-131 as the focus of the experiment, to the development and calibration of the 
procedures of bomb debris analysis by AFOAT-1. The mistaken belief that GREEN RUN was 
specifically a project designed to estimate the Soviet plutonium production rate appeared to 
spring from its position as a project in the same office that directed krypton-85 sampling, which 
provided the plutonium production rate estimates. While the two are deeply interrelated, these 
are distinct techniques that apply to different intelligence topics. If nothing else, the most basic 
differentiation was that iodine-131 was useful as a qualitative measure, while krypton-85 served 
primarily as a quantitative parameter of Soviet nuclear strength.  
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GREEN RUN could also be described as a “virtual” nuclear weapon. Official estimates 
of the size of the release vary and other isotopes, in addition to iodine-131, went up the stacks at 
Hanford that night. The most commonly accepted quantity for the iodine released was 
approximately 8,000 curies, or about 1,000 times the average daily emissions at Hanford, all of it 
emitted instead in one night.
272
 In comparison, the Three Mile Island reactor accident in 1979 
released a total of 15 to 24 curies of iodine-131.
273
 There are several factors which must be taken 
into account in reflecting on the wisdom of the decision of the GREEN RUN experiment. 
The state of scientific knowledge of the risks of human radiation exposure at the time 
considered iodine to be a relatively less dangerous isotope because of its short half-life.
274
 The 
first research into iodine-131’s impact on health and the environment began at Hanford in 1950, 
after the GREEN RUN experiment’s conclusion, in part to examine concerns raised within the 
AEC following reviews after the release.
275
 Contributing to the Commission’s unease was that 
about twice the amount of radiation as originally intended was released by GREEN RUN; calm 
winds the evening of the release caused less dispersal of the isotope plume than forecast, further 
concentrating it in the local Hanford area.
276
 Remarkably, even though large releases of iodine-
131 occurred during the AEC’s routine nuclear material production operations, the isotope itself 
was not closely monitored by the commission until 1958.
277
 Inconclusive studies yielded 
growing concern as evidence accumulated during the 1950s, but the true extent of the problem – 
the bio-concentration of iodine-131 in the thyroid gland – would only be officially recognized 
until after the Windscale reactor fire in the United Kingdom that began on 10 October 1957. 
Some 670,000 gallons of milk were dumped after iodine-131 from the accident was concentrated 
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into it by dairy cattle feeding on grass contaminated by the isotope.
278
 The Windscale event 
precipitated an intensive re-examination of the role of iodine by the scientific community. By 
1958, scientific recognition of the risks of iodine-131 served to accelerate international public 
concerns raised about fallout from atmospheric testing. GREEN RUN itself would remain secret 
until the 1980s; the full story of the experiment still awaits further declassification of relevant 
AEC and AFOAT-1 documentary evidence.  
Secrecy, Science, and Security 
One more link between GREEN RUN and AFOAT-1 was the involvement of Walter 
Singlevich, who later became a key career civilian scientist with AFTAC.
279
 At the time of 
GREEN RUN, Mr. Singlevich worked at Hanford in the environmental monitoring research 
program of the AEC, prior to his transfer to AFOAT-1 in 1952. 
280
 This move was one example 
of how the Air Force, in general, and AFOAT-1, in particular, apparently took to heart the 
difficulties that independent-minded scientists presented to the Manhattan Engineer District. 
Choosing candidates carefully for civilian positions within AFOAT-1, indoctrinating them into 
its strict security regime, and retaining them provided the organization with the scientific skills 
needed at its disposal. This also prevented the host of security and political issues presented by 
scientists prone to moving back and forth between academia and government service. Scientific 
contractors, such as Tracerlab, were used for specific projects, but their work was to meet 
specific needs and isolated them from seeing the wider context of AFOAT-1’s work.  
These layers of secrecy based on the “need to know” concept extended to direct 
supporting units, such as the Air Weather Service, other military organizations, civilian parts of 
the executive branch, and the diplomatic and military officials who hosted AFOAT-1 operations. 
Singlevich’s career with AFOAT-1/AFTAC was an example of the success of methods and 
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policies of close information control the Air Force exerted on information about the 
environmental effects of radiation by means of its security classification program. The fact that 
fallout was inevitably tied to nuclear explosions and that sampling it and other isotopes of 
interest was logically and practically a rather obvious process required concealment of 
connections about the details of its mission. Even hints about the nature of the work could 
strongly suggest to a knowledgeable person what AFOAT-1’s mission was. 
Care must be taken not to conclude that AFOAT-1 specifically suppressed this 
information prior to 1958 (since virtually all such information was secret then.) The state of 
knowledge of radiation’s effects on humans was unconsolidated and in a state of flux as new 
information became available.
281
 The process of secrecy and its associated compartmentalization 
certainly inhibited the sharing of information between scientists working on the problem within 
the government. With fewer security rigors, this could have led to an earlier recognition of the 
dangers posed by iodine-131, but the general implicit policy of paying minimal public attention 
to fallout worked against such a result. Again, it was not so much a formal barrier as it was a 
result of circumstances arising from the secrecy associated with nuclear weapons.  
NSC 68 and the 1950 Air Force Commanders Conference: Containment or Preemption? 
Evidence of the impact of nuclear intelligence on Air Force planning and priorities was 
rapid.  Revelation of Soviet mastery of the basics of nuclear weapons technology was the 
original goal of the AEDS. Beyond the likelihood that krypton-85 analysis contributed to the 
vital first detection of Joe-1, long range detection’s quantification of the Russian fissile material 
stockpile provided concrete description of a growing threat that went far beyond that represented 
by a single bomb. Joe-1 prompted the Air Force’s demand for a qualitative leap in American 
weapons design to thermonuclear weapons, which opened the door to the problematization of 
fallout by their capacity to produce it in great quantities. 
The association of nuclear weapons with air power also reinforced internal conflict within 
the Department of Defense that was expressed in interservice rivalries, particularly with the 
                                                 
281
 There was a general consensus among radiation safety experts that the linear-no threshold theory (LNT) of the 
risks of radiation exposure fits the data best, although this is hardly a settled matter. LNT holds that there is damage 
from any dose of radiation in direct proportion to its intensity. This conflicts with so-called “threshold” theory that 
assumes there is an exposure level below which lesser or no damage occurs. For an accessible discussion on this 
disagreement, see LeRoy Moore, “Lowering the Bar,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 58, No. 3 (May/June 2002), 
28-37. Edward Teller was a sometime advocate of hormesis, the theory that low levels of radiation help strengthen 
genetic stocks, although there were suggestions he did this more to play devil’s advocate in discussions about the 
risks of radiation. Teller was a vocal skeptic of LNT. Teller, 463.  
106 
 
Navy, which sought to carve out a niche for its own brand of nuclear-armed, carrier-based air 
power. Prior to Joe-1, a paradoxical combination of aggressive public talk about confrontation 
with the Soviets and his failure to assertively defend the Air Force’s need for the huge, ocean-
spanning B-36 led to the removal of General George C. Kenney, the first commander of the 
Strategic Air Command.
282
 Kenney was replaced by General Curtis LeMay. While his removal 
was usually attributed to Kenney’s incompetent handling of training and operational readiness of 
SAC, LeMay’s knowledge of long range detection likely played some role in the decision to 
appoint him as Kenney’s replacement as SAC commander.283 LeMay’s belligerent discretion 
about the nature of the threat was well-served by his knowledge of LRD. Kenney’s statements 
and others strayed into political territory during election season, leading to a cautionary 
statement from Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. to leave foreign policy to the 
President and State Department.
284
 In contrast, while LeMay was not a soft touch he was sensible 
enough to understand you do not undermine your bosses. Moreover, LeMay cast the need to 
build-up SAC as stemming from the fact the enemy was strong, which was good for the budget, 
but that the US must stay stronger. The latter message’s appeal proved more enduring in 
supporting SAC’s budget than Kenney’s charge that the Russian’s were poised to go to war.  
After AFOAT-1’s successful detection of Joe-1 in the fall of 1949, the Air Force found 
increasing traction in making a case to fund a rapid expansion of its force structure, along with 
significant investment in research and development of new technology, despite the austere 
funding climate. This included undertaking the high-priority quest for the “super,” as 
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thermonuclear weapons were conceptually known at the time. Military power was no longer a 
matter of simply possessing nuclear weapons, but having deliverable weapons credibly and 
readily available, given “stockpiling alone [was] not enough to meet the threat.”285 The arms race 
with the USSR began in earnest once the chase for the super was on, with a goal of expanding 
U.S. nuclear superiority in order to prevent the potential political, military, and social disaster of 
a “nuclear Pearl Harbor.”286 National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC 68) formally called for a 
policy of containment by virtue of a “rapid buildup” of military force in April 1950, providing 
the intellectual underpinning for an expansive Cold War militarism.
287
 
Like Joe-1, NSC 68 offered LeMay an opportunity to exploit for SAC’s benefit, but like 
the raw military power of nuclear weapons it, too, was eventually undermined by the constraints 
of fallout. An appeal to measured confrontation with the Soviet Union, the adoption of NSC 68 
was fortuitous, given the imminent start of the Korean War. It also fit well with the Air Force’s 
recasting itself as the global vanguard of American military power by means of nuclear power. 
With the ink hardly dry on NSC 68, the Air Force’s first post-Joe-1 “commanders conference” 
took place at Ramey AFB in Puerto Rico in late April 1950, shortly before the outbreak of 
hostilities in Korea.  Minutes of the conference extended for more than 500 pages. Just as 
Kenney had publicly argued to the detriment of his career, behind closed doors the Air Force’s 
leadership argued to its general officers that they saw conflict with the Soviet Union as inevitable 
given the proven threat Soviet possession of nuclear weapons now posed. Several speakers 
suggested this might even extend to considering pre-emptive war against the USSR.
288
 The 
proceedings were also driven by the Air Force’s faith in nuclear weapons, already apparent in 
General Lauris Norstad’s immediate post-war nuclear war plan against the Soviet Union, amid 
eager anticipation of what they saw as the advantageous military utility of exponentially higher 
yield thermonuclear weapons. 
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Leading off the discussions was the Director of Air Force Intelligence, Major General 
Charles P. Cabell, who presented the Air Force estimate of how fast the Soviet stockpile was 
growing, projecting a total of 120 to 200 weapons by 1954.
289
 Cabell argued “the time is fast 
approaching when the Soviets will possess the capability to attempt a devastating atomic attack 
on the United States.” The main problem for the Soviets was their limited means of delivery, 
which depended on the TU-4, a bomber reverse-engineered from the American B-29 after 
examples of it fell into Soviet custody during the later stages of World War Two.
290
  
While an early estimate, the specificity of Cabell’s numbers strongly suggested krypton-
85 monitoring was already bearing fruit. At the time, there was no other source for even 
imprecise numbers on the Soviet arsenal than AFOAT-1, which apparently had at least one 
prototype whole air collector station operating.
291
 In his seminal 1982 work on the distorted 
history of the “Soviet estimate” in the American intelligence community, John Prados made a 
general reference that the only substantive categories of information available in the period up to 
the mid-1950s on Soviet strength were estimates of the total tonnage of Soviet fissile material 
and the characteristics of the weapons themselves garnered from information gleaned from 
Soviet testing.
292
 Both of these categories of intelligence were directly derived from the efforts of 
AFOAT-1, confirming the key role its data played in formulating national intelligence estimates. 
Taking Account of Fallout, Deterrence as a “Wasting Asset” 
The take-away message of the 1950 Ramey AFB conference was that the Air Force 
needed to plan for a preventative war option. Implicitly arguing against the credibility of the 
deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, General Cabell stated Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons 
meant it was “illusory” to depend on “numerical superiority” to deter the Russians, because once 
“the Soviets believe they have produced a sufficient quantity of atomic bombs…the danger of a 
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Soviet surprise attack against the United States will be greatly increased.”293 Major General S.E. 
Anderson, the Director of Plans and Operations, told the assembly that the Air Force needed to 
prepare to “conduct at the earliest practicable date a strategic air offensive against the elements 
of the Soviet war-making capability.”294 Neither of the generals spoke on the record of the issue 
of fallout or nuclear intelligence specifically, although as the chief of air intelligence, Gen. 
Cabell was clearly cognizant of the work of AFOAT-1 and the data they supplied to his analysts. 
Likewise, Anderson was also aware of AFOAT-1, since it was technically in his chain of 
command under Operations.
295
 Like most of the Air Force leadership at the time, what little else 
they knew of fallout beyond its use for intelligence was that it was an otherwise inconsequential 
side effect of nuclear explosions.  
Cabell remarked the Air Force’s position on the Soviet estimate was a “substantially 
different view” than that of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA viewed the main threat 
from the USSR as subversion around its periphery, while the Air Force saw the threat as a global 
one, with the Soviet Union readying itself “for a military showdown with the United States.”296 
While the institutional interests of the armed services viewed the threat as primarily a military 
one, the CIA’s view tended to undercut some of the rationale for future investment in military 
forces in favor of a more political-economic approach conducted by diplomatic and clandestine 
means. Along with Joe-1, the outbreak of war in Korea following the Ramey conference resolved 
these executive branch conflicts over resources largely in favor of a rapid expansion of 
investment in military forces in the short term. 
Despite the numerous strategic advantages the United States held over the USSR, Cabell 
cast American nuclear forces as a “wasting asset” – and apparently ineffectual as a deterrent; 
once the Soviets possessed enough nuclear weapons, Cabell believed a Soviet attack would be all 
but inevitable. The nuclear superiority U.S. forces enjoyed would offer little to no advantage 
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against a determined enemy. Effectively, both Kenney and Cabell argued that mere possession of 
nuclear weapons by Stalin would lead to war, because the Soviet leader was either bad at math or 
simply so deranged by his ideology he was willing to start a fight he was bound to lose. Cabell 
saw the now-lost United States nuclear monopoly as representing a crumbling of the foundation 
of nuclear superiority into unstable deterrence.  American nuclear weapons would “no longer be 
the deterrent to war in the same relative degree to which it has been in the past few years.” 
Cabell argued that “mid 1952 should be considered as the latest date by which we must be 
prepared to meet a Soviet attack.”297 In a nutshell, loss of the American nuclear monopoly 
following development of the Soviet bomb brought the viability of deterrence itself into 
question, as Cabell’s formulation depended on technical superiority of American weapons, not 
on the sheer numbers that LeMay came to depend on instead. Left unsaid before Cabell’s Air 
Force colleagues was that Cabell’s timeline for confronting the Soviets was tied to pressure from 
the Air Force on the AEC to develop and test thermonuclear weapons by that early date. This 
theme of degradation of U.S. deterrence became a familiar trope, a constant theme the Air Force 
publicly relied on to rally its troops and Congress around its budget priorities from the time of its 
brief postwar nuclear monopoly through to the end of Cold War.  
Despite his pessimism about Soviet intentions, Cabell noted “we are immeasurably better 
off in all ways…as compared with the situation of two or three years ago,” a possible reference 
to the operational growth and initial success of AFOAT-1, as it was almost as certainly a pat on 
the back to LeMay for his ongoing transformation of SAC into a credible force. Still, he opined 
that the “lack of adequate information is nowhere so great as in the field of air technical 
intelligence,” a broad category which included the realm of nuclear intelligence.298 Making no 
direct reference to the work of AFOAT-1 and its recent success in detecting Joe-1, yet 
presciently pointing out the fundamental weakness in the capabilities of the AEDS as a first 
generation intelligence collection system, Cabell judged that the existing intelligence 
shortcomings primarily regarded delivery systems, thus indicating his fairly clear-cut 
understanding at this early date of what the Air Force’s greatest intelligence gaps proved to be. 
As discouraging as Cabell’s intelligence briefing was, others present were even more 
pessimistic. General Kenney, assigned as Air University commander after his political debacle as 
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SAC commander, insisted projected numbers for Soviet nuclear weapons were fifty percent too 
low and the numbers of delivery systems were similarly short of what he assessed was Soviet 
strength.
299
 Kenney implicitly argued Cabell was not aggressive enough, demonstrating how peer 
pressure contributed to analytical inaccuracies in estimates by Air Force intelligence. 
In 1950 both Cabell and Kenney’s comments put great stock in the potential of human 
agents in intelligence operations, arguing American deficits in such sources within the USSR and 
its satellites, positioned to provide insight into Russian intentions, was the highest priority central 
intelligence problem. This focus within the Air Force on human intelligence (HUMINT), even as 
it made major investments in technical intelligence collection systems like long range detection 
that proved to considerably more successful, was inspired in part because of what seemed to be 
Soviet intelligence successes. Later typified by discovery of Kim Philby’s betrayal and the 
Rosenberg case, both as of the conference in April 1950 yet to be uncovered, but whose threat 
was foretold by those already revealed, like Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, and Whittaker Chambers, 
the obsession with human agents had much to do with the same paranoid mindset and obsession 
with political loyalty that Senator Joseph McCarthy was preparing to construct.
300
  
In discussing the British nuclear intelligence program, Michael Goodman noted a 
tendency for national security leadership to obsess over the wrong factors, then cited Richard 
Betts in noting that “the primary problem in major strategic surprises is not intelligence warning 
but political disbelief.”301 Extending this argument to the illusions of belief, the Air Force 
leadership’s problem lay not so much in its unmet aspirations for more effective human agents as 
it did in reading too much or too little into what would eventually prove to be fairly accurate 
numbers generated through AFOAT-1’s krypton-85 monitoring program.302 The problem of 
faulty analytical interpretation of the NOMINATION/MUSIC data stood out in retrospect 
because it was an anomaly in the otherwise enormously productive results from the Air Force’s 
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investment in AFOAT-1, which served as a successful model presaging the enormous growth of 
similar technical intelligence systems in other areas of American intelligence community in 
preference to human agents.  
The conference’s foreshadowing of the coming dominance of technical collection system 
as the basic infrastructure of the American intelligence community also suggested what later 
came as significant setbacks.
303
 The subsequent bomber and missile “gap” controversies and the 
excessive build-up of U.S. strategic nuclear forces were analytic missteps that the Atomic 
Energy Detection System (AEDS) eventually underwrote, the results of fundamental analytical 
intelligence failures whose basis has been misunderstood by many historians as driven by purely 
institutional interests. While flogging the “gaps” worked to the benefit of the Air Force’s budget 
to supply more hardware as legislators scrambled to counter what later proved to be a sharply 
inflated Soviet threat, it was data from the AEDS that provided a substantive, empirical case at 
the time for the erroneous estimates of Soviet strength. When that later case fell apart with new 
evidence the U-2 provided, the extreme secrecy associated with nuclear intelligence activities 
prevented public discussion of the missteps.
304
 This information’s centrality to first supporting, 
then undermining massive retaliation as the fundamental strategic policy, and the financial, 
political, and public health consequences posed by global scale fallout that mass employment of 
nuclear weapons threatened cannot be overstated. To soften the case for the significance of the 
manipulation of nuclear intelligence into simply poorly crafted, distorted analysis effectively 
argues the president lacked self-awareness, was ignorant of the strategic situation, and paid little 
attention to the details of his most important task as president and retired general officer, the 
security of the nation. The archival record, plus a recent historiography that increasingly 
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establishes the case for a more activist Eisenhower presidency than previously understood, 
refutes that supposition.
305
 Certainly the fortuitous contingency that propelled Dwight 
Eisenhower into office at the height of the Cold War offered many less experienced candidates, 
but none possessed as credible a military reputation to confront the Joint Chiefs as peers and to 
force them to address issues they would prefer to avoid, such as fallout. 
The Air Force’s persistent insistence on higher estimated numbers of Soviet weapons and 
delivery systems throughout the 1950s was largely based on its faith in the estimates provided by 
AFOAT-1 of Soviet fissile material production, which offered the only continuing, quantitative 
assessment of the Russian stockpile during the bulk of this era. However, the resulting high 
numbers the Air Force assigned to Soviet plutonium-239 production and, more importantly, its 
interpretation of their significance in light of what little was known about the capabilities of 
Soviet delivery systems, became central components in constructing the mythology of the so-
called bomber and missile “gaps,” both of which imposed costly, profound consequences for the 
nation. Whatever disappointment the Air Force had over failure to develop the glamorous-
sounding, but largely mythical potential of Western human sources to penetrate the Iron Curtain, 
the alternative, working world of nuclear intelligence that Ziegler and Jacobson termed “spying 
without spies” proved a tremendously successful, if relatively mundane project in comparison, 
even as it operated in extraordinary secrecy at the leading edge of science and technology.
306
 
Many of the generals in attendance at the commanders’ conference in steamy Puerto Rico in 
April 1950 likely had yet to hear of AFOAT-1, as it was a relatively new direct reporting unit of 
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, controlled operationally by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
307
 Regardless, 
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the officers at Ramey were already undergoing familiarization with the results of AFOAT-1’s 
work products, as cryptically interpreted by Gen. Cabell and others.  
AFOAT-1 
By early 1950, the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) was rapidly expanding in 
the immediate aftermath of the detection of Joe-1 in order to meet operational and intelligence 
requirements needed to track the growth of the Soviet nuclear weapons program. An 
organization chart in Appendix E depicts how the unit, known as both AFOAT-1 and the 1009
th
 
Special Weapons Squadron depending on the audience, was organized.
308
 Indicative of the fact 
the Air Force continues to withhold much of its historical information for what appear to be 
almost capricious justifications was that the other thirty-three pages of the thirty-five pages in 
this basic, presumably superseded document remain security classified and unavailable.  
The Air Force avoided the Manhattan District model for scientific labor and support, 
which largely depended on civilian scientific labor, when it conceptualized AFOAT-1’s nuclear 
intelligence role. Under General Leslie Grove’s command was a virtual army of science, in turn 
headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer. It was a model that retained the basic independence of 
scientists still familiar to those working at any large research university. Groves spent 
considerable effort attempting to maintain the extraordinary security the Manhattan Project 
required, even as the scientists involved actively chafed at such restrictions.
309
 While science was 
necessary to develop the procedures and technology used, the direct work of civilian scientists 
within AFOAT-1 was limited to that of a few closely vetted managers, who could contract with 
outside organizations as necessary, such as the Atomic Energy Commission or contractors like 
Tracerlab, Inc., to provide specialized advice and consultation to the civilian scientists and 
military officers working in AFOAT-1. By April 1950, the unit’s former Scientific Division was 
even renamed the Technical Division, headed by a Technical Director, who would continue to be 
a civilian scientist, but whose brief was clearly the technological implementation of scientific 
research to meet nuclear intelligence requirements. Now the only place that “science” explicitly 
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remained in the organization chart was in the form of a “science library.”310 In light of other 
security policies it adopted, this linguistic distancing over the course of the first five years of its 
existence reflected the effective isolation of scientists working within AFOAT-1 from what the 
Air Force saw as the security threats posed by mainstream scientific interactions, including those 
of international scientific organizations and the AEC itself.
311
 The service was able to pick and 
choose carefully who and what it interacted with so that such networking would be exclusively 
in the Air Force’s interest, a particularly salient issue given the tight security associated with all 
aspects of AFOAT-1’s work.  
Taken together with the bulk of the other evidence, this implicit policy with regard to the 
role of science demonstrated the Air Force desired to ensure that its scientists would exclusively 
serve its needs. The service wanted to prevent the threat of science posed when it constituted an 
independent entity that might expose the Air Force’s most important intelligence source to the 
problem of scientific activism many in the military saw as an inconvenient outcome of the 
Manhattan Project.
312
 Proof of that would come in the form of 1954 AEC hearing that stripped 
Robert Oppenheimer of his security clearance, but the evidence presented then clearly showed 
such concerns operated at the highest levels in the Air Force throughout this period. 
Ironically, Truman’s announcement of the detection of the first Soviet test threw 
unwelcome light on the existence of the U.S. capability to detect nuclear testing. It took almost a 
year before the AFOAT-1 commander dealt with this security threat by issuing a memorandum 
on dealing with press inquiries. 
As was to be expected, the President’s announcement concerning the explosion of 
a Russian bomb generated a series of speculative articles by newspaperman and 
magazine writers concerning methods for the detection of atomic explosions…In 
preparing their articles the writers’ technique will be to probe the subject with 
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special attention paid to the reaction obtained…The newspaperman making the 
inquiry will be quick to detect any undue excitement aroused by his question.
 313
 
 
The memorandum went on to note the 1009
th
 SWS “has no Public Relations officer. Therefore, 
all members of the press making any query concerning the AFOAT-1 mission will be requested 
to call the Public Relations Officer of the Air Force.” Furthermore, the memorandum required 
anyone with knowledge of a press inquiry to immediately bring it to the attention of the 
commander of AFOAT-1. In effect, the unit would make no comment about its work, referring 
such requests to others to handle. The mere fact of a press inquiry suggested a breach of security, 
so required command attention in every case. 
“Control of mission dissemination” by such policies was at the core of AFOAT-1’s 
secrecy and received considerable attention both inside the organization and in necessary 
contacts with those outside of it. Official contacts that revealed the classified mission of the 
1009
th
 SWS to outside organizations – as well as any technique used by it – were strictly 
documented and limited, including with other government organizations and military units. Each 
contact outside the 1009
th
 SWS required documentation on a Form 205-6 and was based on a 
strict “need to know” principle. Any such contact, except in an emergency, required prior 
approval of the commander, deputy commander or technical director. Internally, before any 
officer, enlisted service member, or civilian worker was granted the proper clearances, they 
received a documented intake security briefing. Once assigned to a field station, incoming 
personnel received another specific briefing based on the assignment; further security briefings 
to review existing and new restrictions occurred on a quarterly basis thereafter. Each was 
documented, including a reference in each briefing to the criminal penalties provided for 
violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
314
 Service in AFOAT-1 required all personnel to 
take strict precautions against discovery of the unit’s mission. Violations of these strict 
requirements could bring criminal charges. 
Counterpoised against what the 1009
th
 SWS was actually engaged in were a series of 
cover stories that could, when pressed, be used to deflect inquiries by the curious in legitimate 
contact with the unit. Those engaged in aerial sampling of fallout debris clouds were advised to 
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indicate “This unit is conducting meteorological studies concerning the composition of the 
atmosphere.” Those operating the B/199 airborne gas sampler might reply “This instrumentation 
is used to measure cosmic rays to determine their effect on weather phenomenon.”315  Personnel 
at seismic stations, if pressed, could explain “This instrumentation is employed in meteorological 
studies of the movement of storm centers.”316 Even these vague and often logically confused 
cover stories were so sensitive they were not to be used, unless needed, because “the unclassified 
mission explanation should not be revealed unless it is absolutely necessary to furnish some 
unclassified explanation for the presence of the team at that location.”317 Thus, even official 
cover stories were so sensitive that personnel assigned to AFOAT-1 were prevented from using 
them merely to deflect the idly curious. 
Those with TOP SECRET clearances were still limited in what information they had 
access to or could convey, because of the dangers informing someone with too much 
“information of such a nature that general knowledge…might result in jeopardizing sensitive 
operations or sources of intelligence information.”318  
At the conclusion of their service with the 1009
th
 SWS, departing personnel received a 
“Security Termination Briefing” in which, among other things, they were reminded a final time 
of their obligation, certified under penalty of law, thereafter to “not in any manner reveal or 
divulge to any person any military information or restricted data of which I have gained 
knowledge during my tour of duty except as may hereafter be authorized.”319 This meticulous 
expectation to conceal the mission of AFOAT-1/1009
th
 SWS effectively amounted to an 
indefinite bar on discussion of anything about their assignments and missions unless prior 
command approval was granted. These warnings served to discourage attempts to document their 
service or construct a history of the organization outside of the little available in official sources. 
In the context of the apparent defections of Air Force personnel to North Korea, the Rosenberg 
case, and lingering “red scares” of the early 1950s, such precautions likely seemed more 
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effective and justified then than they are regarded now. These, along with extended classification 
on the topic provided only a very limited historiography of nuclear intelligence until recently.
320
  
The unit was among the elite few Cold War era organizations able to obscure a substantial part 
of its history and operations as part of the U.S. intelligence community well into the twenty-first 
century. 
Further concealment was provided in the course of such ordinary business as addressing 
mail. Although AFOAT-1/1009
th
 SWS was initially housed in one of the wartime temporary 
buildings near 18
th
 and G Streets NW in Washington DC, its several mailing addresses reflected 
a location in the Pentagon. The first was Room 4A-948, whose occupants apparently merely 
forwarded the mail addressed there to a fictitious “Special Weather Research Unit” – AFOAT-1. 
Other than double-enveloping mail, instructions for using these addresses made special note that: 
Particular precautions will be taken to insure that no connection is shown between 
field units and the 1009
th
 SWS or AFOAT-1. Under no circumstances will the 
address shown…include any reference to either 1009th Special Weapons 
Squadron or AFOAT-1…Messages transmitted between these offices which show 
the connection between the field and/or AFOAT-1 and the 1009
th
 Special 
Weapons Squadron will be classified at least SECRET.
321
  
 
Below headquarters, AFOAT-1 was organized into field offices and field teams.
322
 The 
field offices served as regional support centers for the field teams in their region. They provided 
laboratories for radiochemical analysis, centers for logistical and maintenance support, and 
                                                 
320
 See Appendix C. William M. Arkin, Code Name: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in 
the 9/11 World (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005), 1-13, 15-16. While some details have changed, the 
classification sensitivity of AFOAT-1’s mission suggests it would be treated as a special access program (SAP) if in 
existence today under the same circumstances. The early Cold War was a simpler time, with Secret and Top Secret 
the typical classifications used. Programs “above Top Secret” were treated more informally as extensions of specific 
“need to know” aspects of Top Secret. The documents and narratives referenced here support this approach as in use 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s; none of the redacted text appeared to be positioned so as to represent 
additional classification markings that would have been present if formally part of additional restrictions. In recent 
decades, large segments of AFTAC work is most likely covered under a group of specific SAP designations 
assigned to Joint Forces Command (because AFTAC activities are directed by the JCS) that apply to nuclear 
intelligence. In a world of internet-enabled leakers and ever-resourceful journalists, as well as disillusioned 
employees cognizant of official excess, the value of oaths of secrecy seems to be primarily the suppression of 
incentives to talk to the press in an effort to avoid unwelcome publicity by the U.S. government or one of its clients. 
Nonetheless, as Arkin notes, “most genuine secrets remain secret.” Force of habit dies hard. Despite the clearance to 
allow AFOAT-1/1009
th
 SWS veterans to discuss basic facts about their service in conjunction with AFTAC’s 
fiftieth anniversary in 1997 with family and friends, what the author’s father has said about it since would probably 
fit on one page here and be completely mundane, because as he pointed out, “they didn’t tell two-stripers much.” 
321
 1009
th
 Special Weapons Squadron Letter 10-1, “Correspondence: Mailing Addresses,” 25 September 1950, 
Headquarters United States Air Force (Air Staff), NARA RG 341.10.6. 
322
 See Appendix E for table of field office and team/station numbers. 
119 
 
specialists in the various detection techniques in use who were available to analyze and 
troubleshoot problems encountered by field teams.  
Field teams were located at field stations or detachments, designated by a three-digit 
number. The field team station number was sometimes given a suffix to designate the technique 
in use at a particular station. Teams located on military installations operated under cover 
provided by the host unit, with no one cognizant of their mission except on a strict need-to-know 
basis. Teams stationed in remote areas without a supporting unit to provide cover took particular 
care to avoid revealing the nature of their duties. Personal mail was received under the address of 
the unit they were attached to when the team was co-located at a supporting unit.
323
 While the 
team number, when used without the technique letter prefix, was an unclassified short title, any 
connection between the team number and the mission was considered classified information.
324
 
Team commanders were responsible for taking comprehensive measures to ensure the 
communications and operations of their personnel “do not reveal the function of their activity nor 
its connection with the 1009
th
 Special Weapons Squadron.”325 Initially, this 
compartmentalization even applied to other 1009
th
 SWS units located at the same installation. 
Senior officers were responsible for placing: 
…such restrictions on the movement of 1009th SWS personnel between units at 
the site as are necessary to insure adequate compartmentalization of the 
operations, except when specifically authorized otherwise by this 
Headquarters.”326 
 
In phrasing that was more ambiguously confusing than helpful, prohibitions against 
dissemination of information beyond those working specifically on a team were eventually 
relaxed in 1953 for colleagues in certain areas: 
For purposes of security, it is essential that dissemination of the knowledge of the 
type of work in which field offices are engaged, the organizational connections 
thereof, and the type of material collected by the system be compartmentalized 
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and confined to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge. 
(These provisions are not intended to preclude the dissemination of general 
knowledge which is not required in the execution of specific duties yet is of 
general information leading to an intelligent understanding of assigned duties).
327
 
 
This phrasing replaced the earlier language implying individual members of a team could never 
discuss their roles with each other without high level authorization. Given the isolation of many 
teams, the repetitive and often monotonous work, and the paranoia of the era, it was likely 
thought best that more practical language should substitute to prevent misinterpretations of the 
earlier security procedure. It only made sense that other team members trained to perform similar 
tasks were available if illness or other circumstances left a team short-handed in the field given 
the tiny size of each unit, typically less than two dozen. This slight relaxation in security 
procedures recognized the impracticality of maintaining such airtight virtual walls or information 
“stovepipes” among limited numbers of personnel AFOAT-1 operated with at remote locations. 
As a security technique to limit information available to a strict need-to-know principle, 
compartmentalization also imposed other burdens.  Teams received only two pages of the unit 
directory, one with its own listing and the other, explicitly invoking the “need-to-know” 
principle, was limited to “a supplement of the directory with all other field team addresses 
necessary to function.”328 Beyond security regulations overseen by their commanders, personnel 
at these often remote locations were expected to apply self-censorship to their personal mail and 
in conversation with unauthorized persons. Personnel could discuss the name of the cover unit 
under which their team operated. If they made the mistake of mentioning being assigned to the 
1009
th
 SWS, they were to then indicate that they had seemingly transferred to their cover unit’s 
station. If they wanted to comment on a temporary duty assignment or leave taken while 
overseas at some of the exotic locations where teams were stationed, it was allowed unless their 
commander specifically prohibited such a reference. However, they were forbidden to disclose 
even the vague statement they worked on “a classified project for the USAF.” Any reference to 
their work in connection “with any phase of Atomic Energy” was prohibited. Likewise, they 
were not to reveal the locations or addresses of anyone else assigned to the 1009
th
 SWS. Finally, 
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they could not reveal the “names of other units and agencies with whom the field activity has 
regular contacts in the performance of mission.”329 This might include a number of other units, 
from the local supporting base command up through the Central Intelligence Agency. This 
frequently involved the many Air Weather Service units upon which AFOAT-1 depended to 
gather samples on the daily synoptic weather missions that provided forecasting data.  
Team assignments took personnel from frozen northern latitudes to the opposite extremes 
of the tropics, but it was people more than location that provided the most challenging 
difficulties in the private lives of those assigned to the unit overseas. Even with self- and 
command-censorship, security concerns imposed further restrictions on the whole range of 
human relationships, which varied depending on the culture and amenities of life available 
outside the detachment’s perimeter. Many units required that all airmen without dependents 
reside in quarters on base. If such housing was not available, then they must be “quartered in 
respectable abodes which are not subject to foreign interests inimical to the security of the 
mission.” Even “frequent visits to foreign national homes” potentially placed “the mission in 
jeopardy because they will be subject to questions concerning the classified portions of the 
project.” Personnel could not even escape the boredom of being stationed far from family and 
friends without risking the results of a little too much fun on Saturday night. 
Instances of airmen exhibiting undue interest in foreign nationals or cases 
involving too frequent association with foreign nationals in public places such as 
restaurants, taverns, or places of ill repute which cause the OIC [officer in charge] 
to suspect a possible security compromise will be reported to this Headquarters.
330
 
 
Enforcement of security requirements was not left solely to the team commander. The field 
offices conducted inspection visits to team sites, so outside evaluations of unit security practices 
were usually conducted quarterly, but no less than annually.
331
 Interestingly, the last security 
instruction noted above seems to have been rescinded in an updated regulation issued on 28 
August 1952. One can only speculate that prohibiting airmen from engaging in “happy hour” at 
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remote locations without the usual service clubs, in practice, led to too many conflicts at the team 
level, sapping morale more than boosting security. 
Another issue that arose in a nearly all-male military force was marriage. Those at whom 
cupid loosed his arrow overseas faced a discouraging future when assigned to AFOAT-1, 
because of the potential security compromises such relationships generated. In 1952, the policy 
was ambiguously stated to be that “marriage to foreign nationals will be permitted if approved by 
the Theater Commander [and] will constitute the basis for denial of further access to classified 
material.”332 As the end of 1953 approached, a clarification indicated more definitively those 
assigned to the “1009th SWS who marry, even though permission has been granted, are subject to 
termination of security clearance and reassignment…”333 One can only wonder how many 
romances ended somewhere between the forbidden “places of ill repute” and the nearly equally 
prohibited institution of marriage for those assigned to field teams. 
Other problems caused by compartmentalization ranged from the simple to the complex, 
even if it was something as basic as sending communications by mail or radio. The “Weather 
Research Division” address at the Pentagon used as cover for AFOAT-1’s actual address came 
into question after it was pointed out that it was intended to be changed every six months or 
whenever compromised. The issue was that having different addresses, depending on the 
classification of the message sent, caused a significant workload burden on communications 
networks in an era where most communication was handled by code clerks, typewriters, paper 
forms, and teletype, effectively doubling the time needed to send a particular message.  
The realities teams faced in the field meant implementation of some security directives 
from headquarters ranged from difficult to impractical. By 1952, ten teams were already co-
located and likely somewhat aware of what each other was doing. Inspections confirmed teams 
were often cognizant of the work of others, despite the extensive internal efforts to suppress this 
information. Eventually, it was concluded the security regulations should be updated so the 
addresses of other teams were simply considered secret and thus could be shared to facilitate the 
mission more easily than previously permitted by Top Secret classification.
334
 In a very real 
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sense, just as the utility of nuclear weapons was eventually limited by their fallout, these 
communication problems indicated that the security of the American nuclear intelligence effort 
was constrained as much by the limitations of secure communication technology as it was by 
strict enforcement of rules, regulations, and the law. These COMSEC issues resembled the 
relationship between the bomb and fallout, between the desired and the compromised, 
complicating accomplishment of the mission while imposing an unpredictable cost on it. 
Other problems encountered reflected the growing realization nuclear war would bring 
unprecedented destruction in the Washington DC area. By 1953, AFOAT-1 established two 
alternate headquarters for itself and another alternate headquarters location for the 1009
th
 SWS. 
This added to the problem of communication workload in support of this global intelligence 
network, because it required determination of whether each message should be produced in 
quadruplicate or not, in order to make copies of documents available at the alternative sites.
335
  
Detection Techniques Beyond Fallout 
Now that readers can more fully appreciate the stringency of security culture imposed 
throughout the ranks to protect AFOAT-1’s mission and organization, it is time to explore 
sources and methods that produced intelligence data beyond the mainstay of atmospheric testing-
era fallout sampling described earlier.
336
 Fallout sampling was considered by those involved in 
collecting nuclear intelligence to be the gold standard for conclusive proof a nuclear explosion 
occurred.
337
 The bomb debris analysts were so capable and thorough, they could reconstruct the 
weapon’s design “down to what color it was painted.”338 The other “techniques” served two 
primary purposes. First, there were techniques providing the capability of what AFOAT-1 
referred to as “instantaneous detection.”339 Second, there were techniques providing correlation 
and confirmation for both instantaneous and sampling techniques, as well as those used to 
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determine other information, such as the atmospheric loading of krypton-85 that revealed Soviet 
plutonium production. 
It was important to detect each Soviet test reliably so that the pace and results of their 
weapons program could be accurately assessed. Instantaneous detection alerted the rest of the 
AEDS network to mobilize intensified surveillance in an effort to locate the resulting plumes, 
gather fallout samples and analyze recorded signals for additional data. The original way 
instantaneous detection was accomplished was via the Army Signal Corps acoustic listening 
posts, once it was clear what audio and sub-audio wavelength signals nuclear tests generated and 
where this network should listen. Developed for use in locating batteries of enemy artillery when 
they fired on the battlefield, the acoustic technique (designated the “I” or infrasonic technique by 
AFOAT-1) initially depended on an existing network of Army listening posts. This was 
supplemented beginning in 1953 by deployment of several more posts dedicated to serving the 
AEDS.
340
 At its peak extent in 1969, it was in use at more than two dozen sites, mostly in a wide 
arc surrounding the Soviet Union, but also capable of providing the same information about 
Chinese and, eventually, other atmospheric tests not constrained by the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (LTBT).
341
 Although considered to be robust and fairly reliable, the I technique’s 
capabilities could be affected by weather and atmospheric noise. Thus, it detected many nuclear 
explosions in the atmosphere, but also could miss others, leaving an unmet need for additional 
techniques to provide multiple corroborations to reliably detect the timing of tests. 
Seismology offered the most mature and promising method of providing near-
instantaneous detection of a nuclear explosion, yet it still required enough development work that 
it eventually became embroiled in significant controversy when called upon in 1958 to support 
enforcement of a global comprehensive test ban. The development of a continental test site in 
Nevada held several advantages for the use of seismology by AFOAT-1. The geology of the site 
was believed to resemble the Soviet Union’s main test site at Semipalatinsk more than proposed 
U.S. test sites in the Pacific (although it was later discovered significant geologic differences 
                                                 
340
 Besides nuclear explosions, later manifestations of the “I” technique eventually detected a variety of sounds of 
scientific interest, such as meteors entering the atmosphere, eruption of volcanoes, and sounds created by 
earthquakes. Some historical data recorded during the Cold War was later declassified to provide it to scientists 
working on research that could benefit from the documentation it provided. While not exactly comparable to the 
still-withheld classified fallout data the CDC and NCI seek, releases like this do provide clear precedent to release 
sensitive historical intelligence data for important scientific research. 
341
 Air Force Technical Applications Center. A Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection (Patrick 
Air Force Base, FL: Headquarters AFTAC, 1997), 97-100. 
125 
 
existed between the Soviet test site and NTS.).
342
 Its location also impeded the Soviet Union 
from using the same techniques as AFOAT-1 to study the U.S. nuclear program. The Pentagon’s 
pressure on the AEC for a continental test site because of the Korean “war emergency” may have 
been as much about the need for an accessible site that would facilitate nuclear intelligence 
research and development and permit crew training while limiting the Soviet Union’s ability to 
capture samples as it was about forcing the AEC to decide on testing at NTS.  
The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) technique was used experimentally at least as early as 
SANDSTONE in 1948, but officially came online as part of the AEDS network in 1953. Its great 
advantage was its truly instantaneous detection, since it was based on radio waves traveling at 
the speed of light, rather than the orders of magnitude slower acoustic and seismic waves. EMP 
thus provided an initial alerting capability for AFOAT-1’s other techniques, as well as opened 
the door to an important warfighting role for the unit. During the early Cold war, the first signals 
of a Russian attack would likely come from EMP from exploding weapons picked up by the 
AEDS, especially so in the years before the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line’s radars became 
operational in 1957 and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)  achieved initial 
operational capability (IOC) in early 1960, making the unit’s integration into the chain of 
command a vital link in whatever response was made to the threat of a “nuclear Pearl Harbor” 
that was the object of fearful obsession inside and outside the government during the 1950s.
343
 
The warfighting role of AFOAT-1/AFTAC was thus quite limited at first, but as instantaneous 
detection became more sophisticated, its role grew, although it has drawn less comment than 
virtually any other aspect of AFOAT-1/AFTAC operations, perhaps the most guarded of all its 
secrets. 
The Construction of “Safe” Nuclear Testing 
The Atomic Energy Commission bore ultimate responsibility for safely conducting 
testing, but responsibility for radiological safety to protect workers and the public, or rad-safe as 
it became known, was split between it and the military. The military task group commanders 
could also order waivers authorizing additional exposures to the mostly military personnel used 
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to conduct these operations.
344
 The military’s control of these resources allowed it to seamlessly 
hand-off tracking of fallout plumes for test shots between close-in “cloud trackers” who handled 
test diagnostic sampling done for the AEC and the secret units testing and training for long range 
detection operations outside a roughly 200-mile circle around NTS once fallout moved past it.
345
 
The AEC’s primary concern in testing was gathering weapon design data while 
minimizing radiation exposures for those involved. On the other hand, the military wanted to test 
both equipment and personnel under conditions that resembled as closely as possible the 
conditions of actual nuclear war. Even though it ostensibly observed limitations on human 
exposures, officers managing military involvement in the testing process did so amid constant 
command pressure to not let such considerations unduly impede its mission. The exposure of 
large numbers of military personnel was seen by the AEC as clumsy, creating an unnecessary 
hazard for those involved. After the 1951 GREENHOUSE test series in the Pacific, the military 
task group commander generated a report which left one AEC rad-safe expert “feeling that the 
report favors liberally dosing the military personnel with radiation at future operations, for the 
purpose of eliminating undue timidity...”346 Although governed by standards based on the same 
assumptions about the relative benign nature of fallout as the AEC’s, the military nonetheless 
constantly pushed for further exceptions and relaxations to these exposure standards. 
The process of marketing nuclear weapons as controllable guarantors of national security 
included the involvement of many troops as non-volunteer observers. The peacetime draft was 
also in effect, so there was always a large pool of incoming citizen-soldiers to enjoy the dubious 
privilege of witnessing a test shot. However, the movement of those exposed through official 
policy into and out of military service aggravated the military’s problem of multiple fallout 
narratives in circulation once these citizen-soldiers left the information-controlled military for 
civilian life. Despite security restrictions, these military test audiences inevitably communicated 
with civilian Americans. It remains unclear whether this benefited or ultimately worked against 
efforts to shape fallout’s image as benign. The potential for positively communicating policy 
through survival despite exposure to the awesome nature of nuclear weapons was balanced 
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against the wide range of ambivalent and even most certainly a number of negative experiences 
many had with nuclear weapons during their service. The organization of groups such as the 
National Association of Atomic Veterans (NAAV) suggested security culture could generally 
preserve official secrets, but not prevent airing of the intensely personal reactions of many 
service members to their experiences with nuclear weapons.
347
 
Those exposed to the raw fury of nuclear blasts were frequently given brief surveys and 
psychological evaluations in connection with their participation in the tests. The process at times 
included ordering troops to dig in closer to ground zero than AEC standards would allow them to 
remain at the time of the blast. These fighting positions were evacuated just before the shot; 
troops returned to these forward locations afterwards to see “how minor the risks of staying in 
place might have been.”348 In a sense, “training” of this sort reinforced the idea that the unseen 
was thus unimportant, a key component in official elisions of fallout. With the large numbers of 
draftees, informed consent under those circumstances would have been problematic, even if it 
had been a goal. In the event of nuclear war, there would be no volunteers anyway, as everyone 
in the military would be a participant at that point, whatever their personal comfort level with 
radiation or draft versus volunteer status. The reactions of American civilians as strategic targets 
for enemy forces was also of great concern to the government, which resulted in funding of 
academic work in disaster studies to study their response.
349
 Thus, the concept of informed 
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consent as it is now practiced was a concept that the AEC – and even more the military – treated 
as foreign to the fundamental concerns of secrecy, military life, and the threat posed by nuclear 
weapons against millions of civilians in the 1950s. 
A major objective of exposing troops to these nuclear events was to gain insight into the 
problems of troop control, discipline, and morale likely to occur in actual nuclear war. Military 
leaders argued there was no substitute for using the real thing in training because “the realism 
engendered by coming face-to-face with an actual nuclear detonation adds a great deal to the 
benefits derived…”350 While science had its share of the radiation-reckless, from the Curies to 
Louis Slotin to Edward Teller, in seeking to banish fear among military personnel the military as 
an institution consistently chose to banish reasonable caution about the dangers of radiation 
exposure in favor of tidy reassurances.
351
 If it was not official policy, the evidence suggested 
exposure to radiation, whether intellectually in training or in reality by participation in 
maneuvers at tests, official portrayal of fallout exposure as easily managed and minimally 
threatening was an example of “in effect” policy. In-effect, military policy sought to avoid giving 
credence to the dangers of fallout in the belief such discussions undermined the fundamental 
utility of nuclear weapons by emphasizing extraconventional effects of little consequence. 
Official narratives that depicted manageable and useful nuclear power were a form of “talking 
cure” for nuclear fear, a ubiquitous focus of psychological work during the Freudian Fifties. 
Division of Fallout Tracking Responsibility 
The breakdown in responsibilities for sampling between the AEC and the AFOAT-1 for 
RANGER illustrated how military compartmentalization prevented a complete set of accurate 
data from fallout samples reaching those in the AEC with the responsibility for radiation safety. 
The History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling described the delineation of responsibilities: 
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…the cloud tracking aircraft were a [rad-safe] requirement established by the 
Atomic Energy Commission. The cloud samplers, however, were for the Air 
Force atomic energy detection system [AEDS].
352
 
 
Thus, once fallout drifted off the test site, the Air Force cloud-trackers handling close-in 
sampling would appraise AFOAT-1 of the direction of the plume. In effect, this limited AEC 
sampling to the contents of fallout specifically required for weapons development. Despite this 
source and Hacker’s definitive work on the AEC’s efforts to deal with radiation safety in testing, 
it was unclear who, if anyone, shared responsibility for notifications when off-site dosage rates 
from fallout exceeded the relatively liberal exposure standards of that era.  
In fact, the AEC made “no plans for distant monitoring,” leaving it up to Kodak to 
complain (just as it did in 1945 after TRINITY) when fallout again affected its film 
manufacturing.  These complaints about the threat to property presented by fallout, expressed 
through the National Association of Photographic Manufacturers, were what actually led the 
AEC to establish an off-site monitoring network, in order to protect the AEC from legal action 
by giving warning to film manufacturers when fallout from testing might threaten their 
manufacturing operations.
353
 The director of the AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory (HASL), 
Merrill Eisenbud stated flatly that “HASL would not have been involved in fallout monitoring 
but for…[Kodak’s actions]”354 The hasty reaction by the AEC in setting up a monitoring system 
operated by HASL due to these complaints stood in stark contrast to the government’s 
hardening, generally dismissive attitude toward public and scientific perceptions that fallout 
represented a risk, which continued throughout the 1950s. While it was true damage to film by 
fallout was easily demonstrable and the long-term health effects on humans somewhat 
speculative and difficult to document at the time, requiring a significant commitment of scientific 
resources to resolve, comparison of the paradoxical reactions of a lack of caution about human 
health and the quick reaction based on damage to property was an ironic comment on the safety 
priorities of the AEC. The great deference shown Kodak’s concerns also threw light on the 
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government’s indifference to providing the resources needed to study the risks of low-level 
human radiation exposure to fallout. 
The highest exposure limits of all applied to the crews of sampling planes in use by the 
military in place of the troublesome drones used at SANDSTONE, thanks to Major Fackler’s 
“accidental” cloud penetration there. The sampler pilots were all volunteers (it is uncertain if this 
applied to other crewmembers), although it was questionable in most cases whether any 
volunteers could be considered fully-informed test subjects in the sense that this term is now 
used. In the first test series conducted at the newly opened Nevada Test Site (NTS), the 1951 
RANGER series, the Air Force invoked the Korean emergency yet again, this time to justify 
using manned aircraft rather than drones, stating its decision to use manned aircraft was because 
“there was no time to organize drone samplers” on the thirty-day notice the Air Force received 
before the beginning of the test series. Apparently, based on the previous “accidental” 
penetration of the SANDSTONE cloud by Fackler and his crew, in the three years since 
SANDSTONE the Air Force only planned to use manned samplers anyway at RANGER, not 
drones. Hacker reported that drones were still used at RANGER,
355
 but this was contradicted in 
the source he cited.
356
 Thus the first test series at NTS, RANGER, not only increased civilian 
exposures to radiation, because of its location in the continental United States but it also marked 
the beginning of a calculated increase in the exposure of the military personnel involved. This 
trend was driven by the military’s desire to project the image of controllable, nuclear weapons 
with military utility on the battlefield. The issue was not so much addressing fallout, per se, but 
creating an atmosphere where nuclear weapons could be seen as creators of national security, 
rather than as a threat to public health and one’s personal security. 
Developing a Global Network 
AFOAT-1 continued development work during 1951 on its LRD networks in a very busy 
year for testing, which included three test series: RANGER at NTS during January and February 
1951; the GREENHOUSE test series during May and June in the Pacific; and a return to NTS in 
October and November 1951 for BUSTER-JANGLE. Even though sufficient justification for the 
original plans for the LRD system were fulfilled by its detection of Joe-1, accurate detection of 
Russian weapons testing presented challenges beyond those explored at GREEN RUN. The need 
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for system improvements became apparent as operational factors raised new issues requiring 
research and development: this work depended on using American test shots as a means to 
evaluate and calibrate new and existing LRD techniques.  
Ironically, among the first problems faced was the fact that fallout from AEC testing 
interfered with collection of Soviet fallout for intelligence purposes, leading AFOAT-1 to 
complain “radiological contamination of the atmosphere during the Nevada tests [had] 
temporarily impaired long range detection capabilities based on the analysis of bomb debris.”357 
The review panel recommended the AEC plan future U.S. tests so they did not interfere with 
LRD capabilities. This seemed to imply the AEC gained some access to intelligence information 
indicating the timing of potential Soviet testing, just as the AFOAT-1 seemed to have anticipated 
Joe-1, again suggesting the use of cuing provided by the CIA or communications intercepts. 
Most likely, it was testing at the higher latitude of Nevada which caused most interference with 
AFOAT-1’s intelligence work. The near-Equator location of the Pacific Proving Grounds likely 
minimized the interference fallout from testing there caused to intelligence work, at least until 
the testing of high-yield designs began in late 1952.  
The Russians unwittingly assisted the situation by testing relatively few weapons before 
1954, making the radioactive signature of the fallout from each one distinct. Fortuitously (or 
perhaps not), the next two Soviet tests, Joe-2 (32 kilotons, 24 September 1951) followed by Joe-
3 (42 kilotons, 18 October 1951), occurred just before the next U.S. test series, BUSTER-
JANGLE, commenced in Nevada with the fizzle of  BUSTER ABLE (<1 pound, 22 October 
1951). The second Soviet test, Joe-2, was especially important to evaluating the improved 
effectiveness of the AEDS. It was the first Soviet test sonically detected on its initial signal, 
almost immediately determining the location of the blast, which aided in vectoring Air Weather 
Service WB-29s quickly in the direction of the resulting debris plume. Laboratory analysis by 
AFOAT-1 confirmed there was no thermonuclear reaction involved in a device composed of 
plutonium. Some aspects of AFOAT-1’s analysis capabilities were still under development, 
however. A 3 October 1951 memorandum on the findings indicated that improvement in the 
following areas was possible: determination of the magnitudes and efficiency of the explosion; 
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determination of the upper percentage limit of uranium-235 involved in an explosion in concert 
with the plutonium; and estimates of the contribution of any potential thermonuclear reaction in 
an explosion.
358
 Confirming the last capability was a direct result of information obtained during 
the U.S. GREENHOUSE test series. The memo also took note Robert Oppenheimer remained 
within this compartment of information, a situation soon to change.
359
 
With the international crisis surrounding Korea peaking, the American push to develop a 
thermonuclear fusion weapon or “superbomb” depended on several series of tests that began in 
1951, starting with GREENHOUSE in April and May. This test series began with two shots as 
proof tests of the Mark 5 (GREENHOUSE EASY – 47 kilotons, 20 April 1951) and Mark 6 
(GREENHOUSE DOG – 81 kilotons, 7 April 1951) weapons then entering the stockpile. The 
improved designs for the Strategic Air Command were intended to arm the pending rapid 
expansion of its bomber fleet with B-47 and B-52 aircraft. The Mark 5 weapon proof test also 
had another purpose – the design would serve as the primary, or fission, stage of the upcoming 
IVY MIKE thermonuclear proof-of-concept test planned for late 1952. GREENHOUSE 
GEORGE (225 kilotons, 8 May 1951) was an experimental device. It provided data on the 
process of radiation implosion that contributed to the refinement of the Teller-Ulam 
thermonuclear weapon design. GREENHOUSE ITEM (46 kilotons, 25 May 1951) tested the 
principle of the “boosted” nuclear weapon, which significantly increases the yield of a fission 
weapon by injecting tritium into the core of the weapon, an efficiency feature used in nearly all 
current nuclear weapons.
360
 For these tests, sampling aircraft were a key component of 
evaluating the new designs, since “radiological sampling provided one of the most important 
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methods of measuring weapon efficiency.”361 GREENHOUSE, by virtue of the higher expected 
yields, reverted to large-scale use of drone aircraft. The results were decidedly mixed, with 
drones crashing or becoming uncontrollable on every shot.
362
 These failures added further 
impetus to the Air Force’s already strong desire to study more closely the interaction of nuclear 
weapons and human radiation exposures during operations by using manned samplers. 
In-Your-Face Fallout 
The Air Force and the AEC decided future sampling missions during testing would 
involve manned aircraft. In the process, the delineation between Long Range Detection and 
close-in sampling became more distinct. The AEC’s Los Alamos Laboratory was responsible for 
the equipment used by the manned samplers which included small, short range jet aircraft for the 
first time, with installations on the B-29s used for long range samplers made to meet “AFOAT-1 
requirements.”363 In this fashion, AFOAT-1 captured a consistent record of the “fractionation” of 
the bomb debris from detonation onward.
364
 Close coordination between the AEC and AFOAT-1 
continued despite extensive security measures, with AFOAT-1 crews working alongside crews 
from the 4925
th
 Test Group (Atomic), the Air Force unit responsible for air support for test 
operations. Samples for both AFOAT-1 and the AEC came off the same close-in sampling 
aircraft at the next test series, BUSTER-JANGLE, held at the Nevada Test Site in October and 
November 1951.
365
 This series included two shots, JANGLE SUGAR (surface burst – 1.25 
kilotons, 19 November 1951) and JANGLE UNCLE (sub-surface burst – 1.25 kilotons, 29 
November 1951), which offered opportunities to calibrate the newly operational seismic portion 
of the Atomic Energy Detection System. With these calibration shots completed, the AEDS was 
in place as a basic, operational global long range detection network by the end of 1951 as 
originally scheduled. The need to meet this deadline was a likely reason the military rejected a 
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proposal suggested by the AEC to postpone these two particular weapons effects tests until 
spring 1952. 
The two JANGLE shots caused considerable concern to the AEC about “the level of 
radioactivity that the outside populations should be allowed to take” because shots closely 
coupled to or shallowly buried in the ground create extensive fallout, even with the low yields of 
these two shots. A discussion of raising the allowed doses to the public led to the planning of 
emergency evacuations for civilians downwind from the test site, if needed. In addition to 
helping calibrate the AEDS, JANGLE was intended as a “dirty” shot under conditions designed 
to provide data Rand Corporation used to produce its first fallout models.
366
 Intense fallout 
exceeding AEC limits occurred within NTS, but was not observed off-site. The low yield of the 
JANGLE shots (1.25 kilotons) contributed to the relatively limited fallout detected off-site from 
these “dirty” shots, but their limited dispersion depended just as much on favorable winds.367 The 
comparison between the B-29s and the T-33 jet samplers favored the jets, since they exposed 
only one or two crew members to radiation and returned the filters for evaluation more quickly 
than the B-29s, resulting in more complete, “stronger” samples of short-lived isotopes. However, 
the jets were hampered by a relatively short range, a problem which soon recurred with fatal 
results at IVY MIKE in late 1952.
368
 
Indicative of the official attitude of the Air Force was a filmed example of a crew briefing 
that minimized concerns about the threat of radiation for a WB-29 sampling aircrew on the 
BUSTER CHARLIE shot (14 kilotons, 30 October 1951). The rad-safe officer on the mission 
was also the special equipment operator (SEO), tasked with directing the aircraft so that it could 
get optimal samples of the radioactive cloud. As with Fackler’s unscheduled penetration at 
SANDSTONE, the conflict of interest between mission accomplishment and safety continued; 
the same person chose when it was “hot” enough to sample and when it was too “hot” to stay in 
the debris plume, indicating the aircraft should immediately leave.  
The SEO’s statement to his crew summed up the Air Force’s “in effect” attitude to the 
risks posed by fallout. The Air Force’s documentation of this sort of mission both portrayed what 
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the service believed was the controllable and innocuous nature of radioactive fallout, as well as 
expectations for the crew’s performance. Emphasizing the mission’s importance, the SEO stated: 
We are going to prove to everyone who has to do it that they can fly in this stuff 
and remain in this stuff as long as they observe a few safety precautions. You’ve 
all been briefed on the amount of radiation you can get and still be on the safe 
side. I’d like to assure you will never get enough radiation on the inside of this 
aircraft to give a thought to the consequences. 
 
Despite the commander’s clearly stated nonchalance about fallout exposure, he also 
advised the crew, on exiting the aircraft after the mission, “to try not to touch the outside of the 
aircraft and get over to the rad-safe center.”369 While the fuselage did give some protection, 
radiation did not just disappear, as the military often portrayed, “into the stratosphere.”370  
Military training films depicted a continual emphasis of how little danger radiation was to 
military operations. If the military could operate in close proximity to nuclear explosions at NTS, 
civilians outside NTS boundaries, who were – hopefully – much farther away from what were 
seen by the military as the minor dangers of nuclear weapons, should have even less concern 
about fallout. Films of military operations around nuclear explosions from this era typically 
depicted quick reentries to the area of the nuclear blasts, as would be required to exploit the 
tactical advantage use of such weapons brought to the battlefield.
371
 After all, there was little 
point in taking territory one could not occupy to defend if the weapon of victory made it 
uninhabitable. Propaganda in the guise of training films clearly illustrated a hardening, far-too-
optimistic military attitude that found it difficult to later concede the existence of radiation 
hazards accompanying atmospheric testing or potential battlefield use of nuclear weapons. While 
ordinary citizens did not receive a “pep talk” like the sampler crew in the film, they shared the 
same atmosphere. Americans were nonetheless as assuredly along for the ride as the airmen. 
A Newly Steep Learning Curve of Sampling’s Conventional and Radioactive Perils 
Shortening exposure times by using high performance jets as samplers instead of 
lumbering converted bombers seemed like a relatively easy fix when first used in the context of 
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fission weapons. Their application to sampling thermonuclear shots proved more problematic, in 
large part because of the sheer scale of these effects, an issue made clear in the first 
thermonuclear test, the IVY MIKE device (10.4 megatons, 1 November 1952). The 561
st
 Fighter 
Squadron was assigned to the sampling mission; it included pilot Kelsey Wynns and his 
compatriots, typical highly skilled fighter pilots of the early 1950s, part of a hardy group facing 
death on a daily basis simply flying the Air Force’s primitive first-generation jet aircraft.372 Most 
likely having seen the sampler crew training film made at BUSTER CHARLIE as part of their 
indoctrination, sampler pilots were described by one AEC rad-safe expert as seeming “to feel 
that they can go ahead and get higher exposures if they wish.”373 Despite the professional 
bravado and personal courage the Air Force counted on to complete these hazardous missions, 
sampler pilots were not a reckless or foolhardy group. For instance, Wynns took pains to 
persuade one of his fellow pilots, Jimmy P. Robinson, to sign up for low-cost military life 
insurance to protect his family.
374
 Relatively better informed about the risks they were taking 
than most service members involved in nuclear testing, these pilots – like most of those involved 
in test operations – volunteered under questionable protocols of consent in comparison to current 
standards. However, their sense that they willingly accepted what they knew to be a dangerous 
mission probably accounted for the fact that relatively few of those directly involved in handling 
radioactive fallout, including those who served in AFOAT-1/AFTAC, subsequently joined 
advocacy organizations such as the National Association of Atomic Veterans. Comfortable with 
risk in general, they saw fallout as something that might stir fear in others, but was virtually 
written into their job description to ignore as just one more danger. 
Due to the need to operate from an uncontaminated base the samplers for IVY were 
stationed on Kwajalein, over 300 miles away from ground zero on Eniwetok; it was a lengthy 
flight for the relatively “short-legged” fighters. Even at that distance, Wynns, who commanded 
the second flight of four samplers, felt the concussion of the 10.4 megaton blast from IVY 
MIKE’s first full-scale test of the Teller-Ulam configuration while awaiting take off. Things 
quickly began to go wrong. Wynns ordered one of his wingmen to abort his mission after a failed 
refueling attempt en route. The intense electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from MIKE caused havoc 
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with the flight control plan by shutting down or making useless radios and homing beacons 
needed for navigation by the samplers and other test aircraft.
375
  
Captain Robinson, in the first flight of samplers, encountered intense radiation on 
entering the cloud at 45,000 feet, then suffered problems with his autopilot, possibly due to 
EMP’s effects on its tube-era electronics, resulting in the aircraft spinning out of control when he 
tried to turn back. Successful recovery from the spin left him adrift inside the cloud at 20,000 
feet, but the control aircraft’s radar also was disabled by EMP and could not direct him to safety. 
Robinson eventually flew clear and, low on fuel, attempted an emergency landing on Eniwetok 
instead of returning to Kwajalein. Unfortunately, the sampler’s jet engine flamed out from lack 
of fuel just short of the runway and Robinson was killed as his F-84 crashed into the ocean.
376
 
Comforted only by the fact he convinced Robinson to sign up for life insurance, flying in 
the second group of samplers at 46,000 feet Wynns saw the massive cloud from MIKE towering 
before his aircraft, possibly as much as another 100,000 feet above his altitude. The radiation 
detector in the cockpit began picking up readings from the blast 120 miles away. Wynns 
attempted to climb higher, but his now-empty fuel drop tank would not jettison, holding him at a 
lower altitude while increasing the rate of his jet’s fuel consumption as he led his remaining two 
wingmen into the roiling mushroom. The stem of the cloud was 130 miles across as he flew 
through its center. Emerging from the other side, he realized he had enough fuel to reach his 
refueling tankers, but only if he turned and flew directly back through the cloud again, instead of 
circling around it as originally planned to limit exposure of the samplers. Even then, it was a near 
thing as he had only ten minutes worth of fuel upon contact with the waiting tankers on the far 
side. Wynns landed with just enough fuel to make one missed approach landing. 
The samplers taxied to a remote part of the airstrip. The pilots were plucked from their 
aircraft with cranes so flightline personnel would not come into contact with the contaminated 
exterior of the planes. The filters were pulled from the sampling pods, the pilots stripped and 
washed multiple times before they were able to pass muster with rad-safe personnel who scanned 
their bodies with radiation counters. After the samples were packed in lead casks, Wynns was 
armed with a .45 caliber pistol to escort them to the laboratory at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 
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and seated aboard a C-54 transport for the long flight there.
377
 Close-in samples like those 
returned by Wynns and his fellow pilots provided vital diagnostic info on the weapon designs, 
data often read from short-lived isotopes that quickly decayed, so speed in getting the samples to 
the AEC’s laboratory was a priority. 
Wynns learned later his exposure at IVY MIKE totaled 105.5 roentgens, with his 
wingmen receiving similar doses, because of the double pass through the cloud. He related that 
both of his wingmen were dead within two years, with everyone else involved as sampling pilots 
at MIKE succumbing before 1960, except him, although he did not list causes of death.
378
 
Advised to avoid fathering any more children, Wynns and his wife were blessed with another 
daughter after his exposure. The AEC regularly tracked the health of Wynns and his daughter as 
part of a long-term study conducted of those with the highest exposures acquired during testing. 
Lt. Col. Wynns died in 1999.
379
 The long-term study of the Wynns’ health, performed because of 
his known high exposure to radiation, appears to be one of the few conducted on service 
members by the AEC that commenced directly following their exposure. 
 “New Look” – Same Old Fallout 
On the civilian side, nuclear weapons policy was forged in the White House. IVY 
MIKE’s proof of basic thermonuclear designs principles took place on the cusp of the 1952 
presidential election, delivering to the incoming president a powerful new weapon that 
simultaneously empowered and constrained national security strategy. Harry Truman extended 
his personal diffidence about discussing such matters through his order of silence in regard to the 
controversy sparked by the GAC’s advice to not hastily pursue thermonuclear weapons. This 
forced an ominous public silence about fallout on AEC scientists, including J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, following Truman’s decision after Joe-1 to ignore the AEC’s recommendations.380 
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Following the 1952 election, the presidency moved into the hands of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
whose military background and fiscal conservatism prompted him to order his newly-appointed 
Chiefs of Staff to take the first steps in what became known as Ike’s “New Look” defense 
policy.
381
 The New Look planned national security fiscal economies based a shift in emphasis to 
nuclear weapons. The hope was nuclear weapons would prove a less costly solution to deterring 
the numerically superior Soviet threat to Western Europe, building a modernized, highly mobile 
U.S. military equipped with nuclear weapons from funds saved through shrinking the larger, 
wholly conventional forces they were to replace. In the early days of his presidency, 
Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for nuclear weapons appeared to confirm that he had yet to fully digest 
the issue of fallout.  
That initial omission reflected fallout’s status as a vital intelligence secret and little more, 
even within the guarded confines at the apex of the American national security bureaucracy. The 
grim results of IVY MIKE confirmed the fallout predictions for thermonuclear weapons, the 
central problem of nuclear weapons strategy that troubled Oppenheimer and his GAC into 
raising it as an issue in the face of the Air Force’s ambitious optimism for the new class of 
weapon. Along with the usual rough edges in the course of turning over power to a new 
president, during the early days of the Eisenhower administration the issue of fallout as a 
problem remained as deeply buried as possible, known only to a relative few in the AEC and at 
the Pentagon. Ike was likely simultaneously pleased and distressed at details in memos on Soviet 
fissile material production and estimated weapons stockpile rates produced by one of his most 
valuable classified assets, AFOAT-1. 
Historical data on Soviet stockpile production is now available, making it possible to   
evaluate it against annual and cumulative American production in much the same way as highly 
classified AFOAT-1 intelligence and AEC production reports provided to the president and his 
closest advisers during the 1950s. The United States plutonium-239 stockpile during 
Eisenhower’s first term rose from 1,400 kilograms in 1952, doubling to 2,950 kilograms by 
1954, then reached 6,050 kilograms in 1956. The comparable figures AFOAT-1’s krypton-85 
monitoring program documented for the USSR cumulative stockpile were approximately 456 
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part from the technical nature of the super...” 
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kilograms in 1952, 1,131 kilograms in 1954, and 2,081 kilograms in 1956.  While the USSR 
clearly possessed a substantial arsenal and growing capacity to produce fissile material, the total 
Russian plutonium inventory remained at about a third of American holdings even as both 
nations rapidly increased their fissile material production capacities.  Yet this was the same 
period during which the Air Force began asserting the potential for a growing “bomber gap” 
opening between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. The data AFOAT-1 produced on the Soviet 
nuclear stockpile in no sense made sense in support of even a weak argument for American 
weakness.
382
 The worst case argument spun by Air Force intelligence analysts from this data into 
the “bomber gap” (and the later “missile gap”) possessed the same shape-shifting credibility as 
cotton candy; its appearance artfully concealed its lack of substance beyond the assumptions 
made by analysts.  
What Americans Believed (and How to Change It) 
In order to sell the public on the need to support change during the Cold War, shifting 
priorities in national security policy were often seen as a matter of proper marketing in the 
executive branch. Evidence for this marketing-based policy formation was extensive in 
Eisenhower administration documents. As Ike engaged with the Department of Defense over 
details of the New Look in the first years of his presidency, his staff was at work on his version 
of “Operation Candor” as the White House sought to take advantage of Stalin’s death shortly 
after the president assumed office. Candor was an attempt to use straight talk in order to sway the 
American people to support Ike’s national security policy. Among the first actions taken was 
extension of an invitation to Oppenheimer to discuss his views on “Armament and American 
Policy.” 383 In fact, Oppenheimer had helped place the topic of candor about nuclear weapons on 
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the table by virtue of acting as a consultant to a 1952 Department of State panel report on 
disarmament, which argued for candor about nuclear weapons as among its recommendations. 
The idea of candor apparently appealed to Eisenhower. However, the new president’s 
embrace repurposed it from a nascent disarmament proposal into an effort to garner public 
support and avoid panic in the face of informing Americans of the grim realities of the hydrogen 
bomb. This White House project also became known as Candor, including “Operation Edify.” 
Originally proposed as a series of five television programs sponsored by the government to 
address various facets of national security, Ira Chernus argued “Edify” demonstrated that 
“Eisenhower and his advisors cared little about the domestic impact…” of the project, but the 
evidence seems to argue against this interpretation.
384
 Robert Cutler arranged for a special 
showing of the then Top Secret film of IVY MIKE. Those invited included the Cabinet, 
presidential advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service secretaries. C.D. Jackson, serving 
temporarily on loan from Henry Luce’s Time-Life Incorporated as a special assistant advising 
Ike on psychological warfare, called for a campaign that was directed straight at the national 
security perceptions of the American public. 
The national will [emphasis in original] consists of the composite thought of the 
American people. They do not yet grasp the import of the President’s recent 
words that we live in an age, not an instant, of peril. They do not fully understand 
the dangers that confront them, the power of the enemy, the difficulty of reducing 
that power, and the probable duration of the conflict.
385
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In addition to initiating the first national security television marketing campaign, another 
domestic marketing organization, the Advertising Council, suggested providing “vigorous 
follow-through…via all media.”386  
James M. Lambie, whose writ involved assisting development of “Operation Candor,” 
frankly admitted the project was “a job of persuasion or indoctrination or propaganda.” 
This is no more than a business corporation would do before launching a 
campaign. It would discover who comprised its market, what their prejudices and 
predilections [sic], what they knew and didn’t know, what they would accept and 
wouldn’t accept, etc., etc. 
 
Lambie was disturbed by his initial research, in which a Gallup poll indicated that 60% of 
Americans pessimistically thought that Russian policy offered no “real change” with Stalin gone 
Lambie argued: 
There are two jobs. One is to find out what the story has to be. The other is to find 
out what will make people believe it and act on it.
387
 
 
Later in July 1953, along with letters to other polling executives Lambie wrote to Claude 
Robinson, president of the Opinion Research Corporation, in order to engage his services to 
“make people aware of the great danger of Russian imperialism.” Interestingly, Robinson 
expressed surprise to Lambie that Americans had yet to internalize the danger they faced by 
ironically – and likely quite unwittingly – citing the person at the center of the fallout 
controversy. 
The simplest answer that I can think of is just tell the people truthfully what we 
are up against. Mr. Oppenheimer, I think, made a good deal of sense in his recent 
article saying that we are denying the American public a great deal of information 
about the atomic bomb that the Russians already have…[F]olks in the grass roots 
can do pretty well in thinking through national issues if given the right kind of 
help.
388
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A significant part of that denied information had to do with fallout in its problematic new role as 
a direct threat to personal security that extended far beyond the blast zone. Robinson suggested 
that “Gallup is always on the lookout for subjects which he can turn into newspaper stories.”389 
This was hardly news to Lambie, as in addition to Robinson and Gallup, he had also written 
asking for advice to Elmo Roper, another pollster. 
It was something bigger than Stalin’s death that motivated Ike to pursue Operation 
Candor. The president and his advisors were clearly worried about how to bring Americans to 
understand the implications of thermonuclear weapons, foremost among which was the threat of 
fallout, while saying as little as possible to alarm them.  
The American public needs information concerning the growth of the Soviet 
atomic capability. This development brings the communities of the United States 
into the front lines. It places in doubt the claim that quantitative atomic superiority 
is a conclusive deterrent to attack.
390
 
 
Lambie pointed toward the crux of the problem in another round of letters to the pollsters. 
If I were to try to state the problem, I should put it this way: we have not yet been 
able to convey to the American people the enormity of the threat that confronts 
them – including, but not limited to, the atomic situation. 
 
In a July 1953 memo to Robert Cutler, Eisenhower’s National Security Adviser, Lambie quoted 
William James on the “Moral Equivalent of War.”  
When whole nations are the armies and the science of destruction vies in 
intellectual refinement with the science of production, I see that war becomes 
absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity.  
 
Lambie added parenthetically, “And ‘monstrous’ is the word for what we got [sic] now.”391  
While fallout again appeared to have been implicated in general terms, Lambie was 
specifically describing his initiation into knowledge of the threat posed by fallout. Given that the 
supraconventional effects were unlikely to be termed “monstrous” or to make war “absurd,” 
fallout gave every indication of being precisely the factor Lambie was elliptically referencing. 
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What sparked Lambie’s outreach for help in explaining a campaign by the Eisenhower 
White House to call the American public’s attention to “an age of peril” was his staff’s viewing 
film about the then still classified IVY MIKE test following Oppenheimer’s presentation to the 
National Security Council a week earlier.
392
 Shown on 1 June 1953 with Eisenhower in 
attendance, attendees included the cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Department of 
Defense officials, representatives of the AEC, civil defense, and various national security staff 
members. Lambie’s name was not on the official invitation list, but his supervisor, C.D. Jackson, 
was and there were indications others not on the official invitation list with security clearances 
were accommodated to room capacity.
393
 Certainly, Lambie was briefed on the situation the 
extent he was talking around it carefully in his correspondence to recruit pollsters and advertising 
executives to help develop an effective policy response to the challenge of thermonuclear 
weapons. In his interactions with public opinion research executives on how to better assess the 
beliefs of Americans about national security, Lambie’s attention was undoubtedly called to 
relevant data already available. 
What did the public believe about war in the nuclear age and how did this shift with 
Americans’ increasing awareness of the threat posed by fallout? A Gallup Poll taken in October 
1949, just after the first Soviet test was announced by Truman, showed a relatively modest 
concern about the atom bomb itself, with just 6% of Americans listing it as the most important 
issue for the government over the next year. A total of about 25% of respondents listed a broader 
concern with the threat of war, Communism, and the Soviet Union as the major issues over the 
next year. When asked specifically about Russian possession of the atom bomb, a much higher 
45% thought this could lead to war. However, at this point, just 4% had given a thought to 
moving elsewhere to protect their family from such an attack. Rather too optimistically, 63% 
believed that science would develop a defense against the atom bomb in the next ten years. The 
Air Force’s public relations efforts were clearly bearing fruit, as 65% believed the junior service 
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would play the “most important part” in case of war.394  
In spite of Truman’s order of silence, the constrained debate over pursuing thermonuclear 
weapons was something Americans picked up on, slowly at first, then with increasing concern; 
in February 1950, 68% approved of building hydrogen bombs with a nearly equal number 
surprisingly believing the United States should also try to negotiate with the Russians to work 
out an agreement to limit such weapons. However, at the time only 18% of Americans were 
optimistic about successfully concluding such an agreement.
395
  
By the summer of 1953, with Stalin buried, Americans remained fairly complacent about 
how they saw the threat of nuclear war, with between 38% and 51% saying that there “was not 
much chance” of their community being attacked, depending on how the question was asked.396 
In what might be the first poll question composed due to direct queries from the White House, 
Gallup Poll #520 asked whether “U.S. defense officials should or should not give the people 
more information about the destructiveness of the atom and hydrogen bombs?” Americans came 
down clearly on the side of knowing more, with 62% supporting better information.
397
 The 
November 1953 appearance of Michael Amrine’s article, “Too Much Secrecy Can Hurt,” in Air 
Force magazine demonstrated the debate over the need for greater public knowledge of the 
effects of thermonuclear war extended into the inner sanctum of the service.
398
 While the general 
narrative about civil defense and military preparedness was couched in purposefully non-specific 
language, as in Amrine’s article, the bulk of such anxieties expressed by the few informed 
observers were engendered by the threat of fallout. There simply was no other topic of equivalent 
importance that differentiated thermonuclear weapons from fission and conventional weapons, 
even though this was an extraordinarily sensitive official secret, as Chapter Three will 
demonstrate. Fallout as a threat was already well within the imagination of many Americans. 
Other questions in these polls showed generally less than 20% of Americans feared 
nuclear war would break out with the Soviets or that the Russians would prevail if it did occur. 
One can read such numbers in a variety of ways. They demonstrated a faith in both government 
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and science to develop the military tools to prevent war, but at the same time a majority 
optimistically believed the United States would prevail in the event of nuclear war. 
These and other polls certainly drew the attention of military planners and other 
researchers working on the problems of national security in the “air-atomic age.” Amrine, who 
earlier noted how the Air Force framed its pursuit of nuclear weapons as meeting the needs of its 
“customers,” the American public, left no doubt selling the public on the new policy was not 
going at all well in mid-summer 1953.
399
 Amrine summed things up by blaming “too much 
secrecy,” where the U.S. government continued “to stamp CONFIDENTIAL on items now 
secret from none but our own citizens.” Certainly this could be said about AEC’s test program, 
but it applied even more conclusively in describing the rough outline of the capabilities of the 
American nuclear intelligence effort, in addition to the fallout problem itself, was revealed at its 
birth through the compromised agency of Kim Philby, a fact known to both British and 
American intelligence by 1953. Amrine condemned the fact that: 
This confusion is a direct result of the fantastic situation in which we pretend that 
we can keep our hydrogen development secret, while we boast that we can detect 
Russian bombs whenever we desire!
400
 
 
Amrine was an experienced and knowledgeable author who earlier worked in public 
information for the AEC at Brookhaven National Laboratory, as well as serving as managing 
editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Given his background and likely previous 
associations, there can be little doubt that his comment was in reference to the work of nuclear 
intelligence, perhaps even directly about AFOAT-1. His concerns spoke to the paradox of 
nuclear absolutism, the belief nuclear weapons were the greatest threat to national security at the 
same time they provided the ultimate security against just such an attack. Moreover, this security 
depended on blanketing secrecy to keep citizens in ignorance of the harsh realities of nuclear 
war, even when it was clearly not a sustainable policy. 
Amrine speculated on the reasons for the somewhat confused picture polling provided on 
the views of the American public. Supplementing the polls, Amrine drew on additional 
interviews conducted by the budding disaster studies community, including those done at the 
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Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan.
401
 For many, Amrine intimated that 
the public must have concluded that possession of nuclear weapons was a quasi-magical solution 
to national security in the “air-atomic age.” He blamed ignorance and education levels, because 
overcoming “simple ignorance was the answer to this mistaken belief in a magic Maginot Line 
around America.” College graduates recognized by a margin of 46% that the military might not 
prevail in protecting the United States. “It was the most poorly-educated who expected the most 
protection.” The AEC’s 1950 The Effects of Nuclear Weapons was “written in language only an 
engineer could understand.” Most critical of its errors, in Amrine’s judgment, was that “because 
of secrecy and conflicting statements about radiation, the Michigan disaster studies research 
noted that many tended to exaggerate radiation effects. Such ignorance in turn was seen as 
prodding people to exaggerate the size of the civil defense problem, and waver between 
unreasonable fear and unreasonable complacency.” Thus, at a time when scientific knowledge 
about fallout was minimal, with the primary use of fallout being for intelligence purposes, and 
with the Air Force sponsoring research that seemingly demonstrated the American public would 
best be kept ignorant of fallout, even after it was argued the public needed better access to the 
realities of “air-atomic” warfare, fallout was a topic that policy and predisposition caused the 
military to view as troublesome. In fact, as judged by many experts on national security, the 
public already knew too much, possessing “a strong tendency to exaggerate the radiation effects 
of A-bombs.”402 
What factors shaped such dismissive views, which Amrine and others associated with 
backstopping Air Force policy found troublesome in connection with discussion of fallout? As 
with Tomboy soda, extensive cultural evidence demonstrated a more complex picture of 
American encounters with radiation and fallout. Those who made up part of the various national 
security elites clearly felt that the public misunderstood the nature of these new weapons, 
focusing too little on their explosive power and other supraconventional effects and – already – 
too much on the problem of radioactive fallout.
403
 Granted, at mid-century, most Americans did 
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not understand radiation any better than they understood witchcraft. With few exceptions, 
physics was not a subject typically encountered in one’s education prior to the post-1957 
expansion of science education following the political shock of Sputnik’s orbiting by the Soviet 
Union as the first satellite.
404
 
The military understood those whose service required them to come into contact with 
nuclear weapons likely had insufficient or incorrect knowledge of what it considered to be the 
facts of fallout. This was not a one-time problem, but one that persisted and intensified. An 
example was the 1962 training manual, Atomic Fundamentals, used in training by the Defense 
Atomic Support Agency’s Atomic Weapons Training Group  for those “who lack a background 
knowledge of elementary nuclear physics.” In basic terms, this brief book covered the 
fundamentals of radioactivity in order to provide “simple facts herein …essential for a proper 
comprehension of classroom instruction” up to the point where it reached critical mass.405 This 
publication was just one example of the many disconnects existing between popular beliefs about 
nuclear power and what the government preferred citizen-soldiers should know about 
radioactivity. In this case, the term fallout was something troublesome enough to either save for 
later, more complex instruction or to be ignored altogether. Even in 1962, with fear of fallout 
hanging in the very air, amazingly enough, the term was simply not present in this textbook. Just 
as with much evidence of fallout’s role in shaping policy, references to fallout where the 
circumstances clearly pointed to the need for its explicit presence in the narrative were often 
either cryptic or wholly absent. Discovering the full extent of the influence of fallout required 
minding the obvious gaps in the record where one expected to find it, but did not. 
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Boy Scouts Help Nuclear Waste to Rest in the Ocean 
Alongside institutional fear of Americans’ unfounded or exaggerated fears of radiation 
coexisted complacency about the invisible threat it posed. Organized civil defense was part of 
the government’s answer to that aspect of some Americans relationship with the Bomb. As an 
organization founded on disciplined, paramilitary lines, the Scouts already had considerable 
involvement in civil defense, with the experience of WWII still fresh. Andrew Grossman noted 
one project of the early days of the Cold War civil defense revival was to encourage Boys Scouts 
and other youth groups to engage in promoting civil defense education and organization efforts 
at the national, state, and local levels.
406
 In 1951, the national office of Boy Scouts of America 
produced a series of educational booklets on civil defense for Scout leaders, Scouts, and their 
families. For the most part, these suggested training, exercising, and organizational methods that 
relied on reinforcing familiar scouting skills. In the leadership manual, virtually the only thing 
said about the “realities of the air-atomic age” invoked by Amrine was a recommended “atomic 
survival demonstration.”  
In order to avoid panic, caution must, of course, be used in presenting the subject 
of atomic attack to the general public. However, Units can perform a great service 
in their communities by colorfully presenting the steps necessary to protect 
himself in the case of such an attack.
407
 
 
In another title in the series, the standard approach to minimizing the threat of fallout – in fact, it 
again completely avoided use of the term fallout – was a reminder that a ground or water level 
burst height could result in “radioactive dirt or rain,” but this was survivable by staying indoors 
for “one hour, 24 hours if possible.” In a foreshadowing of some of the more frightening and less 
useful post-September 11 recommendations, covering broken windows with cardboard and tape 
was also described as useful. However, in this pre-transistor era, operation and interpretation of 
radiological monitoring instruments was a matter for specialized teams, who would recommend 
whether evacuation was necessary due to radiation. This stood in contrast to how such programs 
evolved by the end of the 1950s, when there was a decided shift to emphasize putting such 
instruments more widely in the hands of the public as technological advances (like the transistor) 
and higher production quantities made them more affordable and widely distributed.
408
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The Boy Scout motto of “Be Prepared” has thankfully never been tested in actual 
wartime civil defense conditions involving nuclear weapons. However, some Scouts found 
themselves in surprising situations, which nevertheless challenged contemporary official 
pronouncements of safe, controllable nuclear energy, as well as suggesting a relatively benign 
public fear of radiation as the 1950s opened. Among the most shocking was a remarkable field 
trip some 75 Scouts took in October 1949 from the Philadelphia Navy Yards. The mother of one 
of the Scouts, the charmingly-nicknamed “Beetle,” described details of the trip in a letter to his 
father, who was away in the Navy. With the letter was the mimeographed announcement for the 
trip, with the missing lower third of it apparently being the release families needed to sign and 
return – “Navy releases are a must.” – to allow their son to participate in a weekend cruise 
leaving from the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 
Their ship was the PCER 853, a WWII-vintage patrol craft nearly 200 feet long. Leaving 
port, the 853 continued east until it was some 60 miles off the Atlantic coast from Philadelphia. 
Scouts were assigned to duties at various stations, supervised by naval crewmen; Beetle was 
skilled enough to be assigned as head of the Communications division, with nine other Scouts 
under his command. Working under the ship’s captain, Lieutenant Potter, Beetle took readings 
from the fathometer of the ocean’s depth, but he also had to scramble with other duties, as the 
heavy seas and fog made all but one of the other Scouts assigned to duty at the helm seasick. 
Beetle cleaned up after them as best he could, but the excitement was just beginning, as Beetle’s 
mother described to his father about how he assisted the seamen in completing the cruise’s other 
mission. 
On the fan tail there were 20 drums of radioactive paint and clothing from Bikini. 
It was roped off and signs and all warned not to go on the fantail. Well at 
10:30pm the Capt. called down this is the place we are supposed to dump the 
cans. 
 
So Sprague got two broom handles and he, Baker, and Beetle went to push them 
over. They unroped them and Sprague shoved one with the broom handles. It hit a 
hole in the can and went into the hole and he couldn’t get it out. That left only one 
pusher stick to push with. They finally got them all over but the last 3. By this 
time these three were well back on deck away from the end. They pushed and 
couldn’t move them, they were so heavy. Remember what they were pushing and 
it was 10:30 at night in a rough sea with only a two inch edge to keep them from 
going over with each shove. At last Sprague went in and got some rags and they 
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wrapped their hands up and pushed the last three over by hand. So we hope all is 
well!
409
 
 
Atomic optimism, indeed! Surely participation in such a project would shock the parents 
of any Boy Scout in more recent memory, if asked to sign a permission slip for such an outing.
410
 
In spite of how we might view the risks posed by such an exposure now, the tone of the letter by 
Beetle’s mother suggested she, Beetle, and apparently Beetle’s father (who the letter was 
addressed to) most likely took the unexpected additional activities of that windy, foggy night off 
Philadelphia in stride. There was no indication the letter was saved for any other purposes than 
its fascinating, unique plotline. It showed no particular worry or trepidation of the events, other 
than the chance of Beetle losing his footing and slipping overboard.  
The incident demonstrated the banality of existing views among much of the public about 
the risks from radiation, despite officials who viewed them as likely to panic if told about the 
risks of contact with radioactive substances. It was still five years before the world first learned 
there was substance to reports fallout was dangerous, due to the fallout plume generated by the 
1954 CASTLE BRAVO test. However, after nearly five years of reassurances about radiation as 
something closely controlled by government policy and practice, the letter was substantive 
cultural evidence that in 1949, just after the first Soviet nuclear test, many Americans shared 
relatively little concern about exposure to fallout and other radioactivity.  
Writing about the history of ocean dumping of radioactive waste, Jacob Hamblin noted 
ocean dumping was fraught with the fears of scientists concerned “the biological effects of 
atomic radiation were too emotionally charged to be discussed rationally…the notion of public 
irrationality, particularly the public’s visceral fears of all things connected to radioactivity, was a 
common thread in discussions of the issue in newspapers, official statements, and even scientific 
reports.”411 However, at this remove and in light of evidence that Americans held a variety of 
opinions on the risk of radiation, it could well be that the hand-wringing by various elite interest 
groups was more a projection of their own ignorance, uncertainties, and emotions about radiation 
and fallout onto the public, rather than vice versa.  
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Contextualizing the Scouts’ trip to send the waste to its watery grave, Hamblin noted the 
problem of waste disposal was one the AEC was reluctant to address. The British had some 
‘expertise’ with ocean dumping, in part because they had little in the way of remote, unoccupied 
lands to rid them of no longer useful radiation, which the United States relied on. The solution to 
mass disposal was not drums dropped off-shore, in the view of the British, but was to send it to 
sea in pipes leading off-shore, shrouded in secrecy.  
Hamblin also discussed the AEC’s lack of commitment to underlying its policy with 
science, because even when it solicited advice to “assess existing knowledge” from independent 
panels, “a new study was precisely what the AEC did not want,” since it would be met “with 
requests for research funds,” rather than the “definitive conclusions” it hoped to gain on the issue 
of radiation in the environment. This lack of interest by the AEC in expanding the pool of 
researchers working on the environmental problems of radiation joined with a lack of regulation 
and recordkeeping, as both the Navy and the Coast Guard assisted other federal agencies in 
ocean dumping, demonstrated due diligence was clearly a lower priority than facilitating arms 
production. This was even the case among institutions whose internal knowledge might indicate 
a better application of caution than their actions subsequently suggested. Both the National 
Bureau of Standards and the Public Health Service used the Coast Guard to dump their waste. 
Lauriston Taylor of the Bureau of Standards disposed of nearly a hundred drums of waste, but as 
Hamblin found, “no one seemed to be keeping track.”412 Thus, the actual source and contents of 
the barrels the Scouts helped dump on a foggy night in 1949 will likely prove difficult or 
impossible to verify independently at this point. 
Even among those few who understood the issue, fallout was clearly recognized at the 
time as a threat linked almost solely to potential wartime use of large numbers of nuclear 
weapons. Moreover, Forest Western, assistant director of the AEC’s Health Physics Division, 
observed that the most persistent problems of nuclear war were likely to go far beyond blast 
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effects. 
The populations of large areas may find the air that they breathe, the food they 
eat, the water they drink, and perhaps anything that they touch contaminated with 
harmful quantities of radioactive materials.
413
 
 
Bad as wartime fallout might be if fought with fission weapons, proposals for 
radiological warfare, using what are now referred to as “dirty” bombs, posed other radiation 
problems, like storage and logistical support before use. Interestingly, Senator Albert Gore, Sr. 
(D-Tennessee) suggested to Harry Truman a zone of lethal radioactivity be laid across the 
Korean Peninsula. Besides the obvious overtones of imperialism and racism implicit in an 
American proposal to poison land in East Asia, the idea was considered impractical by the AEC, 
even if such use of radioactive substances were, as Gore claimed, “morally justifiable” under the 
law of war when used as a deterrent, rather than as an attack on civilians.
414
 Gore’s formulation 
was another nagging reminder of the fear of many inside the government who quietly worried 
that the use of nuclear weapons and the fallout they generated already skated close to the 
boundary line of being a war crime.  
Hamblin also offered an insight into an AFOAT-1 contractor, Tracerlab Inc., used 
extensively for laboratory support during the early era of testing.
415
 In addition to this secret 
work, Tracerlab was also involved in promoting the wider use of isotopes for industrial purposes, 
regularly receiving and marketing isotopes it purchased from the AEC. One of Tracerlab’s 
researchers, F.C. Henriques, permitted his radioactive zealotry to go too far, violating provisions 
of his agreement with the AEC that restricted use of iodine-131. The Subcommittee on Human 
Applications of the AEC’s Committee on Isotope Distribution reprimanded Henriques to the 
extent that “a recurrence of this type of violation will result in stopping shipments of radioactive 
materials to Tracerlab, Incorporated, and a thorough review of the entire situation by the highest 
authority in the Atomic Energy Commission.”416 Henriques was eventually let go from Tracerlab 
in 1951 under unspecified circumstances along with several colleagues, which was called “a 
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serious loss” by AFOAT-1, This prompted AFOAT-1 to suggest the scientists by reinstated as 
“Air Force consultants,” an idea quickly rejected by Tracerlab. Given the earlier problem that 
raised its head in the spring of 1949, it threw some additional light on the sometimes incestuous 
and self-serving nature at work in the network formed among those cooperating under the cover 
of secrecy on nuclear projects during the immediate postwar period. It would have been most 
problematic if Tracerlab lost its authority to receive and process radioactive materials just when 
the Air Force found it was needed most, as those capabilities often rested on employment of 
specifically cleared individuals.  
Consider also the U.S. government already had in place specific standards sharply 
restricting experimentation with radiation and children. Thus it was rather chilling to know Boy 
Scouts were involved in the rather haphazard, hands-on disposal of nuclear waste. Beetle’s 
narrative of ocean waste dumping suggested a culture of benign acceptance of radiation, where 
no one stopped a questionable practice because they assumed the government could be trusted to 
advise them if such a hazard were present. 
Spencer Weart correctly located the origins of widespread nuclear fear in the existence of 
the bomb itself, but official efforts to elide fallout’s significance because of its intelligence role 
show plenty of evidence these efforts paid off in dampening such concern prior to CASTLE 
BRAVO.
417
 The incident involving poor record-keeping nonetheless demonstrated that early on 
Tracerlab had specific, timely expertise working with short-lived isotopes such as iodine-131, 
given that the archival record remains incomplete regarding the history of some of the more 
relevant isotopes utilized for nuclear intelligence purposes by AFOAT-1. This slapdash work by 
AFOAT-1’s major contractor, together with the slipshod involvement of children to assist in 
disposing of nuclear waste by means of ocean dumping and the alarming idea that nuclear waste 
had a potential role in warfare, along with other evidence examined so far, lends itself to the 
conclusion that before 1954, the tendency to treat radiation as more of a nuisance than a threat 
was widely established as effectual, if not official policy. This view provided a context for 
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making decisions that heedlessly spread radiation in the environment. Even if the science had 
been more definitive about the threat it posed, fallout was at the time a key source of  
intelligence data obtainable by no other means, so was too important to do without. 
The Problem of Surprise Attack 
The relative lack of hard information on other Soviet capabilities despite the success of 
the scientific approach to nuclear intelligence he initiated half a decade before suggested to 
Eisenhower the need for new approaches to the overall U.S. intelligence effort.
418
 Eisenhower’s 
greatest fear upon taking office was the possibility of a surprise attack because of the paucity of 
intelligence on the Soviet Union’s actual military capabilities. Fear of political fallout from an 
“atomic Pearl Harbor” became pervasive once the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons.419 
Even the absence of an attack worried the president, as the confrontation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union created a situation where the lack of actual armed conflict, even in 
the midst of an arms race, left both nations – as he noted in April 1953 – with “a burden of arms 
draining the wealth and labor of all peoples…it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.”420 
Shortly before that speech, in the hopeful first spring of his presidency Eisenhower 
waxed philosophical on keeping peace and the challenges of the arms race. Days before Stalin’s 
death suggested potential change in the East-West confrontation, Ike found himself in the 
driver’s seat of the arms race with his erstwhile wartime ally as he pursued the parallel course of 
peace through strength. Nuclear weapons were a fact of life, so much so that he found himself 
invited by the AEC in late February 1953, along with the National Security Council and the news 
media, to attend an “open” shot televised live from the Nevada Test Site, near Las Vegas. A 
flurry of memos between the White House, the AEC, and media representatives attempted to sort 
out the intricacies of commercial sponsorship and acceptability of ad copy. Ike decided to keep 
his personal distance, so he directed “there will be no statement to the effect that the White 
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House okayed the move.” Suddenly, here was the famously reticent, cautious commander 
dodging a virtual blind date with ANNIE (16 kiloton, 17 March 1953). ANNIE brought the 
iconic image of a nuclear explosion live into the living rooms of a significant, yet still not large 
number of Americans already part of the television age. Despite the president’s desire for non-
attribution, his secret approval of the plan ironically foreshadowed what became known as his 
own Operation Candor, in which he hoped to rally Americans to support the need for realism 
about the threat posed by nuclear war. Val Peterson, director of civil defense, hoped the event 
would stir what he saw as lagging volunteer interest in civil defense.
421
 With support from the 
White House, quick AEC approval of televising ANNIE was the opening salvo in a major White 
House public relations effort to muster public support for national security goals for nuclear 
power, military and peaceful. Before CASTLE BRAVO, the broadcast of ANNIE made sense. 
What you see is what you got. After the spring of 1954, people wanted to know more about what 
was unseen – fallout – than what was apparent to the naked eye. 
Behind the scenes and perhaps specifically unknown to the president loomed awareness 
there might be a problem. Project GABRIEL effectively came to a close in the summer of 1953 
with a conference organized by RAND Corporation to assess its findings.
422
 Shorn of its original 
goal of determining the megatonnage necessary to bring about widespread damage from fallout, 
in other words, to determine the limits of nuclear war, it sputtered to a rather inconclusive end. 
For shots whose mushrooms stay below the tropopause (approximately 100KT or 
less), time for 50% of debris to be deposited on the earth's surface is 20 days (PE-
factor of 1.5). 
 
For larger shots, whose clouds penetrate well into the stratosphere, there is 
essentially no information pertinent to rate of fallout. It is expected, however, that 
the higher the yield the less rapid the fallout. As a result of slow mixing of 
stratosphere and troposphere, half time for fallout could be several times as long 
as for troposphere debris.
423
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With just a single thermonuclear shot to base its conclusion on, IVY MIKE in 1952, the 
GABRIEL report demonstrated the AEC was aware thermonuclear weapons were a game-
changer due to fallout, but was not yet sure what the new games rules would be.  
With the AEC’s evolving views on the implications of fallout unsettled in the fall of 1952 
before IVY MIKE, others like Stefan Possony, DOD representative to the Psychological Strategy 
Board, embraced the need to persuade the public to reject what he claimed was a misperception 
spread by the Russians that Americans’ “preoccupation with the atomic bomb rather than with 
atomic energy allegedly is indicative of the warlike character of present American policies.” 
Possony suggested “a new and truly attractive atomic program…[to demonstrate] atomic energy 
is being used for constructive ends.” According to Kenneth Osgood, Possony concluded “U.S. 
reliance on nuclear power imposed a psychological constraint on American foreign policy…”424  
In the short term, Possony undoubtedly contended with how IVY MIKE’s fallout made 
his objective of putting an optimistic face on nuclear power more difficult. Given most details of 
IVY MIKE were suppressed by classification and the shot itself remained a secret until CASTLE 
BRAVO exposed the fallout issue, IVY MIKE initially precipitated no public reaction against 
fallout. Whatever changes were made behind walls of secrecy to address the looming fallout 
problem, they appeared to be ultimately ineffective, and consequently blew up far more publicly 
at CASTLE BRAVO. This suggested Possony’s 1952 advice initially went largely unheeded; the 
very idea constraints came attached to nuclear weapons was a tone particularly unpopular in 
1952 inside the government, too.
425
 In Possony’s formulation, the issue of fear created by nuclear 
energy was largely psychological, a belief echoed in Spencer Weart’s theoretical approach to 
“nuclear fear” that followed some thirty years later; both shared the same brittleness when 
exposed to the thorny problem of fallout. Both argued fear of fallout exposures did not originate 
in empirical reality, but rather was an inappropriate emotional reaction originating in the mind, 
best addressed by the study of various forms of human interaction with it.  
Oppenheimer: Silenced, Marginalized, and Moving On 
J. Robert Oppenheimer, already aware of efforts to marginalize him at the AEC as 
McCarthyism raged, sought to continue his public service by resisting the gathering storm in part 
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through his outside work as a consultant following stepping down as GAC chair in June 1952.
426
 
Ironically, these efforts set in motion the end game for those seeking to end his government 
career. Oppenheimer chaired a Department of State panel that delivered a report on the prospects 
for disarmament discussion with the Soviet Union to Dwight Eisenhower as he took office 
having just absorbed the grim thermonuclear reality IVY MIKE’s success foretold. Bleak and 
with few credible options, as it should have been with Stalin still alive, the paper urged some 
adjustments like improvements in air defense and measures to assess and limit the possibility of 
accidental war. Its call for candor has already been noted, as well as the distinctly different twist 
when the term, but not the essential idea, was adopted by Eisenhower. The actual point 
Oppenheimer made was unstated, but clear, when understood in the context of an era still on the 
cusp of the thermonuclear age. 
Left unmentioned, its most salient point was about fallout, one Oppenheimer drove home 
as a first step in his suggested policy of candor over the risks threatening American national 
security.  
The United States should adopt a policy of candor toward the American people, 
by revealing fully the nature of the dangers engendered by the atomic arms 
race.
427
 
 
It was arguably difficult at that point to suggest Oppenheimer intended “revealing fully the 
dangers” to do nothing more than explain thermonuclear weapons’ exponentially greater 
explosive power or thermal pulse, the supraconventional effects of fusion weapons already so 
familiar to most of the postwar world’s population. “The nature of their dangers” seemed to 
frame these classified dangers as a qualitative difference, not a quantitative one.  
The JCS suggested Eisenhower reject a full-blown discussion of “the terrifying aspects of 
the current situation,” because it would have been difficult to rally “the American people to 
support unpopular measures by disclosing disagreeable facts about nuclear weaponry.” While the 
JCS concurred in the sanitized version of Candor eventually developed as policy by Ike, it was 
clear their concerns were focused on, first and foremost, the newly understood if nonetheless 
most disagreeable fact about the “effects of weapons” – fallout.428 Given the familiarity of 
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Americans with the supraconventional effects of nuclear weapons and the fact that the term 
“weapon effects” was frequently used at the time as an elision of or allusion to fallout and other 
radioactive effects, that it was clear the topic under discussion, which dare not speak its name 
even in the declassified version created for public release in the 1986 JCS history, was fallout. 
And the person most responsible for forcing a discussion about the perils of nuclear weapons at 
that point was none other than Robert Oppenheimer.  
Hewlett and Holl illustrated how the slippery language used to bury what was actually at 
stake in the discussion persisted by its incorporation of a smothering vagueness into the 
historiography of the early Cold War. Acknowledging “that few people, even inside the 
government, understood the special character of the nuclear arms race,” the authors then returned 
to the familiar and pedestrian in the world of 1953 to account for this “special character”: “the 
frightening acceleration of the arms race…the destructive force of the weapons in the stockpiles 
was increasing rapidly...”429 All true, but also largely a rehash of the same deceptive yet vague 
language that insisted on framing the effects of nuclear weapons as exponentially larger than 
those of conventional weapons, but otherwise not qualitatively different. The specific point of 
what this “special character” of thermonuclear weapons being avoided so judiciously actually 
was: the threat their fallout and other radiation effects posed, magnified to lethal peril across vast 
areas. 
When the NSC sat to discuss the paper in the spring of 1953, Eisenhower at first rejected 
the idea of candor, an idea Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson argued “seemed foolish to scare 
our people to death” with, along with several ancillary suggestions of greater openness, including 
giving the American people a rough idea of the size of the American stockpile.
430
 Eisenhower 
continued to hold back news the “super” had been achieved until after the CASTLE BRAVO 
shot verified the U.S. possessed a weaponized version of the thermonuclear design in the spring 
of 1954 amid the pressure of news reports about the fallout incident. Yet this passage made clear 
fallout was identified as the major problematic effect long prior to CASTLE BRAVO. In fact, 
too literal a focus on CASTLE BRAVO as the watershed event in understanding fallout effect on 
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policy elided the fact that Oppenheimer’s fate was sealed prior to CASTLE BRAVO because of 
the stance he took against treating fallout as lightly as the Air Force did. 
The Air Force saw Oppenheimer’s growing concerns about fallout as an indirect attack 
on the effort to build the “super,” part of what it saw as a much larger narrative of systematic 
betrayal by him that put two of the Air Force’s most important strategic programs – 
thermonuclear weapons and the long range detection system – at risk. Between the two, the Air 
Force arguably saw the danger to AFOAT-1’s operations as more immediate. The service feared 
blowing the cover on its nuclear intelligence operation would threaten a variety of negative 
outcomes, even though by 1953 the Pentagon knew of Kim Philby’s compromise of AFOAT-1’s 
existence and mission to his Soviet handlers. The bigger, longer term problem as the military 
saw it was fallout’s potential to spark inquiry that would drag the question of the feasibility of 
nuclear war into the glare of public knowledge. It might shut down American testing, just as it 
might cause the Soviets to consider underground testing or other measures to frustrate Western 
monitoring efforts. For the JCS, revelations about fallout posed an existential threat, not simply 
to vital intelligence sources, but to the bomb itself.  
Given Sean Malloy’s description of General Leslie Groves’ early identification of fallout 
as a most sensitive topic, even in general terms the Pentagon saw the State disarmament report as 
problematic. Far more than lack of sufficient enthusiasm, the JCS perceived Oppenheimer as 
aggressively striking out at the “super” program in a cleverly concealed manner – via fallout – in 
yet another attempt to bring it to a halt. Combined with the political paranoia of the era, from low 
to high the reaction from the Pentagon and the AEC under the aegis of Lewis Strauss 
communicated a powerful message that drawing attention to the disquieting reality of fallout was 
unpatriotic, if not outright subversive. The Department of State’s Oppenheimer disarmament 
panel’s recommendations represented an audacious challenge to military prerogatives in policy 
and planning affecting what the Air Force considered its most vital weapon.  
Conflicting Versions of Candor, With and Without Fallout 
Eisenhower’s reaction to the advice provided by Oppenheimer in the course of meetings 
over several years’ time when the issue of fallout was clearly in play because of the topic matter. 
Despite the rigors of secrecy, what is known about Oppenheimer’s concern about fallout can be 
illuminated by identifying and understanding the influence of its effect on the president’s 
changing views on nuclear strategy, nuclear weapons and both explicit and implicit policy on 
161 
 
fallout. The best documented of these visits was to the White House prior to things falling apart 
for the scientist with the suspension of his Q clearance in December 1953, a conflict that led to 
the 1954 AEC hearing that is the main topic of Chapter Three.  
In late May 1953, Eisenhower read an unclassified presentation by Oppenheimer in 
preparation for a presentation by Vannevar Bush and Oppenheimer to the National Security 
Council on 27 May 1953. Oppenheimer had presented it to the Council on Foreign Relations in 
February and a version was cleared by the AEC and published in the July 1953 Foreign Policy. 
Excerpts from it point to Oppenheimer’s concern about the need to address the problem of 
cumulative fallout. 
…we should all know – not precisely, but quantitatively, and, above all, 
authoritatively – where we stand in these matters. 
 
We have from the first maintained that we should be free to use these weapons; 
and it is generally known we plan to use them. It is also generally known that one 
ingredient of this plan is a rather rigid commitment to their use in a massive, 
initial, unremitting strategic assault on the enemy. 
 
We need strength to be able to at least ask whether our plans for the use of the 
atom are, all things considered, right or wrong. 
 
…first is candor – candor of the officials of the United States Government…we 
do not operate well, when the important facts, the essential conditions, which 
limit and determine our choices, are unknown. We do not operate well when they 
are known only, in secrecy and fear, to a few men. 
 
…knowledge of the characteristics and probable effects of our atomic weapons, of 
– in rough terms – the numbers available, and of the changes that are likely to 
occur within the next years; this is not among the things to be kept secret. 
 
There are many arguments which have been advanced against making public this 
basic information. Some of these arguments had merit in times past. One is that 
we might be giving vital information to the enemy. My own view is that the 
enemy has this information…It is largely available by other means as well. It is 
also my view that it would be good for the peace of the world if the enemy knew 
these basic facts – very good indeed, and very dangerous if he did not. 431  
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Oppenheimer’s version of candor forthrightly included fallout, as there was no other weapon 
effect that fits the logic here. Oppenheimer was saying everything he could say in public to 
indicate cumulative fallout was the pivotal factor to consider as he attempted to convey that 
message the constraints reliance on thermonuclear weapons imposed.  
The president’s subsequent selective embrace of candor was perhaps driven as much by 
an effort to distance himself from the increasingly politically suspect Oppenheimer as by any real 
disagreement with the idea of candor or indeed about fallout itself. The president certainly 
embraced candor conceptually, including a watered-down version of it in his “Atoms for Peace” 
proposal delivered to the United Nations in December 1953.
432
  Relabeled internally as 
“Wheaties,” Eisenhower was clearly knowledgeable, but unprepared to face the issues the 
extraconventional effects of radioactive fallout raised in 1953.
433
 True candor prompted by 
thermonuclear weapons required, first of all, candor about the dangers posed by their cumulative 
fallout, a reversal of the existing circumstance where the “special” character of nuclear “weapon 
effects” was so often discussed at length, all while studiously avoiding mention of the word 
fallout. There was no other issue of primary significance other than fallout present in such 
discussions and fallout was still Top Secret, not blast or fire. 
                                                                                                                                                             
was apt, but also because it was a human-construct by which comparison could be made to the inherent and 
unalterable nature that he was attempting to communicate about that was the distinctive danger of thermonuclear 
weapons. Given Oppenheimer’s acceptance of fission weapons and their use against civilians, as well as their 
limited fallout without alarm, the unique property of thermonuclear weapons left for him to object was their 
potential to generate dangerous levels of cumulative fallout. National Security Adviser Cutler’s memo indicated he 
was passing the article on the president requested by Oppenheimer and confirmed his and Vannevar Bush’s 
upcoming 27 May 1953 appearance before the NSC to discuss “Armaments and American Policy.” The article was 
initialed by the president to indicate he did receive it and most likely read it. 
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The Air Force’s reaction to Oppenheimer’s report on top of simmering existing conflicts 
then quickly expanded, breathing life into a lengthier, far more painful process that culminated in 
the 1954 AEC personnel security board hearing that permanently stripped him of his clearance. 
That is what this project turns to next. Even as Oppenheimer was finally silenced within the 
government, as well as in public, on the matter of fallout, recognition of the empirical perils of 
radiation occurred far more quickly behind closed doors than in public. Delay and obfuscation 
would rule the day until the persistence of fallout won out over bureaucratic inertia.  
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Chapter Three: Fallout, Robert Oppenheimer, and  
the Air Force’s Quest for a “Super” Stockpile 
 
The decision to seek or not seek international control of atomic energy, the 
decision to try to make or not make the hydrogen bomb, these are complex 
technical things, but they touch the very basis of our morality. It is a grave danger 
for us that these decisions are taken on the basis of facts held secret. This is not 
because those who contributed to the decisions or make them are lacking in 
wisdom; it is because wisdom itself cannot flourish and even the truth cannot be 
established, without the give and take of debate and criticism. The facts, the 
relevant facts, are of little use to an enemy, yet they are fundamental to an 
understanding of the issues of policy. If we are guided by fear alone, we will fail 
in this time of crisis. The answer to fear can’t always lie in the dissipation of its 
cause; sometimes it lies in courage.
434
 
 
Taken from a February 1950 radio interview with Eleanor Roosevelt, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer could only implicitly refer to fallout, because of the intense official secrecy 
surrounding the topic. Harry Truman soon prohibited any further public dissension or 
commentary, direct or implicit, about his recent decision to order accelerated research and 
development of thermonuclear weapons.
435
 Prompted by discovery of the Soviet Union’s 
development of nuclear weapons and an Air Force demand for high-yield weapons to maintain 
American advantage, Truman acted against the initial advice of Oppenheimer, the AEC General 
Advisory Committee (GAC), and the Atomic Energy commissioners by initiating a hasty effort 
to up the ante in the Cold War.
436
 The danger of cumulative fallout was at the core of the General 
Advisory Committee’s concerns about the dangerous escalation of the arms race brought about 
by the decision to pursue the hydrogen bomb. 
                                                 
434
 J. Robert Oppenheimer, 12 February 1950, radio show interview with Eleanor Roosevelt, reproduced in U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission, Forward by Phillip M. Stern, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of 
Hearing before Personnel Security Board and Texts of Principal Documents and Letters (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1971), 962.  
435
 Priscilla J. McMillan, The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Birth of the Modern Arms Race (New York: 
Viking, 2005), 4. 
436
 The sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War Two and the Manhattan Project’s successful conclusion, along 
with recent progress in declassification brought a tranche of new works, including those specifically about 
Oppenheimer and his tribulations. A reliable, well-grounded general work was Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, 
American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 2003. 
Speaking directly and effectively to many of the issues explored here was Priscilla J. McMillan, The Ruin of J. 
Robert Oppenheimer and the Birth of the Modern Arms Race (New York: Viking, 2003.) While there is little new of 
any note from the right on Oppenheimer, it may be helpful to consult a fairly standard example in one of their works 
encapsulating claims to a “dangerously slow” research effort, his alleged efforts to discourage Edward Teller from 
working on thermonuclear weapons, and accusations of a failure to detect Soviet tests, including at least one entirely 
specious claim, “By the end of 1949…[the U.S. and USSR] had exploded the same number of weapons.” Earl H. 
Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The Test Ban Trap (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963), 254. 
165 
 
A crucially important strand of fallout’s history, but one where its capacity to shape and 
constrain policy making was far from abundantly clear, was fallout’s role in Robert 
Oppenheimer’s 1954 show trial and purge.437 Construction of a history of nuclear intelligence 
and fallout provided significant new evidence that unexpectedly problematized the useful, if 
dated and incomplete model of a dualistic deus ex machina of rabid McCarthy-era politics and 
the Air Force’s institutional nuclear aspirations as the driving forces behind Robert 
Oppenheimer’s expulsion from government service. While these themes long offered adequate 
explanatory power in describing the circumstances of his downfall, on closer examination they 
are too weak to adequately account for all the evidence presented in the 1954 transcript 
published as In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer or in the fuller picture of this ordeal that 
emerged in October 2014 after subsequent declassification of the nearly complete transcript.
438
 
This declassification action added significant new documentary evidence to better explain how 
the persecution of Robert Oppenheimer came about as a result of the U.S. military’s struggle 
with the civilian Atomic Energy Commission for primary control of decision and policy making 
power over the American nuclear arsenal in the early Cold War. The Air Force wanted a free 
hand to pursue strategic military goals in order to eclipse scientific caution about fallout.  
At the root of the disagreement between the Air Force and Oppenheimer was a conflict 
centered on the enormous potential of thermonuclear weapons to generate fallout and the policy 
implications of this irresolvable problem, not his loyalty. While not the only issue, the exclusion 
of this basis for conflict between the Air Force and Oppenheimer disguised the sharply differing 
views they held of the significance of the risks posed by cumulative wartime fallout and the 
meaning of fallout’s impact on strategic policy. This war of ideas about the military utility of 
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thermonuclear weapons later saw President Dwight Eisenhower essentially turnaround and adopt 
Oppenheimer’s views, then move beyond that position to end atmospheric testing in quest of a 
way to dampen the public’s nuclear fears while avoiding nuclear war. Because Oppenheimer was 
deeply implicated in both the disputed quest for these weapons and the Air Force’s highly 
classified intelligence program directed against the nuclear program of the Soviet Union, he 
represents a key social tracer of fallout’s effects on policy whose narrative must be explored in 
depth to understand how fallout imposed an inherent limitation on the use of nuclear weapons.  
Oppenheimer was best known for events at the bookends of his government service. First 
was the technical triumph and moral Pandora’s Box opened through his service as the scientific 
leader of the Manhattan Project that created nuclear weapons near the end of World War Two. A 
decade later came the ignominy in which his career ended, stripped of his security clearance 
amid charges of disloyalty in a 1954 personnel security investigation and hearing by the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC). Testimony at the proceeding partially revealed a far less known side 
of his work, aiding the successful creation of the nuclear intelligence organization, AFOAT-1. 
As an Air Force consultant Oppenheimer helped develop and implement global detection 
systems that in vastly expanded and updated form remain the technological basis for a 
sophisticated nuclear intelligence system, now operated by the Air Force Technical Applications 
Center (AFTAC), as well as arms control agreement verification by the United States and 
international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
439
  
While he was not as central to the development of intelligence capabilities against the 
weapon he invented as in its creation, Oppenheimer initially played a key role consulting with 
the Air Force program that developed the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS). The 
ambiguities and contradictions posed by the sudden cut-off of his participation in that research 
and development process, along with a recasting of his role offered in a substantially delayed 
AFOAT-1 unit history that represented the Air Force’s coda to his assistance, suggested this 
nearly unexplored area of the scientist’s career was an essential part of the transformation of 
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fallout’s narrative from a closely-held secret into a global public relations problem.440 Until 
recently, the extant, but often widely scattered evidence pointed toward a substantive, if 
convoluted circumstantial case that placed fallout at the heart of this dispute; recent 
declassification of the bulk of long-withheld parts of the 1954 hearing transcript all but 
confirmed in plain language that fallout was the primary flashpoint for the conflict between the 
Air Force and Oppenheimer, which ended his distinguished career in government service.  
Detection of fallout from the first Soviet nuclear test, Joe-1 in late August 1949 sparked 
the policy crisis and subsequent conflict between Oppenheimer and the Air Force over fallout’s 
constraints on the military utility of thermonuclear weapons.
441
 After his service on the team that 
assessed evidence AFOAT-1 collected to confirm that Joe-1’s samples represented a Soviet 
nuclear test, the Air Force secretly dropped consulting with him on subsequent Russian tests and 
related development work. However, this action did not impede Oppenheimer’s work as a 
consultant on other secret military projects and his advocacy as a Department of State consultant 
to repurpose sensitive technology he helped develop so that fallout could also serve the cause of 
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peace through diplomacy, which later exacerbated his fallout-related conflict with the Air 
Force.
442
  
Chapter Two elaborated on the need to conceal fallout’s use as a critical intelligence 
source. This was in itself more than enough justification in the eyes of the military to keep nearly 
the whole topic area off-limits in its first decade of dealing with fallout. Prior to the 1954 hearing 
this included keeping knowledge about it from those without a specific need to know even within 
the United States government. The increasingly public status of fallout as an official problem 
that grew after the 1955 release of a report on the1954 CASTLE BRAVO fallout incident failed 
to close a persistent gap in basic weapons effect data that led civil defense authorities to 
complain throughout the nineteen-fifties of being kept in the dark about information they needed 
in order to properly advise Americans how to protect themselves against nuclear attack.
443
 
Despite the Air Force’s dependence on fallout and other radiation as the nation’s most important 
source of strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union prior to the imagery the U-2 began providing 
in 1956, this top secret use of fallout nonetheless became the subject of testimony by several 
witnesses at the 1954 AEC hearing. Tellingly, fallout did not. 
Conflicting Views of Fallout’s Significance Precipitate Policy Crisis 
The Air Force’s dogged pursuit of high yield thermonuclear devices to address the targets 
in SAC’s war plan set the service on a collision course of action with the AEC following 
detection of the first Soviet fission test in late summer 1949.
444
 Little more than three years later 
while sitting on an advisory board to the Office of Defense Mobilization discussing the 
implications of the recent test of IVY MIKE, the first successful thermonuclear test (10.4 
megatons, 1 November 1952), Lee DuBridge, whose testimony will be drawn upon shortly, 
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reported that James R. Killian, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, warned him 
of a looming conflict that caught DuBridge completely off-guard. 
Some people in the Air Force are going to be after Oppenheimer and we’ve got to 
know about it and be ready for it.
445
 
 
Despite his leadership in creating and managing the scientific organization that made this first 
test of a thermonuclear device possible, concealed behind the resulting façade of accusations 
impugning Oppenheimer’s loyalty were sharper-edged facts about the conflict over fallout that 
formed the bulk of the substantive basis for the Air Force’s fear of the scientist.  
Robert Oppenheimer’s ordeal occurred during the early Cold War phenomenon of 
McCarthyism, but the scientist’s supposed political indiscretions proved to be more cover than 
cause for the Air Force’s actions against him. Evidence from the hearing and other sources 
strongly suggested the reticence by the Oppenheimer-led General Advisory Committee (GAC) to 
aggressively pursue thermonuclear weapons was in large part due to the GAC’s recognition that 
massive fallout generated by wartime use of these devices would pose a global threat. This fact 
was first recognized in the initial Project GABRIEL report in 1949 that sought to better define 
the risk this radiation represented.
446
 Fallout eventually blossomed into a major limitation on the 
Air Force’s initial Cold War strategy of massive retaliation or, as several speakers at the 1950 
Ramey Air Force Base commanders conference suggested, perhaps even an eventual requirement 
for “preventative” attack on Russia.447 Fallout from the mass employment of thermonuclear 
weapons created a fundamental risk to the attacker, as well as the rest of the planet. Chapters 
Four and Five will discuss those subsequent developments in fallout’s problematic effect on 
policy and decision making, even as fallout’s intelligence role expanded to include support for 
diplomacy. This chapter examines how Robert Oppenheimer’s concerns about the risks that 
cumulative fallout posed problematized the Air Force’s intended strategy of massive 
thermonuclear attack. Clumsily and with only temporary effect, the service pursued 
Oppenheimer as if the problem was the scientist, not their bombs. 
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Enough substantial evidence was leavened throughout the original censored transcript 
released shortly after the AEC’s 1954 hearing to establish a circumstantial argument that the 
decision to permanently strip Oppenheimer of his clearance was the result of an Air Force 
campaign to remove him as chair of the AEC’s GAC n order to silence his internal critique of the 
service’s fallout-profligate war plan.448 General Curtis LeMay’s desire for Strategic Air 
Command to wield the maximum amount of tonnage on target as an opening gambit in nuclear 
war to limit or forestall retaliatory attacks led the Air Force to resist efforts by the AEC to better 
define the inherent, if still uncertain limits fallout placed on the use of nuclear weapons. The 
result was an extended clandestine campaign against the scientific leader of the United States 
nuclear weapons production complex that ended his career in government service.  The result for 
Oppenheimer was clear; the basis for the conflicts leading to the hearing was not.  
Discerning the General Advisory Committee’s Advice 
The conflict was far more than a disagreement over political sensitivities. It was also 
fundamentally about policy change necessary to address uncomfortable facts. Tracing the 
beginnings of the case offers a stronger argument for what Oppenheimer’s downfall was about 
than the more publicly memorable end-game of the AEC hearing. Oppenheimer chaired the 
GAC, appointed by the president to advise both the executive branch and the AEC 
commissioners by providing scientific expertise to guide policy decisions. Its members were 
often referred to as an “atomic brain trust” and in 1949 were largely either past participants in the 
Manhattan Project or science advisers to it or other areas of applied technology during World 
War Two.
449
 In practical terms, the GAC did set policy in some cases, either directly or because 
policy makers lacked expertise and so were effectively reliant on deferring to the GAC’s advice. 
Relevant to the argument here beyond considering the question of developing the super, the 
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GAC provided advice on research policy, recommended plans for production growth to meet 
future stockpile requirements, set weapon test requirements, and evaluated test results. As the 
debate over thermonuclear weapons demonstrated, even when the GAC acted together and 
delivered an arguably persuasive case, with significant support from the AEC commissioners as 
with its initial recommendation against a fast-paced pursuit of thermonuclear weapons, they 
stood over-ruled by others in the national security hierarchy. Despite the GAC’s thoughtful 
advice on the super, which notably omitted mention of fallout, Truman ordered not only that the 
AEC pursue the super with all due haste, but the silence of those who gave him contrary advice 
that Truman declined to observe.
450
  
The Historiographical Problem of Fallout 
Fallout was never the sole concern that either J. Robert Oppenheimer or the government’s 
various entities found with nuclear weapons. However, the role of fallout as a factor in shaping 
national security has been quite consequentially historically elided, in part because of the 
lingering of continued Cold War-era classification. The October 2014 release of virtually the full 
transcript of the 1954 hearing confirmed the term did not appear even once in the roughly 3,000 
pages of testimony to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) personnel security board hearing that 
permanently withdrew Oppenheimer’s clearance. Despite the hearing’s capacity to discuss 
relevant classified topics, fallout’s apparent formal excision from the Oppenheimer hearing was 
remarkable given the context. Prohibiting its use even in secret testimony appeared to have been 
at least in part a political act designed to prohibit discussion about fallout as the most significant 
technical problem associated with nuclear weapons.
451
  
Prohibiting the term fallout significantly undercut Oppenheimer’s ability to explain in 
detail why the GAC made its recommendation against rapid pursuit of the hydrogen bomb. 
Without a better understanding of fallout’s historical role in turning around the military’s 
fascination with nuclear weapons and of Oppenheimer’s role in shaping the mostly secret 
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discussions that led to this strongly resisted result, many of the narratives and conclusions drawn 
about nuclear weapons and the Cold War are at a minimum incomplete. With a few, like this 
AEC hearing, current understandings of the contextual circumstances that led to its outcome 
require substantial rethinking in order to better understand the roots of the arms race in Truman’s 
hasty, politically-driven and ultimately mistaken gut-level assumption that thermonuclear 
weapons would contribute to a more secure nation. Instead, the pursuit of thermonuclear 
weapons fundamentally undercut national security by building dependence on these problematic 
devices to bolster what remained an unworkable strategy in practice even as SAC prepared war 
plans based on these faulty premises.
452
 Data collected over the next few years established the 
fact that the GAC’s misgivings were relevant. The Air Force manipulated the AEC’s personnel 
security process in order to silence Oppenheimer’s concerns about the risks posed by the fallout 
from the sort of unlimited, first-strike thermonuclear warfare the service believed was required to 
suppress a corresponding Soviet attack in the event of war. 
The centrality of fallout to the debates about Cold War strategy involved two of the early 
postwar era’s titans, Dwight D. Eisenhower and J. Robert Oppenheimer, was a crucial factor in 
the careers of both as they shaped national security and research and development policies. 
Arguably, given the end of Oppenheimer’s service and the waxing of Eisenhower’s 
administration that followed, in the long run the 1954 hearing was a watershed event that marked 
the passing of who would carry the burden of worrying about fallout from the scientist to the 
president, although this was apparent to no one at the time.  
Historians remain divided about the meaning of the new material and whether it changes 
how the ignoble end of this distinguished scientist’s career should be understood; the only really 
new charge in 1954 was that he obstructed research and development of the hydrogen, or 
thermonuclear, bomb, an accusation made with incredibly weak evidence to support it, but with 
much to suggest it was a fabrication.
453
 The obstruction charge was even more specious than the 
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accompanying thrice-retold tales of old friends and associates that were newly politically 
inconvenient by the early nineteen-fifties; they comprised the bulk of the derogatory information 
recycled in 1954 from an earlier 1947 proceeding to impugn his fitness to hold a clearance.
454
 
Some historians argued the newly available material cemented the case that “the hearings 
suggest that Oppenheimer was anything but disloyal.”455 Certainly so, given much of the recently 
declassified material was exculpatory or even praiseworthy of Oppenheimer’s efforts leading the 
crash program ordered by Truman to develop thermonuclear weapons. These efforts by the AEC, 
its GAC led by Oppenheimer during all but the last few months before the successful first test, 
resulted in a successful demonstration of a thermonuclear design little more than three years after 
Joe-1. Inclusion of the now extant material would have created a distinctly different impression 
of the relative weight of the evidence for and against his loyalty presented at the hearing than 
that presented by the 1954 version of the transcript published soon after the hearing.
456
  
To the extent that the hearing was driven by McCarthyist excess, exculpatory testimony 
and even hard facts seemingly mattered little in the decision; the majority of the hearing board 
was obviously not persuaded by the material made available to the public in 2014, voting to 
make permanent the late December 1953 suspension of Oppenheimer’s clearance ordered by 
Dwight Eisenhower.
457
 The accusations of supposed disloyalty and obstruction both clearly fail 
in light of the preponderance of evidence now available, never mind that the Air Force had 
known of, investigated, surveilled, and yet continued to work with Oppenheimer for years prior 
to his ouster. Rather surprisingly, this continued even after the Air Force suspended at least part 
of his access to classified materials for several years before the hearing, a fact that remained 
surprisingly unmentioned during testimony. Previous reviews found in Oppenheimer’s favor on 
essentially the same material basis; except for the newly added obstruction charge, none of this 
answers the obvious question of the timing of the ultimate pursuit of Oppenheimer or what it 
really was that justified the considerable costs of sidelining someone who was the preeminent 
manager of nuclear weapons research at the height of the Cold War. 
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For Dwight Eisenhower, his suspension of Oppenheimer’s clearance initiated the inquiry 
that followed, but also served to politically insulate him from his prior enthusiasm for the 
scientist’s ideas. The future president’s initial support for Oppenheimer’s efforts to develop 
tactical nuclear weapons while urging restraint on thermonuclear weapons as unsuitable for 
European defense because of their significant fallout was highlighted by the newly declassified 
testimony’s depiction of meetings between the future president and Oppenheimer at several 
points.
458
 The May 1953 White House visit by Oppenheimer was another potential source of 
political embarrassment amid the fevered howls of McCarthyism.
459
 In initially taking the Air 
Force’s side in the fallout debate, Eisenhower chose to trust AEC promises via Lewis Strauss and 
Edward Teller that it could soon solve the fallout problem. 
 Ultimately, amid growing evidence of fallout’s spread in the environment, this effort to 
produce “clean” weapons failed, leading Eisenhower to return within five years to policy 
prescriptions ironically much the same as those that landed Oppenheimer in hot water. 
Eisenhower was pressured by the steady drip of bad news about fallout to end testing as the 
nineteen-fifties wore on. However, he did not suddenly undergo an epiphany about fallout late in 
the decade as data accumulated about it. Rather, it is more accurate to say that Eisenhower found 
himself returning to familiar issues that Oppenheimer discussed with him before the scientist was 
cast out of the inner circles of the national security state. Oppenheimer’s sacrifice on the altar of 
political expediency should be seen in a new light as a prequel to Eisenhower’s own dramatic 
turnaround to embrace pursuit of an end to all testing, as well as clearly, if secretly, recognizing 
the need to avoid thermonuclear war. Thus, it was not the accumulating weight of evidence that 
testing was problematic as described by the otherwise quite accurate works of Benjamin P. 
Greene and Campbell Craig so much as Ike’s realization that data from testing confirmed  
Oppenheimer had been right from the beginning that fallout was a fatal defect in the military 
utility of thermonuclear weapons.
460
  
A Remarkable Turnaround 
The full version of the transcript now available provides numerous examples of key 
witnesses “talking around” fallout in narrative form. These provided opportunities for analysis 
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that revealed the influential role of Oppenheimer’s ideas about fallout. The result is a more 
thorough explanation to better account for the subsequent five years of nuclear ferment in 
national security strategy, as well as better explaining the events leading to the hearing itself. 
What followed ranged from the seeming triumph of massive retaliation in the form of SAC’s 
spectacular growth to a dramatic but largely downplayed about-face in Eisenhower’s second 
term to effectively embrace Oppenheimer’s cautions about the perils of thermonuclear war.  
The remarkably short fourteen years between Joe-1 and the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty was historically upstaged in both speed and the stark reversal it imposed on national 
security policy by the even shorter turnaround between the disgrace of Oppenheimer and the 
policy victory of his belief that the constraints imposed by fallout served as a limit on the use of 
thermonuclear weapons. Accumulating data would drive Eisenhower to seek an end to fallout, 
not only because of the wartime threat Oppenheimer warned against, but because data showed 
even the far more limited threat posed by testing fallout also proved unduly risky by the 
government’s own standards. The aggressive pushback against the USSR touted by Air Force 
leaders at the 1950 Ramey conference was replaced by a cautious stalemate largely shaped by 
the problem of fallout’s undermining the military utility of the weapons they hoped to use to 
achieve that goal. By the end of 1958, the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union 
declared an informal moratorium on atmospheric testing. The key to this transformation of belief 
about the military utility of thermonuclear weapons and the value and prospects of war 
conducted with them lay almost exclusively with fallout. 
The Man Who Knew Too Much 
It was the Air Force whose interests Oppenheimer most directly threatened by his raising 
concerns about the risks posed by fallout. The breadth of his knowledge of their weapons, 
strategy, and planning placed him in position to act as an effective, independent critic who could 
serve as a counterbalance to the service’s proposals. Arguably, it was the nature of the Air Force 
war plan, its purposeful discounting of the cumulative risk posed by fallout from any mass use of 
nuclear weapons, which threatened the victor as much as the vanquished, that became the 
primary point of controversy between the service and the physicist.  
The starting place for understanding the meaning of Oppenheimer’s fall remains the 
original 1954 version of the hearing transcript rendered as In the Matter of J. Robert 
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Oppenheimer.
461
 Much of the often contrived testimony in this document should not be taken at 
face value, as extended passages addressing Oppenheimer’s loyalty starkly demonstrate. 
Certainly those accusations partially or largely motivated the actions of many of those involved, 
as can be seen in testimony from Edward Teller, most of the Air Force witnesses, and others who 
portrayed their sense of deprivation and loss over the super issue in October 1949 when the GAC 
initially declined to engage in a crash program to develop the hydrogen bomb following 
detection of the first Soviet test. Once Truman ordered the thermonuclear weapon project 
forward in January 1950, the issue in the eyes of his critics shifted to what they saw as foot-
dragging and a “failure to ‘enthuse’” on Oppenheimer’s part.462  
Barton J. Bernstein fixed on the outcome, even while edging up against, but not really 
landing on the real issue at stake, arguing that “Oppenheimer’s efforts – especially his opposition 
to the H-bomb – helped get him in trouble with the loyalty-security system.”463 Rich evidence of 
that was found in charges William Borden, the former executive director of the Congressional 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) and an Air Force Reserve officer, made in a letter to 
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and earlier in a memo to JCAE Chair Senator Brien McMahon:  
Oppenheimer has worked tirelessly…to retard the United States H-bomb 
program…[America had to choose between] Oppie’s team [and] the team that 
wants to build H-bombs.”464 
 
Bernstein quite unintentionally framed conventional wisdom on the hearing and what 
Oppenheimer’s ‘crime’ was in much the same terms as the government did, even while 
maintaining a critical distance.
465
 For Bernstein and many other historians, the outcome of the 
hearing sent a message, not about loyalty, but about the place of the scientist in the Cold War 
policy making. A scientist might have an opinion, but take care to express it with studied nuance.  
The historical relevance of the case against Oppenheimer at the hearing must be 
evaluated for what it charged, what it proved, and most critically, for what it obviously chose to 
omit, fallout. There was extensive evidence in the hearing transcript itself pointing specifically to 
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the Air Force’s fears over the significance of linkages between Oppenheimer’s involvement in 
the Air Force’s nuclear intelligence project and what the evidence strongly suggested was his 
cautionary approach to fallout. Comparison between the transcript and evidence subsequently 
revealed demonstrated the shocking weakness of the charges the Air Force witnesses made and 
the surprising hardiness of the untold story of fallout as motivation for much of what was held 
against him. Halfway-visible, it lay embedded like a wind-swept fossil in the hearing transcript 
in plain sight since 1954.  
Given the intense security shielding AFOAT-1 related in Chapter One, analysis of why 
the Air Force was willing to risk examination of so sensitive a subject as nuclear intelligence at 
the hearing suggested the service had something at stake even more valuable to them that 
Oppenheimer’s criticisms also put at risk. Fallout as the primary technical issue with their 
primary weapon was a problem just coming into focus at the time of the hearing in the form of 
the CASTLE BRAVO incident after nearly a decade of denial of the significance of radiation 
associated with the use of nuclear weapons. Maintaining flexibility for SAC’s unrestricted use of 
these weapons was the only thing as critical to Air Force strategy as its nuclear intelligence 
portfolio was in 1954. Oppenheimer’s knowledge of fallout’s significance, independent of the 
service’s control, represented an existential threat to the Air Force’s intentions to build a vast 
arsenal of thermonuclear weapons. 
Borden, out of his job as executive director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
(JCAE) with the change in control of the Senate to the Republicans after the 1952 election, 
finished the opening act of the tragedy by arguing in his 1953 letter to J. Edgar Hoover “that 
more likely than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union.”466 AEC Chair 
Lewis Strauss pollyannishly noted, following the ordeal facilitated in part by Borden’s efforts, 
that Oppenheimer should have been pleased to find “[t]he charge of disloyalty was settled in his 
favor by the opinion of the panel.”467 Was Strauss simply unconvinced by the case made for 
disloyalty, even as he seemed smugly satisfied of the result upholding Oppenheimer’s unfitness 
to hold a clearance? Was there ever a real security issue involved with Oppenheimer’s politics or 
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personal rectitude? A little, very, very little, but just enough to keep the ball rolling in a morality 
play Strauss and the Air Force composed to justify the hearing. As Strauss’s subsequent 
disclaimer in favor of Oppenheimer’s loyalty demonstrated, such charges were largely dismissed 
at the hearing, other than to point out that their persistence periodically emerged again as the 
largely irrational motivation referenced by many of Oppenheimer’s dogged pursuers.  
The critical questions raised over Oppenheimer’s allegiances proved not to be his 
personal loyalty to the nation, but the Air Force’s perception that his embrace of concern about 
fallout threatened their fundamental institutional interests. Thus, Borden’s letter and the hearing 
it precipitated provided an opening for the service to revisit troublesome issues, with charges of 
disloyalty and obstruction of the hydrogen bomb effort effectively serving as stand-ins for what 
the Air Force felt could not be discussed in open testimony and, as it turned out, even in 
classified testimony – fallout. The service’s witnesses reviewed what they claimed after the fact 
as his obstruction on a number of issues, including research and development of nuclear 
intelligence operations; his suspicious turnabout from regarding fallout generated by fission 
weapons as insignificant to embrace concerns about the limitations it imposed on the use of 
thermonuclear weapons; his proposed re-purposing of intelligence capabilities to verify arms 
control agreements; and his facilitation of alternative centers of national security policy advice 
on nuclear strategy operating outside the control of the Air Force.
468
 
More Than a Show Trial 
Thus, the characterization of the hearing as largely a political act, as a show trial, better 
accounts for significant parts of an emergent narrative that suggests the hearing served as a proxy 
for even more substantial strategic issues that arose from scientific conflicts engendered by the 
significance of fallout. A hypothesis that he was just one more victim amid rampant 
McCarthyism does not explain much about Oppenheimer’s fate or about fundamental limits he 
recognized fallout imposed on the use of nuclear weapons once the entire arc of events that 
converged at the hearing is taken into account. It does little good to understand that the 1954 
hearing was not really about loyalty if in its place are only suggestions that another group of 
slightly more pragmatic, yet still only partially explanatory reasons drove the affair forward. 
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Such limited conclusions do not address all facts now known to have driven the antipathy of 
those seeking his ouster from government service.  
 The general tenor of historical insights provided by the Department of Energy’s October 
2014 release of a substantially complete transcript fits seeing the hearing as a political act.
469
 The 
timing of the documented origin of the Air Force’s open conflict with Oppenheimer in relation to 
the GAC’s objections to its rush toward thermonuclear weapons, the context of his association 
with fallout as an intelligence resource and his unexplained severance from this relationship all 
point to the hearing’s roots in fallout. General Roscoe C. “Bim” Wilson’s envisioning of 
Oppenheimer as a threat to Air Force war planning in testimony, with the physicist said to be 
seeking to subvert or disarm the Strategic Air Command, and the panel’s repeated attempts to get 
witnesses to elaborate on a singular phrase seemed to suggest that Oppenheimer controlled a 
mysteriously missing nuclear power that was both global in extent and a threat “to end life on the 
planet as it was currently known.”470 Adding in the enormous effort subsequently expended in an 
ultimately failed attempt to produce useful nuclear weapons with greatly reduced fallout, when 
taken together all point to the hearing as revolving around fallout as a fulcrum on which each of 
these issues tilted. In the course of little more than a decade after Truman ordered them made, 
three presidents came to understand that fusion weapons were the wartime strategic cul de sac 
the Oppenheimer-led GAC predicted, knowledge they possessed by his paying for it at the price 
of his career.  
What prompted the Air Force to set in motion the events that led to the hearing, which 
began years before the accusations of Oppenheimer’s alleged obstruction of the development of 
the hydrogen bomb?
471
 These actions were motivated by what the Air Force grew to see as the 
necessity to silence Oppenheimer’s forthright engagement with fallout as a strategic problem 
through science. Oppenheimer’s raising the issue of fallout threatened to obstruct Air Force plans 
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for unlimited thermonuclear war. In fact, this fear that wider knowledge of fallout could 
undermine belief the United States was prepared to use these weapons inspired both the Air 
Force’s actions against Oppenheimer and the scientist’s perhaps too-loyal for our own good 
permanent silence about the specifics of the foolhardy, suicidal nature of nuclear war.  
Conversely, understanding Oppenheimer’s fall also makes clear that the origin of the persistent 
force structure of thousands of nuclear weapons standing for ready use to this day was 
constructed though the triumph of political chicanery over thoughtfully considered and rational 
application of science and without regard for their limited military utility.  
Fallout Hopes Dashed, Absence Remains a Significant Point 
The circumstances of the hearing in concert with its evident omission from topical 
narratives found in the original 1954 transcript suggested fallout would be addressed by eventual 
release of the withheld material. Given the secrecy associated with fallout in 1954, it was not 
surprising that the term was entirely missing from the censored transcript released shortly after 
the hearing concluded and cited by several generations of Cold War historians. However, it was 
surprising, even shocking to find that fallout remained missing as a term from more than 3,000 
pages of the full transcript released in 2014.
472
 This absence was strikingly implausible, except as 
an intentional act, although definitive proof of that remains elusive. Fallout was making 
headlines almost daily during the hearing because of the CASTLE BRAVO incident the month 
before.
473
 Whatever the basis for its absence in the substantially complete transcript now 
available, the exclusion of the term also confirmed that important and highly relevant context for 
much of what was discussed in testimony by hearing witnesses was sharply limited by design. 
Placing fallout off limits obviously served to sharply limit discussion of its role in intelligence, 
where secrecy met legitimate security needs, but which was nonetheless discussed at the hearing 
by several witnesses. Less obvious was that this apparently purposeful omission deprived 
Oppenheimer of the ability to substantively defend his record by discussing its role in the basis 
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of his conflict with the Air Force over the previous five years. This conflict was rooted in the 
stark limitations fallout made apparent to Oppenheimer about the Air Force’s belief that the 
military utility of thermonuclear weapons provided the means to inflict virtually unlimited 
damage on the enemy.  
Despite uncertainty about the extent of any remaining classified archival record 
documenting the reason for fallout’s absence in testimony at the Oppenheimer hearing, the 
seemingly tenuous evidentiary basis to argue for the centrality of these connections was 
strengthened by what is now known about how fallout shaped the context of the hearing. By 
April 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense knew that 
preliminary results from  CASTLE BRAVO (15 megatons, 1 March 1954) confirmed findings 
from IVY MIKE (10 megatons, 1 November 1952) of theoretical calculations that such devices 
generated lethal rates of radiation exposure from prompt fallout across thousands of square miles 
downwind from their point of detonation.
474
 The rough parameters of this threat were known to 
the AEC at least by the 1949 initiation of Project GABRIEL. Fallout was already perceived as a 
potential problem even with fission weapons, albeit an apparently tolerable one given the limited 
threat posed by their relatively small yields.
475
 Initial concerns about fallout thus focused on the 
greater quantities a general nuclear war might generate. As seen with the decision to resume 
testing in the continental United States in Nevada, justified by the wartime emergency posed by 
the Korean conflict, testing was acknowledged as not without risk.
476
 However, the general 
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argument in favor of testing, despite misgivings at the AEC, was that it was a limited risk 
undertaken to deter the far greater risks, among other things, posed by wartime fallout.
477
  
GABRIEL: Exploring Fallout’s Potential as a Limit to War 
In 1949, Nicholas N. Smith Jr. of the AEC’s Oak Ridge Laboratory began the study 
known as GABRIEL. Smith’s memorandum clarified he sought to not only understand fallout’s 
qualitative and quantitative properties while documenting the types of isotopes likely to pose a 
threat to human health on a global scale, but to answer two fundamental questions about a 
specific, extensive use of nuclear weapons in war. 
How many bombs could explode in Russia before lethal or dangerous amounts of 
radioactivity appeared in the air over North America? Which bomb products 
posed the greatest threat?
478
 
 
The first was answered by the original 60 megaton yield limit for GABRIEL, a number 
that must have perplexed the Air Force. Smith then argued that strontium-90, because of its 
twenty-six year half-life, was the most significant among the more common isotopes produced in 
nuclear explosions. Strontium-90’s tendency to accumulate in the bone marrow suggested 
tracking it as a representative example made the most efficient use of scarce resources against 
the threat fallout posed to human health given the multitudinous mix of isotopes that fallout was 
composed of.  
At the AEC, Oppenheimer’s increasing caution about the effects of thermonuclear 
weapons was counterbalanced by a combination of general scientific ignorance about the effects 
of radiation exposure accompanied by the AEC’s willingness to accommodate military 
expediency. Smith’s lack of attention to iodine-131 as a hazard comported with Shields Warren’s 
erroneous, widely-shared view that radio-iodine was of little consequence as a health threat, due 
to its short half-life, an evaluation that contributed to his acquiescence to pressure from the 
Pentagon to declare what became the Nevada Test Site as safe to use for atmospheric testing.
479
 
As director of the AEC’s Division of Biology and Medicine (DBM), Warren assisted 
Massachusetts General Hospital in developing the first standard policy on the use of 
radioisotopes. 
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In the case of iodine, the thyroid, which retains most of the radioactivity, is 
radioresistant. In this case, the permitted dosage may be increased by a factor of 
100.
480
   
 
This proved to be a factually incorrect statement, at odds with what was soon discovered about 
iodine-131. Its accumulation in the thyroid gland concentrated the effects of this alpha-emitting 
isotope in close proximity to the active biological processes that create various hormones; 
children with their accelerated hormonal systems are especially sensitive to such exposures. 
For those and other reasons, fallout remains the strongest technical reason to avoid the 
use of nuclear weapons in war. Given what was known about SAC war plans and the level of 
expected post-attack cumulative fallout effects, the lack of any single document spelling out this 
dichotomy between thermonuclear weapons as lacking in military utility as a system versus the 
belief in their power to deter can be overcome by discerning what condensed as in-effect policy 
during the 1950s.
481
 Initiation of the 1949 GABRIEL study suggested its examination of the 
limits fallout imposed on war either predated Joe-1 or was then formed immediately thereafter to 
formalize the GAC’s preexisting concern over it, rather than being what the Air Force appeared 
to see as Oppenheimer’s backdoor approach of using fallout’s threat to argue the need for 
limiting the consequences of nuclear war. If it came before early September, it was possible that 
the impertinence of its basic research question about the limits of nuclear war had already 
aroused sufficient hostility at the Air Force to make the decision to begin distancing him from 
especially sensitive programs like LRD even before Joe-1 added fuel to the fire, given LeMay’s 
views on such topics. If made after early September in response to the pressure to pursue the 
super brought on by Joe-1, the reaction could only have been even more inflammatory for Air 
Force leaders. 
The President’s Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) 
observed “most researchers during this period subscribed to the ‘threshold’ theory of risk…In the 
face of such widespread factual ignorance it is difficult to hold these investigators culpable for 
imposing risks on their subjects that were not appreciated at the time.”482 It nonetheless surprises 
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that so little interest was shown about research on fallout as it moved through the environment 
during the Cold War, given the range of anticipated problems predicted for use of NTS for 
atmospheric testing upwind from most of the American population. Bureaucracy and secrecy 
were not the sole causes of apparent disinterest in the risks of fallout, but they magnified the 
natural tendency of policy makers and war planners to ignore disquieting or inconvenient 
information. Unlike Oppenheimer, however, fallout could not be shown the door so long as 
national security strategy remained dependent on nuclear weapons.  
Fallout: A Scheme to Limit SAC? Then What? 
The October 2014 declassification provided numerous examples that connected together 
with a largely circumstantial pre-existing case suggesting that Oppenheimer knew of and even 
embraced the need to minimize fallout. The newly available document also offered a clear-cut 
explanation of why he nonetheless cooperated with the government by taking his public silence 
on the specific threat posed by fallout to the grave. Paradoxically, this offers a more substantive 
motivation for the Air Force’s dogged pursuit of the hearing at the same time it offers a far better 
explanation why Oppenheimer did not break his silence on the matter, despite his significant 
misgivings about it. Concern about fallout’s ill effects representing a threat to the Air Force’s 
strategic policy of reliance on nuclear weapons predated the issues raised by the development of 
thermonuclear weapons and the massive fallout that resulted from their testing – and the even 
more ominous risks posed by their cumulative fallout in the event of full-scale conflict.  
Basic to all American war planning in the first decade of nuclear weapons was a clear 
determination to use them in large numbers as soon as possible after commencement of 
hostilities.
483
 In early 1949 defense officials outlined this fundamental assumption at the 
foundation of American Cold War strategic planning. 
[They] wrote that the US could not allow “the slightest doubt” about American 
willingness “to use the bomb” in a war “to creep into Soviet minds.” If that were 
ever to happen, the plan went on, the Kremlin “may miscalculate and start the war 
we are trying so hard to avert.”484 
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Managing public perceptions about the significance of fallout thus represented a balancing act 
for the U.S. military, one that co-existed with what the Pentagon saw as the need to sustain 
deterrence through Soviet fear of American retaliation. Before Joe-1, with only fission weapons 
as a consideration, the General Advisory Committee, AEC leadership, and military were all in 
accord on the insignificance of fallout’s threat. As related in Chapter One, the initial difficulty of 
capturing good samples for intelligence purposes reinforced this consensus belief in the 
atmosphere’s ability to inconsequentially dilute and disperse fallout. Thermonuclear weapons 
upset this groupthink in profound ways. After Joe-1 and the GAC’s cautious reaction to prodding 
from the military about thermonuclear weapons, the Air Force sought to neutralize Oppenheimer 
in order to alleviate scientific criticism about its plans for use of these weapons. The service 
seemed to believe that the problem of fallout, like the recipe for the super itself, could be solved 
be means of further research or, failing that, deterrence would be fostered by ensuring the United 
States built an insurmountable quantitative advantage.  
The Missing Fallout Problem at the Heart of the Oppenheimer Hearing 
The most significant prior study suggesting the missing link role of fallout in the 1954 
hearing rose into view two decades ago, but with relatively little subsequent effect due to the 
persistent institutional marginalization of fallout in the archive through continued classification 
of relevant documentation. Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson established that the Air Force 
disagreed with Oppenheimer over his critiques of their planning to develop a global nuclear 
intelligence capability as part of his role in the Pentagon’s Research and Development Board’s 
(RDB) review process. The transcript’s revelation of Oppenheimer’s place in the development of 
the AEDS was significant because it provided a basis to explain the antipathy against him 
expressed by a number of witnesses.  
The secrecy that shrouded the [nuclear] surveillance system prevented its 
relevance in some areas from becoming known. For example, the widely 
publicized 1954 Oppenheimer Hearings have been extensively analyzed in books 
and articles, but the degree to which Oppenheimer’s role in the development of 
the surveillance system was partly responsible for the distrust with which he was 
regarded in some government circles remained unrecognized.
485
 
 
This was a remarkable find, given that the evidence they described lay in plain sight with 
minimal discussion about its significance for some four decades prior to it being placed in proper 
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historical context in their work. Confirmation this was more than mere coincidence or an artifact 
of redaction of sensitive topics yet to be declassified when the transcript was first released 
awaited further declassification of material excised for security reasons. Just how unrecognized 
the significance of Oppenheimer’s conflict with the Air Force was remained evident two decades 
later in commentary following new disclosures found in the redacted portions of the hearing 
transcript.
486
  
Subsequently, several groups of related archival materials cited here were declassified, 
establishing a solid contextual basis and circumstantial case in this account for an expansion of 
fallout’s role in the Cold War subsequent to the era through the 1949 detection of Joe-1 covered 
in the Ziegler and Jacobson monograph. Events leading to the 1954 hearing otherwise suggested 
it was to be an inconclusive end to a bitter debate waged almost exclusively behind closed doors, 
until CASTLE BRAVO importunely forced the problem of fallout into the global headlines. The 
manner in which the investigation and hearing was conducted is best assessed by considering its 
goal was to suppress internal discussion and debate. AEC Chair Lewis Strauss’s decision to then 
quickly release a heavily censored and selectively slanted version of the transcript within months 
of the trial may not have only have been intended to squelch public sympathy toward 
Oppenheimer.
487
 Fallout’s absence from the transcript supplied seeming proof that the hearing 
was not about fallout either, even as the AEC was at work preparing a report to publicly 
downplay its significance following CASTLE BRAVO.  
The Department of Energy’s October 2014 declassification drew commentary from a 
number of historians. Many argued anew that the newly declassified version demonstrated the 
testimony failed to prove he was disloyal.
488
 The standard for judging fitness for any individual 
to hold a security clearance balanced the net value of positive and derogatory evidence against 
them with the necessity to protect secrets. There were few if any individuals whose contributions 
to national security in the nuclear field exceeded Oppenheimer’s and few of its secrets he was 
not already privy to; revoking his clearance took an effective administrator and keenly skilled 
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scientist away from an effort the Air Force claimed needed maximum effort in order to succeed. 
If Oppenheimer was not disloyal, as Strauss indicated he was satisfied the hearing proved, it was 
a net negative to sideline him in the absence of conclusive evidence to dispute his loyalty.  
In reporting on the significance of the hundreds of pages of additional, newly declassified 
testimony, the New York Times broadly opined “that Oppenheimer opposed the hydrogen bomb 
project on technical and military grounds, not out of Soviet sympathies.” Historians of science, 
among them Alex Wellerstein on his blog, nuclearsecrcy.org, weighed in. 
What was missing from the Oppenheimer hearing transcript? Did the censors 
remove only technical information, or much more? Were the censors themselves 
biased in their operation? Were the technical omissions crucial or minor?
489
  
 
Posed against evidence that raised doubts about Oppenheimer’s loyalty (and with no 
protection against double jeopardy on the disloyalty charges previously adjudicated in 1947 
because of the nature of the proceeding), Wellerstein noted that the newly available testimony 
failed to resolve the questions raised by his handling of the 1943 “Chevalier incident.”490 He 
viewed this, the focus of the loyalty/disloyalty argument, as the central question needing 
resolution in the hearing record; this certainly described the proceeding’s legal circumstances. 
Wellerstein judged the original classification of the newly released materials as driven primarily 
by concern about the need to veil the nature of the dispute over the “super’s” design beyond what 
was felt strictly necessary by the AEC’s team to prove Oppenheimer obstructed development of 
the hydrogen bomb. Such excisions seemed to require use of the VISTA study’s Chapter Five in 
evidence, because its findings alarmed the Air Force about Oppenheimer’s continuing influence 
on strategic policy; and some miscellaneous redactions to avoid the embarrassment or encourage 
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the frankness of witnesses.
491
 Wellerstein’s narrow interpretation of the motivations for the 
hearing presumed it was not primarily political in nature, a somewhat different take than that of 
most of the historians quoted in the October 2014 New York Times article.  
More importantly and of primary interest here, marginalizing the disputes over the 
“super” and VISTA as largely incidental house-cleaning needed to prepare the transcript that 
AEC Chair Lewis Strauss ordered released soon after the hearing’s conclusion overlooked the 
Air Force’s pivotal role in the timing and thrust of the charges. This lack of focus on the military 
antecedents of the hearing was likewise a problem with the position of those who saw the 
hearing as largely part and parcel of McCarthyism. 
Revisioning VISTA 
Wellerstein described the other technical problem substantiated by the newly released 
material as Oppenheimer’s role in the first prospective study of the utility of nuclear weapons in 
the defense of Europe in the event of a Soviet attack, Project VISTA. The general thrust of this 
view of VISTA was grounded in hearing testimony that focused on the Pentagon’s 
dissatisfaction with Oppenheimer because of his promotion of tactical weapons at the expense of 
strategic forces, suspicions augmented by the longstanding but previously reviewed disloyalty 
accusations.
492
 Oppenheimer was the lead author of the VISTA report’s Chapter Five, arguing in 
a draft that the thermonuclear weapons then under development would prove unsuitable for use 
in Europe because, as witness Lee Allen DuBridge coyly termed it in trying to get his point 
across without mentioning the forbidden term “fallout,” of their “radio activity.”493 By 1954, the 
idea that SAC should control all delivery of American nuclear weapons was clearly a dead letter. 
On the other hand, fallout was more relevant as an issue of controversy every day.  
The problem historians faced with the complete transcript was the assumption that what 
was missing in the heavily redacted original would eventually be found and reconnected by 
means of its declassification, directly providing important new context and information about the 
hearing. In this case, the most important and controversial missing element in understanding the 
                                                 
491
 Alex Wellerstein, “Oppenheimer Unredacted, Part II: Reading the Lost Transcripts,” 
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2015/01/16/oppenheimer-unredacted-part-ii/. Wellerstein noted AEC Chair Lewis 
Strauss sought to silence the sympathetic treatment Oppenheimer received in some of the press with his quick 
release of the original transcript shortly after the hearing ended despite representations to each witness that their 
testimony was to remain confidential. 
492
 Alex Wellerstein, “Oppenheimer Unredacted, Part II: Reading the Lost Transcripts,” 
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2015/01/16/oppenheimer-unredacted-part-ii/. 
493
 DOE, ITMO2, 1751-1752.  
189 
 
Oppenheimer hearing was something that was never there in the first place, fallout. In the 
context in which the hearing took place, this gap – for it was a gap far more substantial than the 
so-called bomber and missile “gaps” that followed later in the decade – occurred in a context that 
was preoccupied and permeated with fallout; it was missing from the transcript through human 
intent, not happenchance. Like the Air Force’s initial difficulties with capturing and analyzing 
fallout samples from global wind currents, the results of digesting the newly declassified material 
seemed uncertain at first, but then proved deeply revealing. Reading the traces of subtext 
radiating from fallout that permeated the transcript despite its apparent bureaucratic exile 
demonstrated that while the term was formally absent, its influence and constraints remained 
nearly omnipresent in the text once the subtle traces of its presence were recognized. If by 
suppressing the term fallout, the government believed it could halt discussion of the idea of 
fallout, it was mistaken. 
The official record revealed no witness allowed the word fallout to pass their lips. The 
significance of the missing term was marked by the contrast between its treatment and the 
relative openness with which long range detection (LRD) was discussed at the hearing, 
Testimony about the latter was rather surprising in light of the intense security that otherwise 
shrouded the nuclear intelligence effort described in Chapter One, so openness about it stood in 
sharp contrast with the complete excision of fallout. While deeply buried within the Air Force, 
LRD as a process was openly, if cautiously mentioned at the hearing because Oppenheimer’s 
extensive involvement in its research and development was something the AEC had little 
cognizance of, as related at several points, but was a point the Air Force wanted made.
494
  
While both of Wellerstein’s arguments provided useful insights, neither was as fully 
explanatory as fallout in accounting for Oppenheimer’s own later, guarded assertion that the 
hearing represented a proxy for his conflict with the Air Force, which precipitated his downfall, a 
reflection that also called into question taking much of the testimony at face value in assessing its 
meaning and significance.
495
 The goal for the Air Force was less to get at the truth in the 
allegations against Oppenheimer than it was to construct the myth of utilitarian nuclear weapons. 
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Revisiting the Meaning of the VISTA Conflict 
Of particular significance in demonstrating fallout’s central place in the conflict between 
Oppenheimer and the Air Force, a newly available passage added significant context to revise a 
previously largely misinterpreted passage found in the 1954 transcript drawn from the 1952 
VISTA report on the potential use of nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe from the 
Soviets. Generally, this reference to VISTA during the hearing has been taken by historians to 
indicate the Air Force’s primary motivation in objecting to the report’s recommendations was 
because using low yield tactical nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe would erode SAC’s 
monopoly on control and use of nuclear weapons.
496
 Wellerstein summed up this commonly 
encountered version of why VISTA distressed the Air Force. 
The US Air Force attempted to suppress the VISTA report, because it seemed to 
advocate that the Army [should move] into their turf and their budget.
497
 
 
However, a close reading of the testimony indicated that the issue was less about preservation of 
SAC’s control of strategic weapons than it was about how Chapter Five of the VISTA report 
portrayed thermonuclear weapons and their limitations.  
The testimony of Lee Allan DuBridge, a former GAC member and president of the 
California Institute of Technology at the time of the hearing, came closest to all but explicitly 
naming fallout as the foundation of the conflict between Oppenheimer and the Air Force. 
DuBridge led the VISTA study, which CIT hosted, then traveled with Oppenheimer to Europe to 
brief General Eisenhower and incorporate his input before finalizing the report.  Eisenhower was 
on his last military assignment as the top U.S. military commander in Europe before retiring. 
DuBridge testified that VISTA intentionally omitted commenting on their strategic use. 
Our point of view throughout the VISTA study on thermo-nuclear weapons was 
that we did not see that they had tactical value. We made no comment on their 
importance as strategic weapons.
498
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Besides damning the hydrogen bomb with faint praise, which undoubtedly did not sit well with 
Air Force leadership, Chapter Five’s larger offense was its assertion that fusion weapons 
possessed inherent limitations, foremost of which was fallout. 
Fallout as a Problem for Europe 
As a physicist, Lee DuBridge’s previously redacted testimony demonstrated a detailed 
and nuanced view of the conflict between the Air Force and Oppenheimer. Like other witnesses, 
DuBridge avoided use of the term fallout, but he took pains in his testimony to describe exactly 
what it was about Chapter Five that irked the service so bitterly. DuBridge described David 
Griggs, a witness at the trial and a former Air Force Chief Scientist, as reacting “very violently” 
when DuBridge and I.I. Rabi met Griggs over lunch as he sought to procure their agreement that 
Oppenheimer obstructed development of thermonuclear weapons.
499
 The redacted material that 
followed made it plain what was driving the Air Force to concoct the enigmatic objections to 
VISTA Chapter Five that surfaced in hearing testimony, while insisting that previously reviewed 
and cleared incidents questioning Oppenheimer’s loyalty be revisited.  
DuBridge acknowledged the controversial nature of a discussion in an early draft of the 
chapter that proposed withholding attacks on Soviet population centers in the event of a crisis in 
Europe if the Russians refrained from attacks on American cities. Whether from ignorance about 
it, astute judgment it would not be helpful before the hearing board, or was simply trying to be 
concise, DuBridge refrained from making the rather obvious observation that this was because it 
suggested the need for significant revision of the Air Force’s longstanding plans for a Day Zero 
mass attack, a concept first documented in Lauris Norstad’s 1945 immediate postwar nuclear war 
plan.
500
 Based on fission weapons, Norstad’s plan formed the basis for a revision in anticipation 
of thermonuclear weapons that was presented at the 1950 Ramey commanders conference, just 
the first stop on the road that led to the first SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) nearly a 
decade later in 1960.
501
 When John F. Kennedy took office the next year, it was conceded that 
“because of fallout from attack of military targets…the casualties would be many millions in 
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number. Thus limiting attack to military targets has little practical meaning as a humanitarian 
measure.”502 Left unmentioned was that fallout could not be limited only to Soviet territory. 
In 1951 at the front end of the planning process that led to the SIOP, the Air Force found 
Oppenheimer repulsed by their intentions. Thermonuclear weapons provided the means to 
radically increase the metrics of target destruction by simply substituting them for the fission 
weapons already assigned to SAC’s lengthy target list. The Air Force’s reconceptualization of its 
already ambitious war plan to incorporate the tremendously improved destructive capacity of the 
hydrogen bomb became the primary source of the conflict between it and the scientist.
503
 What 
Oppenheimer was able to say about the situation at the hearing comported with, rather than 
detracted from, the evidence that this and the GAC’s concerns about a “defect” or “technical” 
problem inherent with thermonuclear weapons centered on fallout. Fallout consistently provided 
the best, fully sufficient explanation for the guarded references the scientists and other witnesses 
made at the time about the nature of this conflict. Fallout remained a secret at the time, but was 
openly discussed in the press and then later officially unveiled to Bernard Brodie’s surprise in 
early 1955.
504
 Subsequent chapters will discuss how ending fallout became the primary 
motivation to end atmospheric testing. Arguments that technical production problems or SAC’s 
desire to maintain a monopoly on delivery of nuclear weapons have a place, but they all fall 
under the shadow of the primary technical problem that constrained the military utility of 
thermonuclear weapons, the enormity of their fallout. 
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For example, consider how DuBridge identified something more basic to historical 
arguments than a conflict centered on SAC’s efforts to reserve nuclear weapons for its own use. 
DuBridge made it clear he saw the root cause of the VISTA Chapter Five conflict arising from a 
set of effects, two quite familiar to Eisenhower, plus another effect, “radio activity,” that was a 
threat primarily associated with thermonuclear weapons. 
We did not see these thermo-nuclear weapons being used on the battle field and 
we made no comment on their strategic use. May I explain this point a bit?...We 
were envisioning a battle in Western Europe, presumably an invasion by Russian 
armies….we would be forced then into a battle of the NATO armies against the 
Russian armies…between the Rhine and the border of the Soviet Zone. 
 
We looked at the question of atomic weapons being used on armies in that area. 
We felt that if a thermo-nuclear weapon was available and used on armies, that its 
area of destruction through blast and fire and its area of damage through radio 
activity would be so great that we would be destroying many civilian populations 
in a friendly area – Western Germany – to such a great extent that the use of such 
a terribly destructive weapon in Western Germany was not feasible and not 
desirable and would be against our interests. 
 
Therefore, we saw no tactical use for it in that kind of battle. Therefore, we made 
no further study of the thermo-nuclear problem in that report.
505
 
 
DuBridge took care to differentiate between the physical and political impacts of weapon effects, 
explicitly delineating them based on their capacity to damage the enemy, but also implicitly 
between those within the realm of broadly accepted norms established in the recent world war 
and which were known to be acceptable to Robert Oppenheimer based on his own actions and 
expressed beliefs, as well as to members of the GAC that he chaired. This broke down in 
simplest terms as the “area of destruction through blast and fire,” and an effect that represented a 
different, rather more liminal moral equation, an “area of damage through radio activity” whose 
threat remained ambiguous in the absence of better data. 
DuBridge’s statement made three important distinctions between the effects of these 
weapons. The former two, blast and fire, were well-known phenomena and occurred in both 
temporal and physical proximity to the target. On the other hand, “radio activity” – standing in 
for the forbidden fallout – represented a largely unknown risk that could strike anywhere. Blast 
and fire from thermonuclear weapons might be enormous, but they were quantifiable and 
localized. Damage from “radio activity” or the more specific term, fallout, was difficult to define 
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geographically and temporally, although its harm was all but epidemiologically certain. While 
empirical proof of the scale of fallout’s threat was yet to come, the GAC’s decision to initiate 
GABRIEL in 1949 underlined the fact that a theoretical understanding already existed that 
pursuing these weapons might generate fallout sufficient to strike at nearly everyone on the 
planet, even those firing the weapons and their families. The distinctions DuBridge made 
carefully tip-toed around the barrier presented by fallout being a forbidden term by engaging 
directly with it as the subject matter. The censors apparently came to a similar conclusion about 
DuBridge’s construction, even if the term itself was missing. The precision and clarity with 
which DuBridge offered his argument about the root of the conflict stands out vividly against the 
bulk of the hearing’s testimony that hewed closely to the obfuscation of fallout, probably 
contributing to the prompt disappearance of this passage into silence for sixty years until its 
October 2014 declassification. 
A Warning to be Silent, Whatever the Cost to Science and Security 
Observing the effects of Oppenheimer’s disgrace, Priscilla McMillan artfully summed up 
the situation for scientists after the hearing and clearance revocation by noting Oppenheimer’s 
public warning about the negative effects of decisions made in secret that opened this chapter 
was the last such statement uttered by an active Q-cleared insider.
506
 Oppenheimer did not 
breach Truman’s prohibition with further commentary after the president reversed the GAC 
decision to not aggressively pursue the super, but McMillan observed Oppenheimer continued to 
irritate the Air Force on other points, by opposing rapid development of the service’s unrealistic 
nuclear-powered bomber, what it saw as his failure to support its desired creation of a second 
weapons laboratory, and the Strategic Air Command’s efforts to monopolize fissile material for 
use by its bombers. McMillan, too, emphasized SAC’s objections to VISTA’s emphasis on 
tactical fission weapons and its suggestions that fissile material be diverted to those programs 
from the Air Force’s favored high-yield thermonuclear weapons.507  
The omission of fallout from direct discussion at the Oppenheimer hearing revealed an 
intentionally deceptive process that carefully steered clear of the primary source of half a decade 
of conflict between Oppenheimer and the Air Force and its leading role in ending his career. As 
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in other historical contexts where formal exclusion of significant information from the available 
record becomes obvious once a wider body of evidence is assessed and analyzed, for example 
through consideration of infrapolitical cultural expressions, new traces produced by interrogating 
the meaning of what was absent and suppressed in the archive can provide insights that 
significantly expand understanding of historical events.
508
 Besides the glaring absence of a key 
topic of known relevance and great sensitivity for national security, efforts to “talk around” 
classification at various points in the hearing indicated fallout nonetheless remained a significant 
narrative factor, despite the term’s formal exclusion. Although the available evidence cannot yet 
conclusively settle matters in some areas, the more complete puzzle offered by the newly 
declassified transcript makes it possible to delineate significant new insights, to evaluate faulty 
assumptions so they can be opened to reassessment, and to establish working hypotheses for 
some of the remaining issues raised in analyzing fallout’s historical importance in limiting the 
arms race.  
Finding Fallout 
Given it was at least “more likely than not” that fallout was specifically excluded as a 
topic of discussion at the hearing, what became known subsequently about fallout makes it 
possible to describe with some accuracy the significant, if apparently excluded role it nonetheless 
played in both the conflict and the hearing that ended Oppenheimer’s government career. Much 
like a jigsaw puzzle of a familiar subject with a few missing pieces, the prospective image that 
unfolds once the majority of available parts are assembled accurately describes the general 
scene; illustrates the context that missing pieces must fit into; and intimates a strong suggestion 
of the role of factors known to be present, if not yet fully addressed by the available assembled 
pieces. So it was with fallout in the context of the 1954 AEC hearing, where it became clear at 
several points in the testimony that it was difficult to impossible to have an intelligent 
conversation without the option of recourse to use of the term fallout.
509
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Given his hearty embrace of tactical and other fission weapons and with most of their 
other qualities being roughly equivalent in form if not in scale, Oppenheimer’s misgivings about 
thermonuclear weapons involved something that clearly distinguished them from fission 
weapons – only the quantity of fallout they produced could be the distinguishing factor that 
famously alarmed Oppenheimer during a meeting with SAC leaders to discuss the nature and 
scope of its war plans.
510
 While accounts of this meeting vary, it is clear that the Air Force’s 
antipathy toward Oppenheimer significantly intensified afterwards.
511
  
The qualitative differences between fallout produced by fission and fusion devices are 
relatively minor, with the isotopes of primary concern remaining strontium-90, iodine-131, and 
others of that ilk.
512
 The primary physical effects of blast and fire are also quite similar except for 
their scope, which does not scale up proportionately. Blast obeys the inverse square law; for 
example, scaling up from the ten megaton yield of early hydrogen bombs to the 56 megaton 
yield produced by the 1961 “Tsar bomba” Soviet test produced only a modestly larger zone of 
obvious physical destruction.
513
 Larger yields create a somewhat intensified thermal pulse, but 
these are brief and likewise simply extend the radius of fire danger around ground zero 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mr. Oppenheimer: I know this is not a classroom, but the counsel and the witness are talking about two quite distinct 
things and therefore they are not understanding each other. 
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slightly.
514
 Besides his own comment in the Council on Foreign Relations presentation that 
Eisenhower read in May 1953, that a quantitative issue was a foundation for Oppenheimer’s 
dispute with the Air Force was also suggested by several oblique references to the global extent 
of this problem and questions from the AEC’s attorneys that unsuccessfully probed for 
comments on the potential for a weapons effect that threatened to end the world as it was 
known.
515
 The AEC hearing failed to get to the bottom of the latter despite the panel closely 
questioning several witnesses about the source of what they saw as a suspiciously repeated 
refrain in the materials that came to light in the October 2014 declassification.  
The meaning of the masked use of the term global in the context of the hearing became 
more apparent in the later use of the term “global fallout” by the Department of Energy in 
reference to its division of the larger part of historical fallout deposition data into that category to 
distinguish it from that produced by continental testing, i.e. primarily low yield fission devices at 
the Nevada Test Site.  ‘Global fallout” was that generated from U.S. testing in the Pacific and 
similar Soviet testing of high-yield fusion weapons. These high-yield tests accounted for far and 
away the largest part of all fallout produced given the propensity of thermonuclear explosions to 
pump large quantities of fallout into the stratosphere.
516
  
Neither blast nor fire was unique to fusion weapons, either, let alone nuclear weapons in 
general, which is why they are classified as supraconventional effects here. The use of blast and 
fire effects on civilians had already become a common feature of conventional strategic 
bombardment by 1945.
517
 While physical destruction of the scope and scale possible with 
thermonuclear weapons might shock the imagination, it could not shock consciences already 
inured by the events of World War Two to the relatively indiscriminate practice of strategic 
bombing prior to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
518
 Only fallout qualified as engendering all these 
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areas of concern – scientific, military, and moral – among what remained secret in 1954 about 
nuclear weapons; there is no substantive evidence of some other mystery factor to account for 
these known facts about the conflict that arose between Oppenheimer and the Air Force over 
strategic policy. Moreover, fallout “fits” together with adjoining pieces of the nuclear puzzle in 
every respect. Confirmation of details may remain elusive, but not the general shape of the 
missing piece; fallout was at the root of the conflict between Oppenheimer’s concerns, the Air 
Force’s war plans, and thermonuclear weapons. 
Because some secrets about fallout still remain from that era, evaluating its role can only 
be partially accomplished by utilizing familiar methods of historical analysis, although that 
provides a vital context to outline the known parts of fallout’s narrative.519 Within those 
constraints, a working set of hypotheses about what remains undocumented can be outlined by 
this contextual construction. Substantive parts of fallout’s narrative that remain indistinct or 
missing can be illuminated by a process some historians of technology refer to as unpacking a 
metaphorical “black box” of social and material relations surrounding a technology to better 
describe and evaluate its cultural and social impact.
520
 Setting aside metaphor, in this case there 
actually was a black box of secrecy intended to enclose the knowledge system that included 
nuclear weapons; their effects including fallout, whose significance in strategic decision making 
appears to have been largely elided from official history much as in the example here; and the 
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means for detecting them, which was controlled by the Air Force, but which could just as well 
serve diplomatic and scientific purposes as it did in meeting military and intelligence 
requirements.  
One cannot take the 1954 Oppenheimer hearing at face value and ignore the black box of 
fallout sitting silently in the corner. A useful comparative example would be attempting an 
analysis of American involvement in Vietnam without taking into account the Pentagon Papers. 
While the picture that can be painted with the available evidence is not as comprehensive and 
documentary as Daniel Ellsworth supplied in that case, fallout’s ominous presence requires 
unpacking the faint traces that exist of it, whatever evidentiary shortcomings may remain at the 
end of the day. While certainty for historians can only be found in the safe zone provided by 
archival evidence, the tepid reaction to the substantially complete transcript of the Oppenheimer 
hearing suggests the need for a working hypothesis more effective at interrogating the superficial 
abstractions  the transcript  provided in order to explain Oppenheimer’s appearance before the 
tribunal, let alone the results. 
Demonstrating how this blind spot often continues to allow fallout’s history to elude 
historical analysis, Alex Wellerstein observed, “Early 1954 was a tricky time for hydrogen bomb 
classification...” but was nonetheless impressed by what was made available through the 
declassification. “In fact, the amount of discussion of the H-bomb’s development allowed in the 
final transcript is rather remarkable — very little has in fact been removed on this key topic.” He 
suggested that among this material was a “strong technical reason” Oppenheimer relied on in 
defense of his opposition to the hydrogen bomb. Wellerstein noted the uncertainty that it could 
be built and would work as intended given the enormous requirements for tritium the initial 
design required. Instead of that gamble, Wellerstein argued Oppenheimer believed those 
resources would be better devoted to the production of more fission weapons of improved 
designs.
521
 All were accurate enough statements in and of themselves, although one problematic 
assessment slipped through. 
In March 1954, a second hydrogen bomb was detonated as the “Bravo test.” 
Radioactive fallout rained down on inhabited atolls in the Marshall Islands, as 
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well as a Japanese fishing boat, making the fact of it being a thermonuclear test 
undeniable.
522
 
 
In fact, any fission or fusion reaction is prone to creating fallout, depending on where it is 
detonated; fallout per se was not indicative of a thermonuclear device, although qualitative 
analysis of this debris could certainly reveal it originated from a fusion reaction. While a rather 
minor point, Wellerstein’s statement was indicative of the gap in knowledge often encountered 
about the strategic significance of fallout. What differentiated the dangers associated with 
thermonuclear weapons from those of fission weapons was not any essential qualitative 
difference in their effects. The reactions involved created blast, fire, and radiation, which differ 
significantly in scale between fission and fusion weapons, but the threatening effects they 
generate are qualitatively equivalent.  What is crucial to understanding the difference, in both 
practical and historical terms, was the quantitative difference in the risks posed by fallout from 
the Air Force’s intended application of thermonuclear weapons, when they possessed no net 
advantage in military utility over fission weapons equally capable of destroying any relevant 
target. 
Fallout, Gabriel’s Horn, and the Hound of the Baskervilles 
As in the classic Sherlock Holmes tale, The Hound of the Baskervilles, the most relevant 
and otherwise expected evidence that went unheard proved to be the most relevant evidence to 
explain what happened at the hearing. Besides exclusion of the term fallout at the 1954 hearing, 
the most significant evidence of the GAC’s early recognition of fallout as a problem was its 
approval of Project GABRIEL. Given LeMay’s rejection of limits on the conduct of strategic air 
warfare, such a finding inherently represented a stark limitation on his ambitious plans for a SAC 
force capable of delivering a swift knockout blow with hundreds of thermonuclear weapons to 
the Soviet Union in the event of war. The SAC 1951 war plan Oppenheimer raised objection to 
was most likely a generation or two removed from General Lauris Norstad’s immediate postwar 
plan to attack more than 200 targets in the Soviet Union with then newly-proven fission bombs, 
but with a target list not substantially different given little more was known about targets in the 
Soviet Union in 1951 than six years earlier.
523
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Given the Pentagon’s orders to the AEC to maximize fissile material production after 
Joe-1, it is reasonable to assume that the problematic 1951 SAC war plan was developed in 
anticipation of near-term availability of thermonuclear weapons, with an intent to upgrade as 
many of the strikes on the 1945 plan as possible to high yield weapons when they became 
available.
524
 The 60 megaton limit GABRIEL proposed was all but certain to have sparked 
derisive commentary and resistance from Air Force leadership.
525
 This suggests an entirely 
different motivation for the service’s action against the scientist, one that far better fits than the 
seemingly incredible claims by General Roscoe “Bim” Wilson and former Air Force Chief 
Scientist David Griggs that one of Oppenheimer’s goals was to hobble SAC. 
While the exact circumstances and even the precise date of the disputatious meeting 
remain murky, three outcomes are known, all of which strongly suggest the conflict was about 
fallout. First, Oppenheimer concluded the war plan was the “goddamnedest thing” he ever saw, 
something that clearly went beyond the bounds of what he was known to have found morally 
acceptable, which up to that point was nearly every other aspect of the use of nuclear weapons.
526
 
Second, the Air Force’s swift conclusion that it wanted Oppenheimer excluded from its primary 
program that involved fallout, the nuclear intelligence work done by AFOAT-1, deprived 
Oppenheimer of the best data available about fallout in the environment and thus prevented the 
AEC from adding empirical evidence to support GABRIEL’s contentious thesis. Finally, 
GABRIEL’s conclusion was later revised sharply upward, seemingly as an accommodation to 
the anticipated availability of high yield thermonuclear weapons and the Air Force’s desires to 
acquire and use these weapons in considerable numbers. From 60 megatons, the final revised 
cumulative yield was raised to 2,000 megatons, a number that might seem profligate to many 
now, but which later versions of SAC’s war plan easily exceeded once crystalized into the SIOP 
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planning assumed that the best defense was an initial offense that deprived one’s opponent of further capability to 
attack. Assuming weapons like IVY MIKE (10 megatons) and CASTLE BRAVO (15 megatons) were used, a 60 
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(Single Integrated Operational Plan) beginning in 1960, by then well within the capabilities of 
SAC to inflict.  
A rough calculation showed this level of total yield coincidentally would roughly 
coincide with a scenario in which the Air Force changed out most fission bombs  for fusion 
weapons in Norstad’s original 1945 attack plan of more than 200 targets in the Soviet Union. 
Assuming a plan for a substantially similar attack on the target list with fusion weapons of 10 
megatons suggests the revised total may have been arrived at by this simple substitution. Given 
LeMay’s stance, the Air Force likely still saw this comparatively expansive cumulative yield 
limit of 2,000 megatons as a significant constraint that would limit the expansion of SAC given 
the eventual addition of thousands more targets to its war plans, even if it was a considerable 
increase over the original GABRIEL yield limit.
527
  
In the context of Truman’s order to build the super and the service’s ongoing suspicions 
of Oppenheimer’s motives, the Air Force more likely than not saw GABRIEL as an elaborate 
backdoor scientific argument for the GAC to limit the military’s access to thermonuclear 
weapons. Rather strikingly, such a discussion of facts about fallout at the 1954 hearing might 
have gone either for or against Oppenheimer. The Air Force would have had a stronger position, 
one that could argue he sought to use concerns over fallout as a means to limit the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, rather than the rather laughable charge that the scientist was bent on effectively 
disabling SAC, as General Wilson and David Griggs alleged.
528
 In contrast, exploring such top 
secret topics to argue the details would offer Oppenheimer an opening to explain why he wanted 
to study fallout.  Explaining the need to limit planned use of thermonuclear weapons would 
likely permit him to discuss the role of those concerns in motivating the GAC’s resistance to 
rushing headlong toward thermonuclear weapons. Fallout’s total exclusion from hearing 
testimony becomes more understandable in this light.  
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Bim’s Tale 
Much of what the hearing revealed and concealed about those hunting for Robert 
Oppenheimer’s demise was conveyed by the testimony of one of his closest military colleagues 
in government service, General Roscoe Charles Wilson, who served in World War Two as 
director of Army Air Corps liaison to the Manhattan Project.
529
 Philip M. Stern argued the purely 
political nature of much of the questioning was designed to encourage attack on unpopular ideas. 
…the security system permits, if indeed it does not encourage, the equating of 
disagreement with disloyalty…it was only natural for…Wilson, after hearing 
Oppenheimer express his views at a top-secret Pentagon meeting, to scurry to the 
Air Force Chief of Intelligence to express his doubts about Oppenheimer’s 
allegiance to the United States.
530
  
 
While superficially accurate, Stern’s misreading of Wilson’s involvement and motivations as one 
of anxiety over Oppenheimer’s loyalty catches only a small part of the significance of Wilson’s 
testimony – and it was one Wilson specifically denied was relevant.531  
The date of meeting that prompted General Wilson to see General Charles Cabell, the Air 
Force director of intelligence, was one that he struggled to remember. It was finally pinned down 
by reference to a document discussing a meeting of the Atomic Energy Committee of the 
Research and Development Board on 18 January 1951. It does not appear to be the same as the 
fabled confrontation, which Freeman Dyson recalled drew Oppenheimer’s earthy reflection on 
the nature of the war plans it discussed. Rather this meeting considered the status of various 
aspects of weapons development, including the status of the program on lower yield tactical 
weapons, in a report entitled, “Military Objectives on the Use of Atomic Energy.” Wilson’s 
description made it clear that he simply did not feel Oppenheimer’s level of commitment to the 
idea of the super was strong as he felt was appropriate. Wilson recalled that his concerns were 
driven by his belief the thermonuclear project seemed to be stalled at that point.
532
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With further research, General Wilson’s involvement in the matter of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer grew curiouser and curiouser – beginning from the birth of long range detection.  
In his own autobiography, Curtis LeMay said very little about nuclear weapons and even less 
about intelligence. Interestingly, Wilson was mentioned in what initially seemed to be an off-
hand remark in connection with the seeming odd assignment of LeMay to head the Army Air 
Force’s research and development command soon after the war ended. LeMay confessed. 
I didn’t know much about Research and Development…I’d had a little bit of 
engineering education. So they gathered in a lot of folks who did know something 
about this whole program: Bim Wilson and such. And we went to work.
533
 
 
Bim turned out to be the nickname of General Wilson, who LeMay apparently took 
modest pains to conceal in plain sight by using just his nickname when writing in 1965, allowing 
for a thoughtful crumb of recognition to be thrown to those with the need to know about the 
close relationship between the two generals, one well-known and the other mostly working in the 
shadows, but as experienced as any with the art of nuclear intelligence. In 1944, Wilson worked 
on a xenon-133 collection project targeted at the Germans, then helped survey the damage in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki before joining the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project after the Air 
Force’s independence in 1947, which bookended his assignment to help LeMay.534  
General Wilson served as deputy to the commander of Armed Forces Special Weapons 
Project (AFSWP), first under former Manhattan Project director General Leslie Groves, then 
with General Kenneth Nichols.
535
 In 1948, Wilson began serving on the Military Liaison 
Committee (MLC) and the Committee on Atomic Energy (CAE) of the Research Development 
Board, where he was in position to work directly alongside Oppenheimer on the CAE and in 
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coordination with him on the MLC.
536
 On the one hand, Wilson recalled a close, even fond 
working relationship with Oppenheimer, staying at his home when committee meetings 
happened to be in California, remarking that “He was very kind to me…”537  
Wilson’s testimony was particularly interesting for its negative contrast with the still 
limited documentary narrative of nuclear intelligence, which celebrated the triumph of science 
over bureaucratic inertia. This included the AFOAT-1 unit histories, where the official record 
pointed almost exclusively in the direction of a markedly successful program of research and 
development of appropriate LRD technology, then building the capability to reliably capture 
evidence of the Soviet breakthrough test in a timely manner, followed by the years-long effort to 
dependably capture samples describing their subsequent testing.
538
 The AFOAT-1 1954 unit 
history was clear and succinct on this matter. 
The system now consisted of several well organized, thoroughly developed 
components…In brief, the Atomic Energy Detection System was remarkably 
effective.
539
 
 
The exception to the generally positive reporting on AFOAT-1’s work was the first of these 
studies, issued in June 1954. Instead of an annual, it compiled the entire previous history into one 
volume covering 1947 to 1953. This work depicted a struggle within the Department of Defense 
between a variety of organizational actors. Their leaders were frequently and repeatedly 
identified as the DOD hashed out what to do and the source and amounts of funding for nuclear 
intelligence research. A significant exception was the RDB Committee on Atomic Energy 
(CAE), where Oppenheimer headed the committee, but went unidentified in this narrative despite 
numerous references to its role in carefully evaluating various proposals.
540
 The result seemed to 
simultaneously blame Oppenheimer for doing his job, even though the CAE was but one party 
among many involved in the delays the text complained of, while whitewashing his name from 
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this history. The timing of its publication in relationship to the timing of the hearing was 
suggestive, as if catching up with events, but there was no indication that its publication was 
more than roughly coincidental with Oppenheimer’s departure under duress. 
In sharp contrast to these narratives of mostly timely, capable, and effective nuclear 
intelligence efforts, at the AEC hearing and much like the initial volume of AFOAT-1’s unit 
history, Wilson testified instead to the harried sense of urgency and frustration the Air Force felt 
at the time about the long-range detection program, heaping much of the blame for those anxious 
feelings directly onto Oppenheimer. Wilson, in common with most of the Air Force’s leadership, 
assessed that Soviet power was “vulnerable only to attack by air power.” Wilson said he was 
concerned Oppenheimer was…  
…interested in what I call the internationalizing of atomic energy, this at a time 
when the United States had a monopoly, and in which many people, including 
myself, believed that the A-bomb in the hands of the United States with an Air 
Force capable of using it was probably the greatest deterrent to further Russian 
aggression. This was a concern. 
 
Wilson clearly emphasized that “I am not talking about loyalty.” But then he suspiciously 
asserted on both the issue of thermonuclear weapons and the earlier long-range detection project 
that Oppenheimer had “reservations made on technical grounds. They were simply not 
challengeable by the military…but the overall effect was to deny to the Air Force the mechanism 
which we felt was essential to determine when this bomb went off.”541 It was easy for the Air 
Force to make the leap to suspect the growing reservations about fallout Oppenheimer later 
expressed were, in fact, nothing less than the ultimate example of “reservations made on 
technical grounds…simply not challengeable by the military.” 
Charles Ziegler noted that Lewis Strauss blamed Oppenheimer for RDB delays in 1948 
and 1949.
542
 What Strauss was referring to in 1948 was clear with respect to fallout establishing 
itself as a useful intelligence method at SANDSTONE, in contrast with Oppenheimer’s original 
view of its limitations, but 1949 was less clear other than the RDB’s ill-timed recommendation to 
cut aerial sampling funding just as the hot samples from Joe-1 arrived.
543
 Lewis Strauss also gave 
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credence to rumors that the Soviets managed to secretly test a nuclear weapon prior to Joe-1 and 
that evidence about the pending Joe-1 test had eluded American intelligence. The RDB’s 
scrutiny again fell on the AFOAT-1 program in 1949. This was as much a financial and political 
development as it had anything to do with Oppenheimer as chair of the RDB. Truman confidant 
Louis Johnson took the reins as secretary of defense in mid-1949, imposing the president’s 
austerity budget at the Pentagon. For Strauss, a Republican, memory of who to blame fixated on 
Oppenheimer, likely driven by conflating Johnson’s budget-cutting hatchet with Oppenheimer’s 
efforts to better establish the justifications  for allotment of scarce research funding.
544
   
General Wilson Drops a Dime on Oppenheimer 
General Wilson’s expression of the Air Force’s anxieties over the delays in LRD research 
and development were refuted by Oppenheimer as best he could in open session during the 
hearing. The physicist argued “The only ground for holding up the installation of something is 
doubt as to whether its development had reached the right stage for it to be effective.”545 
Certainly, the RDB’s pending recommendation to reassess the LRD project’s research program 
in September 1949, swept aside in the wake of the detection of Joe-1, was rendered moot by 
events. The successful detection resulted in a hasty expansion of such obviously productive 
research, rather than the recommended contraction. Blaming Oppenheimer for the entirety of 
what was both a difficult research problem and a subject of intense inter-service rivalry 
intentionally handed off to let the RDB to decide priorities in a difficult funding environment, in 
General Wilson’s hands instead became stronger evidence of the Air Force’s psychological 
displacement of its problems onto Oppenheimer than it was revelation of a legitimate pattern of 
concern about his loyalty.  
In fact, as the record showed, Oppenheimer and others serving on the RDB were critical 
of justifications for funding research in each of the techniques: radioactive sampling, seismic, 
and sonic detection. In large part, however, this was a problem created by delays following 
requests for guidance from the JCS and the playing out of interservice rivalries at the Pentagon 
even after several inquiries from the RDB on the topic, as Ziegler and Jacobson extensively 
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documented.
546
 Memory of the more distant past was being conveniently refashioned to fit a 
configuration more useful in the present, recasting it to better serve the goal of the Air Force to 
provide the AEC a pretext to expel Oppenheimer. 
Wilson’s depiction of growing misgivings about Oppenheimer ran from LRD to the 
super, so disturbing him that he “felt compelled to go to the Director of Intelligence to express 
my concern over what I felt was a pattern of action that was simply not helpful to national 
defense.”547 Although Wilson did not name the DoI, at the time he was General Charles P. 
Cabell, who was intimately aware of AFOAT-1 and its LRD mission.
548
 Given Wilson’s 
concerns over Oppenheimer’s “conservative statements” about thermonuclear weapons, his 
opposition to nuclear-powered aircraft based on “technical judgment,” and the fact that the 
scientist had not initially been “enthusiastic about 2 of 3 of these [nuclear intelligence] systems 
or devices…some of them were exceedingly difficult to produce, and some of them were very 
costly…” – well, one can see how that would send any military man “to the Director of 
Intelligence to say that I felt I was  unhappy.”549 Or perhaps not, strung together as it was with a 
diatribe about Russian power and the threat it posed that could only be controlled by air power. It 
is difficult to convey here, but the yarn read in a highly contrived manner that raised suspicions it 
was largely composed ex post facto to be served up whole at the 1954 hearing. 
Beyond raw ideology, Wilson did offer some factual basis for his concern. Reading 
between the lines and deconstructing what Wilson was talking about, the transcript provided 
some obvious insights into the motivations of the Air Force in engaging with such a sensitive 
issue. The “2 of 3 of these systems” referred to a desired expansion of research in support of the 
seismic and sonic techniques approved by the RDB so that in Wilson’s eyes “the overall effect 
was to deny to the Air Force the mechanism which we felt was essential to determine when this 
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bomb went off. In our judgment, this was one of the critical dates, or would be at that time, for 
developing our national-defense policy.”550 In reality, these systems provided important, but 
ultimately supplementary data to the collection of aerial fallout samples. Perhaps Wilson was not 
cognizant analysis of the fallout samples inherently provided rather precise dating of the timing 
of their origin in a nuclear explosion, without a need for additional confirmatory techniques? 
Such ignorance seems unlikely for such an experienced and well-located officer. Perhaps 
Wilson, instead of meaning when, meant “where”? Both seismic and sonic techniques provided 
capabilities to resolve locations more precisely than aerial sampling. If one needed target 
information, as SAC did, where was a far more important question than when. This was yet more 
evidence AFOAT-1 data was also intended from the beginning to serve as targeting information 
in support of SAC war plans. 
Wilson’s testimony cited intelligence research and development that were directly tied to 
the use of fallout despite its source being unmentioned. Wilson’s appearance on behalf of SAC’s 
interest was another strong suggestion that the political effects of fallout posed a threat to Air 
Force war planning and thus played the central role in bringing about Oppenheimer’s AEC 
hearing. Understanding fallout’s influence on strategic policy and Air Force resistance to 
acknowledging this threat suggests a substantially more compelling case to explain the hearing, 
fallout’s omission from it, and its outcome than what became known about the weaknesses of the 
allegations made against him. While the newly released statements presented no exoneration for 
Oppenheimer’s poor judgement in several dusty, previously reviewed incidents, these portions of 
the transcript confirmed the otherwise complex and circumstantial case for an expanded role for 
fallout as a constraint on strategic planning. This improved understanding of the basis of the 
government’s internal conflict over fallout also places its origins at the very beginning of the 
nineteen-fifties even before a design for a thermonuclear weapon was finalized. Establishing a 
theoretical basis for concern about fallout illuminated the paradoxical nature of a powerful 
strategic arsenal that was developed in spite of scientific advice that fallout would bar any 
substantial use of thermonuclear weapons, except as last gasp retaliation, a national security 
problem that has yet to be forthrightly explained by any president.  
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Breaking Faith 
While LeMay’s R&D assignment may have covered matters other than nuclear 
intelligence, Wilson’s clearly did not, as the focus of his career at that point was on research and 
development of methods for nuclear intelligence collection.
551
 In fact, LeMay’s terming his work 
at the time as specifically with “Bim” Wilson and the “whole program” suggested he may, too, 
have been as exclusively focused on nuclear intelligence as Wilson obviously was at the time. 
Clearly LeMay was in the loop from the beginning on the project that resulted in the organization 
of AFOAT-1.  
The long-simmering but rapidly deteriorating conflict between Oppenheimer and the Air 
Force also suggested an additional insight into another initiative the service helped sponsor, a 
second weapons design laboratory. Presuming the Air Force believed Los Alamos was 
thoroughly penetrated by Soviet intelligence, if Oppenheimer was as disloyal as some painted 
him, establishing a second lab served as, not simply as a competitor to keep Los Alamos on its 
toes and cozy home to Edward Teller, but as a backup in the event Los Alamos suddenly was 
closed because its leadership was determined to be compromised. Seemingly counterproductive 
in the long view of history, for the Air Force weighing its options in the middle of the McCarthy 
era, planning for such an event likely seemed far more comprehensible given the context and the 
service’s obsessive belief that Oppenheimer represented a threat to national security. 
LeMay: Bigger Is Always Better 
The substantially complete transcript released in October 2014 also added another 
previously excised piece of the puzzle to the conflict between Oppenheimer and General LeMay. 
General Wilson revealed LeMay apparently did meet Oppenheimer face-to-face to discuss the 
super at some point. Wilson recalled the SAC commander was blunt, telling the scientist exactly 
what he needed. 
I remember his saying most vigorously that they couldn’t make them too big for 
him.
552
 
 
LeMay’s World War Two record of ruthlessly putting maximum bomb tonnage on target 
was the foundation on which the Air Force’s desire for the virtually unlimited yields of 
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thermonuclear weapons stood.
553
 Previous evidence of significant Air Force dissatisfaction with 
Oppenheimer prior to the GAC’s controversial decision after Joe-1 remained deeply buried 
during Ziegler and Jacobson’s research, which missed subtle earlier signals of estrangement that 
lay fallow until the Soviet achievement and Teller and Lawrence’s lobbying for the super forced 
it to surface.
554
 Following capture and initial analysis of its samples the fall of 1949, the Air 
Force wanted an outside review of the Joe-1 evidence before completing its report to the 
president confirming that evidence analyzed by AFOAT-1 demonstrated the Soviet Union 
successfully tested a nuclear weapon. Vannevar Bush was tapped to chair the panel, but the Air 
Force also chose the other members.
555
 In his testimony at the 1954 hearing, Luiz Alvarez 
indicated why Bush told him he was appointed as chair of the panel. 
I think the reason the President chose me is that he does not trust Dr. 
Oppenheimer and he wants to have someone in whom he has trust as head of this 
committee.
556
 
 
Bush was returned to the stand near the end of the hearing and questioned about Alavarez’s 
assertion. Bush recalled that Alvarez’s claim was “simply not true.” But he then offered up what 
was in retrospect early evidence of the slippery slope Oppenheimer was already on with the Air 
Force before Joe-1. Bush took the opportunity to ask Air Force General Nelson about the 
makeup of the panel. 
“But wouldn't it be more reasonable for Dr. Oppenheimer to be Chairman, since 
he is Chairman of the General Advisory Committee?” and he said to me 
something to the effect that they would prefer it the way it was. That is all there 
was.
557
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Bush also flatly denied Alvarez’s assertion that Oppenheimer informally acted as the chair 
during the panel’s deliberations instead of Bush. 
…I acted as chairman. When it came to the report, we wrote that report around 
the table…Dr. Oppenheimer contributed throughout in a normal and perfectly 
proper manner.
558
 
 
Bush’s interaction was almost certainly with Major General Morris R. Nelson, who 
commanded AFOAT-1 from August 1949 to December 1950 during the detection of Joe-1.
559
 
Nelson was an obvious point of contact to facilitate work between AFOAT-1 and the long range 
detection evaluation panel. Tellingly, unlike Luis Alvarez, who was the only witness who 
identified AFOAT-1 by name perhaps because he felt comfortably on the same side of the 
argument as the Air Force, Bush was careful to avoid such a blatant violation of the security 
ground rules against identifying the unit.
560
 
The dispute grew from what priority to give thermonuclear weapons development into a 
secret May 1951 Air Force clearance suspension for Oppenheimer.  The service applied pressure 
for a second weapons laboratory and other signals grew that Oppenheimer understood as 
blocking his reappointment as chair of the GAC.
561
 He further irritated the Air Force through his 
consulting work on Project VISTA’s analysis of the potential use of tactical weapons in Europe, 
the air-defense oriented Summer Study, and working with the Department of State as a 
consultant on disarmament diplomacy.
562
 Concerns raised by Air Force witnesses at the 1954 
hearing suggested the Air Force’s complaints on these matters formed the central motivation in 
bringing the AEC’s case against Oppenheimer. All were at least as significant, if not obviously 
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more so than the formal charges made against Oppenheimer.
563
 In light of the charges made 
against Oppenheimer, it was notable that the conflicts before Joe-1 over RDB assessments of the 
value of Air Force research and development and those made afterwards over production 
difficulties and long-ago adjudicated questions about his loyalty were relatively minor in 
comparison with the paranoia over SAC’s “disarmament” articulated clumsily by General 
Wilson to the carefully anonymous General Cabell, then facilitated by Air Force Secretary 
Thomas Finletter and Air Chief of Staff General Hoyt  Vandenberg in reaction to Oppenheimer’s 
critique of SAC war plans. Oddly, for such a supposedly direct threat to his sinecure, General 
LeMay’s organization was all but absent from the proceedings, highlighting the spotty and 
disjointed nature of the evidence of Oppenheimer’s wrongdoing presented against the scientist at 
the hearing.
564
As an analogy, in some ways the evidence presented versus the charges made was 
akin to trying to prove a defendant was inclined to assault based on claims about his uncharged 
string of supposed recent murders.   
Pointing to a different danger, Bush bluntly offered up his assessment of the scientific 
community’s reaction to the credibility of the charges made against Oppenheimer and to the 
legitimacy of the hearing. After a leaked document detailing the particulars of the charges was 
rephrased by the New York Times so that it even more strongly suggested his opinions got him in 
trouble, not his loyalty, Bush told the panel that its publication stirred reaction because many 
already felt the affair was a baseless political attack on Oppenheimer.
565
 
The National Academy of Sciences…and the American Physical Society…are 
deeply stirred. The reason…is because they feel that a professional man who 
rendered great service to his country, rendered service beyond almost any other 
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man, is now being pilloried and put through than ordeal because he has the 
temerity to express his honest opinions.
566
 
 
The censorship of Wilson’s testimony about LeMay’s frank comment that implicitly 
referred to yield was an example of how selective Strauss was in pandering to security and public 
relations concerns engendered by the potential threats posed by fallout in choosing what part of 
the transcript was released in 1954.  LeMay’s comment, besides its obviously inflammatory 
potential and along with one other brief comment censored from Wilson’s otherwise surprisingly 
open discussion of the Air Force’s motivations regarding intelligence matters in acting against 
Oppenheimer, reflected the fact that LeMay was at the root of fallout’s transition from a secret to 
a problem.
567
 Strauss’ decision to drop Wilson’s recounting of LeMay’s comment entirely 
removed the issue of quantity or yield from the discussion of tactical weapons and bombardment 
connected to the VISTA dispute, an example of how fallout was an even more sensitive topic 
than nuclear intelligence was at the time of the 1954 hearing.
568
 Another troublesome comment 
for Strauss as the censor was Wilson’s direct use of the term long range detection, along with his 
framing of Oppenheimer’s dispute with the Air Force as centering on his critique of the planned 
LRD research program.
569
 Dropping that sentence obscured much of the nuance in Wilson’s 
subsequent discussion of the intelligence aspects of fallout.  
Fallout as the Biggest Secret at the Hearing 
Tellingly, the testimony of General Wilson earlier noted by Ziegler and Jacobson, along 
with Hans Bethe’s now-declassified testimony, demonstrated that discussion of intelligence 
operations was not totally off-limits at the hearing, thus secrecy about that topic was not the 
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fundamental cause for many of the manipulations now known in the testimony.
570
 What was 
forbidden was uttering the term fallout. Oppenheimer was left vulnerable and largely defenseless 
to the charge that the GAC’s objections to the hydrogen bomb were not pragmatic. Without a 
discussion of their proximate cause, his comments on Mrs. Roosevelt’s radio show could be 
reduced to “moralizing” about the inevitably immoral business of war and nothing more. 
Oppenheimer’s own invocation of morality, as well as that of Bethe and other scientists, 
sometimes in reference to discussion of some variant of phrasing about thermonuclear weapons’ 
potential to destroy the world as it was known, while undoubtedly sincere, in part also apparently 
represented the scientists’ attempt to maneuver around being forbidden use of the term fallout. 
Bethe discussed his interaction with David Griggs about Griggs’ beliefs that the Air Force should 
rely on high yield weapons in exactly the terms he would if discussing the need to limit fallout. 
Instead of simply doing the math to demonstrate the excess of fallout in using a single multi-
megaton yield thermonuclear device to strike two targets that were most efficiently destroyed 
with two 100 kiloton strikes, Bethe layered in a discussion of the “moral considerations” because 
it was “important to not over-destroy the enemy country, but to fit the weapon in each case to the 
target and to attempt the best accuracy that one can on bombing so as to make a minimum of 
destruction compatible with gaining the objective.”571 This was at the heart of the dispute over 
the super, not an issue of loyalty. Bethe’s implicit acknowledgment of fallout as the issue also 
demonstrated that the cause of Oppenheimer’s plight, while not widely known because of the 
tight security restrictions, was clearly understood for what it was by the few with clearance to 
have knowledge of it. 
With fallout beyond the pale for discussion, the very circumscribed manner in which the 
service’s active, longstanding interest in limiting his influence was selectively portrayed in 
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hearing testimony, and the curious and rather fantastical allegation made by Air Force witnesses 
that the service believed Oppenheimer intended to somehow disarm SAC, all suggest the secrecy 
connected to the hearing was not primarily intended to hide an intelligence operation. 
Importantly, Oppenheimer’s direct connection of the conflict leading to the hearing to SAC’s 
1951 war plan earthily described in years later to Dyson, while seemingly vague, points at those 
misgivings as central to the dispute, rather than the conflicts over fissile material production or 
nuclear intelligence research and development funding that historians previously focused upon, 
primarily because archival materials were available to support those far more limited 
conclusions. Oppenheimer saw no need to disclaim to Dyson the ridiculous and unfounded 
accusation that he slowed development of hydrogen bomb. The blast, fire, and limited fallout 
produced by fission weapons did not give Oppenheimer pause; it was also unlikely that he saw 
the same qualitative effects from any single thermonuclear weapon much differently.  While the 
bomb might be problematic, the real problem Oppenheimer saw was with how SAC intended to 
strategically use these weapons to fight a war, leading to what he believed were unnecessary and 
intolerable levels of global fallout. 
Whither Deterrence? 
Superficially, fallout might be seen as strengthening the deterrent effect of nuclear 
weapons on one’s opponent. On the other hand, the United States military’s initial decade-long 
effort to conceal from public knowledge fallout’s uncontainable threat suggested fear of its 
potential to erode deterrence. What if fallout’s consequences were seen as politically influential 
enough to stay the hand of the president or military commanders in the event of war? That could 
lead to precisely the sort of doubt that might give an opponent reason to believe they could gain 
an advantage. Strategic Air Command planners thus sought to foster deterrence by focusing on 
the supraconventional effect of nuclear weapons of blast, front-loading American war strategy in 
the event of conflict with the goal of breaking the opponent’s will to resist.572 Should deterrence 
fail, SAC wanted to destroy an opponent’s forces with an overwhelming reaction sufficient to 
destroy Russian capabilities to continue a confrontation in hopes that would forestall an attack on 
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the United States.
573
 It was a strategy designed to discourage Soviet contemplation of pre-
emptive attack by building a massive force structure, even as SAC planners ignored the 
consequences of the radiation associated with its use in the event of a failure of deterrence as 
immaterial to the task at hand.  Rather than strengthening deterrence, giving credence to the 
threat of fallout would build up uncertainty that undermined it. Emphasizing the 
supraconventional effects of nuclear weapons while suppressing anxiety over their potential 
fallout was designed to encourage executive branch policy makers and the public to default to 
thinking about these devices as simply more powerful versions of weapons already morally and 
politically tolerable. 
Fear of the political consequences of subjective reactions to nuclear weapons became 
somewhat better defined, coalescing around what Nina Tannenwald termed more generally as 
the “nuclear taboo” – a countervailing force to the use of nuclear weapons imposed by an 
amorphous universal abhorrence of their nature.
574
 Tannenwald noted it came in reaction to this 
desire of the U.S. military to treat nuclear weapons as if they were conventional ones, citing 
comments by three protagonists whose role will be examined shortly. 
In 1958 Lt. Gen. James Gavin, a principal promoter in the U.S. military of the 
development of tactical nuclear weapons, wrote, “Nuclear weapons will become 
conventional for several reasons, among them cost, effectiveness against enemy 
weapons, and ease of handling.” Indeed, during the 1950s numerous U.S. leaders 
fully expected that a nuclear weapon would become “just another weapon.” 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles accepted “the ultimate inevitability” that 
tactical nuclear weapons would gain "conventional" status. Adm. Arthur Radford, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Dwight Eisenhower, 
predicted in 1956 that the use of nuclear weapons “would become accepted 
throughout the world just as soon as people could lay their hands upon them.”575 
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Tannenwald’s explanation for why this “conventionalization” did not occur was that “nuclear 
weapons have come to be defined as abhorrent and unacceptable weapons of mass destruction, 
with a taboo on their use…[and] that the taboo has helped to constrain resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons since 1945 both by reinforcing deterrence and by inducing restraint even in cases where 
deterrence did not operate.”576 Tannenwald defined the “nuclear taboo” as a “global norm” that 
she argued served as a sufficient explanation for the absence of nuclear conflict when opposition 
to nuclear weapons was seen as largely based on the metanarrative of political subjectivities. 
Tannenwald’s position on nuclear deterrence generally accords with that found in much of the 
historiography of the arms race. 
However, the concept of a “nuclear taboo” is more descriptive than explanatory and 
failed to specifically locate fallout as its major cause. Tannenwald described the role of fallout 
briefly, but only as an inspiration to movements of resistance against nuclear weapons.
577
 As 
with the military’s own preference for assigning significance to the blast and fire effects of 
nuclear weapons, while ignoring the empirical effects of their fallout except where it served as an 
invaluable intelligence source, the nuclear taboo reinforced the metanarrative of fallout as an 
argument over public perceptions about it rather than confronting fallout’s little understood, yet 
potentially substantial physical risks to human health, genetics and the environment. 
The Perception of Deterrence Deterred by Fallout 
With its influence all but unrecognized, the nonuse of nuclear weapons conceived of by 
theories of deterrence was problematized by fallout. It is axiomatic that deterrent forces must to 
be a credible threat to be useful or, more formally, to demonstrate their military utility. 
Discussing the newly-released materials Alex Wellerstein pointed this out in his general 
assessment of the hearing, linking Oppenheimer’s promotion of tactical weapons in VISTA 
Chapter Five to the scientist’s motivations in doing so as certainly not disloyal or driven by lack 
of attention to national security as the Air Force witnesses implied. 
Oppenheimer wanted a nuclear arsenal that the US would feel capable of using, as 
opposed to a strategic arsenal that would only lead to a deterrence stalemate… 
[this] changed the perception that Oppenheimer was acting on purely “moral” 
reasons against the hydrogen bomb…because he advocated making hundreds of 
smaller fission bombs.
578
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What was missing here in terms of an explanation was what was missing from the transcript all 
along, fallout. Oppenheimer was not simply enthralled by the idea of tactical weapons as being 
more useful than high-yield ones; there were factors other than fallout at play, too, such as more 
flexibility in use of delivery systems and limiting collateral damage from blast and fire that also 
motivated his promotion of these weapons knowing he was swimming against the Air Force 
strategic tide. 
Testimony indicated mitigating such reluctance was part of the discussion when 
Oppenheimer and the rest of the VISTA panel sat down with General Eisenhower to discuss 
Chapter Five. When Walter G. Whitman, another former GAC member and later chair of the 
Pentagon’s Research and Development Board (RDB), described why the panel dropped 
consideration of including in the VISTA report recommendation of a potential announcement 
that the United States would not initiate nuclear war or that it would withhold strikes on urban 
areas, he turned the discussion toward the reason why they chose to narrow VISTA’s look at 
alternatives to defend Europe by eliminating consideration of the use of thermonuclear weapons. 
We knew at that time, of course, that thermonuclear weapons [would be] of great 
magnitude… well, we felt they would find their usefulness in the strategic 
campaign, rather than the tactical.
579
 
 
Before leaving for Europe to speak with Eisenhower, Whitman recalled that two of Air Force 
Secretary Thomas Finletter’s aides made the Air Force’s displeasure with the question being 
framed in terms of the problematic nature of strategic weapons in densely populated Europe.  
They were quite disturbed that the effect of the presentation of atomic weapons in 
the tactical picture would react unfavorably upon the strategic air force which – 
no, I will try to give you what they said – on the strategic air force and its mission 
to knock out Russia.
580
 
 
The context made it clear that both the VISTA team’s concerns and those of the Air Force were 
located at the confluence of weapon effects and their planned employment. The future president 
found the discussion of Chapter Five interesting and provided substantive feedback later 
incorporated into the VISTA final draft.
581
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Only fallout represented an area of controversy among weapon effects at the time, with 
blast and fire being old hat to Europeans, certainly not something desirable, but not out of the 
ordinary in terms of experience. Whitman’s preface to the discussion in his testimony was quite 
similar in its formulation of the VISTA discussions in Europe to Lee DuBridge’s testimony that 
named “radio activity” as the major problematic effect associated with the use of thermonuclear 
weapons in Europe. Whitman conclusively was not invoking blast or fire as a source of potential 
hesitancy, given the recent experience of World War Two when little to no restraint was shown 
over the problem of civilian casualties. 
I think we all reached the conclusion that anything which implied any hesitancy 
on the part of the United States about being willing to retaliate with the atomic 
bomb would be disastrous. That the enemy must have no question or no feeling 
that there was a question in the minds of the United States about the willingness 
to retaliate.
582
 
 
Given the general insignificance typically ascribed to fallout at the time, both publicly and in 
secret, and the fact that blasting and burning German cities was old hat to the Americans, it was 
difficult to discern any factor capable of causing the Russians to believe the United States would 
hesitate about the use of nuclear weapons to protect its interests in Europe other than fallout. The 
fact that Whitman and the others worried over hesitance was among the most solid evidence that 
the VISTA team composed Chapter Five in its report with the findings of GABRIEL in mind and 
that the discussion centered on the hearing’s forbidden word, fallout. 
Fallout’s potential to contaminate the atmosphere was the definitive concern that 
explained the need for the term’s suppression at the hearing. Paradoxically, the fear of it serving 
as a restraint on wartime decisionmaking also deterred discussion of this raw reality. Fallout 
explained why the conscientious scientist did not leak his message into the media and continued 
to speak of it no more than vaguely even to friends like Dyson, although the microscopic 
surveillance he knew he was under would have reinforced his natural circumspection on that 
matter.
583
 Fallout also explained how, besides the frontal assault of GABRIEL and the flanking 
maneuver of VISTA, Oppenheimer’s stubborn pressure on the Air Force led Wilson, Griggs, 
Finletter and likely even the cryptically stubborn general with no limits, LeMay, to believe the 
scientist represented a direct threat to Air Force interests, whether or not they believed William 
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Borden’s pandering assertion that “more probably than not” Oppenheimer was “acting as an 
agent of the Soviet Union.”584 All point to the fact that the Air Force, like Oppenheimer, saw 
fallout as casting doubt on the military utility of thermonuclear weapons, undermining belief 
they would be used. As a corrosive effect on an otherwise credible deterrent, fallout fatally 
compromised the high-yield war plans of SAC. While the precise circumstances of the dispute 
that arose at the fateful 1951 meeting between the Air Force and Oppenheimer may never be 
exactly known, there is little doubt the root of the dispute was in what only became publicly 
controversial three years later after CASTLE BRAVO.  
The multiple layers of secrecy that shrouded fallout were selectively tapped in making 
the case against Oppenheimer, helping conceal the linkages between his positions on fallout and 
the nuclear intelligence program that were of greatest concern to the Air Force. For example, 
what little that Hans Bethe revealed about sampling techniques, General Wilson obscured.
585
 
Fallout was something the service wanted to talk about least of all, but it chose to discuss 
intelligence operations to a limited extent in the face of the direct threat they believed 
Oppenheimer’s concerns about fallout represented to the Air Force’s interests due to his 
persistence in calling attention to the excesses of their war plans. Thus, the subject matter experts 
who were designated as witnesses, like Wilson and Griggs, were careful to talk around sensitive 
topics needed to make a case against Oppenheimer while helping ensure a positive outcome for 
the Air Force by carefully guiding the discussion around fallout’s constantly looming presence in 
the hearing.  
Interestingly, despite the number of witnesses associated with the program, the issue of 
long-range detection was not specifically mentioned in the charges brought against Oppenheimer 
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nor was it addressed in the findings of the hearing.
586
 It was even more remarkable, considering 
the nature of the charges appeared to not directly involve these highly classified topics, that the 
Air Force witnesses who appeared to testify against Oppenheimer did not directly represent the 
Air Force’s Strategic Air Command either, the supposed victim of his disloyalty, but were 
instead drawn from the scientific and intelligence teams closely connected to the nuclear 
intelligence project. Taken together, these very odd circumstances represent something 
considerably deeper than mere happenstance.
587
 The Air Force recognized fallout was a 
significant problem, while hoping no one else would draw the same conclusion. Decades later, 
fallout is almost universally recognized as the problem of nuclear weapons that nearly everyone 
knows about, but the obvious fact it was the primary technical problem constraining the use of 
nuclear weapons remains officially unconfirmed and often overlooked in most narratives 
involving Cold War history. 
The Fallout “Gap” in Oppenheimer’s Hearing 
Worry at the Pentagon about sufficient fissile material production to expand the 
American nuclear stockpile was an example of the technical problems Wellerstein argued 
motivated Oppenheimer to oppose thermonuclear weapons. Witnesses, including Edward Teller, 
unconvincingly asserted Oppenheimer was responsible for a reprehensible delay in the new 
weapon’s development, suggesting the production difficulties the AEC faced before 1953 might 
have sinister rather than practical explanations. Despite some brief, cryptic references by Hans 
Bethe, General Wilson and others to the work done by AFOAT-1 as it closely tracked Soviet 
nuclear efforts, underlying the accusations was the implication that the United States knew little 
about the threat that the USSR posed, thereby justifying an expectation of superhuman efforts to 
expeditiously create the hydrogen bomb.
588
 Production of the required fissile materials for 
expansion of the existing weapon stockpile and the somewhat different needs of various 
promising thermonuclear designs required conflicting uses of the limited reactor production time 
available to the AEC in the early nineteen-fifties. The AEC’s own historical series noted its 
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repeated requests to the military to better define what was needed to meet military requirements 
in order to optimize available capacity pending construction of more reactors were largely 
ignored.
589
 There seemed to be relatively little of substance in assertions that Oppenheimer 
delayed production of the new class of weapons, because the failure of the Pentagon to better 
define its needs was the primary factor that delayed wringing the most out of existing facilities 
and planning for new production capacity.
590
  
The transcript’s rather detailed look at the controversy over design of the super left 
Wellerstein understandably enthused about its credibility on technical points where witnesses 
were permitted to go into detail, while serving to justify the original classification decision 
because of these extensive references to previously classified information and restricted data, but 
fallout should have occurred numerous times in such passages in the testimony. Arguably, fallout 
has always been far and away the most significant and intractable technical problem associated 
with thermonuclear weapons. Fallout was a feature, rather than a bug, so its intentional absence 
in contemporary discussion fostered a misleading gap implying this accurately represented its 
relative insignificance, a notion refuted by subsequent declassifications that point toward its 
singular importance to the history of nuclear weapons. It is remarkable that the most important 
technical problem associated with the science and strategy of nuclear weapons, fallout, still 
remains ambiguous enough because of this intentional historical absence that its role as a 
technical restraint on the conduct of nuclear war can be overlooked or substantially elided by 
otherwise knowledgeable observers like Wellerstein. The purposeful omission of fallout by 
means of original classification authority in practice concealed its historical relevance in many 
sections of the documentary record, with the 1954 hearing transcript being the most salient 
example. This excision was unintentionally replicated by the methodological focus of historical 
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practice on what has proven to be an incomplete and often unfaithful archive. No official 
explanation of the term’s exclusion from hearing testimony has yet come to light. 
Declassification of original narratives that clearly omitted fallout when it was obviously part and 
parcel of a topic serve to reproduce a mistaken impression of a far less significant Cold War role 
for fallout. Historians should nonetheless be aware from the example of the Oppenheimer 
hearing that fallout may still play a carefully hidden role in such proceedings even if the term 
itself is absent. 
Discovering Megatons of Fallout Threatens SAC 
Despite its formal exclusion from the record, analysis of the newly declassified, near-
complete hearing transcript together with what is otherwise known of the basis of 
Oppenheimer’s conflict with the Air Force demonstrated significant parts of the testimony were 
nonetheless shot through with implicit references to fallout. Fallout stood out because of this 
consistently obvious non-use when it was plainly the topic under discussion.  
In contrast, the extraordinarily secret nuclear intelligence program operated by AFOAT-1 
was discussed in open, if guarded terms, even while observing the forced silence about the key 
source for much of its intelligence, fallout; this included Luis Alvarez’s direct reference naming 
the Top Secret unit when such linkages were either discouraged or forbidden.
591
 By process of 
elimination, the argument here is that fallout remains the only practical explanation available to 
stitch together a coherent narrative to explain Air Force fears about Oppenheimer’s discussion of 
what were effectively the potential limits thermonuclear weapons might impose on nuclear war. 
This was the only rational explanation for Air Force witness claims that Oppenheimer’s efforts, 
which pointed to him placing fallout in scientific context rather than moralizing about war, 
constituted an attempt to somehow disarm or “give up…the Strategic Air Command.”592 There 
was no other credible basis for such an otherwise seemingly paranoid and unrealistic accusation 
against the AEC’s top scientist than this was sparked by his efforts to remind the Air Force that 
fallout must be taken into account in formulating national security policy and war plans.  
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Krypton-85 Capers 
One of the criticisms the Oppenheimer-chaired RDB made of the AFOAT-1 LRD 
research and development plan was its failure to place enough priority on “determining the rate 
of bomb production.”593 This was likely a reference to RDB support for the krypton-85 project, 
demonstrating the short-sighted nature of the Air Force’s fixation on detecting the first Soviet 
test, without considering the next important intelligence question that would arise afterward; it 
was but one example of the Air Force’s benefiting from Oppenheimer’s foresight. Obviously, the 
1954 hearing panel offered nothing to put that in context, as was the case with many other 
questionable assertions against Oppenheimer.  
Conversely, there were episodes during the hearing indicating that Oppenheimer may 
have been intentionally left out of the loop with regard to the status of AFOAT-1’s krypton-85 
project as it expanded. If the GAC had any prior access to them, Oppenheimer and the rest of 
GAC were quite likely not receiving intelligence reports on Soviet plutonium production directly 
by mid-1951 due to the Air Force’s secret action against Oppenheimer, especially given the ill 
will since late 1949. However, the GAC’s involvement in the ongoing planning to greatly expand 
AEC fissile material production capacity and expand the American weapons stockpile suggested 
they were cognizant of the krypton-85 issue.
594
 Production reactors and processing facilities 
needed equipment to monitor emissions of the gas to determine baseline values that Western 
sources added to the atmosphere. Once the program to monitor Soviet plutonium production was 
initiated, total data for Western production was needed to evaluate potential Soviet contributions 
to the atmosphere’s krypton-85 load. Some stack gases released at the Hanford complex were 
filtered beginning in early 1948, with improved filtering installed in December 1950.
595
  
However, several passages of testimony at the hearing indicated the Air Force took pains 
to conceal part or all of AFOAT-1’s operational efforts to monitor krypton-85 from 
Oppenheimer and others at the AEC. In discussing estimates of the pace of the Soviet nuclear 
program and the advantages spying produced for the United States nuclear program, 
Oppenheimer seemed to indicate that perhaps only the Murray Hill Area (MHA) project and 
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some other limited data were available to base estimates upon when he spoke of only “raw 
material” as a source of intelligence on the Soviet stockpile in one passage.596 
…our reliance on what the Russians could or could not do was based on primarily 
the supplies of material which I felt would be available to them, that is raw 
material…597 
 
The discussion was ambiguous enough that he may have been speaking of fissile material as the 
“raw” material from which bombs were made, despite the complex process needed to produce it.  
Moreover, like fallout, krypton-85 was not mentioned in the transcripts, so the sparse 
evidence of it must also be teased out from between the lines.
598
 Interestingly, one of the two 
pages specifically known to be still missing in the recent declassification was noted on the cover 
of that section of the October 2014 release. It was a page that followed the above quote, page 
572. A single comment by Oppenheimer from it was preserved and declassified, but the 
remainder of this page remains suppressed, suggesting the continuing sensitive nature of this 
particular topic.
599
 The single sentence by Oppenheimer was located elsewhere in the October 
2014 release in a chapter comprised of short redactions excised as fragments from passages 
published in the 1954 version. After describing how the postwar division of Europe provided the 
Soviet Union with access to stocks of relatively high grade uranium ore, Oppenheimer seemed to 
rule out his possessing information with the accuracy made possible by the krypton-85 technique 
when he was asked if it was possible to provide an estimate of the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear forces. 
It was not conceivable; even today nobody knows how many bombs they have.
600
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Oppenheimer’s statement suggested he was not cognizant of the extent and capabilities of 
AFOAT-1’s krypton-85 sampling program or at best possessed only limited information about it. 
While it likely could not produce exact estimates of the number of weapons the Soviet had 
available, the estimated accuracy of the technique to within five percent for Russian plutonium 
production suggested that Oppenheimer was outside the compartment cognizant of Willard 
Libby’s breakthrough in its use.601  
Libby was best known as the discoverer of the carbon-14 method of dating ancient 
artifacts and sites by measuring the ratio of the isotope to ordinary carbon and calculating the 
passage of time since the source sample was alive to ingest it by breathing or absorbing carbon 
from the atmosphere, a breakthrough which saw him awarded the 1960 Nobel Prize for 
chemistry. That discovery had its basis in Libby’s research into the uses of various isotopes for 
nuclear intelligence, with the carbon-14 discovery following Libby’s development of a method 
to measure krypton-85. The technique was based on calculation of the atmospheric load 
produced by the known emissions of the substance in the West, which was given off in direct 
proportion to the amount of plutonium produced in reactors.
602
 Given the lengthy period of Air 
Force mistrust of Oppenheimer, it was possible that despite his position as chair of the GAC 
where he would typically know about such work, the service may have made an early decision to 
compartmentalize the krypton-85 technique and conceal AFOAT-1’s build-out of a global 
network of stations to monitor it. In the context of the hearing, whatever he did know about 
krypton-85 was a reminder how little Oppenheimer did not know about the American nuclear 
program and how potentially informative identifying such gaps may be for historians.  
While it is doubtful that General LeMay ever found the destructive power available to his 
command sufficient, wider knowledge of the relative weakness of Soviet forces that SAC was 
counterpoised against would have only heightened the troubling knowledge of the shape and 
extent the Air Force’s war plans that boiled up in Oppenheimer at the fateful 1951 meeting that 
left him so perplexed and troubled. Given that the 1951 memo documenting the early positive 
results from the krypton-85 method indicated extensive research and development had been 
successfully completed by the date it was written, the timing of both the meetings and the memo 
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correlated with a renewed emphasis on security at AFOAT-1 and the Air Force’s suspension of 
Oppenheimer’s access to nuclear intelligence matters.603 Together with the actions taken against 
Oppenheimer’s security clearance, Oppenheimer’s uncertainty on the matter suggested the Air 
Force was already taking steps to compartmentalize him off from other sensitive areas prior to 
the rupture in relations between the scientist and the Air Force.  
While the full narrative of the management of the telltale noble gas isotope krypton-85 
remains to be plumbed as a historical-technological problem, the need to deny the Soviet Union 
the sort of data that the United States and the United Kingdom were exploiting to assess Russian 
plutonium production seemed to create a requirement to address its production in Western 
reactors. However, indications were the radioactive gas was instead simply measured and 
released much of the time. Krypton-85 made up over ninety percent of atmospheric radionuclide 
releases between 1944 and 1972 from Hanford’s plutonium production reactors.604 Such a 
forthright statement made other claims that “No monitoring data for this noble gas is known to 
exist…” rather laughable, unless a certain premise is considered: Perhaps the AEC never had that 
information, because AFOAT-1 or some other agency bore sole responsibility for monitoring 
these systems at AEC production sites?
605
 The AEC’s successors bear a burden to history to be 
more truthful than was possible in the past when such clear contradictions exist.  
Krypton-85 releases could be construed as serving as a means to communicate American 
resolve to the Russians, much as some believed atmospheric testing did. It was also possible that 
partial capture of the tell-tale gas was undertaken as an active deception measure to suggest 
Western plutonium-239 production was less robust than it was. Whether or not the Soviets 
engaged in similar analysis of krypton-85 to determine their relative position in plutonium 
holdings is unknown.  
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Regardless, the fact that the Western intelligence services knew the United States and 
Great Britain held a substantial lead in stockpiled fissile materials during most of the Cold War 
premised on the need to deter what were made out to be uncertainties about the threat the Soviets 
actually posed throws new light on the very basis of these justifications. Once the cautious 
conclusions found in the GABRIEL estimates about the very limited utility of thermonuclear 
weapons due to their enormous fallout were established, self-interest offered a better explanation 
for why both parties chose to step back from the brink of destruction emerges than concepts of 
deterrence or “nuclear taboo” alone offer. Given fallout’s corrosive influence on the credibility 
of reliance on nuclear weapons, something there is evidence for in the reactions to fallout by 
both the Air Force and Oppenheimer, fallout’s effects on deterrence must have disturbed policy 
makers who were loath to make a public issue out of this paradoxical result of less security 
despite more bombs. Data on the Soviet stockpile gained by krypton-85 monitoring showed that 
the Russians lagged far enough behind to give hope that the credibility of the nuclear Potemkin 
village of security that SAC built would never be tested. That alone proved not to be enough for 
Eisenhower, as discussion in following chapters demonstrates, because the problem of fallout 
proved pertinent to fallout from testing alone. 
A Different Kind of Clearance Suspension:  
Longstanding Doubts and Inaction over Loyalty 
In order to unpack the unspoken, underlying reasons that the AEC chose to act against 
Oppenheimer requires questioning assumptions in hearing testimony.  Beyond establishing that 
the warmed over and previously adjudicated charges about Oppenheimer’s loyalty long predated 
the eruption of the case into public view, these urgent claims should be interrogated for 
credibility because of the obvious lack of haste in which they were addressed if the situation was 
so dire. What do we know about the conflicts that grew steadily between the Air Force and the 
scientist? Was there a hierarchy exhibited by these concerns? Have declassifications of relevant 
documents assembled enough of the jigsaw puzzle of nuclear history piecemeal so that persistent 
gaps in the historical record can be filled with substantial certainty based on how they fit known 
features of surrounding evidence?  
The original, heavily censored 1954 hearing transcript described how the Air Force 
harbored misgivings about his personal associations based on stale accusations made even before 
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it was established in 1947 as an independent service.
606
 In itself, this left questions about why the 
Air Force saw no need to act on these prior to 1952 if it believed they were substantive. The 
notable exception to this relative inaction was the suspension of his “Air Force clearance,” which 
Priscilla McMillan discovered took place in May 1951; seemingly a vital piece of evidence, it 
went completely unmentioned during the 1954 hearing.
607
 Nonetheless, General Roscoe “Bim” 
Wilson’s testimony offered at least a partial description of the service’s motivations behind this 
action, while steering carefully clear of the specifics of this and other actions against 
Oppenheimer from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas Finletter.
608
 
Even after Eisenhower’s December 1953 order to build a “blank wall” between 
Oppenheimer and the government’s nuclear secrets, as he explained in testimony redacted from 
the 1954 version of the transcript, the first the scientist apparently heard of any suspension of his 
clearance was in mid-January 1954, nearly three years after the initial Air Force action. James 
“Scotty” Reston of the New York Times called his home for days, finally buttonholing 
Oppenheimer for an interview, who demurred to comment. Reston noted that while secret, the 
December 1953 suspension was quickly and thoroughly communicated worldwide. Reston 
advised Oppenheimer. 
…that my clearance had been revoked. That was the story he had heard. That this 
had been cabled, telegraphed and broadcast to Submarine Commanders 
throughout the Fleet and Army posts throughout the world…609 
 
This immediate, global follow-up stands in stark contrast to the years of whispered innuendo, 
rumor, and veiled attacks in the press that followed the suspension of the “Air Force clearance” 
that McMillan described. These and other events along the timeline between the 1951 “Air Force 
clearance” suspension and the December 1953 Q clearance suspension, as well as their starkly 
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differing nature, suggest the need for a new interpretation of this aspect of Oppenheimer’s 
travails.  
The clear-cut and widely communicated suspension of Oppenheimer’s AEC Q clearance 
did not take place until six months after he stepped down as chair of the General Advisory 
Committee, long after Finletter’s earlier, but closely-held action.  Until he left the GAC, 
Oppenheimer continued leading the effort to develop thermonuclear weapons, what SAC wanted 
most.
 
 The prior Air Force action clearly had no effect on his handling of classified material and 
Restricted Data in connection with that effort or other studies like the controversial Project 
VISTA report and the Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study where at least some access to Air 
Force classified information was required. Nor did the service previously raise questions about 
his performance, which was vital in the successful AEC effort that delivered emergency 
capability thermonuclear weapons for use by SAC by 1954.
610
  
The Special Character of the Air Force’s 1951 Suspension of Oppenheimer’s Clearance  
Explaining the secrecy concealing what Priscilla McMillan identified as the May 1951 
suspension of Oppenheimer’s Air Force clearance, when it could have served to significantly 
bolster the case made against Oppenheimer, is a bit speculative, because like GABRIEL and the 
early history of krypton-85 sampling, so little is known about it. The most obvious clue to 
understanding what it involved was the stark difference between how it was handled and how the 
president’s order to build a “blank wall” between Oppenheimer and Restricted Data in December 
1953 was brought into force. The 1951 clearance suspension was virtually unknown, with even 
top administrators like Louis Ridenour only discovering it almost by accident. 
In June 1951, shortly before David Griggs assumed his post as Air Force Chief Scientist, 
Ridenour, Griggs’s predecessor and on leave from his post as dean of the Graduate School, 
University of Illinois, and Ivan Getting, Assistant for Development Planning, Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Air Force, and a brilliant former MIT Radiation Lab researcher, recruited Oppenheimer to 
assist with a study to support SAC.
611
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give him the good news, they instead found the general freaked out by the news of their 
“success,” warning them that “under no circumstances was Oppenheimer to have access to Air 
Force strategic targeting policies and plans.” Getting later claimed Air Force Secretary Finletter 
refused to testify at the 1954 PSB hearings, leaving Griggs as the fall guy, even though Griggs 
supposedly asked Finletter to clarify the Air Force’s exact position on what it saw as 
Oppenheimer’s failings.612 Perhaps this explains some of the wanderings in Griggs’s story or 
Griggs’s own attempts at placing blame for everything the Air Force saw as a problem on the 
physicist, much as General Wilson did. It does smack of an effort to obscure the Air Force’s very 
direct hand in shaping much of what occurred in the controversy. It also suggested that the 
conflict and resulting clearance revocation were not just about nuclear intelligence, but about the 
results obtainable with thermonuclear weapons, the subject du jour in Air Force planning. Given 
the preponderance of evidence, this, too, involved fallout. 
With the suspension so secret that few knew of it, apparently including Oppenheimer, 
and his continuing otherwise unfettered access to other extraordinarily sensitive information 
given he continued to hold his Q clearance until it was suspended by Eisenhower in December 
1953, this suggested the 1951 suspension was limited to his access to a program similar to those 
which are now known as Special Access Programs (SAP). Sometimes referred to as “above Top 
Secret,” the SAP designation protects especially sensitive information with additional safeguards 
by an even more restrictive application of the “need to know” principle. References suggest that 
use of the SAP designation formally began in the 1980s, but likely reflected a legacy of treating 
especially sensitive information in such a manner.
613
 Evidence and discussion elsewhere here 
suggested both nuclear intelligence and fallout’s influence on strategic policy and planning were 
treated in ways quite similar to programs designated as SAPs are now.
614
 Unlike the 1953 
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suspension, the clearance suspension identified by McMillan was most likely selective and 
concealed, in part to avoid tipping off and alarming Oppenheimer, but also to disguise his 
relationship to and the existence of these sensitive programs. This accords additional significance 
to the Air Force’s willingness to allow limited testimony and discussion of Oppenheimer’s 
involvement in nuclear intelligence, while fallout remained an effectively forbidden topic. 
Science Apart, SAC Missing in Action 
The crumbling of its relationship with Oppenheimer despite the value of his scientific 
expertise also throws new light on how AFOAT-1 increasingly preferred to keep science at arm’s 
length by relying on development of its internal scientific expertise or using the services of 
outside contractors.  The troubled relationship with Oppenheimer that left the Air Force’s 
dependent on outside assistance during the research and development phase standing up 
AFOAT-1 prior to Joe-1 likely played a role in this insular shift.
615
 For the Air Force, the vexing 
difficulties encountered with collecting and analyzing samples from fission devices strong 
enough to be useful stood out in sharp relief to the fallout problem Oppenheimer postulated for 
thermonuclear weapons. If it had been so hard initially to find, sample, and analyze, as Chapter 
One documented, how could fallout suddenly become a significant threat? The roughly 
thousand-fold increase in yield thermonuclear weapons produced generated similar increases in 
their fallout, making it correspondingly easier to detect thermonuclear tests and their 
contamination of the environment. This dramatic increase in yield reinforced that the problems 
Oppenheimer foresaw with pursuit of the hydrogen bomb were primarily quantitative, not 
qualitative. 
Between the Lines in Oppenheimer’s Own Words 
That the problem of cumulative fallout from wartime use of thermonuclear weapons was 
on Oppenheimer’s mind was established at the beginning of his own testimony. Panel Chair 
Gordon Gray began by asking that the scientist recount the contents of the GAC’s 1949 post-Joe-
1 reports. Oppenheimer demurred, except in general terms. Nonetheless, he inferred that fallout 
was a big part of the problem in responding to Joe-1 if national security policy focused on 
pursuit the super. Despite the secrecy in which the hearing was conducted, Oppenheimer used 
the opening Gray gave him to make the point that some form of security restrictions on his 
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testimony continued to limit his ability to respond completely to every question at the hearing. 
He could not discuss the “affirmative actions” section except in “general terms I used before” in 
reference to the design and effects of the super, outlining the report’s assessment as “semi-
quantitative notions of what it would take, what kind of damage it would do, and what kind of 
program would be required.” 
The essential point there is that as we then saw it, it was a weapon that you could 
not be sure of until you tried it out, and it is a problem of calculation and study, 
and then you went to the proper place in the Pacific and found out to what extent 
your ideas had been right and to what extent they had been wrong…We all hope 
that by one means or another, the development of these weapons can be 
avoided.
616
 
 
This was the first of many salient points where simple mention of the forbidden term would have 
allowed the witness to answer questions in a more direct and accurate manner.  
Oppenheimer understood that fallout effects were part of the most basic calculations of 
the fission reactions provided as far back as Frisch and Peierls’ initial fission calculations.617 
Oppenheimer was familiar with at least the basic findings of GABRIEL as chair of the body 
responsible for directing that project’s work. Pointing to the issues the GAC found looming over 
a thermonuclear weapons program as “semi-quantitative notions… a problem of calculation and 
study,” given that fusion weapons depended on the use of a fission trigger there can be no doubt 
fallout was included in what was left unsaid because of the hearing’s security restrictions. Those 
at the hearing were reading about it daily in the press in the few weeks since CASTLE 
BRAVO.
618
 While carefully omitting mention of the specific reason for locating testing in such a 
remote location, Oppenheimer was clearly pointing toward something that was already roughly 
understood from a theoretical standpoint; while he left it unmentioned, this made it unsuitable for 
testing in Nevada and led to the requirement for vast spaces of the Pacific test range in order to 
safely test it; and that data from testing was needed in order to confirm the exact nature of the 
GAC’s theoretical assessment this unnamed threat posed. It was notable that Oppenheimer 
expressed confidence in the basic assessment by the GAC of the threat this class of weapons 
posed and that it would hold regardless of how much additional precision was obtained from 
testing data. His blasé reference to testing in the Pacific was as close as he likely dared get to 
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pointing out that IVY MIKE and CASTLE BRAVO had already confirmed the 1950 GAC’s 
concerns.
619
 Only fallout fits among all these considerations. 
If doubt remained about the subject of Oppenheimer’s comments on the motivations for 
the hearing, his testimony about the GAC’s disputed recommendations left further crumbs that 
described what could only be references to fallout as both “obvious” yet simultaneously a secret.  
We added to this some comments as to what might be declassified and what ought 
not to be declassified and held secret if any sort of public statement were 
contemplated. If the President were going to say anything about it, there are some 
things we thought obvious and there would be no harm in mentioning them. 
Actually, the secret ones were out in the press before very long…there are part[s] 
of it which I think you should read but, for the record, there are parts that I cannot 
go into here.
620
 
 
With the term fallout off limits as subject matter for direct, unambiguous reference in testimony, 
this was as specific as Oppenheimer could be about its role. Those in the know about fallout 
understood; those who were not admitted to this secret compartment, despite the clearance they 
held permitting admission to the hearing, understood they had to simply play along, a 
circumstance implicit in Oppenheimer’s statement that he must abide by the classified guidelines 
his defense and the AEC’s attorneys were apparently bound by.  
The AEC panel’s attorney, Roger Robb, then interjected, “I think it might be well for the 
record to show at this point that the Board has read the entire report.” Oppenheimer responded 
by inquiring, seemingly baffled by the line of questioning under the circumstances, “I see. Then 
what am I doing that for?”621 Assuming a prohibition existed on use of the term fallout, these 
interrogatories to Oppenheimer were apparently directed to test how carefully he would couch 
his testimony when discussing their substance in the report.  
Besides Oppenheimer’s own comments indicating his testimony was limited in what he 
was permitted to say, Priscilla J. McMillan turned up one of the most telling bits of corroboration 
that Oppenheimer and the other witnesses clearly understood the ground rules and confirmed the 
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all-but certain prohibition on the use of the forbidden term fallout. In a 1987 interview with 
James Beckerley, the AEC’s classification officer present during hearing testimony, Beckerley 
conceded Oppenheimer wanted him there to ensure nothing he said could later be used to accuse 
him of aiding the Russians. Beckerley was frank about what his primary duty was. 
If Oppenheimer or his witnesses had given anything away, they’d have been had 
up for it, but they knew better than the prosecutors what ought not to be said.
622
 
 
 Quite obviously, what was unmentionable above all was fallout. 
Gray and Robb’s approach struck Oppenheimer as something rather odd given the panel 
already had the information they both asked about. Oppenheimer, encouraged by his attorney’s 
argument that he should provide his own view on the matter, then proceeded as best he could to 
convey why the GAC arrived at its controversial decision. 
The real reason, the weight, behind the report is, in my opinion, a failing of the 
existence of these weapons would be a disadvantageous thing. It says this over 
and over.
623
 
 
The issue the GAC saw was not their supraconventional effects, which only expand with higher 
yield via the “square cube” rule and which drew no basic objections from Oppenheimer, AEC 
Chair David Lilienthal, or the other members of the GAC, moral or otherwise.
624
 By process of 
elimination, the only remaining effect that could generate such an evasive narrative was fallout. 
Blast and fire on the target could never really be “disadvantageous” to the attacker, but fallout 
clearly could be – and by then two tests proved it was. Reinforcing that point, Oppenheimer cited 
Enrico Fermi and I.I. Rabi’s minority statement on the expansive nature of this threat, which 
again clearly applied only to fallout, not blast and fire. 
The fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of this weapon makes its very 
existence and the knowledge of its construction a danger to humanity as a whole. 
It is necessarily an evil thing in any light. For these reasons, we believe it is 
important for the President of the United States to tell the American public and 
the world we think it wrong on fundamental ethical principles to initiate the 
development of such a weapon.
625
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Again, blast and fire were never “an evil thing considered in any light.” No matter how 
powerful, in practice neither could constitute “a danger to humanity as a whole…” because of the 
limits the square cube rule placed on the extent of blast damage. Most observers subsequently 
saw statements like this when raised by scientists as framed in purely ethical terms. It was not. It 
was raised because fallout from use of such weapons involved massive destruction that went far 
beyond the battle zone and was persistent with great potential to harm future generations far 
removed from the conflict that generated it. By necessity in the post-Nuremberg era, technical 
issues like fallout raised inherent moral and ethical questions about the development of 
thermonuclear weapons, which were largely driven by what little was known to science about 
this problem multiplied by the geometric increase in yield they produced. However, it was the 
quantitative difference in their threat that was the key factor distinguishing thermonuclear 
designs from fission designs.  
Fallout was not explicitly cited at the hearing, but it was certainly on the minds of those 
making such statements as they attempted to navigate their narratives of the hydrogen bomb 
around the apparent ban on use of the term. It was not the emotive reaction that the Air Force 
feared when Oppenheimer or other scientists raised the issue of fallout, either; it was the data-
driven aspect of the fallout problem. The Air Force was concerned about concealing its 
intelligence program, but later as the evidence rolled in confirming the original Frisch/Peierls 
calculation similarly applied to thermonuclear devices, it was the facts about fallout they really 
feared, because of their potential impact on public support and budgets to sustain the build-up of 
SAC then underway.
626
  
Oppie then cited the majority statement, which he had joined in supporting.  
In determining not to proceed to develop the Super Bomb, we see a unique 
opportunity of providing by example some limitation on the totality of war…627 
 
This might sharply limit availability of the hydrogen bomb, as well as lead to what the Air Force 
saw as significant limitations on its strategic planning process. Again, only fallout really fits the 
bill here as a problematic direct effect of the unlimited yields possible with such a device that 
also represented a global threat and suggested the need to apply limits to its use.  
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 Returning to the intelligence angle, Oppenheimer’s suggestion that using the AEDS or a 
parallel monitoring system to verify the results of diplomatic arms control agreements in his 
work as a State Department consultant was part and parcel of implementing such limits. On the 
other hand, the Air Force learned too much via fallout to lose it as a source of vital intelligence. 
It was fear of losing this productive source that most likely offered an explanation why the 
service felt going after Oppenheimer while revealing some of the nuclear intelligence work he 
was involved in through a carefully stage-managed proceeding was worth the tradeoff of risk in 
order that fallout’s problematic nature remain officially cloaked. This was especially so if the 
word fallout never appeared in the transcript. 
 Another aspect of the Air Force’s strange tango between revelation and continued 
secrecy at hearing was that the hearing was not just about the past. The presence of General 
Wilson, a man with similar experience with the use of fallout who nonetheless modeled with care 
the fact that the word was officially taboo, seemed intended at least in part to remind 
Oppenheimer to take care about making future statements on this matter, as well as during the 
hearing itself. Oppenheimer pressed on as best he could. 
These are total views where you try to take into account how good the thing is, 
what the enemy is likely to do, and what you can do with it, what the competition 
is, and the extent to which this is an inevitable step anyway.
628
 
 
While crediting Teller and Ulam with the most significant contributions and in spite of obvious 
signs he should speak carefully, Oppenheimer pointedly noted that what was most important was 
something described elsewhere in the transcript more succinctly as military utility, i.e. “what you 
can do with it.”629 Here again, fallout is the only weapon effect that would negatively affect the 
military utility of thermonuclear weapons, given the square cube rule’s limitations on blast and 
fire. 
Knowing from Robb’s confirmation that the hearing panel had likely already seen 
fallout’s problematic nature implicitly pointed out in the unexpurgated version of the GAC 
report, Oppenheimer took the opportunity to skate as close to the sun as possible by referencing 
the nature, if not the exact term, of fallout’s threat. 
The notion that the thermonuclear arms race was something that was in the 
interests of this country to avoid if it could was very clear to us in 1949…even if 
                                                 
628
 DOE, IMTO2, 263. 
629
 Ibid, 263-264. 
239 
 
we could outproduce the enemy…because the world in which great destruction 
has been done in all civilized parts of the world is a harder place for America to 
live with than it is for the communists…I do not know enough about 
contemporary intelligence to say whether or not our actions have had any effect 
on theirs but you have ways of finding out about that.
630
 
 
Indeed, there were. Without mentioning the word, fallout was reflected throughout 
Oppenheimer’s summation of why the GAC believed, when the United States already possessed 
a weapon capable of destroying any military target that might be anticipated, it would 
counterproductive to put evidence on the wind about an even more horrible weapon, a weapon 
whose effects he referenced only by use of terms almost exclusive in application to fallout: 
“because the world in which great destruction has been done in all civilized parts of the world is 
a harder place for America to live with than it is for the communists.” This was about as close as 
Oppenheimer dared get to the argument here about what the hearing was really about, tying in 
fissile material production and intelligence about it to calculations of the expected results of 
nuclear war outlined by Project GABRIEL’s estimates of fallout’s global impact. 
Gently, very gently, Oppenheimer then touched the synapse between fallout and the 
sensitive intelligence nerve. 
I believe that their atomic effort was quite imitative and that made it quite natural 
for us to think that their thermonuclear work would be quite imitative and that we 
should not set the pace in this development.
631
 
 
This was Oppenheimer’s summation of what could be learned – and given away – from fallout 
based on his knowledge of what AFOAT-1 was up to, as he emphasized the fact that there were 
no real nuclear secrets when the results were scattered to the wind. 
…the goddamnedest thing I ever saw… 
Trying to understand why Oppenheimer simultaneously argued for the expansion of 
tactical nuclear forces and great caution about thermonuclear weapons, Freeman Dyson later 
asked Oppenheimer if he regretted the specific position he took in the VISTA report and in more 
generally supporting the development of tactical weapons. Oppenheimer replied,  
‘No. But to understand what I did then, you would have had to see the Air Force 
war plan as it existed in 1951. That was the goddamnedest thing I ever saw…’ 
The 1951 war plan was, in short, a mindless obliteration of Soviet cities.
632
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 Dyson argued Oppenheimer hoped to use inter-service rivalry to dampen the arms race, 
by posing the Army’s interests against those of the Air Force. If so, this must have been a short-
lived hope, because the massive expansion of the AEC’s production capacity for fissile material 
production underway at that time soon undercut any potential for nuclear scarcity to dampen the 
arms race within the Pentagon.  Dyson’s characterization of what Oppenheimer told him 
suggested he missed part of the point being conveyed. It was the cumulative effect of the 
mindless destruction that SAC ignored, their fallout, which troubled Oppenheimer. The results of 
such destruction – the accumulation of fallout that would result from the use of thermonuclear 
bombs as area weapons rather than a more accurately targeted use possible with lower yield 
weapons – was what set LeMay’s plans for SAC apart.633 Oppenheimer had clearly if uneasily 
come to terms with the moral equation of fission weapons, given the wholesale destruction and 
substantial loss of civilian life against Japan.
634
 The “goddamnedest thing” was not mindless 
physical destruction, but the Air Force’s refusal to recognize the cumulative fallout threat caused 
by the sloppy manner in which SAC planned to go about its business.
635
 
Dyson on Fallout’s “Mindless” Destruction  
Because of the intense pressures on the AEC to increase production after Joe-1, 
Oppenheimer was conscious of the intimate connection between the increasing availability of 
fissile material, the size of the Air Force target list, and its potential ability to reach down to 
targets of ever decreasing priority provided by the growth in the size and diversity of the 
American nuclear stockpile.
636
 Oppenheimer’s concern in anticipation of growing nuclear plenty 
after 1952 was to educate policy makers about the threat cumulative fallout posed. Beyond the 
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GABRIEL study, no one else seemed to be doing the math on this, least of all the Air Force. That 
was a significant part of the reason why Oppenheimer took the opportunity to engage with 
Eisenhower as both a commanding general and as commander-in-chief, as well as his efforts to 
“educate” military officers about nuclear weapons as recounted by Walter Whitman.637 
Dyson’s account left much to speculation, at least in terms of the exact circumstances of 
the ill-fated meeting involving SAC’s war plans. Given the tense standoff underway over 
interminably delayed military requirements, the issues with planning for production increases 
and the ongoing Air Force campaign that eventually hounded Oppenheimer from government 
service, adding in his frank manner and LeMay’s own counter to that, whether SAC’s 
commander was present that day or not, there was plenty of room for conflict between the Air 
Force and the AEC even absent the Oppenheimer factor.
638
 Oppenheimer’s telling of the tale 
appeared to reflect a belief that the meeting was a watershed moment in his public service. He 
may have left the meeting in benign silence, although the Air Force’s subsequent reaction 
suggests he made some comment, whether or not he blurted out the same reaction he recounted 
to Dyson. Given the issues raised by GABRIEL, Oppenheimer’s own inclination to minimize the 
required yields to something closer to “sufficient” than LeMay was ever likely to accept, and the 
generous potential range of forecast fissile material production rates, the meeting represented a 
recognizable tipping point for both the physicist and the Air Force.
639
 Oppenheimer likely did 
not then directly tie it to the end of his career, given how unlikely an outcome that might have 
seemed at that moment, but he certainly contemplated the end of the world, marinated in a stew 
of raging isotopes far beyond what GABRIEL warned were the finite limits of nuclear war.  
General LeMay, whether he looked Oppenheimer in the eye that day or was later briefed 
by subordinates on what they considered to be the suspicious outcome of the meeting in their 
eyes, understood Oppenheimer suggested there were limits to nuclear war. Given his clearly 
stated dismissal of such ideas, LeMay was not a happy man afterwards. Identifying the date of 
the meeting, those attending, the minutes, and any follow-up may offer more detailed insight. It 
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certainly occurred before the successful first test of the super at IVY MIKE in November 1952 
and would have focused on existing war plans, but most likely was influenced by the anticipated 
availability of the hydrogen bomb SAC so heartily desired. It almost certainly occurred prior to 
the date Patricia McMillan identified when the Air Force pulled Oppenheimer’s clearance, May 
1951.
640
 Given the obvious goal of the Air Force was to expeditiously obtain the high yield 
weapons it wanted for the service’s plan to transition from fission to fusion weapons, it was the 
massive nature of the attack that Oppenheimer found so disturbing, not simply the fact that 
thermonuclear weapons were the means to accomplish it. In 1951, this was the most salient 
known issue and point of conflict between Oppenheimer and LeMay, the AEC and the Air Force; 
it seems all but imponderable for any other more significant empirical factor to constitute the 
basis of the conflict. Oppenheimer was no pacifist, as Wellerstein reminded, but based on what 
was known of his position of these matters by that date he simply argued a case for matching the 
weapon to the need in order to minimize fallout.  
“Technical Grounds” Only Part of Conflict 
Another problem from the Air Force’s point of view, consonant with the “technical” 
problem of the limits of tritium production identified by Wellerstein, was what it construed as an 
unacceptable suggestion for future stockpile planning in one draft of VISTA Chapter Five. One 
proposal suggested that fissile material be prioritized in a three-way split. The scenario was to 
devote one-third of the AEC’s production to continue the SAC build-up then under way, with the 
other two-thirds being divided evenly between building tactical weapon capabilities and growing 
a war reserve stockpile in case of open conflict with the Soviet Union or other attacker.
641
 In a 
sense, this shift, too, could be construed as disarming SAC as Griggs and Wilson’s testimony 
alluded to was among Oppenheimer’s sins.642 More remarkably, by the date of the hearing, while 
not adopting the specifics of the draft’s suggestion, the Pentagon had adopted the idea of 
providing a diverse range of tactical weapons for all the military services. In effect, Oppenheimer 
was indicted for offering a suggestion DOD subsequently found useful and adopted as 
fundamental policy. The Air Force wanted to spin these efforts as undermining its strategic 
monopoly, perhaps even as a backdoor way for Oppenheimer to impose de facto limits SAC 
refused to abide, weakening it by routing fissile material it felt was its due to other purposes. 
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This was the scenario that Dyson suggested was in play, but again it seems too weak a reed to be 
the basis of the conflict leading to the hearing. 
Walter Whitman, another former GAC member and later chair of the Pentagon’s 
Research and Development Board (RDB), testified that the three-way split was simply an 
allocation proposal in light of new smaller weapon designs that no longer required sizable 
bomber aircraft to deliver weapons, which also made more effective use of fissile material, as 
well as a result of the expansion of the AEC’s production capacity.643 For whatever reason, 
Whitman made no reference to tritium boosting as a source or technical cause for competition 
among the military services for fissile material, but simply referred to its scarcity and SAC’s 
monopolistic views on the nuclear stockpile.
644
 The nature of this redaction suggested an effort 
by AEC Chair Lewis Strauss to suppress evidence that contradicted the part of the allegations 
that suggested Oppenheimer restricted or delayed capacity improvements in order to obstruct 
development of thermonuclear weapons. The accusations left Whitman “shocked to read any 
comment that there was an attempt to obstruct progress …”645 
There had been in the early days of scarcity a very strongly held belief [of the Air 
Force] that the bomb was useful in strategic bombing and there had been very 
little thought given to the expansion of the use of the bomb for other military 
purposes.
646
 
 
Whitman was forthright in his praise of Oppenheimer’s efforts, which in his eyes demonstrated 
an ongoing commitment to ensure the United States military were without peer in terms of the 
weapons available to them.  
Whitman’s testimony made it plain that while the Air Force might have objected to some 
of the work he did for the other services, it was clear why General Eisenhower, was “particularly 
interested” in the VISTA Chapter Five draft that so incensed the Air Force. Eisenhower was 
dual-hatted in his final assignment, with two tasks to be accomplished. On the one hand, he was 
commander of United States forces defending Europe, badly outnumbered and outgunned by the 
Soviet forces they might encounter and equipped mainly with World War Two vintage arms. The 
quick expansion of these ground forces he oversaw as the Korean War raged was intended to 
discourage any similar Russian initiative in Europe. As commander (SACEUR) of Supreme 
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Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Ike also provided support and encouragement to 
NATO forces to steel their resolve to resist Russian aggression.
647
  
Whitman described how tactical nuclear weapons as presented in VISTA Chapter Five 
might, at first blush, have seemed like an ideal force multiplier to General Eisenhower. 
[Oppenheimer] more than any other man served to educate the military to the 
potentialities of the atomic weapon for other than strategic bombing purposes; its 
use possibly in tactical situations or in bombing five hundred miles back. He was 
constantly emphasizing the bomb would be more available and that one of the 
greatest problems was going to be its deliverability, meaning that the smaller you 
could make your bomb in size perhaps you wouldn’t have to have a great big 
strategic bomber to carry it, you could carry it in a medium bomber or you could 
carry it even in a fighter plane.
648
 
 
As the leader of the Department of Defense’s Research and Development Board (RDB), 
Whitman saw no problem with Oppenheimer’s advocacy. In fact, he welcomed it. 
The idea of a range of weapons suitable for a multiplicity of military purposes 
was a key to the campaign which he felt should be pressed and with which I 
agreed. 
 
Even a question from Gordon Gray, the chair of the hearing panel, was parsed as acknowledging 
how this could lead to an obvious conflict between the Air Force and DOD over nuclear weapons 
and their effects. 
Did that cause some trouble for him in the Department of Defense?
649
 
Whitman granted that it did not endear Oppenheimer with the Air Force. 
The Strategic Air Command had thought of the atomic weapon as solely restricted 
to its own use. I think that there was some definite resentment at the implications 
that this was not just the Strategic Air Command’s weapon.650 
 
 His position at DOD likely strengthened Whitman’s tendency to see things driven by 
interservice rivalries, accentuated by the fact that he was a chemist, not a physicist, which he 
noted had left him hurrying to catch up with the subtleties of nuclear energy when he first joined 
the GAC.
651
 Whitman’s testimony thus cast the conflict more as the familiar one of SAC’s 
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argument for nuclear weapons as an essentially strategic that it should control even as he made it 
clear that the joint services saw the issue as more complex. Whitman’s previously redacted 
testimony clarified that whatever objections the Air Force had about the matter, DOD was 
thoroughly cognizant of and endorsed the same efforts that the junior service painted as disloyal 
and subversive. Asked directly, “…would you say whether the military is now following the 
policy of the broad use of atomic weapons pretty much as you stated…?” Whitman’s answer left 
no doubt. “Yes, of course.”652 
Culture Clash 
Central to Air Force culture was its faith in technology to solve problems. Prior to LeMay 
and Eisenhower’s assignment of the mission to the nascent independent Air Force, Ziegler and 
Jacobson noted that when the need for long-range detection was initially defined, the problem 
was seen as primarily organizational in nature. The Air Force was somewhat shocked when told 
by AEC Commissioner Robert Bacher “intensive research would be needed to improve existing 
techniques and devise new methods.” Bacher’s views were disturbingly different from the 
conclusion that ‘there were no major technical problems involved,’ reached by the original Long 
Range Detection Committee.” The ‘insider’ belief of the Air Force that long-range detection was 
an easy task of simply finding and collecting radioactive fallout initially clashed with the 
‘insider’ belief at the AEC that fallout was a very limited phenomenon all but impossible to 
detect outside of the immediate area of an atomic explosion.
653
  
When the issue of what became known as fallout was raised in relation to the TRINITY, 
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki shots, Oppenheimer predicted that fallout from the bombs dropped on 
Japan would not be a problem because of the height (1850 feet altitude) selected for detonation. 
He wrote: “With such high firing heights it is not expected that radioactive contamination will 
reach the ground.
654
 This wartime view of fallout persisted after the birth of the AEC, as did 
Oppenheimer’s influential view on its lack of utility for intelligence purposes. When Tracerlab 
was hired to assist in establishing analytical capabilities for AFOAT-1, they assumed that the 
director of the Radiochemical Division at Los Alamos, Roderick Spence, would play a role in 
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assisting in and overseeing their work.  Frederick Henriques of Tracerlab traveled to Los Alamos 
to discuss the mentor-mentee relationship he assumed would develop between the two groups. 
Spence was reluctant to assume this role because, as Henriques later recalled, “Oppenheimer had 
come to the conclusion that there was no way you could detect radioactive isotopes at long 
distances from an explosion. It was a waste of time to even try since they were going to be 
atomized.”655 
Thus, Oppenheimer’s initial skepticism about the utility of fallout for intelligence 
purposes contrasted sharply with his more optimistic views on the potential of seismic and sonic 
techniques as the Air Force’s long range detection (LRD) research and development program 
ramped-up at the end of 1947, shaping the decisions he made as chair of the Committee on 
Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board. The reluctance of the AEC’s scientists 
to become involved with the long-range detection program and the apparent organizational 
influence of Oppenheimer’s pessimism about its potential underwrote the Air Force’s decision to 
use alternatives to the resources available at Los Alamos. The spectacular results achieved under 
pressure from the newly independent service culminating in discovery of the first Soviet nuclear 
test provided an interesting model that foretold much about a very similar set of circumstances 
that would play out in public disarray over the thermonuclear program. Many of the same actors 
were involved in both disputes. The Air Force leadership’s influence was for the most part 
carefully camouflaged at the hearing, but was significant. While General Wilson was most 
surprisingly talkative about long-range detection of the witnesses appearing at the hearing, others 
with the best direct knowledge of the role it played were no-shows; they included former Air 
Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg, who was deceased, and former Air Force 
intelligence director General Charles Cabell, who was carefully positioned so that his name did 
not surface even as his presence was directly invoked at a key point during Wilson’s 
testimony.
656
   
The conspiratorial context that swirled around and ultimately swallowed Oppenheimer 
demonstrated numerous factors serving to encourage Oppenheimer’s enemies to pursue him.657 
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His arrogance was often cited as a personal fault, particularly in connection with his prickly 
relations with Strauss, with distaste for each other palpable in nearly every account of their 
interactions.
658
 There was also Edward Teller’s rivalry with Oppenheimer, partly driven by 
professional disagreement, but some of it basely personal, as demonstrated by Teller’s repeated, 
unsolicited denunciations of Oppenheimer during the Hungarian’s pursuit of his own powerbase 
by shamelessly catering to the desires of his military sponsors.
659
 
These embittered personal histories were aggravated by Strauss’s dogged pursuit of 
Oppenheimer as a security threat, brought about by the physicist’s documented, if mostly 
unsubstantial associations with friends and family on the left. Strauss was a man who worried 
about security, perhaps to a fault, as another AEC commissioner observed. 
If you disagree with Lewis about anything, he assumes you’re just a fool at first. 
But if you go on disagreeing with him, he concludes you must be a traitor.
660
 
 
The importance of Oppenheimer as the quarry was best summed up by the assessment of 
one of Strauss’s associates in the hunt, William Borden. Well-informed as executive director of 
Congress’s Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the last years of the Truman administration, 
Borden was an active co-conspirator with Strauss in building the case against Oppenheimer even 
after he left the JCAE. With access to Oppenheimer’s file over the course of a lengthy 
investigation, Borden was in position as well-situated as any in government to appraise the 
centrality of the scientist to virtually all nuclear projects of military importance, feeding 
Borden’s rather paranoid view of the threat the busy scientist posed to the nation. Kai Bird and 
Martin Sherwin pointed out Oppenheimer’s prestige and influence among the American 
scientific community were as important and irritating to those stalking him as any personal threat 
he might be to their interests. Borden made his argument – and likely found little disagreement 
from those who joined him in the hunt – in a sixty-five-page report. 
No other individual in America…had more ‘detailed, precision data’ about the 
nation’s military and foreign policies than this scientist.661  
 
                                                 
658
 Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, 382-383; 401-402; 429. Strauss was not only an AEC commissioner 
and, eventually, AEC chairman, but also served as a trustee at Princeton’s Center for Advanced Study, where 
Oppenheimer held a position. In a sense, both were trapped like “scorpions in a bottle” at the university when away 
from Washington on terms that further aggravated their mutual dislike. 
659
 Herken, The Winning Weapon, 272; Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, 437, 443-444, 494; Herbert York, 
The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller & the Superbomb. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976), 142. 
660
 Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, 362. 
661
 Ibid, 472. 
248 
 
As a general statement, the truth of this assertion is obvious enough. Once his 
contributions in the field of intelligence were taken into account, it magnified Oppenheimer’s 
crucial location within an extraordinary nuclear web of science and secrecy. One must dig deeper 
for the crucial details that placed Oppenheimer squarely in the bombsights of the Air Force.  
Thermonuclear Fallout’s Enormous Quantity as a Uniquely Threatening Quality 
Fallout became an issue for the Air Force because it significantly problematized the 
services embrace of thermonuclear weapons as a solution to the 1949 Soviet acquisition of 
nuclear weapons.
662
 The quality of thermonuclear fallout itself was identifiably, but not 
effectively that different than fallout from fission weapons.  The problem the hydrogen bomb 
presented was the enormous fallout yield such explosions produced, combining the insidious 
quality of the radiation they emitted in the voluminous quantities made possible by yields 
geometrically larger than typical fission weapons. This, not merely the qualities of the fallout, 
formed the basis of the Oppenheimer-led GAC’s cautions about development of these weapons. 
It was the cumulative nature of their use under anticipated wartime conditions that worried 
Oppenheimer and those on the GAC who supported the cautions that led to the GAC’s 
discouraging report on pursuit of thermonuclear weapons after Joe-1 that so inflamed the Air 
Force. The question of defining the likely parameters of when total fallout became a general 
threat to health and the environment formed the basis of Project GABRIEL.
663
  
By 1949, the qualities of fallout produced and their quantities in relation to explosive 
yield were intimately linked by the basic Frisch-Peierls equations and subsequent refinements to 
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them provided by fallout data collected by sampling fission reactions.
664
 The basis of every 
workable fusion weapon design was and remains a trigger fashioned from a fission primary 
stage; many such designs were multi-stage, as CASTLE BRAVO was, with the tertiary fusion 
reactions focused by the device’s uranium case as it is bombarded by thermonuclear radiation 
from the secondary. This reaction causes the U-238 case to also fission, enhancing the fallout 
such a weapon design produces.  Fusion was often treated as if it were inherently “clean,” but 
fusion also created fallout by a process of neutron induction.
665
 The complexity of this issue, 
compared to GABRIEL’s relatively straightforward, if not easily answered experimental 
question about the relationship of total yield to potential immediate and long-term risk, made it 
possible for Strauss, Teller, and E. O. Lawrence to persuade Eisenhower that the problem of 
fallout was solvable through continued testing.
666
 
Educating a Future President 
SAC’s early interest in limiting the access of other services and branches to nuclear 
weapons was well known, including the summer 1949 confrontation with the Navy over funding 
the giant B-36 bomber versus new aircraft carriers.
667
 This stance remained rather obviously on 
display in the testimony of Air Force witnesses at the hearing, even though the junior service’s 
impulse toward maintaining an effective monopoly on all nuclear weapons as essentially 
strategic ones was moribund by the time of the hearing. During 1951 and 1952, the Army was 
only beginning to assert its own need for tactical nuclear weapons by issuing its first doctrinal 
circulars and beginning limited test exercises. Both had a notable emphasis on radiological 
monitoring, as did Army participation in testing in Nevada with its DESERT ROCK exercises in 
three test series there from 1951 to 1953. Feedback up the chain of command noted more effort 
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was needed to develop force protection measures from fallout, an example of what this project 
calls the fallacy of “measurement as control.”668  
Notably, a recently released Army official history by Army historian Donald A. Carter of 
its participation in the early Cold War in Europe made no mention of the 1951 evaluation trip by 
Project VISTA participants, including Oppenheimer, DuBridge and others who testified in 1954; 
there they briefed and recorded comments and critiques of the Chapter Five from Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR) General Eisenhower. The future president’s positive reaction to 
this part of VISTA report was undoubtedly among the reasons why “the Army had come to see 
its forces in Europe as a sounding board and test bed for its evolving doctrine on atomic 
warfare.”669 According to DuBridge and Whitman, Eisenhower and several of his top aides were 
briefed directly by Oppenheimer’s group, with DuBridge’s testimony, in particular, making it 
clear that Eisenhower understood that Oppenheimer’s promotion of tactical nuclear weapons was 
driven in large part because of the necessity to limit fallout’s effects if these weapons had to be 
used in densely populated Europe.
670
 
As with Oppenheimer, Eisenhower was not, however, as filled with nuclear enthusiasm 
as their ready embrace of development of tactical weapons and other such policies might 
indicate. The relatively low yield, tactical nuclear weapons that Oppenheimer suggested in 
VISTA Chapter Five as more useful under European conditions provided the means to avoid the 
use of higher yield weapons that Eisenhower would otherwise have to depend on the Air Force to 
deliver. Eisenhower commanded American forces that even after a three-fold expansion 
following the initiation of combat in Korea still found themselves at a ten-to-one disadvantage 
versus Soviet forces in Europe.
671
 Given the fact of Joe-1, the population density of Europe, and 
the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Russian troops, tanks, and aircraft arrayed against 
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NATO even after United States forces completed their Korean War-related augmentation, 
Eisenhower was eager to discuss the advantages low-yield tactical nuclear weapons would bring 
to such a challenging battle zone, but still cautious about the implications. Carter described what 
Eisenhower faced in his last military assignment as a lesson learned that he brought along once 
elected president. 
672
   
Eisenhower’s experience in World War II, and his analysis of the fighting in 
Korea, had led him to the conclusion that conventional ground forces were largely 
obsolete.
673
 
 
Carter’s innocence about the VISTA controversy saw it and the fallout problem it intimated was 
at the root of the future president’s misgivings omitted from the factors that perplexed 
Eisenhower in later shaping nuclear force into national security policy.  
What SAC Feared 
Given what Oppenheimer hinted at in his comments to Freeman Dyson, as well as what 
was implicit about the perils of thermonuclear weapons in his previous discussion in early 1950 
on Eleanor Roosevelt’s radio program prior to Truman’s silencing order, coupled with Lee 
DuBridge’s frank observation pointing out “radio activity” was a distinguishing weapon effect 
that made the use of thermonuclear weapons impractical in Europe, a very different light was 
thrown on what the Air Force objected to in VISTA Chapter Five. Neither the supraconventional 
blast nor thermal effects of the hydrogen bomb were mysterious or particularly controversial in 
light of blast and fire damage from conventional weapons still on display all over the continent 
when Eisenhower received the visitors from VISTA in late 1951. Only fallout fit the bill as 
something that disturbingly transgressed beyond this all-too-acceptable damage, as well as drove 
him as president to draw such ominous conclusions about the nature of nuclear war in eventually 
shaping a transformative policy replacing confrontation with negotiation. It was also notable that 
while the tactical nuclear weapons Oppenheimer’s team promoted in Chapter Five seemed to 
offer a more viable alternative, such a limited conflict still threatened imminent escalation into 
full-scale attacks with high-yield thermonuclear weapons if either party feared defeat on the 
battlefield. Despite this, by the time of the 1954 hearing a rapid expansion of availability of 
tactical nuclear weapons was already well underway, with the Army and Navy both set to receive 
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significant numbers of operational tactical weapons by mid-decade.
674
 What remained notably 
unresolved in early 1954 about thermonuclear weapons was what was forbidden from mention at 
the hearing, fallout. 
 Matched with knowledge of how critical high-yield thermonuclear weapons were in the 
eye of SAC strategists, the idea that the Air Force was merely defending what it felt was its 
monopoly fell well short of the concerns the organization had about VISTA Chapter Five. In 
light of General LeMay’s oft-expressed distaste for any practical limits on the use of strategic 
airpower after having already bombed the Germans (and the Japanese) as the enemy, the Air 
Force preferred to view fallout simply as collateral damage, part of the price of war, and a 
tangential concern to its primary mission of destruction of enemy capabilities.
675
  
The primary reason for Oppenheimer to come into conflict with the Air Force was his 
repeated statements about thermonuclear weapons likely proving  unsuitable for use, in this case 
on the European battlefield, was the argument he made about the threat their massive fallout 
posed to densely populated civilian areas. Oppenheimer’s refusal to be silenced about fallout 
within the scope of his duties, which seemed to have precipitated the confrontation with SAC in 
1951, then his subsequent expression of fallout acting as a limit on their use in VISTA Chapter 
Five, when taken together represented a fundamental threat to the military utility of 
thermonuclear weapons in the eyes of the Air Force. Arguments about the priority needs of the 
other military services were largely resolved by the spring of 1954, although these issues did 
play minor supporting roles in the Air Force’s complaints.676 The high esteem for Oppenheimer’s 
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advice multiplied the threat he represented to what the Air Force saw as the necessity for 
unlimited use of high yield weapons when the scientist repeatedly urged caution about their use. 
On the other hand, the then still unfolding CASTLE BRAVO crisis underlined the 
fundamental argument Oppenheimer made, although wishful thinking about its outcome 
prevailed for the time being. In a sense, the Oppenheimer hearing represented a sub rosa part and 
parcel of initial official reaction to that incident as the United States downplayed fallout’s 
significance before finally partially admitting the scope, if not the full significance, of the 
problem in a report released in early 1955.  CASTLE BRAVO was a public revelation of what 
Oppenheimer argued behind closed doors, a reminder that the surprise about its fallout expressed 
by Eisenhower was feigned while the government scrambled to decide how to spin the 
implications of this closely-held secret to the public. 
Filling the Fallout Gap with Inferential Knowledge 
Based on the bulk of the evidence and the scientist’s own words, clearly something about 
the use of thermonuclear weapons in SAC’s war plan was at the root of Oppenheimer’s 
misgivings about the entire fusion enterprise. Blast and fire inflicted on civilians, even on the 
enormous scale made possible by a weapon that could be scaled up to whatever yield was 
desired, were reconstructed from what was considered German terrorism in bombing civilians in 
Guernica in 1937 by the events, technological capabilities and outcomes in the course of World 
War Two into acceptable collateral damage by General LeMay and his cohort of Air Force 
strategic bombing pioneers.
677
 Whatever conflict existed between SAC and Oppenheimer, there 
is no evidence that concerns about blast, fire, or extensive civilian casualties from those effects 
were at its root. Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented clear punctuation of Oppenheimer’s stoic 
shared views of these grim realities with the military services.
678
 Fallout was originally viewed 
by Oppenheimer as a minor, controllable factor of little practical relevance in the use of such 
weapons. Thermonuclear weapons changed that equation, because suddenly the potential for 
wartime fallout went from puny to prodigious. What is known about Oppenheimer’s knowledge 
of and views about fallout beyond the discussion centering on its role in the 1954 hearing? 
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Substantial, if widely scattered and intentionally concealed evidence pointed to fallout 
being the single most important technical problem associated with the use of thermonuclear 
weapons. The massive quantities of fallout produced by thermonuclear weapons anticipated in 
SAC’s war plan constituted the most significant feature that distinguished its effects from the 
more limited uses of tactical weapons that Oppenheimer actively promoted in the disputed 
Chapter Five of the Project VISTA report. As a scientist, Oppenheimer’s only potential capacity 
to disarm anything was through his mastery of facts and theory, assuming that was even his 
intent, rather than the suitable caution he displayed in his duties as a scientific administrator to 
serve the public interest.  Both of the fears expressed by hearing witnesses, that he had in fact 
influenced those working on the “super” to limit its progress and that he intended to undermine 
SAC were shown by testimony to be specious, even more so once the October 2014 transcript 
release was taken into consideration. Like most mythology, both claims aspired to offering a 
politically acceptable alternative explanation for reality.  
In this case, given no other feature of the use of these weapons contemplated in SAC’s 
war plan was of equivalent significance in potentially limiting their use, the idea that 
Oppenheimer could disarm SAC has only a single plausible explanation, worry that political 
leaders might get cold feet if they learned the extent of deadly fallout associated with the high 
yield weapons SAC sought in quantity. With mention of fallout banned from the hearing, 
Oppenheimer could offer no fundamental specific reason for objection to most aspects of how 
the weapons were likely to be used. Oppenheimer’s concern about SAC’s war plan appeared to 
have been driven largely by the cumulative fallout that would be produced by the large number 
of weapons that SAC intended to use right out of the starting gate in wartime. This was implicit 
in the words that Oppenheimer used to close the classified portion of his testimony. 
If the development by the enemy as well as by us of thermonuclear weapons 
could have been averted, I think we would be in a somewhat safer world today 
than we are. God knows, not entirely safe because atomic bombs are not jolly 
either.
679
 
 
The working hypothesis here was that Oppenheimer sought to draw a line between 
destroying one’s enemy and destroying the planet’s environment, something theoretically 
predictable by 1951 even prior to the first thermonuclear test, IVY MIKE, knowledge that was 
demonstrated through the AEC’s 1949 initiation of the Project GABRIEL study under the 
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guidance of the GAC chaired by Oppenheimer. Sampling proved that IVY MIKE generated 
massive fallout, which confirmed the theoretical threat fallout from high-yield weapons posed 
based on calculations that elaborated on those originally done by Frisch and Peierls.
680
 Fallout 
was also the reason that testing of these weapons was relegated to the remote Pacific even when 
they had only been described in theory. CASTLE BRAVO emphatically punctuated that point 
just weeks before Oppenheimer’s hearing began. 
Blast and fire, while worrisome on the nearly unimaginable scale made possible by 
thermonuclear weapons, could not represent the crux of the varied concerns that Oppenheimer 
and the GAC expressed. Only fallout fit the modus operandi as the primary technical problem 
that created a global risk at yields far short of the yields needed for potential global-scale 
physical destruction from blast and fire.  Only fallout could worry Generals LeMay and Wilson 
that Oppenheimer’s goal was to disarm the most powerful military organization on the planet, 
because only fallout threatened the planet as a whole. 
Another Reason Why Fallout Was a Forbidden Term 
In a telling twist that confirmed the general thrust of argument here, the long redacted 
transcript held another reminder of a more mundane, yet crucial reason why secrecy about fallout 
was intense enough to force the term’s exclusion from the hearing. A substantial part of first 
AEC chair David Lilienthal’s testimony was withheld from the 1954 version. Lilienthal noted the 
AEC was excluded from Truman’s evaluation of strategy and his decision to proceed rapidly 
with thermonuclear weapons development after Joe-1’s detection. Lilienthal recalled this was 
due to the president’s fear that involving the AEC would draw the attention of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, the AEC’s oversight body, leading to what was seen as the 
problematic influence of Congress on that decision.
681
 Most worrisome, given the GAC’s advice 
to give the matter careful consideration before proceeding, was that Truman worried Congress 
would probe more specifically into what the GAC’s objections were based on. At the hearing, 
Lilienthal apparently still could not address fallout directly, but there can be little doubt that a 
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“technical problem” already known to exist was at the center of the discussion in 1949, 
constituting the primary source of the conflict between Oppenheimer and the Air Force. 
[W]e take a position as a nation that atomic weapons should and must be 
eliminated. But our military leaders are depending almost entirely upon nuclear 
weapons in the event of war. This kind of contradictory position is not merely a 
defect of reasoning, a faulty argument. It is a positive danger to continue both 
those courses at the same time. To go ahead on a new cycle of atomic weapons, 
the super, might well make it more difficult for that defect to be faced and 
something done about it.
682
 
 
The defect Lilienthal spoke of could be narrowly construed to simply be the emerging over-
reliance on nuclear weapons seen as necessary to counter the numerical superiority of Soviet 
armor and personnel, a defect of strategy.  In the absence of evidence that fallout was a 
confounding problem, that conclusion prevailed. But just the opposite proved to be the case, 
including the word’s banishment from the hearing, something which gave Lilienthal pause but 
which he seemed to resist by speaking of it in terms of being “not merely a defect of reasoning, a 
faulty argument. It is a positive danger…”  
Reinforcing evidence of his expansive meaning of defect in this context was what 
Lilienthal said just before he specified the present circumstance came about due to a delusional 
omission within the government. By refusing to come to terms with an inherent threat produced 
by this class of weapons, Lilienthal argued this problem transcended mere disputes about 
strategy by reflecting a new form of horror that threatened humankind and the planet as a whole. 
…the act of going ahead, far from strengthening our defenses or atomic program, 
would magnify its weaker aspects making it increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible to face the realities, or to take another course that might save the world 
from the fury of the atomic arms race…683 
 
Lilienthal was as earnest, forthright, and factually informed as any witness at the hearing. Like 
Oppenheimer’s own dogged warnings, his message was ignored by the hearing board – and the 
president – at the time. Lilienthal could only speak about what was at stake in terms that were 
muffled and indistinct because that was what was forced on him and other witnesses by the 
circumstances of the hearing and the clearances they held. The sensitivity of the problem 
Lilienthal cited that made “it increasingly difficult, if not impossible to face the realities” was 
because the need to conceal fallout as a problem exceeded even the secrecy about its usefulness 
                                                 
682
 DOE, ITMO2, 1335. 
683
 Ibid, 1334. 
257 
 
as a source of intelligence. Only fallout provided sufficient explanation to account for 
Lilienthal’s statement that thermonuclear weapons would significantly magnify weaker aspects 
of the Air Force’s belief in their military utility.   
Conclusion 
The hearing, which concluded Oppenheimer’s downfall by leaving him silenced, in 
bureaucratic exile, and with the issue of fallout research suppressed and brought under its 
control, gave the Air Force most of what it wanted. But the Air Force’s seeming win, which 
effectively ended Oppenheimer’s attempts to call attention to the need to limit fallout by limiting 
yield expended on targets in wartime, proved to be but one battle, rather than the conclusive 
victory the Air Force sought.  
It was not the super, per se, Oppenheimer objected to, but the massive fallout such 
weapons create when used en masse.
684
 Historians tend to emphasize the role of the weapon over 
the weapon effects, thus replicating the official marginalization of the role of fallout. Fallout’s 
friction or resistance as a material actor acted much like the social resistance that characterizes 
infra-politics.
685
 In that light, it is possible to begin to see fallout’s influence in gaps and seams in 
the record, pushing back against those who would exclude or diminish its role.
686
 One might 
reasonably ask, “But fallout was not mentioned once in the thousand plus pages of text of In the 
Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer”! True, and also true of the longer nearly complete declassified 
transcript text now available.  
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Nonetheless, in reading the testimony with a sensitive eye, the linkage of nuclear 
intelligence and fallout as a technical problem was certainly the elephant in the room overlooked 
for decades and missed as the primary (but not sole) motivation behind the Air Force’s interest in 
removing Robert Oppenheimer from government service. The intelligence angle was just one 
aspect of Oppenheimer’s peculiar knowledge and unique capacity to argue for a review of 
nuclear strategy. But it was fallout as a problem that constituted the basis for the Air Force’s fear 
he might use its inevitable link to use of nuclear weapons to uncertain advantage against its 
interests within the United States government. Questions about his loyalty to the nation were 
largely red herrings, their relevance more a matter of providing an opportunity to insinuate 
against Oppenheimer’s character than of any substantiated relevance to the accusations raised by 
Air Force witnesses. But that was just the beginning of the final downward slide in this fraught 
relationship between Oppenheimer and the Air Force, one that began as early as 1946 and which 
culminated under circumstances that effectively constituted a show trial. 
This was never an argument about the existence of fallout itself. Nuclear weapons 
inevitably produced it, as the seminal calculations of Frisch and Peierls predicted. What was 
contested by the Air Force versus Oppenheimer was fallout’s location, significance, and 
meaning. In short, the Air Force’s planned use of thermonuclear weapons challenged scientific 
prediction of fallout’s potentially imminent risk. Unveiling its stubborn presence at the hearing 
despite its implicit status as a factor non grata requires unpacking the black box of fallout, 
treating it as a material actor whose footprints can nonetheless be traced through the wet cement 
of the early Cold War. Within the Air Force, fallout as an issue went far beyond its value as the 
most tellingly productive intelligence system of that era. At the highest levels of Air Force 
leadership, the service’s dogged pursuit to silence Oppenheimer’s known concerns about fallout 
at the 1954 hearing demonstrated it recognized that fallout created by these weapons served as a 
potent constraint on their use. While the relative paucity of direct documentary evidence is of 
concern, fallout’s notable absence at the hearing strengthens a working hypothesis that the 1954 
hearing served as a proxy to suppress Oppenheimer’s critique of the fallacy of depending on 
thermonuclear weapons to fight a war. Fallout’s exclusion from the hearing artfully avoided the 
discussion Oppenheimer wanted, but served the Air Force, which did not want on record a 
hearing that revolved around fallout. 
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Reframing the Oppenheimer affair here speaks directly to historiographic emphasis. 
Concentrating on the thermonuclear weapons issue as the dominant factor as many have done 
created a certain tendency to see the world in the long-term structural sense in the same ways as 
the Air Force did, with the weapon itself as the ultimate source of power, a token or fetish. 
Certainly the Air Force of 1949 or 1954 often projected itself into the future and did this more 
strategically than the rest of the Department of Defense, given its dependence on cutting-edge 
technology. When General Wilson testified at Oppenheimer’s PSB hearing “I am first of all a 
big-bomb man” his declaration echoed throughout the Cold War, most explicitly a decade later 
in Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 Dr. Strangelove as Major “King” Kong rode that big bomb down.687  
What Did the President Know and When Did He Know It? 
The revised view of the 1954 hearing made possible by the newly declassified transcripts 
adds considerable depth to what was previously known about Oppenheimer’s repeated briefing 
of Dwight Eisenhower in detail on nuclear weapons. This occurred on a number of occasions 
between 1951 and 1953 until shortly before the president ordered a “blank wall” built between 
the scientist and the nuclear secrets he helped create. Whatever he believed about Oppenheimer 
before the hearing, by taking action Eisenhower chose to embrace assertions by Edward Teller 
and others that a technical fix for fallout from weapon designers would prove to be an adequate 
solution.
688
  Eisenhower bet the policy farm on massive retaliation through nuclear superiority. 
With the vapors of McCarthyism still hovering in the wings, the Air Force and AEC Chair Lewis 
Strauss persuaded the president he had no choice but to take action, suppressing Oppenheimer’s 
science-based fallout cautions as politically toxic. How could the president trust a man’s science, 
when he did not trust the man? Following Truman’s 1950 silencing order on the controversy 
between the GAC and the Air Force over pursuit of thermonuclear weapons, this further 
supported a working hypothesis that the military used the 1954 hearing to silence Oppenheimer’s 
voice within the government about the limits fallout imposed on nuclear war. That strategic need 
was the motivation for the concerted effort by the Air Force to drive him off the GAC and 
replace the AEC leadership with more compliant and supportive commissioners who minimized 
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the significance of Oppenheimer’s guarded warnings about the potential threat posed to human 
health and the global ecosystem by massive fallout from high-yield nuclear weapons.  
In the end, it was not simply the slow accumulation of evidence often cited by historians 
that explain Eisenhower’s changing views about nuclear weapons over two terms in office.689 
That decision was substantially motivated by the collection of fallout data that reinforced an 
eventuality Eisenhower already feared would come to pass, based on Oppenheimer “educating” 
him about nuclear weapons. Someone, somehow, chose to fulfill the intent of GABRIEL. The 
Air Force’s fears of fallout’s potential implications for its force structure, strategies, and war 
plans were realized, not by the subversive designs of one man, but by the laws of physics, but 
only in the sense that this curtailed additional expansion of its force structure.  
Testimony at the 1954 hearing showed Eisenhower’s later policy shift to end testing was 
influenced by several face-to-face meetings in which Oppenheimer was known to have laid out 
the theoretical problems of nuclear war to him. First and foremost among Oppenheimer’s 
concerns was that the massive global-scale fallout thermonuclear weapons produce made any 
significant exchange of attacks with such weapons an untenable tool of national policy. 
Oppenheimer tangentially described this in public as the problem of “two scorpions in a 
bottle.”690 The analogy was generally understood to mean that the two creatures threatened each 
other equally with death, with no escape from the confrontation. The more subtle point was that 
because they shared the atmosphere in the bottle, if either contaminated it both would suffer the 
consequences. The case against Oppenheimer was at its heart an attempt to permanently silence a 
discussion about fallout; the outcome was soon eclipsed by empirical facts. It proved to be easy 
to eliminate use of the term at the 1954 hearing; by Eisenhower’s second term, accumulating 
data suggested only by eliminating fallout could the discussion about its strategic implications be 
silenced. Oppenheimer did not need be found using the word to understand that fallout, while 
formally excluded, was at the center of the conflict on those fated days in the spring of 1954.
691
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Chapter Four: The Invisible as Inconsequential 
1 March 1954 
No nation has ever known catastrophe of the scope that would result from all-out 
nuclear war. No estimates were published about how long…the areas poisoned by 
fall-out would have to be evacuated for periods from a few weeks to more than a 
year. . It might be noted in this connection that it is still unsafe, a year and a half 
after the 1 March, 1954 thermonuclear test, for the Marshall Islanders to return to 
the islands from which they were evacuated...
692
 
 
Fallout Overkill: CASTLE BRAVO and the Problem of Fallout 
Just before dawn on 1 March 1954 (local time), Japanese fishermen saw a bright flash, 
then a brilliant “orange-red sun rising in the west.”693 At 15 megatons, the yield of the second 
thermonuclear device, CASTLE BRAVO, unexpectedly became the highest of any tested by the 
United States. Aggravated by unfavorable winds rising after shot time, its intensely radioactive 
fallout plume moved beyond the designated danger area before evacuations could take place. 
Among the first to notice the heavy fallout were a group of twenty-five Air Force weathermen 
stationed on Rongerik, 130 miles from ground zero on Nam Island, Bikini Atoll. In addition to 
weather observation, these servicemen maintained a ground monitoring station for the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) test organization. Eight hours after the shot, the radiation meter went 
off the scale (it was limited to measurements of no more than 100 milliroentgen per hour.) The 
weather observers sent a message to headquarters requesting advice; they were told to stay 
indoors. Early the next day, a seaplane evacuated the group after taking readings of at least 3.2 
roentgens per hour at one inch above the ground surface.
694
  
The situation of the weather observers eventually called attention to the plight of the 
island residents, exposed to doses on Rongelap (at 100 miles distance, even closer than Rongerik 
to ground zero) initially estimated to be as high as 340 roentgens (the total dose was later re-
estimated downward to an average range from 100 to 125 roentgens.) Emergency evacuations of 
the islanders commenced. It was a week before the population was medically evaluated, although 
the task force determined they quickly began showing signs of radiation exposure equivalent to 
that suffered by “the Japanese who were about 1.5 miles from ground zero at Hiroshima and 
                                                 
692
 Brig. General (retired) Thomas R. Phillips, “Civil Defense,” Air Force, Vol. 38, No. 10 (October 1955), 60-61. 
693
 Joseph L. Miller, Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing (New York: Free Press, 1986), 189. 
694
 “Memo for the record re: Evacuation of Rongerik After Shot BRAVO,” Operation CASTLE, from Headquarters, 
Task Group 7.4 Provisional, 14 April 1954. http://www.aracnet.com/~pdxavets/wetokian/memodoc.htm. 
262 
 
Nagasaki.” Instructions sent to the medical team reminded them “due to possible adverse public 
reaction” they were not to discuss the situation with anyone “except those with a specific ‘need 
to know.’” The exposures would have been far higher, except for the evacuation. The average 
lethal dose, or LD50 (where half of those exposed die within sixty days), for radiation exposure 
is 400 to 450 rem, with any dose of over 1,000 roentgens considered invariably fatal.
695
 Maps 
showed exposures ranging as high as 3,300 roentgens fell on the edge of Rongelap.
696
 
Fortunately, instead of being 1.5 miles from ground zero without aid, they were 100 miles away 
from CASTLE BRAVO’s detonation with some limited and haphazard assistance; the islanders 
were evacuated after suffering the most significant unintended radiation exposures of the entire 
U.S. nuclear weapons test program.  
Worse news was yet to come. As the Japanese fishing vessel, the Fukuryu Maru #5 (or 
“Fortunate Dragon” #5), sailed that morning  outside the designated security zone, white ashes 
fell from the sky onto the crew as they worked. This odd incident came just three hours after the 
enormous flash in the sky to the west they suspected was from a nuclear test. After the ash fall, 
the entire crew was almost immediately stricken with symptoms of radiation sickness, but their 
plight was not understood until they returned to port in Japan on 14 March. Their catch of 
contaminated fish, a staple of the Japanese diet, was sold before testing revealed that it was 
radioactive, creating a panic when it was recalled.
697
 The fish panic spread to the United States, 
although only fish in Japan was found to be contaminated.  
Efforts to keep the massive fallout incident secret and confined to the testing grounds 
failed, largely because the return to port of desperately ill Japanese fishermen with ready access 
for journalists to question them provided unequivocal proof civilians were harmed far beyond the 
zone of blast damage. Due to miscalculation about how efficient the reaction of the bomb’s 
lithium deuteride fusion fuel was in its first full-scale test, the resulting yield was much higher 
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than calculated.
698
 A public relations disaster for the United States and incitement to a 
transnational movement against nuclear weapons around the world, CASTLE BRAVO’s fallout 
undermined attempts to portray nuclear weapons as controllable and largely inconsequential, 
with its effects restricted to military targets. 
AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss charged the Fukuryu Maru was a “Red spy ship,” 
highlighting again his obsession with secrecy and loyalty, even though it was impossible in any 
case to keep evidence of such a sizable explosion secret from eventual discovery, as was soon 
related in the context of the Oppenheimer hearing.
699
 In the long run, this fallout incident created 
a permanent policy marketing problem for the AEC, the U.S. government and any other nation 
which sought nuclear weapons. The drifting “hot” plumes of CASTLE BRAVO’s fallout were a 
clear-cut demarcation between fallout as almost exclusively a deeply hidden, vital intelligence 
asset and fallout as a major and very public problem for national security policy.  
Failing to See the Light: The Politicization of Fallout 
Strauss’s public stance that fallout was a Communist plot to discredit the American 
nuclear program was definitive for many in classifying their views of fallout critics who arose 
after CASTLE BRAVO. In the context of J. Robert Oppenheimer’s upcoming security hearing, it 
was an alarming incitement, one that proved Senator Joe McCarthy was far from the only habitué 
of Washington, DC to indulge in such purple prose. A curious aspect of Strauss’s red-baiting 
claims was his inspiration may not have been the usual garden variety, knee-jerk anti-
Communism. Instead, it was slightly more sophisticated response to what he believed was a 
propaganda attack on a legitimate, useful weapon – fallout. Nuclear weapons historian Chuck 
Hansen noted the AEC actively considered making use of fallout as a weapon as late as the 
summer of 1954.
700
 The AEC became discouraged about it only after it began sinking in fallout 
was far more of a problem than a desirable feature of nuclear weapons. After digesting a lengthy 
exposition by Carson Mark, head of the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos, on the possibilities 
of salting thermonuclear weapons with cobalt, tantalum or other materials to produce heightened 
levels of fallout, the Commission decided existing designs were plenty nasty enough, 
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radiologically.
701
 Only small changes in delivery parameters were required to achieve more 
intense fallout effects, so it made little sense to design a bomb specifically to generate it.
702
  
Facing a growing public backlash over the fallout incident, in secret Strauss virtually 
salivated over the utilitarian possibilities of fallout as a weapon in a 1 July 1954 letter to the chair 
of the JAEC Military Applications sub-committee.
703
 In the memorandum, Strauss demonstrated 
the AEC clearly understood the concept of military utility applied to nuclear weapons. 
The possible military usefulness of radiological contamination raises the question 
as to whether the effects can be intensified or prolonged by adding special 
materials to weapons.
704
  
 
At the time, Strauss had yet to face the facts that would be outlined in a report later issued 
in early 1955 on the incident, at that point still clearly considering fallout useful. With strategies 
like “salting” nuclear weapons in order to create more fallout under active consideration in 
secret, these documents shed an interesting light on the AEC’s subsequent assertions changes in 
tactics of how weapons were employed could generate less fallout. The flaw in AEC’s illusion of 
control over it was the belief fallout, like nuclear weapons, was subject to close control by 
humans; small changes in tactics could just as easily lead to more fallout with the same weapon. 
Human beings are less than reliable witnesses, let alone bombardiers.  Ultimately, no method 
proved capable of eliminating fallout by design or to address the far larger challenge of defeating 
the threat of cumulative fallout posed by general nuclear war. 
Fallout was generally underrated as a significant factor in Cold War decision making by 
scientists, policy makers, and historians.
705
 However, empirical evidence of fallout’s capacity to 
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shape and revise narratives across a broad swath of Cold War history emerges once it is 
understood how deeply fallout was secretly embedded in many aspects of the Air Force’s first 
two decades as an independent branch of the U.S. military, as well as the important role it played 
across the spectrum of national security culture. From tiny details like display of unit badges to 
really big things, like the limits it placed on yield for each test series, evidence of knowledge of 
the effects of fallout as a problem was extensive. Some historians of civil defense, like Laura 
McEnaney and Andrew D. Grossman, incorporated fallout in substantial areas of their work, but 
by and large the tendency has been to downplay its consequences on the basis of a lack of direct 
evidence of harm, while insisting on the subjective nature of most fallout anxieties during the era 
of atmospheric testing.
706
  One significant example where the widespread influence of fallout as 
a problem was seen were the nuclear stockpile objectives revised at the Air Force’s insistence in 
1950 to prioritize pursuit of high-yield thermonuclear weapons following the detection of Joe-1. 
These priorities were again revised after CASTLE BRAVO proved fallout was a problem to 
track more closely the original intent of the Oppenheimer-led 1950 GAC stockpile research and 
development plan, which emphasized development of smaller, more efficient, tactical 
weapons.
707
 
One example of evidence attributable to fallout’s social and empirical effects within the 
national security establishment was a Military Liaison Committee (MLC) lessons learned report 
to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. While clumsily trumpeting having “reached the goal 
of achieving a family of weapons to meet the military need for a large variety of tactical and 
strategical (sic) needs,” the MLC warned the man from General Motors the thermonuclear 
weapons development program “which began as a military task some five years ago is becoming 
a major problem of international politics due to CASTLE BRAVO’s fallout.”708 The AEC report 
on CASTLE BRAVO remained months away from completion; in comparison to the AEC, those 
handling the definition and fulfillment of military requirements moved quickly out of the blocks 
in recognizing the potential implications of fallout’s catalyzation of an otherwise largely 
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marginalized opposition to testing. As the body that represented the Pentagon’s interests at the 
AEC, the MLC was unequivocal about the substance of the matter in a way the AEC seemed 
unable to be in its own report, a stark turnabout in decisiveness on fallout from just a few years 
before between the two organizations. What was missing from the MLC’s somewhat timely 
conclusion was any explicit recognition fallout was proving to be a significant impediment to the 
“military task” that was the original goal – creation of a useable weapon of nearly unlimited 
destructive capability. Acknowledging massive fallout from thermonuclear weapons testing was 
at the root of the issue, the MLC still appeared to be digesting the implications. The Pentagon 
was less acutely focused on a detailed grasp on fallout’s consequences, marking measures for its 
control down as seemingly one more military requirement yet to be satisfied, while recognizing 
fallout was changing the game.   
Writing to AEC Chair Strauss, Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Development, encouraged Strauss’ rather naïve hope that fallout could become a 
controllable, even useful feature of nuclear weapons. 
Consideration of the effects of nuclear weapons, particularly those with high 
yields, indicates that radioactive fall-out and contamination are among their most 
important characteristics, and indeed may be one of the factors governing their 
use in some situations. 
 
It also appears that it may be possible to control to a considerable extent, by 
different weapon designs, the relative amounts of long-lived radioactive products 
per megaton of total energy yield. It is understood that the AEC is gathering 
information as to special materials which could be added or substituted to enhance 
or diminish the radioactive contamination.
709
 
 
As the service most familiar with fallout, as well as with the most extensive responsibility 
to deliver the weapons that created it, the Air Force’s needs remained the primary force driving 
military requirements, including arguing the need for a weapon with a contact fuse.
710
 As the 
AEC itself noted, the tactics of employment had a great effect on fallout production; whatever its 
intended target or cleanliness of its design, a weapon equipped for detonation on contact was 
certain to produce high levels of fallout.  
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Los Alamos began work on “clean” designs by August 1954 in order to achieve 
“different contaminating characteristics,” but initially only in the context of being able to both 
“decrease and increase fallout.” 711 The Pentagon was anxious for active efforts to clarify the 
fallout or “contamination” problem and strangely unable to let go of the idea radiation could 
somehow be spun as a benefit. Producing more intense fallout through altering tactics by contact 
fusing and other means was relatively easy, while altering the design of a weapon to inherently 
create less fallout was costly in terms of an estimated 75% reduction in yield.
712
 One “salt” with 
the potential to lessen overall fallout, gold, could substitute for uranium in bomb casings, 
reducing longer-lived isotopes by increasing short-lived isotope production.
713
 Hopes for a quick 
fix to produce less fallout were quickly dashed at the Pentagon.   
There really was no such thing as a totally "clean" weapon: even if all fission 
yield could be replaced with fusion yield, neutron-induced radioactivity would 
cause major short-term local contamination for bursts in which the fireball 
contacted the earth or water. Little consideration had been given to this aspect of 
thermonuclear explosions, and LASL was planning to undertake a theoretical and 
mathematical analysis to determine the seriousness of this problem.
714
 
 
Falling Apart 
Little more than three years after the AEC grudgingly accepted the uncomfortable task of 
managing the Nevada Test Site due to fear a fallout incident there might draw unwanted 
attention to the accelerated United States weapons test program, CASTLE BRAVO 
demonstrated no test site was remote enough to avoid controversy over fallout.
715
 Long 
interpreted as a journey into the unknown, much as Eisenhower’s longer-standing acquaintance 
with the problematic nature of fallout is a more accurate summation of his experience than the 
former model of a slowly growing accumulation of knowledge about it, the circumstances 
outlined in Chapter Two also suggested AEC leadership was well aware of the dirty nature of 
their experimental charges.  
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These matters also called into question the unitary view of American national security 
leadership during the Cold War, exposing fracture lines defined in large part by the nature of the 
actor’s relationship to fallout.716 For the Air Force, fallout was the fountain of eternal youth, 
nothing less, with every hot sample collected by AFOAT-1 another reminder about the need for 
the Air Force’s capability to deliver nuclear weapons, the more, the better. For the Army and 
Navy, fallout was a means of leverage to make their own claims to strategic roles and resources, 
much as the Air Force accomplished; while arguing in secret to be wary of the perils of fallout in 
1957, they were soon sated of such activism by evolution of their own nuclear arsenals. For the 
AEC, fallout was an often inconvenient but frequently useful scientific marker, but one about 
which the Oppenheimer affair established the AEC must allow the military the last word. 
For the president and his advisers, despite his own experiences permitting an unusual 
degree of insight into the institutions nominally under his command, fallout had grown into an 
appalling political and strategic problem as well as an increasingly obvious fatal flaw in the 
general military utility of nuclear weapons and the national security strategy they supported. 
Instead of delivering military superiority, the risks posed by the fallout from nuclear weapons 
undermined the idealized premise of clean, unambiguous military victory they offered, while 
starkly limiting the choices available to the executive.
717
 
Certainly, Robert Oppenheimer and the GAC cohort he worked within understood the 
problem, though they were mostly gone but certainly not forgotten by 1954. The Oppenheimer 
hearing’s outcome did not so much impose a harsh boundary on allowable debate, because 
official secrecy continued to conceal much about the role of fallout despite an intense public 
debate about nuclear weapons, as it suggested the narrow range of politically copacetic news its 
new leadership desired to hear on the topic. Official expediency thus replaced outright denial of 
fallout’s relevance, a seemingly very ad hoc policy considering the work previously done with 
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the calculations for GABRIEL.
718
 Nonetheless, the indirect acknowledgement CASTLE BRAVO 
forced on the government that fallout during war might be a problem acquired a permanency like 
the arsenals it might spring from at a few moments notice, spun out as more of a nagging worry 
than the harsh reality known to inevitably accompany nuclear war upon execution of SAC’s war 
plans. The momentum of SAC’s build-up was politically undeniable, largely because 
Oppenheimer’s fate prevented emergence of a critical public fallout narrative from within the 
government. LeMay got what he wanted: a force so overwhelming that it would never be tested – 
so far. It came at an enormous price, so long as it held war in check, when the cost would 
become an exponentially higher burden. The problem of fallout was even refashioned into a 
primary reason to justify continued testing. Except during the brief revival of atmospheric testing 
in the last couple of years before the original three nuclear powers ended the practice in 1963, 
atmospheric testing from 1955 to 1958 loosed more radiation than humans ever encountered in 
hope that fallout would soon be defeated by design. Examination of test operations and results 
after CASTLE BRAVO demonstrated pursuit of the alluring goal of eliminating fallout as a 
problem was largely fruitless even as evidence of its threat accumulated. 
“Emergency” Testing in Nevada and Teller’s Grim Failure of Imagination 
There was interesting ground to till between the transformation of the research agenda for 
Project GABRIEL in the period from 1949 to 1953 and the manner in which the AEC viewed the 
risk from use of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) after it was activated in 1951 as an “emergency” 
measure during the Korean War. For the AEC, Hewlett and Duncan dispassionately argued, “the 
hazards of radioactive fallout took on increasing importance…” largely due to the “increasing 
tempo of weapons testing” at the Nevada Test Site.719  
Besides the campaign against Oppenheimer, other ominous forebodings suggested the 
AEC preferred somewhere outside the continental United States as a test site, but chose not to 
rock this boat by failing to accommodate the Pentagon’s desire to learn more about taking 
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ground blasted by nuclear weapons in easily accessible Nevada. The public was given assurances 
that NTS was safe to use; behind the scenes the scientific debate continued.
720
 In May 1951, 
between the winter-time RANGER test series and the upcoming October-November BUSTER-
JANGLE series, Shields Warren convened a meeting at Los Alamos to evaluate the risks of 
using the Nevada Test Site for nuclear testing. Warren concluded “in light of the size and activity 
of some of these particles, their unpredictability of fallout, the possibility of external beta burns 
is quite real.” In other words, Warren worried that the normally invisible threat fallout 
represented might suddenly be transformed into a visibly obvious malady. On the other hand, 
Warren agreed with Gioacchino Failla, a radiological physicist, that “we should take some 
risk…we are faced with a war in which atomic weapons will undoubtedly be used, and we have 
to have some information about these things…if we look for perfect safety we will never make 
these tests.” Carrol Tyler of the AEC fretted an untimely fallout incident could lead to loss of the 
continental test site.
721
 These fears, if not the actual risks posed by fallout, raised the ante for 
those monitoring the tests, making them aware of how important it was to avoid publicity about 
fallout contamination in an effort to portray these weapons as controllable and utilitarian. The 
existence of NTS upwind of the majority of the nation’s population was implicitly a declaration 
by the government of the controllable and utilitarian nature of nuclear power. More realistically, 
Las Vegas was the closest city to the test site, itself an argument that proximity to nuclear 
explosions was only for those comfortable with risk. 
Lewis Strauss was not the only person at the AEC who considered fallout to be a feature, 
not a bug. Among the usual suspects when it came to thermonuclear enthusiasm was Edward 
Teller. Soon after the GAC warned of the potential for the super to generate “very grave 
contamination problems” on a catastrophic scale difficult to imagine, Teller wound up his 1950 
“alarm clock” thermonuclear weapon design.722 Described as an enormous device with a yield of 
1,000 megatons, transportable only by ship or submarine, it was “capable of producing disastrous 
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effects.” Teller calculated that if detonated in Leningrad, its fallout plume “might reach Moscow 
with lethal radiation.” Teller mused that the fallout plume of a similar bomb with a ground zero 
near Washington, DC would send deadly fallout past New York City, perhaps as far as 
Boston.
723
 Later, Teller proposed the possibility of building a 10,000 megaton bomb to the 
GAC.
724
  
   
Figure 3: Map of CASTLE BRAVO fallout plume superimposed on United States East Coast 
map with Ground Zero centered on Washington, DC.
725
 
 
Teller dramatically underestimated the realities of fallout, given that lethal dose levels of 
fallout from the comparatively petite 15 megaton CASTLE BRAVO test easily reached from 
Washington, DC to New York City when the map of its plume was superimposed on a map of 
the East Coast after the 1954 incident. The effects from what would be the far larger weapon the 
Hungarian-born physicist imagined on the same hallowed ground zero likely meant heavy fallout 
to Greenland and beyond. By at least an order of magnitude, Teller significantly underestimated 
fallout effects in this case. Even after nuclear intelligence successes and then thermonuclear 
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explosions made fallout’s power more credible, the post-nuclear apocalyptic world it was 
capable of creating remained too seemingly unimaginable even for Teller. 
Like Teller’s imagination, Project GABRIEL’s conceptual basis failed to keep up with 
the potential fallout effects posed by rapidly growing plans for nuclear war.  The shift in research 
emphasis from it to Project Sunshine in 1953 followed the quickly rising available megatonnage 
after the CASTLE BRAVO test in spring of 1954. In 1954, the total potential yield of the 
stockpile was 386 megatons, rising within a year to 2,819 megatons. The Air Force’s infatuation 
with high-yield thermonuclear weapons quickly and decisively broke through far beyond the 
limits of nuclear war examined by GABRIEL. Even if Sunshine had dared to continue asking 
GABRIEL’s basic research question about the threat posed by global fallout effects from an Air 
Force attack on Russia, the model used failed to keep pace with the Air Force’s acquisition of 
ever increasing capability to deliver destructive power on its lengthening target list. By 1957, 
when the full impact of the expansion in AEC production facilities approved in 1952 was 
reflected in stockpile expansion, it stood at 16,335 megatons, rising to a 1960 peak of 19,000 
megatons.
726
 Even after the questionably-timed revision of GABRIEL’s original estimate of the 
danger level from 60 megatons to roughly 2,000 megatons, the prospect of revising what was 
originally intended as a means to define a limit further upward by another order of magnitude to 
20,000 megatons would be absurd. The resulting wartime fallout remained extraordinarily 
problematic. Concealed from the public, such formal research seeking the answer to the limits of 
nuclear war was inaccessible except for those with very restrictive clearances. This desiccated 
outcome stood in stark contrast to the blizzard of relentlessly optimistic statements by Willard 
Libby about Project Sunshine after its public acknowledgment in January 1956 led to 
declarations that the risks posed by testing fallout were seen as limited in the eyes of the AEC.
727
  
Indications in the record strongly suggest that GABRIEL came under the control of or 
was at least at the mercy of AFOAT-1’s discretion around the time that RAND organized the 
conference intended to wrap it up in 1953. An AEC memo nonetheless insisted that GABRIEL 
continued in pursuit of its objective to “determine the practical limits” of nuclear war and would 
be “accelerated and given a first priority status.” 
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In order to obtain the factual evidence upon which such a study must be based, the 
Division of Biology and Medicine has sponsored, during the past year and a half, 
an extended series of investigations by various agencies and organizations which 
should, when completed, give us reliable information on the meteorological 
influences controlling fallout of bomb debris, the uptake of fission products by 
plants and animals, and the ultimate degree of hazard which may be occasioned 
by such materials.
728
 
 
In November 1953, Dr. Walter Claus, the GABRIEL principal investigator and chief of the 
DBM’s Biophysics Branch, wrote to Brigadier General W.M. Canterbury, AFOAT-1 
commander, requesting “bomb fission product samples for certain analyses,” specifically for 
strontium-89 and strontium-90.
729
 The request was likely prompted by a review of GABRIEL 
and associated projects in September 1954 that noted the obvious. 
Analyses of CASTLE series greatly underlined the need for better quantitative 
measurement of close-in fallout.
730
 
 
While U.S. testing always presented opportunities for research, development, and 
training, the memo suggested “the Weather Bureau’s prediction of trajectories from 
meteorological data and AFOAT-1 aircraft verification of trajectories” would continue with the 
data contributed to the Biophysics Branch’s work on fallout. Of particular note was that the 
“[e]ffect of storage of atomic debris in upper atmosphere on local or world climate is drawing 
some interest among weather experts.”731 The hope was that fallout held aloft would decay 
significantly before it returned to the biosphere below. With the full impact of CASTLE 
BRAVO’s fallout awaited release of a report then nearly six months away, the AEC was already 
at work coming up with reassuring theories.  Coincidentally or not, GABRIEL faded from the 
record just as its primary study subject, fallout, was becoming readily available in the wild and 
Libby’s SUNSHINE became the brand of reassurance about American fallout. 
While the Air Force’s writ probably did not extend to issuing orders about the direction 
of fallout research at the AEC, the record is clear that AFOAT-1 was kept apprised of the nature, 
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direction and results of relevant fallout research. Moreover, the AEC remained dependent on the 
discretion of the Air Force for much of its data.
732
  Considerable documentation of fallout’s 
spread from tests conducted in Nevada was declassified and later made available, but the Project 
Sunshine documents held by the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
Maryland hint that much more about fallout’s role on the global stage awaits further 
declassification.
733
 A note attached to a map with tracks of the FLATHEAD (365 kilotons, 11 
June 1956) plume was suggestive of much greater detail in the classified records. 
Heavy Flathead debris picked up by AFOAT aircraft at 20,000 ft. (see Red arrow, 
18 June) If rain occurs, is possible have significant fallout Japanese Islands today 
or tomorrow. Sample taken at approx. 1 A.M. EDT, analysis not yet available. 
 
Irregular outlined area contains debris from a number of shots intermixed.  
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734
 
 
While there was little evidence of a serious pursuit of iodine-131 recorded as the “[m]ost 
important recent change” in a September 1954 memo, there was evidence that it was of 
increasing research interest. A memo from the previous fall records collection of milk samples 
“in both Utah and the Chicago area.”735 By way of contrast with the fading of GABRIEL, the 
growing pervasiveness of iodine-131 due to testing drew intense interest from researchers.  
Utility: Doubt, Hope and Limits of a Stockpile Solution 
The Air Force quickly lost its limited interest in fallout reduction, despite the Pentagon’s 
newfound passion for it, even as the political and technological consequences of CASTLE 
BRAVO became clear. Fallout was something the Air Force valued highly, regarded as a net 
positive deeply rooted in the service’s dependence on it as a source for its most critical 
intelligence data. The service’s general dependence on nuclear weapons, which provided it with 
comparable stature to the venerable, proven institutions of the Army and Navy, made it 
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especially sensitive about factors it saw as potentially limiting their use. The service’s aversion 
to expressions of anxiety over fallout rubbed off on the second weapons laboratory, University of 
California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL, now known as Lawrence-Livermore National 
Laboratory, LLNL), when it came to “clean” weapons designs. The junior weapons laboratory 
chose to constrain itself initially to theoretical work of “general applicability” in limiting fallout, 
but left any experimental work to its colleagues at Los Alamos.
736
 Given the very limited record 
of UCRL success during its first two test series prior to the 1956 REDWING series, deferring to 
Los Alamos may have been as motivated as much by a desire to limit the possibilities for further 
embarrassment as it was about a lack of enthusiasm for “clean” weapons.737 Whether from 
guidance initiated by the Air Force or just following Teller’s natural disinclination to be troubled 
over fallout, the contrast between the laboratories was telling. Teller, of course, suffered no 
indignities over his lab’s initial failure to enthuse over fallout reduction, an indictment of the 
relativistic nature of loyalty, obedience, and priority-setting inside the AEC in comparison to 
Oppenheimer’s experience. 
Amid the public furor over the BRAVO report once it was released in early 1955, the 
idea of a test moratorium, initiated inside the government by Robert Oppenheimer in 1952 to 
decidedly mixed reviews, resurfaced with AEC Commissioner Thomas Murray. While AFOAT-
1 was not mentioned by name, the DOD representative was undoubtedly referring to its 
operation of the AEDS when he registered the Pentagon’s primary reason for its negative 
reaction to the idea of a test ban with the AEC.  
Under existing conditions of no moratorium, through detection and analysis of 
Russian tests we obtain intelligence as to Soviet progress in the field of nuclear 
weapons. This affords us a much better estimate as to the Soviet nuclear 
capability than would be the case under conditions of a moratorium which 
undoubtedly would lead to Soviet stockpiling of weapons without complete 
testing.
738
 
 
Fallout remained too valuable as an intelligence resource for the U.S. military to see much 
benefit in a test ban.  
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Certainly, there were other reasons the Air Force opposed a test ban, notably so that the 
AEC could continue thermonuclear weapons development. Following that basic achievement, 
preserving AFOAT-1’s intelligence window into the Soviet’s most threatening military project 
exceeded all others. The United States continued testing in the atmosphere, in significant part 
because American testing provided a political opening encouraging the Soviet Union to likewise 
continue the practice – and feeding data on its weapons to AFOAT-1. Fallout possessed 
extraordinary utility in serving the Air Force’s goals, strong evidence that fallout was more 
valuable – and useful on a daily basis – than nuclear weapons were.739 The corollary argument 
was that justification to end fallout must be equally if not more compelling, strongly suggesting a 
ban on atmospheric testing must have an empirical basis, not simply a political one, in order to 
overcome what the Air Force saw as the benefits provided by fallout. This was the niche where 
fallout as a problem insinuated itself and began to grow into a threat to the Air Force’s 
dependence on high-yield weapons. The service’s first response was to shut down Oppenheimer, 
a tactic that proved notably porous as atmospheric testing continued to generate more fallout and 
opposition. 
In grasping for reassuring facts about fallout, the AEC took pains to publicly describe 
new tactical weapons coming into service as far lower in yield than CASTLE BRAVO, capable 
of generating only limited fallout. Draft statements demonstrated the AEC anticipated objections 
to testing at NTS sparked by the fears stoked by CASTLE BRAVO. In preparation for the 1955 
TEAPOT series at NTS, the AEC proactively released the planned yield range in hopes of 
reassuring the public, arguing for the safety of testing in Nevada in relation to the CASTLE-
BRAVO post-test incident by acknowledging the 1954 test… 
…did produce heavy fallout over a very large area. But, the device tested was not 
a tactical weapon such as our Army Navy, and Air Force would use on the 
battlefield. Our tactical atomic weapons are very much smaller in every way, 
ranging down to possibly 1/10,000ths of the explosive power released in our test 
detonation at Bikini a year ago.
740
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Whether or not Oppenheimer and his GAC compatriots explicitly intended to limit fallout 
in creating the range of yield options more useful on the battlefield than Teller’s super when they 
drafted the 1950 GAC weapons development plan remains unclear. The 1952 VISTA report 
explicitly stated a preference for use of tactical weapons over the unwieldly thermonuclear 
weapons in the development pipeline. However, after CASTLE BRAVO the Pentagon, along 
with the AEC, seized upon the Oppenheimer-era legacy of tactical weapons in hope of filling an 
interim stockpile until better designs with sharply reduced fallout could be developed. The 
circumstances of that ill-fated shot thus also forced another uncomfortable, yet rather obvious 
linkage before the public; fallout was proportional to yield, forever linking the high yield 
weapons the Air Force wanted most to a clear stigma against them because of their capacity to 
generate large volumes of fallout.  
A familiar voice also felt slighted in the fallout-constrained test series that followed 
CASTLE. In a June 1955 letter to Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining following the spring 
1955 TEAPOT series at NTS, General Curtis LeMay groused that a third of his bombers “were 
without weapons,” while other commanders had “more than one weapon” per aircraft. In another 
rehash of the ongoing struggle for priority between SAC and the growing interest in nuclear 
weapons to equip tactical airpower of the Air Force as well as to serve the varied needs of the 
other military services, LeMay demanded SAC receive all fissile cores allotted for production 
over the next year of two classes of weapons, plus a special allocation of pits for another 
weapon.
741
 While LeMay’s concerns had more to do with AEC production rates than testing 
itself, they also reflected his stubborn unhappiness with the limited supply of high-yield weapons 
he desired versus the quick growth in tactical weapons provided by the maturing development 
plan set in motion by the 1950 GAC. Despite the enormous resources devoted to SAC, LeMay 
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still felt he was losing the battle for high-yield weapons, a sense of loss which the fallout-
constrained 1956 REDWING series did little to alleviate.
742
  
LeMay was likely even more exercised a year later in June 1956 when the AEC issued a 
revised edition of its nuclear weapons effects handbook. Paradoxically, it was Lewis Strauss who 
initiated the controversy with his objection to adoption of a 100 megaton upper limit for the 
graphs used to illustrate yields-to-weapon-effects in the AEC handbook. “Strauss stressed the 
danger of unrealistic yield values on one hand, while noting the possible interpretation by the 
Soviets that 100 MT was a U.S. goal.”743 Strauss’ position was dictated by Eisenhower’s promise 
to limit the yield of the largest American thermonuclear weapons to no larger than CASTLE 
BRAVO’s 15 megatons. Behind the walls of secrecy at the AEC, Strauss’s own mounting 
concerns over fallout were carefully concealed following the firestorm the report on the 
CASTLE BRAVO incident ignited in early 1955. In public, he and Willard Libby both continued 
to reassure citizens fallout was a manageable problem with an imminent solution.
744
 Perhaps, 
like the Air Force, Strauss naively believed that after mastering fission and fusion weapons 
fallout-free weapons would be just another challenge to be overcome with the application of 
enough scientific resources under more enthusiastic leadership? 
Fallout and Military Utility 
Rapid development of “clean” weapons was certainly the vision of Congress, as the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) pressured the AEC for quick advances on “clean” weapon 
designs. Unfortunately, at the same time it linked that call with one for accelerated development 
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of very small diameter weapons.
745
 Together, these fundamentally conflicting goals recognized 
no limits on nuclear war or any appreciation for the cumulative nature of fallout’s threat under 
circumstances of war.
746
 
When I speak of small weapons, I mean very small weapons. When I speak of 
larger numbers, I mean tens of thousands of weapons in this range.
747
 
 
While there was no basic scientific conflict in such a dual directive beyond those which 
already applied to tactical weapons and the finite nature of AEC resources, such Congressional 
action indicated ignorance of the limits fallout already imposed on the existing stockpile 
according to GABRIEL, as well as the potential for increased fallout that widespread tactical use 
of low yield weapons raised. Due to anticipated deployment of tactical weapons against hard 
targets under battlefield conditions, primarily armored vehicles and field fortifications, such use 
was likely to lead to significantly increased fallout because of greater fireball contact with the 
ground.
748
 Likewise, the inefficiency of conversion of fissile material to energy inherent in the 
design of very small weapons suggested relatively more plutonium-239 and other fissile 
materials would be left behind or aerosolized to drift away and fall elsewhere. 
While Congress pushed for what they believed were inherently more useful tactical 
nuclear weapons, Eisenhower struggled with the strategic implications posed by thermonuclear 
war. To handle a review of current and needed capabilities, he turned to General Harold L. 
George, who was recalled to active duty for eight months in 1955 at the request of Air Force 
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Chief of Staff Twining. George was the leader of the Air Force’s so-called “bomber mafia” of 
whom Curtis LeMay was the best known. George was a primary advocate of daylight precision 
bombing, the strategy the Army Air Force trained and equipped for through the first years of 
World War Two.
749
 LeMay superseded that principle with his firebombing tactics in Japan, 
which served as the prelude to the mass devastation made possible by nuclear weapons. George’s 
findings cemented the Air Force’s uncomfortable adoption of the intercontinental ballistic 
missile as an alternative delivery vehicle to the piloted heavy bombers it relied on. From the 
beginning it was clear that Eisenhower was leery of the direction of the whole business. 
The President stated vigorously that, if this is the only means of waging war, he 
would never wage it. If we wage such a war to establish respect for free 
government in Europe and Asia, we won’t have that type of government left 
ourselves. He thought we should develop a few of these missiles as a threat, but 
not 1000 or more. The nature of conflict has gotten beyond man. We are getting 
to the point where it is no longer worthwhile to have the operating staffs study 
such a war.
750
 
 
Consider Eisenhower’s unease with missile technology in light of the fact they would carry 
thermonuclear warheads, given concerns about hesitancy already raised previously with him over 
fallout during the 1951 VISTA study interviews as discussed in testimony at the Oppenheimer 
hearing the previous year. Eisenhower did not ride that roller coaster of frightening twist and 
turns over the next five years naively. The president was not ignorant of the likely destination of 
this inexorably frightening journey that instead of security offered only new heights of paralysis 
amidst quickly growing arsenals of planetary doom. The public saw virtually nothing of this 
frenetic, yet deeply secret activity, which would later contribute to the surprise felt by many 
when diplomacy shifted from confrontation to negotiation with the Soviet Union. 
AEC Commissioner Thomas Murray expressed a salient point about military utility often 
lost in the continuing struggle over the mix of weapons in the stockpile and, in particular, the 
problem he saw with the Air Force’s incessant demand for ever bigger weapons. 
...our stockpile should include only weapons that are actually useful in war. 
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Moreover, it should include only weapons that we can legitimately intend to use. I 
am altogether opposed to any school of thought that would move on toward 
weapons of ever-increasing magnitude, while at the same time disclaiming the 
intention of using them.
751
 
 
In case omission of the term meant there was any doubt about Murray’s point being the problem 
of fallout, he continued on to point the finger directly at it. 
Furthermore, a special problem presents itself in judging the military usefulness 
of large thermonuclear weapons. We know a great deal more about the effects of 
nuclear explosions than we did a few years ago. For instance, we now know 
considerably more about the contamination of the atmosphere and soil by 
radioactive strontium. ... 
 
When the military usefulness of a weapon is being determined, all the knowledge 
that we have must be brought to bear. Serious account must also be taken of the 
gaps in our knowledge; these gaps make it imperative to proceed with caution in 
evaluating the military usefulness of large nuclear weapons. 
 
Here the chief question is this: how does the factor of contamination resulting 
from large thermonuclear explosions affect the military usefulness of these 
weapons? Surely it must limit their military usefulness. Indeed, in certain 
circumstances the factor of contamination might well cancel all apparent military 
usefulness. This is particularly true in view of the further fact that this 
contamination lingers for years and would affect life on earth long after hostilities 
had ended.
752
 
 
Murray was raising the same question GABRIEL raised. Like many of the questions this 
study raises, discusses and takes a position on based on a preponderance of the evidence, 
knowing a far more complete unseen record exists even with the door cracked open only enough 
to see a sliver of what we now know must be in the next room, the combination of context, 
contingency, and archival evidence initially strongly suggested Eisenhower knew little if 
anything about the specific premises of GABRIEL. With one exception, circumstances in the 
direct documentary record to this point suggested the president never was given the opportunity 
to directly “do the math” by considering GABRIEL’s findings, even with its wide uncertainties, 
amid numerous conversations of stockpile holdings and nuclear strategy.  
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The only documented early instance of a thorough and unambiguous discussion of this 
unfortunate conjunction brought about by thermonuclear weapons was the ill-fated report of the 
State Department’s Disarmament Panel, delivered to Eisenhower just as he moved into the White 
House. In it, the Oppenheimer-chaired panel predicted the early stalemate with Russia due to 
thermonuclear weapons development, advising that Eisenhower “should tell the story of the 
atomic danger.”753 
Recent declassification of the full Oppenheimer hearing transcript suggested Eisenhower, 
like Murray, was at least familiar with the general thrust of Oppenheimer’s concerns about 
fallout acting as an inherent limit to the use of thermonuclear weapons. Such knowledge, given 
what is known about the president’s views and his concerns over surprise attack and nuclear 
warfare in general, suggested a deeper long-term concern about fallout than the extant 
evidentiary record indicates. The available record has supported a longer-term, incremental shift 
in his view of fallout, where it took most of his presidency for him to process the extent of 
fallout’s damage to his policies and strategies through an iterative process.754 Further analysis 
suggested instead that Eisenhower’s deepest fears, while certainly realized near the end of his 
presidency, instead of growing incrementally haunted him throughout both terms in office. 
Regardless of which it was and in spite of great efforts to suppress or minimize its impact, fallout 
very much “liberated” itself by maintaining its stubborn presence as a strategic factor the 
president could not afford to ignore. Fallout left few options other than avoiding nuclear war, no 
matter the heat of public Cold War rhetoric. 
It would underestimate Eisenhower’s resolve to argue it crumbled having learned from 
Oppenheimer of the threat fallout posed to American war planning and that he then simply 
latched onto deterrence and massive retaliation as a suitable alternative. Here, Eisenhower’s 
potentially relevant statements on the matter extended from his “cross of iron” speech in 1953 to 
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his “beware the complexes” speech as his second term drew to a close in 1961, which take on a 
certain exponential glow of steely resolve under the circumstances. The broad range of possible 
solutions that fit the evidence suggested what the president knew and when he knew it about 
fallout was a factor in accounts of how fallout irrevocably insinuated itself into conversation 
about Cold War strategy at the highest, most compartmentalized levels of government 
throughout his two terms. It was less any single piece of evidence about fallout’s impact on 
Eisenhower’s policy and decision making processes than it was the unremitting, cumulative 
nature of the evidence for Eisenhower’s growing concern about fallout that eventually led him to 
act to end it. As the full 1954 transcript and other associated evidence confirmed, the seed of 
Eisenhower’s skepticism about the nuclear endeavor pre-existed his eager participation in the 
VISTA study.   
It remains less important to immediately resolve which context informed the president’s 
thinking on this matter than to note the profound tensions fallout increasingly called into play 
during his discussions about nuclear weapons and national security policy and planning over the 
course of two terms in office. Eisenhower was a quick learner and had little choice but to be a 
persistent worrier about fallout’s impact on his presidency, with CASTLE BRAVO clearly 
demarcating mere presidential anxieties over nuclear war from his subsequent committed effort 
to end testing and seek other means to avoid nuclear war through negotiation.  
Shifting Stockpiles and Missing Fallout Data 
Continuing the Air Force’s passive-aggressive relationship with the AEC, LeMay’s 
complaints about a lack of appropriate and sufficient strategic nuclear weapons to equip his 
bombers were translated into military requirements by the Air Force and communicated to the 
AEC in February 1956. This document was likely influenced by the anticipated availability of 
additional fabricated fissile components and material in 1957 with the opening of the Rocky 
Flats plutonium-uranium composite core facility and another U-235 component line at Oak 
Ridge. 
755
  
Here, too, was more evidence of the Air Force’s resistance to interpreting fallout as a 
constraint. Most of the additional requirements issued through the Military Liaison Committee 
(MLC) were for higher yield weapons in a variety of configurations. The only slight concession 
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to the growing public pressures generated by fallout was stated as a need for a design that could 
be configured alternatively, as either a “clean” weapon or as a “salted” one constructed to 
produce the maximum amount of fallout.
756
 Demonstrating the Air Force’s thinking on strategic 
weapons at this point remained largely unaltered by CASTLE BRAVO, the updated set of 
military requirements continued its call on the AEC to supply a 100 megaton weapon. While 
Edward Teller was often remembered as a promoter of schemes for enormous thermonuclear 
devices with potential yields into the thousands of megatons, likely deliverable only by ship, it is 
important to note that the Air Force played a significant role in encouraging such thinking with 
their persistent call for a 100 megaton bomb.
757
 The Air Force’s gratuitously immense military 
requirements in the face of clear presidential directives to limit the upper yields of thermonuclear 
weapons even set off alarm bells at the now obsequiously compliant Strauss-led AEC.  
The AEC is not in a position to determine whether a bomb of greater than 
[deleted] megatons is required by the military. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
should be asked to inform the President of their stated requirement and should ask 
Presidential sanction before we proceed with production. 
 
Presentation to the President should include information as to the destruction [sic] 
effects and strategic benefits to be expected from use of these larger weapons, and 
in general terms, the price (if significant) (of the development and production of 
high-yield weapons in terms of) the (loss) of other (lower-yield) weapons. The 
views of the (Atomic Energy) Commission should be part of the (presentation) to 
the President.
758
 
 
It is important to note that Commissioner Murray’s assessment of the Air Force’s deep 
sense of denial almost two years after CASTLE BRAVO omitted explicit mention of fallout as a 
weapons effect needing review by the president.
759
 Once again, fallout was the dog that did not 
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bark, by its absence foretelling nearly unfathomable dread lurking just outside the boundaries of 
proper discussion. Eisenhower was, at the least, so reluctant to address the matter except with the 
closest of confidants that his views or even his knowledge of basic facts seemingly remained 
obscure in the mind of those he had delegated the authority necessary to deal with nuclear energy 
and its benefits and problems. 
Ten Years After, the Pentagon Suddenly Discovers a Problem 
In March 1955 as fallout brought a sense of crisis to the AEC, the Commission 
anticipated reaction to the long-awaited publication of its essentially dismissive public report on 
the CASTLE BRAVO incident. Secretary of Defense Wilson wrote to Strauss, outlining the 
Pentagon’s alarm over the fallout issue as its implications sank into the minds of its war planning 
staffs. The Joint Chiefs believed the Air Force had solved the fallout problem by showing 
Oppenheimer the door, yet their reactions suggested the Pentagon, as well as Strauss, wanted to 
feign a certain distant, naïve ignorance radiation just might be involved with nuclear weapons. 
Information that we have received from the [Atomic Energy] Commission and 
studies that have been made by Defense Agencies [sic] all indicate the great 
importance that should be attached to the radioactive by-products of high-yield 
bombs. 
 
Until the CASTLE tests confirmed the feasibility of megaton yields at 
comparatively small cost, military economy in the atomic weapons field had been 
largely dominated by blast effects and means of maximizing these [effects] in 
relation to design and delivery costs. 
 
As important as these blast considerations still are, we are now confronted with 
perhaps even more important considerations in the radioactive by-products 
field…the areas subject to lethal radiation are so large, that in planning the use of 
these weapons we must carefully weigh the damage to friendly as well as enemy 
installations.
760
 
 
Thus, fallout as a problem first appeared on the radar of many weapons designers and war 
planners as if it were an almost unknown, just-discovered phenomenon that could be exploited as 
a useful military effect. However, fallout’s problematic nature was also clarified, given 
recognition its damage could not be confined to the enemy. 
Fallout’s sensitivity as an intelligence method created the basic conflict that drove much 
of the AEC’s reluctance to divulge information about it, but CASTLE BRAVO’s 
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problematization of dependence on thermonuclear weapons created an even greater issue for 
national security strategists. The AEC’s avoidance of a forthcoming account about fallout could 
be written off as due to its politically embarrassing and problematic nature, which was correct as 
far as it went, but this was never more than very partial motivation for the government’s actions 
or silences on the matter of fallout. As with the AEC’s Oppenheimer hearing, the real 
motivations for policy and decision making involving fallout were disguised by credible, yet 
obviously now insufficient omissions of fact. The very concept of a “clean” nuclear weapon was 
just one example where a comforting discourse was enlisted to provide reassurance to the public 
about testing, even when such efforts were unlikely to alter the fundamental nature of the 
cumulative nature of fallout from a nuclear war involving thousands of nuclear weapons. 
Thus, the overriding issue preventing a forthright discussion within the United States 
government about fallout at the time of the CASTLE BRAVO incident was the existing silence 
imposed by fallout’s role as a critical contributor of strategic intelligence, which was reinforced 
as recognition grew that it undermined the strategy of massive retaliation. Similar to how secrecy 
about sources and methods limited the president’s ability to respond to later controversies over 
bomber and missile intelligence “gaps” that also politically troubled Eisenhower, the 1954 
incident forced a narrative into public view even as the government was loath to reveal the 
details of fallout’s threat.  
Fallout Trouble at the United Nations: The Problem When the Truth Is a Secret 
Having ignored – and worse! – misgivings about testing in Nevada and Oppenheimer’s 
cautions on fallout, the AEC was ill-prepared when CASTLE BRAVO brought fallout 
scandalously into the transnational public eye. Nuclear weapons historian Chuck Hansen 
observed that the Eisenhower administration gave serious consideration to joining a proposed 
United Nations test moratorium “as a way to let public opinion against weapons development 
cool down a bit.”761 The meticulously factual Hansen focused as was his wont on weapons 
testing, not on the fallout angle, even though fallout was relentlessly intertwined with his 
narrative of weapons development. Despite a focus on high-yield weapons for the Air Force at 
CASTLE, when the military was asked which of its weapons programs it might be willing to 
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relinquish testing under a threshold test ban, the program of research and development of lower 
yield, tactical weapons regained place of priority.
762
  
A suggested threshold test ban upper limit set at 5 to 10 kilotons yield would allow the 
United States to continue tactical weapon development relatively unhampered. The Pentagon 
argued in favor of the need for continued testing with any agreement short of complete and 
satisfactory arms control. Continuing his characteristic role as the government’s loudest internal 
skeptic of AFOAT-1’s work, Admiral Strauss sniffed “the large margin of error involved in the 
long-range detection process” meant any threshold yield limit was an essentially meaningless 
proposal. An Operations Coordinating Board (OCB, responsible for marketing U.S. policy to 
foreign audiences) discussion in August 1955 considered an apparently poorly-vetted proposal 
consisting of a “check list of actions to reduce world antagonisms to U.S. nuclear weapons tests.” 
Although approved by the Pentagon, among the options it outlined was an obvious non-starter, 
despite its superficial attractiveness for propaganda purposes: “release data on the global effects 
of Soviet weapons tests.”763 Despite having already handed an outline of its basic nuclear 
intelligence dossier to the Russians courtesy of Kim Philby, the secrecy shrouding AFOAT-1’s 
work meant many in the Pentagon itself were not yet aware of the highly sensitive nature of 
fallout as intelligence data.  
It was unclear if any action was taken on this specific proposal, although it was hard to 
imagine anything other than outright rejection once it was read by more knowledgeable 
reviewers at the Pentagon. Moreover, the OCB’s lackadaisical timing in addressing the issue 
internally more than a year after the CASTLE BRAVO incident was indicative of a generally 
poorly-managed official reaction by the American government to the public relations disaster 
fallout became after 1954. If more detail were to be released beyond the bare sketch found in the 
AEC’s and State’s existing periodic announcements of many of the Soviet tests AFOAT-1 
detected, the OCB’s proposal would have compromised the capabilities of the AEDS in ways far 
more radical than the moribund 1952 Oppenheimer/Department of State panel proposal to 
initiate a thermonuclear test ban. The proposition also failed to recognize the thankless task of 
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trying to disentangle the public’s examination of Soviet data from that created by tests of U.S. 
weapons.
764
 Fallout owed allegiance to no one; the policy-marketing gurus of OCB inexplicably 
believed they could sell the benefits of ‘good’ American fallout to the public at the same time 
they attacked ‘bad’ Russian fallout. 
Transnational Political Pressures Piggyback on Internal Fallout Disarray 
Transnational concerns about fallout added to the domestic political pressures on the 
AEC. 1955 also saw a request from the United Nations for the United States (as well as the 
USSR and Britain) to provide an accounting of the total quantity of fission products released by 
testing since 1945. John von Neumann warned Libby and fellow AEC Commissioner Thomas E. 
Murray that answering the UN request would disclose restricted information and compromise 
critical design data that could then be extrapolated from the known yield of their primaries.
765
 
Even more worrisome was potentially disclosing a “dirty” secret connected to Project Sunshine’s 
strontium-90 studies. 
Indeed, if we did, so, we might mislead the (UN commission) since we know the 
former amount exceeds the latter, as far as we can determine the latter, by the 
factor of about 10. In other words, about 90% of the bomb fission products are, at 
this moment, unaccounted for. 
 
Furthermore, the steadily continuing increase of strontium-90 deposition on the 
ground indicates that at least part of this "unaccounted" quantity is not removed 
forever from the biosphere. This latter information is also restricted data, and of a 
highly sensitive nature.
766
 
 
Difficult as it is to believe in the present, at least initially the AEC and the military clung 
to the hope this finding provided that a significant part of the total fallout generated simply 
vanished into thin air, never to return, even though it was clear it had to be conserved 
somewhere. To those inclined to believe, this theory was the basis to argue the problems of 
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fallout were minimal. It was a finding that paralleled the initial struggles to simply reliably detect 
fallout as the Air Force frantically scrambled to stand up nuclear intelligence operations before 
August 1949.  Obviously, despite the efforts of Libby and Project Sunshine, outside of AFOAT-
1 surprisingly little was yet understood about the life-cycle of strontium-90.  
Reflecting his own appreciation of the sensitivity of the information in the U.N.’s request, 
von Neumann was even more exercised in his memo about the U.N. request for information on 
“total radiokrypton production,” an apparent reference to his concern it could compromise the 
MUSIC program’s monitoring of krypton-85, what he termed “restricted data of high sensitivity, 
and it is at present clearly illegal to communicate it to anyone under any conditions.” However, 
von Neumann – possibly naively – acknowledged the legal subterfuge of AFOAT-1’s continued 
nuclear intelligence work with the British despite the overall ban on such exchanges – von 
Neumann stated only that “the British very probably possess a good estimate of this” and 
possibly the Russians, too.
767
  Readers of Michael Goodman’s Spying on the Nuclear Bear and 
earlier parts of this work understand there was ongoing, quite active cooperation on krypton-85 
data between the British and AFOAT-1.
768
 Given the continued success of MUSIC, it was an 
open question whether the Russians had a basic understanding of krypton-85 – or they might 
have taken countermeasures. On the other hand, the lack of evidence of any reaction suggests the 
possibility the Soviets used its emissions to communicate their capacity to stand toe-to-toe in a 
nuclear faceoff with the West. Von Neumann’s indelicate handling of cooperation with the 
British, other than to dissuade Libby and Murray from further thoughts along this line, suggested 
that the AEC itself was not fully cognizant of the full extent of AFOAT-1’s long running 
cooperation with the British in this field. Given Strauss’s infamous Anglophobia, AFOAT-1 
cutting him and the AEC out of the loop on this matter was an entirely plausible solution to his 
objections to undertaking cooperation with the British on a vital project in the eyes of the Air 
Force.
769
 
REDWING: Enter the “Energy” or Fallout Budgets 
As the dust settled in 1955 after release of the CASTLE BRAVO report, Strauss 
optimistically wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the upcoming 1956 REDWING 
series was planned with fission yields totaling less than 25% of CASTLE, with total series yield 
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(fission + fusion) predicted as less than one half of CASTLE.
770
 To achieve this goal, fallout-
forced changes in test procedures at REDWING on the Bikini Atoll were extensive. The 
imposition of what was effectively a “fallout budget” of total yield for the series heightened 
existing competitive tensions between Los Alamos and Livermore.  
Officially termed an "energy budget,” it assigned fixed limits for the whole series for 
total explosive yield of the series and the total fission yield. The total yield limit was 
approximately 20 megatons (actual total 20.82 megatons), and the actual fission yield was 9-10 
megatons (less than the CASTLE BRAVO fission yield alone). The apportionment of the 
allowed total yield and fission yield between the two weapons laboratories (Los Alamos and 
UCRL - University of California Radiation Laboratory) were subject to bitter dispute. Many high 
yield designs were tested at reduced yield, and a number of "clean" (low fission yield) megaton-
class devices were tested (but also some very "dirty" ones).
771
 
 Because of the fallout budget at REDWING, competing demands to incorporate tests of 
both “clean” and “dirty” designs led to conflict. Willard Libby, then acting AEC Chair in place 
of an ailing Strauss, gave priority to “clean” designs. In order to stay within the allotted 20 
megaton fallout budget, Libby hoped to limit work on “dirty” designs to only theoretical test 
shots, but was forced by military requirements to fit in two full scale test shots.
772
 Of 
REDWING’s seventeen shots, only FLATHEAD (365 kiloton) and TEWA (5 megaton) were 
“salted” to increase their fallout intensity.773 The exact number of “clean” shots depended on 
how the counting was done, but included multiple variants of three different designs. The 
paradox of a fallout-constrained yield total impeding research on that very problem may have 
perplexed Libby, but simple math likely told him he could make more progress on “clean” 
weapons if research on them was not joined at the hip with research on new “dirty” weapons. As 
complacent as the man often was about public health, Libby was likely satisfied the AEC knew 
well how to make dirty bombs and thus believed they deserved a relatively low priority.
774
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Thinking Small or “Clean”: It’s Only Relative 
To meet the sudden shift in enthusiasm towards smaller nuclear weapons following the 
CASTLE series, REDWING tested a number of very low yield designs. The smallest, YUMA, 
with a diameter of just 5 inches, was 2 feet long and weighed just 96 pounds, intended for firing 
from the U.S. Army’s ubiquitous 105mm light howitzer. While not quite a fizzle at 0.19 kiloton, 
YUMA failed to achieve its predicted yield by a wide margin, although other very small designs 
were tested successfully at REDWING.
775
 Such a weapon would have dramatically increased the 
flexibility of Army tactical nuclear weapons employment at the time. In 1956, the only 
operational Army nuclear artillery was the ponderous M65 280mm cannon.
776
 Weighing over 80 
tons, this apparatus was 84 feet long and required power and steering units at both ends to 
maneuver on the narrow roads of West Germany and South Korea where it was deployed. In 
contrast, the 105mm howitzer weighed 2.5 tons, could go anywhere a jeep could, and was 
transportable by helicopter. The Army never standardized a nuclear munition for the 105mm 
howitzer due to technical issues with the 5 inch diameter pit, choosing instead to develop and 
deploy 8” and 155 mm artillery shells and the man-portable, very short range Davy Crockett 
unguided rocket. While the “atomic hand grenade” was a mythical distraction, after 1955 the 
AEC turned a significant part of its weapons development efforts to emphasize producing 
smaller, more agile nuclear weapons intended primarily for tactical use, whether in the air, on the 
ground, or at sea.
777
 
Vernacular measurement 
ZUNI was another significant REDWING shot, with the twin attributes of being the first 
fully weaponized American 3-stage device (fission-fusion-fusion) and the first successful UCRL 
thermonuclear design. ZUNI was considered a “clean” design deriving 85% of its yield from 
fusion. Nonetheless, ZUNI rained fallout at rates of up to 150 roentgens/hour scattered over 
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some 17,000 square miles of ocean, dusting another Japanese trawler, but not as badly as Lucky 
Dragon. Interestingly, having learned from that experience some Japanese fisherman equipped 
their vessels with Geiger counters; the captain of the Mizuho Maru, after observing the flash of 
CHEROKEE’s unannounced detonation at a distance, began taking measurements that soon 
revealed they were under bombardment by fallout. The rapid spread of radiation monitoring 
instruments into the hands of ordinary people did not go unnoticed by the AEC, as Willard Libby 
implicitly noted such efforts amounted to a poor man’s AFOAT-1. 
We have learned from the Japanese that they can follow every bomb we fired in 
REDWING.
 778
  
 
Such uncleared, unsupervised, and unscripted fallout observations presented a far thornier 
problem than the mere presence a of a handful of journalists at the AEC’s dog-and-pony show, 
especially given the effort put into projecting a positive public image of U.S. efforts to clean up 
nuclear weapons at REDWING.
779
  
The Costs of Military Utility and the Fallout “Budget” 
The argument over what to say about ZUNI and the tests of other “clean” designs at 
REDWING boiled over in the middle of the fallout-limited test series. On 3 July 1956, AEC 
Commissioner Thomas Murray wrote directly to Eisenhower to object to the Air Force’s updated 
military requirement for a 60 megaton weapon.
780
 Shaped by the moral anxieties that framed 
much of his service on the Commission, Murray again asked a pointed, far more practical 
question, one undoubtedly already in Eisenhower’s thoughts as a retired commanding general. 
Is a weapon of this size necessary or useful for military purposes?
781
 
Murray repeated his call for an explicit upper limit on weapon yield, noting his fellow 
commissioners refused to pursue the issue. Strauss hit the roof upon hearing of Murray’s letter, 
arguing the 60 megaton weapon was only a “feasibility study” and that the AEC had “no firm 
requirement from the Pentagon” for the weapon. Less than two weeks later, Eisenhower ordered 
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Strauss, Secretary of State Dulles, and Secretary of Defense Wilson to outline a proposal to 
formally settle the matter as a policy question.
782
 Having first pledged after CASTLE BRAVO 
that the United States would not create higher yield weapons, Eisenhower now wanted to 
restructure and settle the “in effect” policy to address growing public pressure on the fallout 
issue.
783
  
It was October 1956 before Defense, on behalf of the Air Force, finally replied to the 
AEC’s inquiry on its plans for filing a military requirement for a new high-yield “clean” weapon 
design. In a statement directly at odds with the AEC’s public claims of considerable progress on 
“clean” weapon designs following REDWING, the Pentagon argued there was not yet enough 
data on which to even base such a requirement!
784
 To compensate for the reduction in yield 
caused by design changes necessary to create “clean” weaponry, design parameters for a 
proposed 60 megaton weapon design were apparently driven by a desire to compensate for 
reduced yield by creating higher yield thermonuclear weapons to serve as their basis. From the 
Air Force’s point of view, creating a 60 megaton weapon did not seem so extreme if its yield was 
destined to undergo a dramatic downward adjustment to make it “clean.” One example of the 
effects of these design changes was the Mk 36, developed in both a 19 megaton dirty version and 
a 9 megaton “clean” variant.785 Weapons with such high yields nonetheless created considerable 
volumes of fallout, even if in lower proportion to its total explosive force than a standard design 
weapon. They also did little to change the calculus of cumulative fallout damage likely to be 
inflicted in a general nuclear war, given the large and growing numbers of weapons anticipated 
in SAC war plans. 
Air Force demand for higher yield weapons after 1954 served as a compensating factor to 
make up for yield lost to “cleaning” up these weapons, making hollow the AEC’s boast of 
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progress in advance of the 1958 HARDTACK test series, an assertion repeated in the AEC’s 
January 1958 semi-annual report.
786
 The general lack of enthusiasm for such weapon designs 
across the Potomac from the White House and the “don’t call us, we’ll call you” nature of the 
military’s reply to the inquiry about pending requirements for “clean” weapons was a signal to 
the AEC it, too, should focus most of its efforts on developing standard nuclear weapon designs. 
High Hopes 
Most responsible for an impulse of false optimism among the national security 
bureaucracy following REDWING was NAVAJO, as its test proved the feasibility of a two-stage 
thermonuclear “clean” weapon design. A high percentage of fission reduction was only possible 
with high yield weapons, yet it failed to substantially alter the cumulative risk posed by wartime 
fallout. As tested, the 4.5 megaton NAVAJO shot (10 July 1956) nonetheless generated fallout 
equivalent to a 200 kiloton fission weapon.
787
 Utilizing a modified version of the same primary 
design used at CASTLE BRAVO, NAVAJO was the “cleanest” U.S. shot ever, achieving 95% 
of its yield from fusion. Nonetheless, 50% of its fission product yield came down as fallout over 
some 14,000 square miles. Chuck Hansen noted the high percentage of yield from fusion with 
NAVAJO was often cited by proponents of “clean” weapons as demonstrating the success of this 
approach to fallout reduction.
788
 Instead, the results clearly disputed the public assertion of an 
anonymous source inside the AEC who claimed with the new “clean” design the “H-Bomb 
Proved Itself ‘Sanitary.’”789 Left unsaid was the 14,000 square miles of ocean impacted by 
NAVAJO’s fallout plume remained a daunting level of contamination. While NAVAJO may 
have been “cleaner,” it was hardly “sanitary.”  
Fallout reduction came at a cost in military utility, with increased weight versus yield 
ratios.  A significant factor here was anticipation of guided missile delivery systems, which were 
designed around fairly narrow limits on available throw weight to range. Prior to NAVAJO, 
REDWING also brought the first successful fission test device from Livermore, no doubt a relief 
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to both Teller and his Air Force sponsors after three previous failures at UPSHOT/KNOTHOLE 
and CASTLE.
790
 
While the “fallout budget” constrained the scope and pace of testing at REDWING in the 
Pacific, fallout was a more direct threat to testing in Nevada. In order to limit continental testing 
at NTS, some lower yield shots that might have waited for the next series there were instead 
shifted to the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG) in the 1956 REDWING test series schedule. At the 
PPG, the shuffle of “musical bombs” continued as the limits imposed by fallout created 
additional inconveniences in an already meticulously complex test process. The main support 
base for PPG was located on the Eniwetok atoll. Given the results of CASTLE, it was decided 
that future high yield shots would take place only at the medium distant (~200 miles), but 
downwind, Bikini atoll. Lower yield shots were conducted at Eniwetok, where their relatively 
less threatening fallout plumes were much less likely to contaminate the PPG support 
facilities.
791
 Although the shift helped protect testing activities and facilities, placing the high 
yield shots at Bikini moved them significantly closer to the populated islands of Rongerik and 
Rongelap. Given the islands’ political status as a trust territory, this decision was seen as 
effectively shielding Americans from dirty work they were unwilling to do on their own 
territory, shifting it instead onto the lands of others they were ostensibly charged with protecting, 
heightening their risk and burdens instead.
792
  In the context of the Soviet Union confining 
testing, if not fallout, to its own territory, many saw these decisions as an American abuse of its 
trust territory responsibilities, complicating already complex political comparisons between the 
East and West across vast swathes of the rapidly decolonizing postwar world.  
REDWING proceeded with every indication fallout was not only unconquered, but a 
problem whose scope was not yet fully appreciated. On 9 July 1956, the APACHE shot (1.8 
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megaton) yielded heavy fallout. The TEWA (5 megatons, 20 July 1956) shot followed later that 
summer, a “dirty” version of ZUNI (3.5 megatons, 27 May 1956). TEWA produced 87% of its 
yield from fission, spreading 28% of its fallout over 57,000 square miles, with a particularly 
intense area of 120 square miles receiving fallout at a rate of 2,500 roentgen/hour; readings 
above 100 roentgen/hour contaminated a further 7,100 square miles.
793
 Most of the rest of 
TEWA’s fallout was injected into the stratosphere, although at the time of REDWING, many 
still believed this radiation simply disappeared through a yet to be understood process of 
atmospheric dilution. 
Mr. Strauss, We Have a Security Leak…It May be a Good Thing 
One problematic feature of radiochemical analysis of fallout was procedures so useful in 
providing a detailed analysis of fission weapons were not so all inclusively tell-tale in revealing 
the workings of thermonuclear weapons, for example in discerning the relative proportions 
contributed by the primary and secondary to total yield.
794
 Reacting to prepared statements by 
the AEC, apparently seeking to take advantage of good news on developments in “clean” 
weapon designs to bolster Eisenhower’s chances for reelection as he ran against Adlai 
Stevenson’s promise to end fallout from testing, Edward Teller blasted the idea of revealing that 
ZUNI was a “clean” design, in the somewhat naïve belief that pointing this out for political 
advantage would help the Russians calculate that most of its 3.5 megaton yield came from 
fusion. While the Russian program lagged behind that of the U.S. in several areas, evidence of 
ZUNI’s yield might instead make them wonder what wasteful path the Americans had stumbled 
upon. Teller’s personal appeal on the matter persuaded General Alfred D. Starbird, AEC Director 
of Military Application, to support Teller’s position. Whether he believed Teller or simply 
wanted to placate him was unclear. However, in advising AEC Chair Strauss of the matter, 
Starbird took a more ambivalent turn, arguing that it might actually be a good idea if the 
Russians did learn something about American developments in “clean” designs then underway 
by the United States.
795
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Starbird’s point of view was obviously that of a man who presumed the Russians were 
watching American tests as closely as Americans watched Russian tests. Given his technical 
responsibilities in coordinating various test operations, he was familiar with the basic concepts of 
long range detection, if perhaps not privy to all the details. As an AEC representative 
formulating arms control policy positions in the years after 1956, he later closely worked with 
Doyle Northrup and others representing AFOAT-1. It was clear from the archival record Starbird 
was generally cognizant of the unit’s intelligence work during REDWING. In fact, AFOAT-1 
was consulted on their opinion of Teller’s concerns about revealing ZUNI was a “clean” design 
might aid the Russians.
796
 Certainly Starbird’s comments in the letter to Strauss conveyed a basic 
understanding that fallout compromised bomb design information, again confirming AEC 
leadership knew then, if it did not realize in some form or fashion before, that every atmospheric 
test it conducted potentially revealed far more design information than multiple Soviet human 
agents planted within the AEC might be able to do. The Air Force certainly understood from the 
time of the development work to put AFOAT-1 in operation that its techniques could just as 
easily be used against American testing as against the Russians. This factor was a large part of 
the reason for worries expressed over Japanese fishermen acquiring the capability to measure 
fallout. While fallout was born in secrecy, it was a perishable secret, one that by 1956 showed 
every indication of unraveling. This contingency became another factor driving AFOAT-1 to 
develop new long range detection technologies, particularly improving seismic detection 
capabilities in anticipation testing, for a variety of empirical reasons largely related to fallout, 
would eventually move underground.
797
 On balance ending what was potentially lost on the 
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winds, if for no other reason, would contribute to ending fallout as the security risk it obviously 
represented. 
There was considerable irony in the discussion about whether to publicize a shot as 
“clean,” aside from toying with a paranoid like Strauss over how loyalty and nuclear secrecy 
were compromised every time a nuclear device was tested in the atmosphere. It was remarkable 
an American general seemingly wanted to ease the burdens his Russian peers might place on 
those they targeted by suggesting that it might be useful for them to surreptitiously discover 
American “clean” weapon designs by means of fallout analysis. This almost put the Russians in 
the same position as the British in gaining a legal dodge around the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
which narrowed the limited cooperation the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (or McMahon Act) 
provided with Britain and Canada, although one presumes the Russians would not be tipped off 
about the timing or details nor invited to send representatives and observers, as the British 
were.
798
 As an engineer, it was not surprising that Starbird regarded fallout as a technical 
problem, rather than a fundamental strategic one that undercut the premise nuclear weaponry 
provided a means to achieve security. Starbird’s premise of the potential beneficial aspects of 
“clean” weapon designs and other actions suggest as late as 1956 he still considered fallout a 
minor, manageable design problem, rather than the irresolvable Achilles heel of nuclear weapons 
it was shaping up to be. Starbird’s was a widely shared view. In an eerie way, this “patience, it 
will all work out” approach to eliminating fallout as a problem in the latter half of the nineteen-
fifties had interesting parallels to the immediate postwar fallout belief system suggesting fallout 
made nuclear tests trivially easy to detect.
799
 The memo clearly demonstrated the Pentagon and 
the AEC were mutually aware of the general security problem fallout represented. 
Described by one colleague as “the ultimate manager,” Starbird was the Pentagon’s 
primary advocate and representative inside the AEC, with lengthy experience and the respect of 
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his technical and scientific peers. A West Pointer and 1936 Olympics Gold Medalist in the 
pentathlon, Starbird came upon his ultimate career path beginning with his participation in 
SANDSTONE in 1948. After subsequent assignments outside the nuclear field, Starbird served 
as director of Military Applications at the AEC from 1955 to 1961, during which he was deeply 
involved in “developing Atomic Energy Commission positions on U.S. disarmament proposals 
to control nuclear weaponry.” Later, after the resumption of atmospheric testing by the Soviets in 
1961, Starbird was recalled from another assignment and tasked with directing what became the 
last U.S. Pacific atmospheric test series, DOMINIC, in 1962.
800
 In that capacity, he managed 
creation of more fallout than any other American, making his dour comments especially piquant. 
Coming “Clean” about Fallout and Long Range Detection 
At the 1956 REDWING test series, the argument “clean” weapons were an answer to the 
fallout problem came into uneasy juxtaposition with the belief that simply shifting military 
strategy to emphasize use of low-yield tactical weapons was sufficient. Interestingly, General 
Starbird clearly indicated these points conflicted in describing how “clean” weapons required 
more fissile material than standard designs did and sharp limits about how they could be 
employed, in addition to facing physical limits on how small a yield such a “clean” weapon 
could have and still sustain a fission reaction.
801
 More testing was required, but Starbird’s 
description demonstrated he understood the complexities of what seemed reasonable to the 
uninitiated, but which in fact directed the AEC towards conflicting goals.
802
  
The U.S. military’s overall shift in thinking to embrace very low yield nuclear weapons 
also presented a problem affecting formulation of arms control verification proposals. Projecting 
its own interest in weapons with yields of less than five kilotons onto the Soviets, the Pentagon 
shifted to framing its concerns about use of the AEDS for arms control purposes to an 
expectation that any monitoring or verification system must detect all such tests and differentiate 
these relatively weak signals from noise and natural geologic vibrations.
803
 The problem was that 
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all of these faint signals were buried together down in a noise floor of low-level natural and 
human-induced seismic noise, thus the Pentagon’s caveat represented a very difficult, near-
absolute standard to meet in assessing the effectiveness of a verification system. Whether 
actually intended as a rigorously effective standard by which to assess verification technology or 
simply as an implicit poison pill to block signature of any diplomatic arms control agreement, in 
effect this extraordinary requirement for unprecedented accuracy asserted an implicit Pentagon 
veto on arms control policy. 
Trying to Dodge Fallout’s “High Yield” Problem 
Discussions between the Pentagon and the AEC on new military requirements came to a 
head in early 1957 as inter-service rivalries stirred up by BUDAPEST apparently added to the 
complexities of determining future weapons production schedules.
804
 In one of the rare instances 
when a light shone into the inner sanctum of Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberations on nuclear 
strategy in a timely manner, a letter from a somewhat anonymous informant with direct access to 
the JCS wrote to AEC Chair Lewis Strauss, summarizing discussion among the chiefs about 
pending requirements for the 60 megaton weapon.
805
 In part, the letter specifically addressed 
Commissioner Murray’s complaints about stockpile composition and his desire to shift away 
from high-yield weapons because of the threat posed by their massive fallout.  
With one eye on congressional and public opinion, the author assessed the JCS would 
likely conclude they preferred to not issue a formal military requirement for a high yield “clean” 
weapon. They then noted Eisenhower’s request that the Secretaries of State and Defense, along 
with Strauss, advise the president on a response to Murray’s letter, with the author arguing that 
while the president believed “no sound military requirement exists (for such a weapon),” he 
apparently acceded to the idea that “small numbers” of a very high yield weapon should be 
produced as a “desperation, disaster weapon for last-ditch use.” However, the arrangements to 
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produce it should be made in such a way as to “preserve deniability that any such requirement 
existed…”806 While clearly a political dodge, it was another sign despite their expressions of 
public confidence on the issue, fallout was increasingly constraining the choices available to 
policy makers. Interestingly, the memo’s author laid out what he saw as the problem driving the 
whole issue. Generals, who knew little about nuclear matters, were advised by lower ranking 
officers who lacked guidance due to what was a policy of “in effect:” 
Another major handicap lies in our National Policy (sic) which establishes no 
specific war objectives from which the military can deduce any limitation on the 
destruction to be inflicted on the enemy. Consequently, no limitations are 
planned.
807
 
 
Alarmingly for its still-anonymous author, the lack of apparent constraints demonstrated 
how the few who understood the implications of fallout for the military utility of nuclear 
weapons were shocked at the continued resistance within the Air Force to coming to terms with 
that reality. In its enthusiasm for airpower, General LeMay himself could have written the 
memo. The sentiment of revulsion at the wanton excess of SAC’s war plans was an indication 
the author’s view was widespread in the military, in uneasy juxtaposition to others like LeMay 
who believed war without limits enabled by the tenets of nuclear absolutism was the only 
prescription possible in the nuclear age. The only way to avoid nuclear destruction seemed to be 
to destroy the opponent first before he could launch his bombers or missiles. Once fallout was 
factored in, however, it was recognized this would be a suicidal act, even if Russian retaliation 
could be cut short by a quick victory. How could the president explain “winning” such a war and 
what would that “victory” look like? 
After discussing the rather arbitrary math of the target planners’ calculations for a 
requirement to expend 110 megatons in an effort to ensure 90% probability of destruction of a 
single airfield, Strauss’s correspondent expressed his dismay at the purposeful ignorance about 
fallout on display in secret. 
When SAC calls for high probability of cratering runways, with high CEP 
[circular error probability], the yield required for single-weapon attack is not only 
high, but the weapon must be ground burst. Fall-out from such attacks has been 
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largely ignored to date by all planners except SACEUR (Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe) who prohibits ground bursts.
808
 
 
In a nutshell, concerns about developing “clean” weapon designs were wholly beside the 
point if they were used in such a fashion; given the yields involved and a zero height of burst; 
under such a targeting scheme, fallout would be massive regardless of the weapon design. Citing 
his breadth of experience in Europe, the author noted that it was only under General Lauris 
Norstad as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) that any of the Air Force commands 
considered fallout as a factor in what he called a “stone age” approach to developing military 
requirements for nuclear weapons.
809
 Acknowledging Murray might just have a point, he also 
rebelled at the notion Murray’s “guesses” should substitute for those which he acknowledged the 
military planners were also routinely making.
810
 If it was possible, the “goddamnedest thing” 
grew incrementally more damning. The insights offered by Strauss’ anonymous informant spoke 
to the likelihood the routine marginalization of consideration being given to the multiple perils of 
fallout pre-existed the anonymous officer’s experience, a policy that represented continuity over 
change over the bulk of the nineteen-fifties. 
Strauss Flips on Delivering “Clean,” Runs out of Others to Blame under Gathering Clouds 
Despite these obviously mixed, even pessimistic results from REDWING on “clean” and 
“dirty” weapon design, Strauss issued a statement on behalf of the AEC on 19 July 1956 
conforming to the official theme of the test series, while conveniently ignoring the factual 
results. Rarely one to avoid stirring the pot of controversy further, Strauss argued that the test 
series heralded the arrival of a new era of “humanitarian” weapon designs. Strauss claimed the 
results of REDWING meant “mass hazard from fallout is not a necessary complement to the use 
of large nuclear weapons.”811  Congress was increasingly skeptical of Strauss’s claims. U.S. 
Representative Chet Holifield rather presciently noted Strauss lacked credibility. 
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Huckstering is no substitute for policy as we grope for solutions to the atomic and 
hydrogen dilemma.
812
 
 
Eisenhower was no more impressed than Congress; in fact, he ducked the fallout storm 
Strauss stirred by refusing to issue a Strauss-prepared statement claiming advances made at 
REDWING “resulted in only a fraction of the fallout experienced in our previous Pacific tests,” 
ostensibly because the president did not want to take questions that might be raised by bringing 
up the subject.
813
 Whether fallout or Strauss’s personal faults lay at the root of Ike’s growing 
mistrust of Strauss’s advice mattered little at this point. Strauss was more effective in the role of 
lightning rod than as the barn it protected, a dangerous situation for a presidential appointee with 
a controversial agenda to enact.
814
 Strauss either obviously did not understand the cumulative 
nature of fallout, if he still believed it did not represent a “mass hazard” in wartime, or his 
statement was as cynical as his persecution of Oppenheimer. The threat of a “mass hazard” 
created by fallout clearly was before Eisenhower – and he wanted to change the subject in 
public, not deal with inconvenient candor. 
Discretely pointing out his own intimate relationship with the intelligence uses of fallout, 
AEC Commissioner Willard Libby also opposed confirming the United States could alter 
production of fallout by means of weapon design.  Libby’s concerns centered on how such a 
statement could be used in concert with radiochemical analysis of fallout to infer restricted data 
about weapon design. Libby frankly acknowledged “a series of events” had forced the AEC’s 
hands on the matter of being seen to do something about fallout, the most significant being the 
inadvertent release of top secret testimony by Army Lieutenant General James Gavin in late May 
1956 in the middle of REDWING.
815
 Fallout’s capacity to extend its political effects outside the 
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hermetically-sealed world of national security drastically turned up the pressure for the AEC to 
act. Much was at stake. 
 Mr. Libby said that if the proposed statement were made, it was possible that it 
would ultimately lead to warfare with radiological weapons or that the DOD 
would be forced to stockpile only “clean” weapons. The commissioners then 
discussed whether public opinion might force the DOD to such a step.
816
 
 
Strauss then insisted that the world needed the reassurance of a statement that the United 
States was committed to achieve a “clean” weapon design in order “to reduce pressure for the 
cessation of weapons tests.” In the end, Libby dropped his own previous opposition to such a 
statement, arguing it was necessary this time, but must be coordinated closely with the Pentagon 
and the entire government to be persuasive. Essentially, fallout was at this point ironically 
forcing the secret of “clean” weapons into the open despite significant opposition to releasing 
information about them, largely because public opinion about fallout and its unavoidable 
connection to any nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, which could be exploited in the same 
manner as the United States did, created nearly irresistible political pressures for government to 
be seen as acting to limit it. However, to suggest this was fully a product of social actors ignores 
the vital role of fallout’s capacity to insinuate itself and force the hands of social actors despite 
human evasion and resistance. Even in simply being avoided, whether in the public statements of 
the president, the classified memos of an AEC commissioner, or the myriad of other ways 
something secret like fallout became an uncomfortable subject of public discussion, it played a 
powerful role as a material actor among and within networks of human actors.  
Conventionalization: 1956: Throwing the Bones 
….the United States appears to be gambling, as far as civil defense is concerned, 
that there will not be a war.
817
 
 
In the midst of the slowly percolating  public uproar over fallout, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
sat down to what Campbell Craig called “the richest NSC meeting on nuclear strategy during the 
entire Eisenhower era” on 27 February 1956. Focusing on the annual basic national security 
policy review, JCS Chair Admiral Arthur M. Radford pitched inclusion of more comprehensive 
language on the terms of engagement of nuclear weapons in order to address their pervasive 
                                                 
816
 Commission Discussions of Public Statement of Reduced Fallout Weapons, attachment to 
Memorandum for the Chairman dated July 21, 1956 from W. B. McCool, Secretary, 13-16; cited in Hansen, Swords 
of Armageddon, IV-189-191. 
817
 Brig. General (retired) Thomas R. Phillips, “Civil Defense,” Air Force, V. 38, No. 10 (October 1955), 60-61. 
305 
 
presence in frontline military units. Radford essentially asked for authority to implement the 
same rules of engagement for tactical nuclear weapons as applied to conventional weapons when 
designated for defensive purposes.
818
 Here Radford invoked the basic principle of nuclear 
absolutism, arguing that the only effective answer to a nuclear threat was a nuclear defense 
The prospect alarmed the president, given his fear of rapid escalation into general nuclear 
war such an incident could precipitate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed for the formal change of 
language to provide greater flexibility for the use of tactical nuclear weapons under 
circumstances other than general war; the JCS also requested more incremental options be added 
to the Strategic Air Command’s massive retaliation war plans. In part due to pressure from 
European allies simultaneously fearful of stopping a potential Russian attack and the use of 
American thermonuclear weapons to do so with resulting fallout, Secretary of State Dulles 
endorsed this clarification, already enshrined in policy as NSC-5602/1.
819
 In fact, the two 
initiatives worked somewhat at cross purposes, given the Europeans were just as alarmed as 
Eisenhower about the potential for an American officer to start a nuclear war with a loosely-
controlled tactical weapon.  
Reflecting the pitch by Admiral Radford, the apparent goal of the significant policy shift 
toward tactical nuclear weapons underway at the Pentagon was part of a wider effort on the part 
of the JCS to effectively conventionalize the use of nuclear weapons. The remedy to the 
perceived lack of utility of high yield thermonuclear weapons due to their massive fallout was to 
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embrace weapons with significantly less fallout simply by virtue of their limited yield, ironically, 
yet fortuitously present and scheduled to soon be ready for action in the U.S. stockpile thanks to 
the legacy of Robert Oppenheimer’s prior leadership of the AEC’s General Advisory Committee. 
In Europe, fallout contributed to a significant shift from a virtually all-SAC Air Force show to 
one where the Army constituted a significant part of nuclear-equipped forces, with tactical air 
power now constituting the bulk of frontline air force units. As attractive as the 
conventionalization solution was to the Pentagon, it perturbed the president as risky business. 
Interestingly, despite Eisenhower’s fear of surprise attack, the president carefully avoided 
the question of limited, flexible use of nuclear weapon until the JCS put him on the spot about it 
in the spring of 1956. Meeting in May with just the four members of the JCS present, 
Eisenhower’s follow-up response to the military’s gambit, shaped by Clausewitzian theory, 
argued armed conflict tends toward general, total war, using “every weapon at hand.” 
Eisenhower felt it highly unlikely the USSR’s leaders would resist massive use of any nuclear 
weapons available to them in the event of nuclear conflict with the United States.
820
  
As a West Point graduate, it was unsurprising the president framed his theoretical 
orientation with the aid of Clausewitz; more significant was his expansion and refashioning of 
Clausewitz to the demands of the nuclear age.  Eisenhower adapted Clausewitz by arguing for a 
utilitarian approach to war in the nuclear age, recognizing weapons technology was inextricably 
interwoven with the ideological, social, and political relationships of total war.  
Eisenhower’s innovation centered on realization the effects of nuclear weapons, most 
significantly of all their fallout, put not just the state at risk, but society itself. Fallout made the 
potential costs of nuclear war too high to profit from in any sense in all but the most exceptional 
cases; even then, success remained dubious and depended on a redefinition of victory as 
something very different from any war ever undertaken. Here was where fallout played a major 
role in prompting Eisenhower to recognize nuclear weapons created a stalemate, as Campbell 
Craig related in detail; notably, Craig did not closely connect Eisenhower’s innovation to the 
problem of fallout as decisive, rather invoking the supraconventional effects of physical 
destruction as the basis of Ike’s belief.821  The result was a military strategy dependent on the 
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deterrent effects of nuclear weapons, rather than on their use, as the only viable outcome to the 
Cold War confrontation.  
Shattered Victory 
Despite the growing effort to refashion discourse in support of fallout, leaks and 
subsequent declassifications provided evidence the debate about the utility of nuclear weapons 
was far from settled. What did General Gavin’s testimony suggest about the increasingly 
controversial nature of fallout within the government and the military? At the 25 May 1956 
closed hearing by the Senate Subcommittee on the Air Force, Gavin, the Army’s Director of 
Research and Development, testified about the toll fallout would impose on the victors were the 
United States to prevail in a nuclear war against the Soviets. While it was unclear exactly how 
Gavin’s testimony was printed and inadvertently released just over a month later, its sensitivity 
was crystal clear given the release’s timing during the REDWING series.822 Gavin stated it was 
estimated “deadly radioactive fallout” would kill “hundreds of millions of people, including a 
great many in friendly countries…in an all-out Air Force attack on the Soviet Union.” Unlike 
much informed and uninformed opinion on the matter, Gavin specifically noted that the numbers 
he quoted were drawn from current planning documents, essentially what the Pentagon’s agenda 
was for tomorrow if war were to suddenly begin. General Gavin strongly suggested the Air Force 
should give its own account of the problem.
823
 Given the interval since CASTLE BRAVO and 
the SAC’s substantial lack of attention to the matter of fallout except for intelligence purposes in 
the interim, the plans Gavin referred to were based on extrapolations from the threat posed by the 
cumulative fallout generated in accord with the level of anticipated Air Force strikes against 
Soviet targets. While Gavin did not use the word “goddamnedest,” his suggestion that the Air 
Force should offer its own account of the matter seemed to distinguish between what he reported 
in confidence and what the Army supported in public. Ultimately, the lack of further direct 
comment on the matter largely buried its import. 
The dispute pointed out the role of fallout in heightening inter-service rivalry, which was 
a factor in the hearings held in late May 1956. Secretary of Defense Wilson described 
Eisenhower as “a bit vexed” about the squabbling over the roles and responsibilities of various 
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weapons systems each service favored.
824
 At its root was a growing clamor from the Army and 
Navy for their own arsenal of tactical weapons, even as fallout placed limits on the Air Force’s 
acquisition of the high yield weapons it had fought so tenaciously for just a few years earlier.
825
 
Having failed to make its case for a virtual monopoly priority on fissile material for SAC, but 
winning the battle against Oppenheimer, the Air Force then lost the war on high-yield weapons 
and found itself thrown into more direct competition with the other services for the vast, but still 
finite nuclear resources provided by the AEC.
826
 Army and Navy capacity to begin fielding a 
diverse range of tactical weapons systems in 1956 thus was largely made possible by the 
weapons development legacy of the Oppenheimer-era 1950 GAC.  
How fallout impacted the shifting strategic stockpile mix was demonstrated at 
REDWING by the fact that UCRL shots like INCA, KICKAPOO, and YUMA were more 
historically significant for being 15 kilotons yield or less than the yield of the second 
laboratory’s first successful thermonuclear shot there was, the 3.5 megaton ZUNI device.827 The 
Livermore laboratory, created to focus on creating high-yield strategic weapons for the Air 
Force, now divided its time to include both “clean” and tactical weapons to address the shifting 
strategic paradigm created by the forced recognition that fallout was a far more significant threat 
than originally envisioned. This effort created a frustrating hierarchy of preferences for the Air 
Force, which having seen its access to desired high-yield weapons limited by fallout, found 
alternatives, which placed them again in competition with the other services. Both tactical 
weapons and the questionable quest for “clean” weapons were inherently less “efficient” than 
SAC would be in their use of fissile material and delivery system capacity. While SAC felt it 
lacked what it needed, what it possessed was more than enough to deliver a knockout punch to 
humanity, as well as to any specific opponent. 
Despite his assessment that REDWING’s results were “spectacular,” Chuck Hansen 
turned uncharacteristically judgmental, given the usually even-handed gaze of his evaluations of 
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formerly secret documents. Hansen summed up this relatively brief infatuation with the prospect 
of discovering a technical fix for fallout bluntly. 
Aside from being an interesting technological challenge, “clean” weapons were 
primarily just an expensive public relations gimmick.
828
 
 
Certainly, one thing undermining the putative national commitment to reducing fallout at 
REDWING with “clean” weapons was the work done there in parallel on the development of 
“salted” weapons to intentionally increase the radiation produced, demonstrating the liminal 
potential for an even worse public backlash against the nuclear plans of the AEC and Pentagon. 
It is worth interrogating again Teller’s documented concern about publicly revealing that the 
ZUNI shot was a “clean” design. Teller’s objection likely centered on the fact such a revelation 
might identify samples from other shots as being particularly dirty. Given Teller was both 
cognizant of fallout’s informative potential and already wary of identifying a “clean” shot, it 
follows almost certainly that he and others were equally concerned about the comparisons that 
sampling potentially held for every other shot in the series as well.  
REDWING was successful in increasing the efficiency of specific U.S. weapons designs, 
but the overall yield efficiency of 58% from fusion was actually less than CASTLE’s 63% from 
fusion, the latter statistic driven by the unexpectedly large yield of BRAVO.
829
 Even in pursuing 
research to suppress fallout, the United States government remained conflicted about what 
national policy was on fallout – having left so much of that to chance over the last decade, other 
than for intelligence – that it continued to generate fallout at basically the same rate as before it 
became an issue. If not for the secrecy shielding the nuclear program in general and fallout 
specifically, the contrast between the claims made and the token results achieved in fallout 
reduction by the REDWING test series would have been a scandal. 
NSC 68 Withers Away with a Whimper, Not a Bang 
While the implications of the observable supraconventional blast and fire effects of 
nuclear weapons, recognized as the original design goals for these weapons reaching back to the 
Manhattan Project, were easy enough to grasp, it was Eisenhower’s recognition his reliable, vital 
intelligence resource, fallout, also served as a veiled, but nonetheless real threat delineating the 
limits of nuclear power was innovatively new. Ike recognized the fundamentally conservative 
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approach to strategy the problem of fallout dictated. Rather than embrace LeMay’s belief in the 
harsh virtues of megatonnage or trust to the smaller yields of tactical weapons to overcome the 
massive fallout effects produced by high-yield weapons , the president concluded nuclear 
weapons represented an inflexible strategic dead-end whose use was to be avoided. 
The great fear of the American government’s public engagement with fallout through 
1957 continued to be the mantra first elaborated by Dean Acheson in February 1950. 
As the power of mass destruction weapons grows, public opinion will ill support 
the prospect of war conducted with such agencies and will tend to lose its sense of 
perspective and entertain wild schemes for the settlement of political conflict.
830
 
 
In this light, the central horror of nuclear war, fallout, came to be seen as a sort of psychic 
blackmail on government, as if the forthright admission of its existence and risks would sap the 
will of free people to resist Communist aggression. Acheson’s idea did implicitly stand the 
recently broken American nuclear monopoly on its head by suggesting the extraconventional 
effects of nuclear weapons would undermine national security just as surely as their 
supraconventional effects were relied upon to protect and sustain it. Acheson’s framing, 
however, saw fallout as primarily a psycho-social problem amenable to the standard efforts of 
morale boosting and was the central precept for most fallout policy during the nineteen-fifties. 
Over most of a decade that followed, Eisenhower and his advisors continued to struggle 
with the facts, fruitlessly trying to sever the fallout issue from nuclear weapons. Towards the end 
of the decade there were mixed signals and clearly a revival of concern underway about the 
central question GABRIEL asked, but was not given the chance to definitively answer. One 
report found among documents from 1958 in the AEC’s Division of Biology and Medicine, 
clumsily titled “The Number of Nuclear Weapons Which Might Be Tolerable to World 
Populations,” began by arguing, “It is impossible to state a maximum number of nuclear 
weapons…to be tolerable to populations of…neutral nations.” The maximum yields studied, 
again updated from the revised 2,000 megaton limit in the later editions of GABRIEL, ranged 
from 4,000 megatons upward to 1,000,000 megatons! While the supporting calculations were 
extensive (and somewhat unreadable), the conclusions suggested a bit of a whitewash, 
considering the yields expended. One table of calculated incidence of injury and death associated 
with 4,000 megatons of yield foresaw only a rough doubling of the leukemia rate. A discussion 
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of risks associated with some significant isotopes briefly acknowledged the potential for infants 
and children to suffer injury, but then largely dismissed iodine-131 from the discussion because 
of its short half-life, arguing that removal of the thyroid solved most issues associated with it and 
hormones were available as replacement therapy.
831
  While that might make sense in the calm 
world of research medical bureaucracy, it would be of doubtful comfort in a post-attack world 
where people had to grapple with the exigencies of contaminated food and water, let alone 
enormous demands on specialist medical resources by individuals under wartime conditions. 
Another paper, dated 1 May 1959, clearly reflected more up-to-date knowledge and 
another change in the calculation of nuclear war, a surprising reduction in yield, to just 1,000 
megatons – essentially a reversion to a range within GABRIEL’s research premise and a far 
more constrained scenario than contemplated in the intervening years. Titled “Long-Term 
Biological Effects of a [sic] Nuclear Warfare,” this presumed scenario was the result of a limited 
attack on the United States, perhaps suggesting it might be the estimate of damage from Soviet 
attacks that evaded NORAD air defenses. While the full implications of iodine-131 were again 
given limited attention due to its “transient” nature, here the calculations clearly indicated 
children were likely to receive a dose to the thyroid ten times that of an adult when exposed to 
the same level of fallout. The report again saw limited long-term consequences, with a 
disturbingly optimistic caveat attached. 
…[T]he conclusion must be made that the immediate biological damage probably 
would greatly exceed the long-term hazard.
832
 
  
The president’s actions in placing constraints on their testing prompted by fallout 
demonstrated a similar understanding of the implications of fallout’s limits on strategy in the 
nuclear age.
833
 Confirming the immutability of fallout as a strategic factor was the military’s 
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rejection of reduced-fallout weapons represented as “clean.” Given their deep interest in his 
many other proposals, the Pentagon was singularly disinterested in the idea of “clean” weapons, 
even from Teller, a conclusion later confirmed by the results of 1958’s HARDTACK test 
series.
834
 
Another factor indicative of fallout’s pervasive latent influence was found in the subtext 
of a 1956 report on the “Human Effects” of nuclear war.835 Eisenhower took an extraordinarily 
cautious approach to the panel’s primary recommendation – the need to educate the public about 
the realities of nuclear war in order to address the misperceptions most Americans had about it. 
Seemingly, a forthright discussion of fallout was also long overdue in order to comply with the 
president’s policy of candor. The Human Effects panel was frank on “the need for constructive 
leadership” through “the processes of involvement and participation.” Given it functioned in a 
democracy, the panel felt it was necessary to go into detail about the scope of the threat in order 
to develop enough public support for national security policy to sustain morale in the event of a 
sudden onset of war.
 836
  
One excluded topic was fallout, which had to be factored into the findings by the 
president once the “Human Effects” report arrived at the White House in early 1957. Given the 
depth of knowledge about fallout Eisenhower clearly possessed, the report’s conclusions on the 
five factors of morale it identified could only engender a heightened sense of alarm once the 
president brought together its findings about nuclear war with the fallout protection later urged 
by the forthcoming Gaither report.
837
 The “Human Effects” report nonetheless identified factors 
                                                                                                                                                             
Armageddon, V-385, V-389, V-396. While not a clear-cut break with its past heritage of megatonnage above all, it 
was the sort of decided turnaround that indicated the Air Force was beginning to come to terms with the limits that 
thermonuclear weapons imposed on the rational exercise of war.                         
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that could be usefully applied to a better understanding of fallout’s threat. Among these were its 
ability to undermine “confidence in leaders;” the government’s long record of dissimulation on 
fallout might serve to betray the existing trust needed “for effective communications throughout 
the group;” and – in the eyes of many already – the government’s failure to limit fallout was 
vulnerable to being seen as trifling with “the health of the group – both physical and mental…an 
element of major importance.”838  
The Price of Victory 
Perhaps without anyone except the president quite realizing it, taken in context the 
“Human Effects” report ran up against the same problem with fallout that Sean Malloy and 
others described as originally worrying General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan 
Project, about TRINITY – at a minimum, concern about the prospect of explaining an apparent 
technical and policy failure after billions of dollars were spent on it.
839
  
For Groves, it was simply a matter of whether or not the device exploded that confirmed 
the Manhattan Project money was well spent. For Eisenhower, the question was more 
epistemological. What if every nuclear weapon made did not deliver more real security, but 
rather undermined it further? The problem of fallout also tended to reinforce Campbell Craig’s 
thesis that Ike was maneuvering to make nuclear war next to impossible except under the direst 
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conditions of national survival.
840
 Thus, as Michael S. Sherry explained, Eisenhower faced a 
rather more systemic problem than the simple failure to successfully detonate Groves feared at 
TRINITY: What were the political costs of explaining that the Bomb as the central conceptual 
and material guarantor of national security represented a deeply flawed, perhaps even untenable 
solution to national security needs – or at least was increasingly recognized as possessing 
significant limitations?  
Still, atomic peril was also paralyzing…It fostered a fatalistic belief in 
technological determinism, as if the bomb rather than people determined the 
world’s course, and a deep fear whose focus could be transferred from the bomb 
to the Soviets, With “fear of the Russians” replacing “fear of the bomb,” the 
“dread destroyer of 1945 had become the shield of the Republic by 1950.” 
Deterrence hardly resolved much, however, especially once the Kremlin acquired 
nuclear weapons: was it credible to threaten it with nuclear retaliation if the 
ensuring war might destroy the United States or its allies? Yet if the threat was 
not credible, what use did America’s atomic weapons have…?841 
 
How would the public react to news use of thousands of nuclear weapons against the Russians 
was fundamentally constrained by the threat their fallout posed to American lives? 
With the fall 1956 campaign looming, Eisenhower was naturally reluctant to arouse this 
sleeping dog prior to the election, with the “Human Effects” panel report timed to arrive in 
December 1956. Work on this national intelligence estimate (NIE) began in March 1956 and was 
a product of a committee of social scientists, which tended to marginalize the impact of its 
conclusions from the AEC and the military bureaucracy, casting its recommendations more as a 
bureaucratic feint, than as an effort intended to fully engage the attention of Eisenhower and his 
advisers. Its impact and that of the following Gaither Report can be gauged from a general shift 
to greater openness about fallout beginning in 1957 by the president, the military, in Congress 
with hearings, and even a greater openness in secret as AFOAT-1 began sharing a basic 
summary of its secret mission with selected partners elsewhere in government.
842
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Craig’s description of the “Human Effects” report as pivotal in leading Eisenhower to his 
conclusion of the necessity of making general war involving nuclear weapons improbable found 
his argument replicating much of the panel’s relegation of fallout to the same small space 
allowed for fallout to play in the “Human Effects” report itself. 843 This “fallout gap” in the 
received narrative obscured by dint of its unintended papering over of fallout’s supposed 
inconsequential nature that reflected its intentional historical marginalization because of its use 
as an intelligence source and its potential “banana peel” effect on American strategic dependence 
on thermonuclear weapons. The perspective of seeing the problem as primarily a subjective 
reaction to fallout, rather than as fallout itself being a problem, was cozily and seductively 
rational. While acknowledging the role of the irrational, it stood in as a substitute explanation for 
another more substantive motivation for policy change regarding fallout – its empirical effects 
fundamentally undermined the utility of nuclear weapons.  
Because of security restrictions, the issue here, as with much Cold War history, was not 
inaccuracy so much as incomplete accounting for all significant factors. Thus, Craig’s already 
substantive argument that Eisenhower wanted to make thermonuclear war all but unthinkable, 
accounting for what he called the “paradox of Eisenhower’s military policy,” is fundamentally 
strengthened by reference to the crucial context of fallout and the role nuclear intelligence played 
in Eisenhower’s close and informed command of the levers of national security policymaking. 
Fallout was often relegated to being an inconvenient or unfortunate and certainly unintended by-
product of nuclear weapons despite its clearly consequential, if largely undocumented, role in 
shaping the presidential anxieties about public “hysteria” and the policy changes needed to 
address its risks. It was one thing to deal with irrationality when there were few if any facts that 
supported such conclusions. But if the public’s potential for “hysteria” were to be bolstered by 
available, but top secret-classified empirical evidence, then the issue became quite difficult from 
a policy stand point. 
If the Cold War turned hot, fallout meant that Eisenhower risked the prospect of a sudden 
defeat in a nuclear war that would be all but literally world-shattering or, alternatively and nearly 
as grimly, might achieve a victory that would seem much the same as defeat to most Americans. 
Fallout from thermonuclear weapons made them too dangerous to contemplate using in a 
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“preventative” violent overthrow of Communism. This left prevention of war as the only realistic 
option. Fallout was a major contribution to Eisenhower’s grappling with the fact that the 
paramount national security priority of the Cold War was peace, not the risky potential for war 
championed in the aggressive posture of containment and confrontation outlined in NSC 68.
844
 
Notably, despite a number of references to it and a chapter titled “Fallout” and as with Richard 
Rhodes, Craig’s monograph on nuclear strategy did not index the term, reflecting his 
concentration on the familiar historiographic interplay between social actors as the notable 
narrative factors. Given General Gavin’s revelations in May 1956, Eisenhower already knew that 
the fallout from even a putative military victory would kill the “hundreds of millions” Gavin 
described to Congress.
845
  
If nuclear hostilities broke out, what “victory” might be snatched from the jaws of defeat 
depended on quick and decisive action in order to conclusively limit the Russian side’s ability to 
make war; only massive retaliation could do that, but as few but the president understood, only at 
the cost of exposing one’s own nation and the rest of the planet to fallout on a scale almost 
beyond human understanding in its scope and threat to humanity, even if the Soviet Union were 
caught so flat-footed as to be unable to get off a single retaliatory shot.
846
 Craig’s portrait of 
Eisenhower noted his original, if somewhat conflicted view on deterrence put him in much the 
same corner as LeMay – favoring the threat of a decisive retaliatory strike to discourage Soviet 
aggression. Yet the president clearly and consistently remained at odds with LeMay in his stated 
aversion to the SAC commander’s insatiable appetite for high-yield weapons, even as the Air 
Force continued to embrace them as an effective solution to the Cold War confrontation.  
The president’s rationale for grudgingly embracing massive retaliation was simple and, as 
Craig noted, seemed to parallel LeMay’s.  
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[W]hy should we put a single nickel into anything but developing our capacity to 
diminish the enemy’s capacity for nuclear attack…the United States should 
continue to concentrate on producing a force that is so good and so well 
distributed that the Soviets will not attack.
847
  
 
Where Ike differed from his erstwhile SAC commander was deterrence. It was a 
fundamental disagreement, given LeMay’s proclivity for bombastic suggestions his crews could 
quickly resolve any confrontation in favor of the United States. The president’s atomic anxieties 
were arguably aggravated by his visceral response to reading “Human Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons.” The omission of fallout from the agenda of the Human Effects panel was likely an 
effort to compartmentalize the problem of fallout for security reasons, with the empirical issues 
of fallout left to 1957’s Gaither Report.848 
From the other direction, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued for more flexibility 
than Eisenhower’s plans allowed. Massive retaliation was a difficult diplomatic hard sell for 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies, who fretted alternatively between the 
opposed poles of abandonment anxiety and the fear of becoming a fallout-strewn nuclear 
battlefield, stuck between the rock of inaction and the hard place of cataclysm. This eventually 
translated into their acquiescence to a vast expansion of the tactical weapon stockpile available to 
forward-deployed U.S. forces in Europe as these weapons became operational in the late 1950s. 
Many of these NATO allies then accepted nuclear warheads under U.S. custodial control to 
equip their own tactical nuclear forces, primarily air defense and artillery.
849
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serendipitous results of the 1950 GAC’s planning for tactical weapons was a grudgingly 
embraced alternative for NATO military forces that reduced the potential for collateral damage 
and limiting the fallout high-yield weapons threatened under wartime conditions; there was 
considerably less enthusiasm for nuclear weapons of any kind among the general population. 
When the conversation with the JCS continued the next day, Eisenhower articulated his 
goal was not defeat of the Soviet Union should it misjudge the situation, but to evaluate whether 
“the suggested courses of action would markedly reduce the threat of the holocaust described 
yesterday.”850 In case the point was lost on his subordinates, he emphasized it again in another 
NSC meeting in January 1957. 
The concept of deterrent power has gone as far as it can. In view of this incredible 
situation we must have fresh thinking on how to conduct ourselves.
851
 
 
Unlike LeMay and the Air Force, Eisenhower appeared to disabuse himself of any 
illusion a nuclear war could be “won.” It was evident that his faith in deterrence was shaky, too. 
The president repeatedly demonstrated his concern about the potential cost of nuclear war with 
the USSR, from the 1953 “cross of iron” speech through to his 1961 farewell address focusing 
on the threat to democracy posed by the military-industrial complex.
852
 Already wary of the 
supraconventional effects of nuclear weapons, fallout as an extraconventional effect drove the 
stumbling stone of nuclear weapons’ lack of utility beneath his feet repeatedly and 
unavoidably.
853
 It was a message an experienced and wary general was quite unlikely to 
overlook or ignore. 
Another troubling item on the agenda of the 1 August 1957 NSC meeting demonstrated 
the continuing pressures fallout secretly yet effectively placed on the president and his advisers. 
William F. Vandercook examined the context in which the NSC reviewed NIE 100-6-57, 
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“Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development,” the final report from the panel. Much like 
Weart’s Nuclear Fear, Vandercook problematized fallout anxieties as primarily a subjective 
human reaction largely disconnected from fallout as a technological problem, similar to Weart’s 
framing of the issue.  The report showed the NSC focused on the belief that fallout’s impact was 
primarily a political problem amenable to elite control. Many of the issues summarized in the 
report originated in the harsh, constraining reality fallout imposed on the development of 
thermonuclear weapons as the inevitable extraconventional augmentation to their enormous 
potential for supraconventional destructive power.
854
 
Paradoxically, even as the Pentagon found new value in Oppenheimer’s legacy of a 
diverse tactical weapon stockpile by widely adopting the first fruits of the1950 General Advisory 
Committee’s production plan into frontline service, crudely addressing the issue of fallout by 
limiting yield, the president’s negative views on the matter of battlefield use of nuclear weapons 
hardened.
855
 Craig argued making nuclear war all but unthinkable except in a clear-cut case of 
national survival grew into an implicit policy at the root of Eisenhower’s strategic decision-
making during his second term.
856
 Eisenhower’s views on nuclear war did not so much shift as 
organically take form from his own military experience, but his alarm over the potential for the 
escalation of nuclear conflict was reflected in the Human Effects panel’s estimates of stunning 
devastation in the event of even a relatively limited Soviet attack on the United States.
857
 When it 
was launched in October 1957, Sputnik all but confirmed the Soviet Union was capable of 
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launching an attack on the United States with ballistic missiles, while sparking a revival of 
executive interest in critical scientific advice largely dormant since the 1954 Oppenheimer 
hearing.
858
  
Craig argued that Eisenhower did not have faith in deterrence alone to keep the peace, 
because deterrence depended on having rational actors on both sides. The consequences of a 
failure of deterrence with thermonuclear weapons were enormous. One superficially positive 
aspect of fallout was that it seemed to increase the value of deterrence, even though fallout’s 
contribution to destruction was something SAC specifically rejected as consequential in terms of 
its targeting protocols. In this sense, General LeMay’s vision of deterrence also varied from the 
president’s, as SAC sought to systematically exclude fallout as a consequential factor. This tack 
was akin to the sleight of mind evident in Radford’s proposal to treat defensive tactical nuclear 
weapons the same as conventional weapons under rules of engagement authority. Suggesting that 
militarily “clean” weapons were adequate solutions to the problem of wartime cumulative fallout 
in relation to the arms race was another attempt to create through policy making new classes of 
nuclear weapons whose use would not be constrained by fear of their fallout.
859
 These efforts to 
“conventionalize” nuclear weapons also reflected the need to limit the influence of outsider 
beliefs on military personnel, should their potential to create fallout give them pause in 
employment of nuclear weapons. As Craig argued, the potential for such loose rules of 
engagement to lead to conflict motivated Eisenhower to deter, not just the Russians, but also the 
Pentagon from rash action.
860
 Selling Americans on such caution was another matter. 
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…even if Eisenhower could abstractly permit himself to believe that general war 
was no longer acceptable, how could he renounce the idea of American national 
security during the height of the Cold War? There was no way that he could 
straightforwardly suggest to his military and civilian advisers, the nation as a 
whole, and America’s allies around the world that the advent of intercontinental 
thermonuclear weaponry meant that the United States would no longer wage all-
out war.
861
 
 
Eisenhower’s dilemma on nuclear strategy also explained his reluctance to implement the 
Gaither Committee’s 1957 recommendation for a national fallout shelter plan, while funding its 
recommendations on force protection, a view that persisted into the Kennedy years, despite 
Kennedy’s vocal support for civil defense. McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s national security 
adviser, summed up the situation in 1962, arguing that civil defense was “a losing battle,” 
regardless of Kennedy’s own enthusiasm for fallout shelters. Later that year, Harold A. Knapp Jr. 
argued… 
…deterrence being a psychological phenomenon is enhanced by the more horrible 
consequences for failing to deter. This bizarre feature of deterrence, with all its 
unspoken portent for civil defense was first pointed out by Winston Churchill in a 
1955 budget debate in the House of Commons. 
 
“After a certain point has been passed, the worse things get, the better. The broad 
effects of the latest developments is to spread almost indefinitely and to at least a 
vast extent the area of mortal danger…Then it might well be that we shall, by a 
process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be 
the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.”862 
 
Eisenhower assessed that the Air Force, despite its massive build-up of more destructive 
power than expended in all of the wars of history, faced an effective stalemate, even as secret 
evidence from MUSIC demonstrated a significant American lead in the basic materials of 
nuclear confrontation.
863
 The Air Force was not as sanguine, even as its leadership tacitly and 
discreetly conceded in quite circular fashion that things had changed because of fallout. 
For the first time in history, no head of state, whether democracy or dictatorship, 
can promise the man on Main Street clear-cut and certain victory in war. 
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The most he can promise is devastation of the lands of another people. He cannot 
promise his people that their own lands will not be blackened.
864
 
 
Like many references to it at the time, General Nathan F. Twining’s speech as the Air 
Force Association’s 1955 “Aviation’s Man of the Year” did not explicitly acknowledge fallout, 
but did implicitly warn of the dramatic effects it imposed on strategic policy even as arms control 
negotiations began at Geneva. Twining was certainly not referencing supraconventional weapon 
effects that, however powerful, were confined to the general area of ground zero. Rather, 
Twining was surreptitiously referencing the extraconventional, widespread effects of radiation 
that traveled beyond the zone of physical destruction to threaten the aggressor’s population, too. 
1957: The Fragile Nature of Eisenhower’s “Clean” Promise 
The government’s sloth-like effort to rebrand nuclear weapons as “clean” opened it to 
critical attack as untimely, insufficient, and misrepresented. Commissioner Willard Libby fanned 
the flames by his clumsy attempts at snuffing out the ill publicity winds carrying fallout. In an 
AEC press release issued just as the 1957 PLUMBBOB series began, Libby declared virtual 
certainty the problem of fallout was largely solved. 
[T]he amount of radioactive fallout per megaton of explosive power is very 
greatly reduced. I believe this is a most important development because it would 
minimize the potential health hazards to those who are far from the scene of the 
battle if nuclear weapons are used.
865
 
 
It was a spectacularly ambitious conclusion to draw, given the scope and scale of SAC’s 
war plans, the very limited experimental work completed so far and the daunting challenges 
further progress on “clean” weapons posed. Commissioner Murray and U.S. Representative Chet 
Holifield (D- California) of the JCAE both raised objections, arguing Libby’s statements were at 
best misleading. Holifield was blunt about the difference between Libby’s statement and the 
reality of nuclear war. 
It is true that fallout is being reduced. But there is and at present cannot be such a 
thing as an absolutely clean bomb, i.e., no fallout. Moreover, in any large-scale 
war, it would seem inevitable that weapons of varying degrees of cleanliness will 
be used, and the inevitable result will be large-scale fallout.
866
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Holifield came close, nudging right up to, but not quite crossing the line to realization it 
was the cumulative nature of their use in a “large-scale war” that was the problem with fallout, 
much less so than the individual dirtiness of any specific weapon. 
By 5 June 1957, Libby found himself forced to elaborate on his position in a supplement 
to his earlier statement as his goal became more obvious, declaring, “Unfortunately, there is no 
substitute for testing…[to develop] designs which would lessen still further radioactive 
contamination…”867 Eisenhower, generally reluctant to publicly address the topic himself, 
surprisingly climbed out on the political limb next to Libby by declaring the U.S. was able to 
reduce fallout by 90% at one test in a news conference on the same day Libby amended his 
remarks to the JCAE. Despite some relief found with Commissioner Murray’s departure from the 
AEC at the end of the month, the president confronted the same questions about fallout and the 
anxieties it engendered twice more during the summer of 1957 at news conferences on June 26 
and July 3 as the PLUMBBOB series continued in Nevada.
868
 The normally cautious Eisenhower 
was enticed enough by the possibility to publicly embrace it during the June 1957 press 
conference, when the president argued the United States could “produce ‘an absolutely clean 
bomb’ with ‘no fallout to injure any civilians or anyone, any innocent bystanders.’”869 Each time 
he offered his personal assurance that the problem of fallout was being addressed successfully, 
citing discussions with Lawrence and Teller. Interestingly, a significant motivation for Teller’s 
sudden conversion to the need for “clean” weapons was his fear fallout might discourage any use 
of nuclear weapons, a telling acknowledgement of the growing strength of concern about 
fallout’s capacity to undermine perceptions of their military utility.870 Teller’s anxieties about the 
impact of fallout were notable for their congruence with the same concerns about hesitancy 
expressed by Robert Oppenheimer and others in connection with the disputed VISTA report at 
the 1954 hearing, testimony that remained classified for sixty years. 
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 “Nuclear Bombs Bursting in Air” Overhead – With New Easy-“Clean” Feature 
In April 1957, the Army publicly announced its intent to ring American cities with “new 
missiles equipped with atomic warheads…” in order to defend them against attack by Soviet 
bombers.
871
 Driven by inter-service rivalries, geopolitical certainties, and strategic uncertainties, 
there was a great deal of competitive rivalry between the Army and the Air Force over how to 
prioritize responsibility for air defense with the limited funding available for defensive military 
forces.
872
 Fallout’s contentious position complicated the Army’s push for nuclear-armed air 
defense missiles, putting them in much the same spot as the Air Force, facing the need to 
convince an American public increasingly uncomfortable with fallout to tolerate it for their own 
“security.” The Army effectively asked them to accept the possibility of new, nuclear “bombs 
bursting in air” directly overhead of the most densely populated areas of the nation. Americans 
were told not to worry, however. 
The general also said the amount of radiation in fallout from an air explosion was 
“negligible.”873 
 
Akin to “nuisance,” “negligible” smacked of sophistry in the context of what the Army, 
the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission knew about fallout at this point. 
The declaration was clearly a proactive policy pronouncement intended to portray nuclear 
weapons the way the government wished they were, rather than as it already knew they were. 
Nuclear air defense represented the leading edge of the Pentagon’s ill-fated effort to 
conventionalize nuclear weapons, arguing they should be treated as simply more powerful 
versions of weapons already at the U.S. military’s disposal. 
American consumers were reassured in the very same edition of the New York Times that 
if there was fallout, it could be dealt with by such simple methods as “detergent and water.”874 
Newspaper readers in New York and across the country now regularly encountered such efforts 
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to promote positive spin about fallout in articles, setting the stage for marketing products to 
relieve fallout worries by playing on these anxieties to increase sales. These clumsy attempts to 
manipulate public discourse seemed to succeed at first, in the absence of other information. In 
fact, substantial – and worrying – new scientific concerns, which added context to the popular 
understanding of fallout, were looming on the horizon, as well as new cultural and social forces 
generated by fallout overseas that recirculated from the periphery back to the center.
875
 
Nuclear Absolutism Leads to Atomic Air Show 
The Air Force took its turn to pitch its ability to defend American cities in the May Day 
1957 edition of the Chicago Tribune. The new weapon was again an argument that the best 
defense against nuclear weapons was more nuclear weapons. The Commission announced it 
would open nine shots in the upcoming summer 1957 PLUMBBOB series in Nevada to small 
groups of journalists, although it chose to omit press observers at the test of a nuclear air-to-air 
rocket originally anticipated to be on the public test schedule. The reason given for the change 
was surprisingly frank about why a publicized test was initially considered for a weapon that, if 
used, would be detonated in full view of millions of Americans. 
A demonstration shot of an atomic rocket was planned to dispel any public 
apprehension that a high-altitude explosion of such a warhead against an enemy 
bomber would also rain death upon the city below. 
876
 
 
Amid sharp questioning in Congress about the sudden disappearance of the “bomber 
gap,” the Air Force sought to demonstrate its capability to strike down Soviet bombers with the 
JOHN shot of the 1957 test series. American citizen-consumers were directly asked to adjust 
their comfort level to accommodate fallout, not in some remote location, but just above the heads 
of their families. Nuclear defenses in urban skies were safe, because there was “virtually…no 
danger from these rockets.” Not quite safe enough it seemed, because the AEC canceled a 
scheduled public viewing of this shot due to “the possibility of some extremely slight hazards if 
                                                 
875
 The most poignant case of this recirculation to the center was that of the “Hiroshima maidens,” women disfigured 
by the only two instances when nuclear weapons were used in wartime in 1945. Brought to the United States for 
reconstructive surgery beginning in 1955 as part of a charitable reconciliation effort, their witness to the horrors of 
even limited nuclear warfare reinforced the conventional model of nuclear weapons in appearance. Often left untold 
in the simplification for American consumption were personal stories that frequently included radiation injuries. 
Championed by Norman Cousins, the narrative of the hibakusha, of those exposed to the nuclear bomb, became far 
more complex than a simple outstretched hand of medical care united with a chance to bear witness to the horrors of 
war where it served to mark the awful conclusion of the war against Japan. For more on this troubling, transnational 
narrative, see Naoko Shibusawa, America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 213-254. 
876
 Lloyd Norman, “AEC Drops Test of A-Weapons for U.S. Cities,” Chicago Tribune, 1 May 1957. 
326 
 
an accident occurs.”877 Instead, the PLUMBBOB JOHN shot was staged and recorded by an 
official photographer and then publicized as proof of the safety of a nuclear defense. 
Conducted at NTS, JOHN attempted to demonstrate the “conventional” nature of Air 
Force use of nuclear weapons on or above U.S. soil for defensive purposes. A group of five 
officer/“volunteers” stood at a point thousands of feet directly below the test explosion’s Ground 
Zero. A recording of audio from a film made to record that event provided several insights. 
H-Minus one minute...The airplane is up. Over our shoulders, it is a bright silver 
spot in the sky…Thirty seconds…John sees it. Twenty-five seconds… Twenty 
seconds [in background, countdown to rocket firing starts here at 10, 9, 8…] 
…There it goes. The rocket is gone….We felt a heat pulse, a very bright light, a 
fireball! It is red; the sky looks black about it. It is boiling above us. It is wrapped 
in Christ[-BANG!-]mas color! There is the ground wave! It is over, folks. It 
happened! The mounds[sic]  are vibrating! It is tremendous, directly above our 
heads. We lived! And we lived! [everyone shouting increasingly loudly over the 
narrator]   
[Second Voice] Boy, I’d hate to have been there! 
[Narrator] There is a huge fireball, the sounds are still echoing through here. 
Wasn’t that a perfect, perfect shot? 
[Second Voice] I think the first time in history that bombers will turn back now. 
[Third Voice] The bombers won’t come.  
[Second Voice] I feel this has been a great day for Air Defense Command. There 
is no question in my mind that that won’t do the job that it’s designed to do, 
namely, completely destroy a bomber at that altitude. There is absolutely no 
danger for the personnel on the ground here. We did feel the heat momentarily, as 
though one stepped out into the bright sunshine…878            
 
For the Air Force’s Air Defense Command, nuclear weapons were the obvious answer to 
the problem of defense against nuclear weapons, essentially a problem that offered its own 
solution.  It was also a solution directly refuting the oft-repeated claim made by airpower 
advocates that “the bomber always gets through,” embracing the same narrative of deterrence it 
applied to Air Force offensive strategic forces. In the internal logic of the Cold War nuclear 
absolutism, a nuclear means of defense was the best match against a nuclear threat, simply 
ignoring fallout was a problem. 
The height of PLUMBBOB JOHN’s burst (this shot was sometimes referred to as HA, 
for High Altitude) was reported variously by different sources. Chuck Hansen cited two March 
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1955 planning memoranda in calling the shot height as 36,620 feet.
879
 The Nuclear Weapons 
Archive listed a shot height, 18,500 feet, about half that originally planned in 1955.
880
 An Armed 
Forces Special Weapons Project report on radiation exposure to the air crew involved indicated a 
rocket release and burst height of 19,000 feet, with an accuracy of within ~100 feet.
881
 An AEC 
press release indicated only an altitude of “more than 15,000 feet.”882 Peter Kuran, who produced 
an audio transcript recorded during JOHN, suggested a much lower shot height of 10,000 feet 
during an interview.
883
 Although his copy of the taped audio was edited, the conversation and 
spoken time interval heard as the test count-down supports this even lower burst height. The 
speed of sound requires a count of between 32 seconds (340 meter/second) at sea level and 38 
seconds (295 meter/second) at 11,000 meters altitude in order to provide evidence to place the 
burst height at the test height of 36,000 feet originally planned in 1955. Kuran’s audio indicated 
timing between the flash observed by the participants and the sound of the explosion reaching 
the ground was considerably shorter, only about twelve seconds, than the interval required to 
support previously documented burst heights. This indicated a burst height considerably lower, 
somewhere between 11,614 and 13,385 feet, than previously documented. 
The ambiguity about the JOHN shot’s burst height associated with this clearly staged 
performance was indicative of the Air Force’s efforts to minimize the issues of utility that fallout 
increasingly imposed on nuclear weapons. The proposed test burst height suggested to 
Eisenhower in 1955 was clearly altered to an altitude only half as high – and perhaps even lower, 
based on propagation of the explosion’s sound. The theatrical, staged nature of the JOHN test 
was obvious in contemporary reporting, which interestingly also pointed toward a lower burst 
height than originally planned in 1955, as it was said to explode only “three miles up in the sky.” 
To demonstrate the safety of the weapon if used defensively over cities, five Air 
Force officers stood unprotected on the desert directly under today’s 
detonation…radioactive fallout was almost undetectable.884 
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Need for “Clean” Weapons Becomes Primary Pretext to Test 
The theatrics of the JOHN test came amidst dueling opinions and evidence about the 
impact of fallout. Having just stepped down as a AEC commissioner in June 1957, Thomas 
Murray charged that “the public should be informed that nuclear weapons without fallout are not 
available” in responding to an assertion by Edward Teller and E.O. Lawrence that “smaller 
hydrogen bombs with essentially no radioactive fallout” were possible.885 Coming in the early 
stages of the PLUMBBOB series at NTS, those who formerly only scoffed at the dangers of 
fallout from testing now embraced the problem as a public justification for further testing to 
produce the promised advances in “clean” weapons technology. Elite commentators summed up 
the issue in stark terms. 
No danger from tests of nuclear weapons is remotely comparable with the danger 
of falling into a second-best position in relation to the Soviet Union in nuclear 
armaments.
886
 
 
 Nuclear absolutism defined the major problems of national security as only solvable 
through application of nuclear power. This effectively rendered deterrence as a fragile tautology, 
rather than a reliable theoretical concept. Nothing but nuclear weapons could suffice, although 
this essentially house-of-cards solution raised as many questions about deterrence and fallout as 
it settled. The Air Force’s public ambiguity and apparent fudging on releasing information about 
the burst height of JOHN was indicative of its longstanding efforts to manage public perceptions 
of the utility of nuclear weapons. The test suggested planned to use of the Genie, the weapon 
tested at JOHN, against threat aircraft, whether high or low. Like Paul Fackler’s turn of his 
sampler into the fallout plume at SANDSTONE, pushing the boundaries of flight – and nuclear 
weapons employment – the lower than originally planned burst height of JOHN fit a long Air 
Force tradition of pushing exposures to and beyond established limits. 
Citizen-consumers were awakened to a closer relationship with fallout when reading 
about it in the context of the latest tips in household management and interior design. On 9 May 
1957, the Chicago Tribune carried an Associated Press story with the alarming headline, “Atom 
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Fallout Seen as Peril to Thousands.” An investigative article in The Reporter, described as “a 
liberal magazine of ‘facts and ideas’” founded in 1949, charged that “thousands of persons in 
Nevada and Utah have been exposed to radioactive fallout from weapon tests.” Complaining of 
“unnecessary secrecy in connection with radiation dangers,” the article claimed residents of St. 
George Utah, in the southwest corner of the state bordering Nevada, “were exposed during on 24 
hour period to 1,260 times more than the permissible concentration established for radiation 
workers.” Alarmingly, but quite factually, it stated the AEC “lacked sufficient information to 
provide proper safeguards for the public or to accurately predict test results.” The AEC 
responded with its now-pro forma denials of hazard “or detectable injury to health.”887  
But it was simply not the case that the government was unable to trace the path of fallout 
in order to “accurately predict” where it might fall on communities like St. George. Such 
tracking was standard procedure for fallout moving away from NTS, as the maps of fallout 
recorded from Air Force samplers tracking the various shots in the 1957 PLUMBBOB test series 
demonstrated.
888
 While neither conducted under AEC control nor completely transparent to the 
Commission, AFOAT-1’s Special Equipment Operators (SEO) regularly gathered samples while 
flying aboard the planes of its Air Weather Service “contractor” along the flight path on most if 
not all of these shots as a training opportunity. It was also necessary in order to accurately record 
the “fallout landscape;” tracking fallout from American tests was an essential part of updating its 
ever-changing, baseline reference of global fallout.
889
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These secret flights also served as rehearsal and training for one of AFOAT-1’s wartime 
missions for the first time in 1956, tracking the fallout plumes of detonations of enemy weapons 
over U.S. territory. Codenamed BIT BITE, this mission involved SAC, the Air Defense 
Command, and fourteen state Air National Guard (ANG) units. Sampling at the 1957 
PLUMBBOB test series at NTS was the first opportunity for a large exercise involving BIT 
BITE units. ANG personnel received training from the 4926
th
 Test Squadron (Sampling), which 
conducted close-in post-shot sampling for the AEC.
890
 The otherwise rather pedestrian T-33 jet 
trainer used by the Air National Guard was recruited for sampling duty. The plane was already in 
use to collect high-altitude samples for AFOAT-1 from Soviet tests as they drifted over Japan.
891
 
These specially-configured ANG aircraft, two each to fourteen different units for twenty-eight 
total, supplemented AFOAT-1 sampling capability over the continental United States in the 
event of war to provide forecasting data to the Weather Bureau and Civil Defense. Getting a 
handle on that data for both short-term and long-term planning and coordination was now a vital 
aspect of warfighting and civil defense. 
While long-range sampling of U.S. tests by AFOAT-1 occurred throughout the era of 
U.S. atmospheric testing, from 1957 on this close documentation of domestic testing fallout 
apparently became a consistent practice. Scattered references to tracking of Pacific Proving 
Ground tests suggest similar data was generated for testing conducted there. Then there was the 
voluminous collection data generated on the primary targets of the AEDS, Russian and other 
foreign nuclear tests. The program generated an enormous quantity of data on the dispersal of 
fallout across the United States and beyond, but much of this data trove remains just out of the 
reach of investigators, as it has for more than a half-century.
892
 That this data continues to 
represent a risk to national security becomes more palpably risible with each passing year. 
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Paper Chase – Pursuing the Illusory “Conventional” Nuclear Weapon 
Thus, conceptual pursuit of a fallout-free nuclear weapon briefly became a central part of 
the public nuclear weapons narrative, before quickly flaming out. The president’s enthusiastic 
lead was soon followed in Congress, when U.S. Representative Sterling Cole (R-New York) 
made the argument explicit, while uncomfortably harking back to the military’s efforts to 
conventionalize nuclear weapons. 
The honest objective of this program of experimentation tests and education will 
be that we have harnessed atomic energy to provide us with just another 
"conventional" weapon — that is, one which uses blast and heat to destroy the 
target but with no amount of radiation.
893
 
 
Like President Ronald Reagan’s later “Star Wars” ballistic missile defense system, it was 
a noble idea, but the basis of both notions was more alchemy than science, overlooking the 
practicality of basic physical laws in the interests of reassuring public relations copy. Belief in a 
scientific or engineering design deus ex machina to solve the fallout problem put off coming to 
terms with fallout’s natural, fundamental constraints on the use of nuclear weapons, trading the 
short-term political impact of fostering belief in such a patently impractical scheme into 
justification for further testing. Given the general lack of evidence of feasible means to overcome 
the vast technical challenges, what amounted to scientific mythology also found a place at the 
policy table, seated there by short-term political expediency.
894
 For politicians, as for the 
military, the limitations of the seductive dead end of the “clean” weapon were a siren call, but 
ultimately only an unworkable fiction. 
Interestingly, the shift in Eisenhower’s thinking on the matter of fallout that Craig, 
Greene, and others located as beginning in 1957 took place amid considerable influence wielded 
by the Air Force on the Gaither committee’s agenda, an effort to define the needs of force 
protection and civil defense. The service saw money invested in civil defense as better applied to 
its strategic force structure, setting up an obvious tension between these two major aspects of 
Gaither’s charge. Among Gaither’s notable members familiar and relevant to this narrative were 
several who carried the Air Force’s water against Robert Oppenheimer, including General James 
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Doolittle and Ernest Lawrence; balanced against them were others of more independent note 
such as James Killian, Jerome Wiesner, and I.I. Rabi.
895
 As Snead argued, it was “civil defense 
that had the greatest influence on the establishment of the Gaither committee,” yet the bulk of its 
implemented recommendations eventually focused on improving survivability of U.S. strategic 
forces. Eisenhower rejected the committee’s central civil defense recommendation, a mass 
fallout shelter program, as financially and politically suspect.  
In its comprehensive evaluation of strategic nuclear force capabilities, the Gaither 
committee worked from estimates of Soviet nuclear delivery capabilities provided by the Air 
Force. The intelligence community was by then aware that the junior service’s historically higher 
counts of weapons in its analyses were under suspicion of significant inaccuracy because of the 
controversy over the “bomber gap.” The Gaither final report was effectively based on the same 
worst case scenarios that led to the “gaps” controversies.896 The Gaither committee also had 
access to relevant National Intelligence Estimates, including the most recent, which evaluated 
potential international reaction to an announcement by the United States that it intended to 
embark on a national fallout shelter program.
897
 Crucially, while a few of its members were 
individually cognizant of it at the time, the Gaither committee as a whole apparently was not 
briefed on the CIA’s U-2 missions over the USSR. Snead argued the U-2 program in 1957 was 
too young to produce a clear picture of the conflict between the findings in its imagery and the 
consistently high Air Force estimates of Soviet strength.
898
 It was a situation that strongly 
suggested this proliferation of studies represented a narrowing of Eisenhower’s goals in dealing 
with the problems of nuclear weapons, with avoidance of nuclear war as the highest priority 
barring compelling, extraordinary reasons to do otherwise. The most important missing piece of 
the puzzle supplied by fallout was excluded from significant, critical discussion, because the 
president viewed this highly privileged information as reliable, revealing, and possibly indicative 
of potential solutions to the problem of inspection, the main stumbling block in any agreement 
with the Soviets. 
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Thus, Eisenhower’s return to discussion of the “Human Effects” report with the NSC on 
1 August 1957 presaged the Gaither conclusions, but was also indicative of the president’s own 
emergent clarity on the matter of fallout’s effects on policy. After National Security Adviser 
Robert Cutler reviewed the Human Effects report and noted JCS concurrence with it, the 
president summed up his view on how much to tell the public about what he concluded about the 
cataclysmically indecisive nature of thermonuclear war. 
…if we attempted to inform the public on the human effects of nuclear weapons 
by dramatic actions, we would create hysteria instead of spreading information.
899
 
 
The discussion on this agenda item provided little direct reference to specific effects, but 
this again seemed as much an artifice to avoid direct reference to fallout’s role as an unintended 
oversight. Given that it was the only direct weapons effect for which there was a recent, 
significant change in understanding, fallout was the prime suspect as the subject for such 
bureaucratic obscurantism in the meeting minutes. Fallout was discretely set aside as a topic for 
the Human Effects panel, apparently because the issue was still highly classified, leaving it to 
those with the requisite high-level clearances possessed by the members of the Gaither 
Committee. 
In its final report of November 1957, the Gaither committee noted considerable surprise 
at the previous marginalization of fallout in such policy discussions when it addressed the 
problem in detail. 
A “fall-out shelter program” may in our final deliberations be recommended as 
the only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly 
exposed to the hazards of radiation. Our initial skepticism is yielding to the 
analysis of the megatonnage which will elude the best defensive systems now 
predictable.”900 
 
When 1956 drew to a close, knowledge of fallout’s potential effects on policy remained 
tightly held and largely confined to the most rarefied policy making apparatus serving the 
president, the JCS, and the AEC, with the latter two uninterested in addressing the issue unless it 
was forced upon them by circumstances. By the end of 1957, with the Gaither committee’s 
report in hand and Sputnik circling the globe, the situation dramatically changed. It was clear 
that those with the most expertise on the problems of morale and national political cohesion in 
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the face of nuclear war were forced to move on in the relatively short space of a year to include 
fallout. This shift followed the earlier 1956 shift at AFOAT-1, as it reached out to other units in 
the intelligence and national security community to better explain its mission.
901
 
Isolated in a different compartment from the Human Effects Panel which issued its report 
in late 1956, apparently in part in order to address the increasingly controversial empirical threat 
posed by fallout, the Gaither Committee explored the value of shelter during 1957. As the pre-
Sputnik era of the Cold War drew to a close, the American military possessed nearly 
unimaginable, and quite certainly unsurpassed, striking power. A comparison of the viewpoints 
of two old generals on the best solutions to their fears of surprise attack and the lingering 
radiation it might bring was a study in contrasts – LeMay, whose fear was deployed strategically 
in alarming displays intended to justify SAC budgets, and Eisenhower, whose own fears were 
more private and diverse. For nuclear absolutists like LeMay, the answer to nearly every national 
security problem was a nuclear weapon. For the latter, every nuclear weapon brought an 
additional burden. Fallout was now tinged with the sour presidential juices of regret over the 
very scary corner Ike realized they had all been painted into by the Air Force’s hubris over 
nuclear weapons and the AEC’s concessionary treatment of fallout risk. Having publicly opened 
that bottle with CASTLE BRAVO, there was no putting the bitter wine of cumulative fallout 
back in. Instead, there was continued silence on that matter, even as policy underwent rapid 
transformation. 
As David L. Snead noted in his discussion of the Gaither Committee’s report on civil 
defense, force protection and strategic force posture, the controversy over fallout was first among 
several issues the panel was assigned to address in “determining how much destruction the 
United States and its people can absorb and still survive.”902 Snead observed that “Eisenhower 
based his decisions on an established set of values and a highly organized decision-making 
system.”903 This description of the president’s general disposition fit well with Eisenhower’s 
long history of innate skepticism about nuclear weapons, intense planning efforts, and his 
compartmentalization of the various studies of weapons effects and countermeasures reflected in 
the split of assignments to the Human Effects and Gaither panels.  
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The Gaither panel began deliberations in May 1957 and concluded with a classified 
report issued in early November 1957, just after the uproar over Sputnik struck. For the first time 
directly addressing the complexities fallout added to civil defense against nuclear attack, the 
committee’s report focused on “a series of questions, the most important being, ‘What is the 
optimum balance between active and passive defense measures for the protection of the civilian 
population?’”904  This comprehensive effort to examine the empirical effects of fallout was 
essentially playing catch-up ball. Having been ignored in the previous year’s “Human Effects” 
report and in other earlier, more thoughtful studies like Project East River, efforts to directly 
warn the public of fallout’s threat seemingly required a high priority, but remained an area 
approached with trepidation by policy makers, rather than candor.
905
  
Significantly, given his role elsewhere in this narrative as a supporter of Oppenheimer, 
I.I. Rabi was instrumental in determining the scope of the Gaither panel’s work.906 In a letter to 
Office of Defense Mobilization chief Gordon Gray, who earlier chaired the panel that booted 
Robert Oppenheimer from the AEC, Rabi set out a broad agenda of research work with its 
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particulars shaped in significant part by the need to address the issue of fallout in various ways, 
ranging from “the deterrent value of shelters” to a broadly constituted evaluation of various near- 
and long-term ways to build shelter capacity.
907
 Rabi’s research and development agenda was a 
breakthrough, at least in secret, finally putting fallout formally back on the table as a factor in 
national security policy for other than intelligence purposes for the first time since 
Oppenheimer’s involuntary departure. Rabi’s memo likely was the proximate initiative behind 
much of the subsequent fallout research in the late 1950s. 
Benjamin Greene noted the Gaither report addressed most of Rabi’s lengthy list of needs 
to better define fallout risk and protection.
908
 By establishing the problem of fallout as a crucial 
area of civil defense for the Gaither committee to address, Rabi constructed a critical 
counterbalance at the opposite policy pole from the Strauss/Lawrence/Teller axis, demonstrating 
the rebirth and ascendancy of scientific anxiety over fallout underway among the government’s 
own advisers. Oppenheimer was physically purged, in part to limit the potential for his crisis of 
enthusiasm over nuclear weapons spreading elsewhere inside the government. However, the 
president’s evolving state of mind on the problem of nuclear war was highly indicative of the 
persistence of the concerns Oppenheimer had earlier raised about fallout. The subsequent 
dismissal by Eisenhower of Gaither’s call for a massive national shelter network to meet the 
challenge of fallout strengthened Craig’s argument that the president’s goal was prevention, not 
preparation for war.
909
 If deterrence supported by nuclear weapons failed, shelter could not 
ameliorate the long term consequences of fallout after the first few iterations of nuclear assault.  
As fallout became a regular item on the NSC’s policy agenda in 1957, it was self-evident, 
if still a closely held secret, that growing recognition of its extraconventional empirical impacts 
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exponentially increased the potential massive social impacts of supraconventional weapon 
effects. Fallout made possible a situation in nuclear war so untenable it need not be analyzed in 
detail, considering the other effects already predicted to create a socially- and environmentally-
toxic post-attack environment.
910
 Recognition fallout made thermonuclear war unwinnable also 
ironically reinforced the argument it was best to invest in deterrent forces.  
Arguably, Eisenhower’s eventual formal rejection of the shelter construction proposal 
found in the 1957 Gaither report reflected the emergence of the president’s belief that there was 
no effective solution, shelter or otherwise, to the problems of thermonuclear war. From this 
perspective, factoring in fallout was a substantial contribution that could strengthen Craig’s 
general argument. Eisenhower chose to pursue the idea of shelter with Gaither only to use the 
resulting recommendations as a counterbalance to undermine the Air Force’s continuing rush 
towards nuclear absolutism embodied in the bulk of the Gaither report’s recommendations, 
which focused on increasing the survivability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Choosing to 
refrain from commencing a massive shelter program became a sort of poison pill in 
Eisenhower’s national security policy, recognition that leaving all at risk nurtured a greater than 
ever incentive to avoid nuclear war. Intended to aid in emphasizing stalemate in the face-off with 
the Russians, Craig argued Eisenhower also intended to restrict the Pentagon to a limited range 
of options that all but precluded use of nuclear weapons, with the sole obvious exception being 
as a reaction to or preemption of a mass Soviet attack, the fabled “nuclear Pearl Harbor.”911 
Eisenhower’s approach to managing these advisory panels was typical of what Snead 
identified as a more general feature of Eisenhower’s management of national security policy. 
[Eisenhower] had attained his objective of avoiding war with the Soviet Union by 
engaging in a form of personal administration…Only he knew what he was doing, 
what his real purpose was – no one could fill it in for him. Officially, both the 
writing of nuclear policy and decisionmaking during the 1958-1959 Berlin Crisis 
incorporated the efforts of dozens of American planners, negotiators, and soldiers. 
Effectively, both endeavors were undertaken by the president himself, with aides 
from Dulles on down simply accomplices.
912
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However, without a forceful partner – fallout – it is questionable that even Eisenhower’s 
leadership and restraint would have been effective in constraining those seeking aggressive 
confrontation with the USSR.  
Going Underground: Anticipating the End of Fallout? Or Just the End? 
Cultural, diplomatic, and political pressures aside, AFOAT-1 anticipated wider 
recognition of fallout’s risk could diminish its role as an intelligence source with significant 
restrictions or even a ban on testing in the atmosphere. Some in the Air Force also continued to 
hold the long-running suspicion the Russians were successfully concealing other testing the unit 
was unable to detect. While largely politically motivated, this belief suggested pressure to 
commit additional effort to develop techniques to detect nuclear explosions by means other than 
direct sampling of fallout. New or expanded capabilities were required if AFOAT-1 was to 
continue providing even a much-reduced portion of the useful intelligence on Soviet weapons 
design which sampling and analysis of fallout produced. AFOAT-1 responded to these 
possibilities by emphasizing development of alternative long range detection technologies, 
particularly those that provided some level of near-instantaneous alerting. Improvements in 
seismic and EMP detection capabilities received specific emphasis during the late nineteen-
fifties.  
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with their access to the Soviet weapons program provided 
by AFOAT-1 and through understanding the AEC weapons development and stockpile situation 
via the Military Liaison Committee (MLC), including the American fallout contribution, the 
math was stark and simple, the big picture clear. Because of fallout they would produce, under a 
policy of massive retaliation the enormous destructive capability of SAC’s nuclear weapons 
threatened the future of the United States almost as surely as it held Soviet society at risk, 
regardless of any destruction the Russians might cause on their own. It was problem formulation 
Libby, Strauss, Teller, and a few others, such as Oppenheimer and LeMay, certainly understood 
viscerally. By 1956, whatever level of fallout the cumulative yield of a general nuclear war 
might generate would be more than enough to enter well into the territory GABRIEL warned 
was dangerous, even with a revised limit of 2,000 megatons.
913
 American strategy thus 
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increasingly embraced the mysterious panacea of deterrence in growing recognition of the need 
to prevent nuclear war, rather than simply prepare to wage it. To acknowledge fallout deterred 
the Soviets from war seemed simple enough, but as with the naïve belief that the United States 
should play up Russian fallout as a threat, the trick in making such a justification was to avoid 
explaining how fallout just as effectively deterred American decisions about war, too.   
In the short term, anticipation of a requirement to place U.S. test shots underground 
merged with AFOAT-1’s need to better characterize signals from potential clandestine Soviet 
underground tests. The 1957 RAINIER test (1.7 kilotons, 19 September 1957) was the first full-
fledged U.S. underground shot, as well as the first underground nuclear test anywhere with a 
goal of fallout containment.
914
  
While concerns raised at SAC over its continuing unmet priority for high-yield weapons 
lingered, the Pentagon moved enthusiastically forward with multiple new requirements to further 
diversify the range of available medium yield strategic and lower yield tactical weapon designs. 
UCRL continued producing tactical weapon designs, after coming into existence in part because 
Los Alamos was supposedly concentrating too much effort on these very weapons under 
Oppenheimer’s influence.915 This line of march was a familiar, if long elided one that 
conceptually brought to fruition the well-laid plans of the 1950 Oppenheimer-chaired GAC.  
SAC, Post-Oppenheimer 
While Robert Oppenheimer clearly lost his battle, his opponent in the conflict over the 
heedless treatment of fallout in the Strategic Air Command’s war plans, SAC commander 
General Curtis LeMay, appeared to gain the Air Force he and his fellow generals sought – with 
freedom to disregard inconvenient facts in the face of public opposition. Over the course of 
nearly a decade under his command, LeMay built an impressive fleet of thousands of 
intercontinental jet bombers provided with an arsenal of thermonuclear weapons, controlled as a 
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global strike force.
916
 By 1956, confidence in SAC’s ability to deter Soviet attack was high, even 
as an urgent need remained: accurate identification of actual targets for its bombs. Planning for 
use of lower yield weapons required increased accuracy in targeting and increased confidence 
that air crews could reliably hit their marks.  
LeMay ordered a mass overflight, Project HOMERUN, going far beyond the typical 
Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) flights frequently conducted adjacent 
to Soviet airspace.
917
 Taking off from remote Thule Air Force Base, Greenland, hundreds of 
miles north of the Arctic Circle, in early May 1956 a gaggle of six RB-47Es penetrated the 
remote north shore of eastern Siberia. After flying hundreds of miles directly south at 40,000 feet 
deep into Russian air space, they turned east, emerging into international airspace again roughly 
1,000 miles later over the Bering Sea to recover at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska Territory. 
There, they rested and refueled before returning to Thule. While the lack of Soviet reaction 
suggested complacency, in reality the area was lightly defended. A total of 156 missions flown 
saw less than a handful of unsuccessful attempts to intercept.
918
 With the immediate goal of the 
project to locate suitable targets for some of the thousands of nuclear weapons now at SAC’s 
disposal, LeMay may have been less pleased than such an account of tweaking the Russian’s 
nose would otherwise indicate. A largely empty land also meant it was largely empty of targets. 
This remoteness may have been part of the reason the Russians did not treat the flights, grouped 
together on radar, as the first waves of a preemptive American attack – and react accordingly.  
They would soon have other, more challenging opportunities.  
The first CIA U-2 overflight of Soviet territory took place shortly after on 4 July 1956.  
The plane and its special cameras were the leading wave of a second generation of imagery 
collection systems designed to extract a diverse variety of data from imagery, a sharp contrast 
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with the first generation American intelligence systems designed to extract specific information 
with a narrow “field of vision” focused on a specific target, with the preeminent example being 
the AEDS. The result would be a more accurately nuanced view of the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union’s strategic nuclear forces that provided the breathing room for policy makers to pursue 
effective diplomacy, rather than preparing only for a war that all would stand to lose. 
1957: Downsizing Destruction 
In secret, fallout shared credit with better understood features such as rapid advances in 
weapon design efficiency, incorporation of solid state devices, and increasing missile system 
guidance accuracy in shaping the emergent empirical realities of nuclear war. By 1957 a 
combination of those factors began to reshape strategic policy largely based on the publicly 
stated preferences of air power boosters for high-yield weapons. The net result was increased 
delivery system accuracy that reduced the yield requirements for optimal destruction of a 
target.
919
 Dwight Eisenhower’s personal preference to limit the size of the largest American 
nuclear weapons was another significant, if largely secret and somewhat compromised reaction. 
The quick retirement of the several models of high yield emergency capability weapons, hastily 
stockpiled in 1954 even before their designs were standardized, was followed by the nearly 
equally speedy retirement of the 15 to 20 megaton MK 17 carried by the giant B-36 bomber. The 
last of these weapons left the U.S. stockpile by August 1957.
920
 
Despite the informal presidential limit on the maximum yield of individual weapons, the 
total megatonnage of the U.S. stockpile continued its rapid growth, reemphasizing the 
geometrically larger scale cumulative wartime threat fallout posed than by fallout created 
through testing. Between 1956 and 1958, the inventory of U.S. nuclear warheads more than 
doubled, rising from 4,618 to 9,822.
921
 Thus, a primary feature of the Pentagon’s first phase of 
its policy shift in response to the problem of fallout was a half-hearted, technical observance of 
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presidential limits on the maximum yield of individual weapons even as it continued to acquire 
quantities of nuclear weapons far in excess of any reasonable prospects of practical use.  
Placing limits on total megatonnage likely to be expended by the United States was in 
line with the findings of studies like GABRIEL and Project Sunshine, but it was a solution 
fundamentally incompatible with SAC’s war plans under LeMay’s leadership as his time there 
drew to an end. SAC’s war plans depended on rapid execution through delivery of the maximum 
bomb tonnage on target in the shortest possible time. The cumulative risks posed by fallout 
inherent to SAC’s strategy represented the most significant threat.  The problem was not any 
individual weapon, but detonation of hundreds, if not thousands in a short period of time, which 
represented the grave hazard to humanity posed by SAC’s chosen strategy. 
The Nuclear Air Force Takes Command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
When General Nathan Twining moved his management team into the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff chair’s office in 1957, it was as someone intimately familiar with the benefits of AFOAT-
1’s work. The direct reporting role of AFOAT-1 under the direction of the JCS continued, so for 
the first time the Air Force unit’s efforts were expressly directed by an Air Force officer.  
Twining was intimately conscious of the relationship between nuclear intelligence and 
the creation of the powerful Air Force prior to his promotion to Chair of the JCS. Twining 
understood how much the Air Force institutionally benefited from the intelligence data the secret 
unit generated about Soviet nuclear strength. Twining commanded the 20
th
 Air Force when its 
base on Tinian served as the launch pad for the atomic strikes on Japan. Then Twining served 
after the war as chief of the Air Material Command when the long-range detection mission was 
shepherded into existence under General LeMay’s oversight there with Bim Wilson’s assistance. 
At the same time, the AMC was preparing to use the upcoming 1948 SANDSTONE series as an 
open-air research and development laboratory for further refinement of LRD techniques.  
General Twining then took what some likely considered a rather odd assignment to the 
backwater Alaskan Command. Rather than being a lull in an otherwise up and coming officer’s 
career, the assignment placed Twining in the ideal position to manage implementation of the new 
long-range detection techniques AFOAT-1 deployed in collaboration with the Air Weather 
Service. Flying from Alaskan bases anchoring the northern ends of the Air Weather Service’s 
synoptic tracks to Japan and back, the sampler-equipped long-range aircraft operated back-and 
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forth where the prevailing winds were most likely to carry fallout out of the Soviet Union.
922
  
Like his subordinate LeMay, it was unlikely mere coincidence placed Twining squarely at the 
center of the Air Force’s developing rationale for its vast Cold War nuclear build-up.  
Twining and his cohort’s professional competence also made them keenly aware of the 
problems fallout increasingly posed to the construction and implementation of national security 
policy. Loss of fallout’s secrecy was of relatively small import, given prior Russian knowledge 
of the value Americans placed on fallout, but it paled in comparison to how the loss of the Air 
Force monopoly on information about it directly and increasingly constrained the Air Force’s 
own prerogatives in choosing weapons and tactics. In the face of a threat described largely 
through fallout and krypton-85 analysis, the Air Force knew better than anyone how central it 
was to their argument for the postwar shift of budgetary resources to the Air Force that served as 
the foundation for SAC’s spectacular expansion. Stunted at first by limited funding under the 
parsimonious Truman administration, the SAC build-up quickly accelerated after the detection of 
Joe-1 in 1949 closed out four years of lean postwar budgets. Fallout was both evidence of and 
motivation for the Air Force’s organizational success. Its lack was closely associated with 
memories of lean times for the Air Force leadership, much as most Americans remembered the 
Great Depression with a similar lack of nostalgia, even as they took pains to invoke its memory 
as evidence of personal fortitude. 
By 1957, General LeMay built the Strategic Air Command from a hollow, postwar shell 
into a fearsome nuclear striking force that was still expanding its capabilities. In concert with 
Twining’s promotion to JCS Chair, LeMay was promoted to Air Force Vice-Chief of Staff as the 
service’s leaders shuffled command positions. LeMay and many other officers in Twining’s 
cohort were intimately familiar with the context, priorities, and significance associated with 
AFOAT-1 in building a technologically superior Air Force capable of visiting vast destruction on 
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America’s enemies. But it was also a group whose strategies were threatened by bumping up 
against a growing body of empirical evidence of the peril from what they had long dismissed as 
an arbitrary nuclear ceiling imposed by fallout. An extensive literature exists on the dominance 
of SAC wagging the Air Force dog in relation to other factors such as the problems of warning, 
overkill, war fighting, and survivability in the midst of mutual destruction from thermonuclear 
war potentially so vast it would threaten the survival of humankind.
923
 With a similarly 
fundamental role, fallout played a vital role in growth and sustainment of the newly independent 
Air Force. A decade later, countervailing forces were at work. 
Just when the Air Force appeared to be in position to cement its ascendancy as the 
dominant strategic force, Eisenhower’s cautious and conflicted process of developing a viable 
nuclear strategy led to an attack on the Air Force from a vulnerable quarter, its partners in the 
Department of Defense, the Army and Navy. Eisenhower’s frustration with the lack of clear-cut 
options to general nuclear war led to a request for their evaluation of the Air Force’s war plans, 
with a specific focus on the issue of high yield weapons requirements. The results of the study, 
Project BUDAPEST, were alarming, with the number of potential targets growing in the course 
of the study from 2,997 to 3,261 as it was drafted in 1957. Lori Lyn Bogle, a historian at the U.S. 
Naval Academy, summed up the situation succinctly. 
[F]ar more weapons were being assigned to targets than were needed to achieve 
the damage required…the resulting radiation and fallout would be dangerously 
and unnecessarily high. Blast radii were huge, and there were as many as 
seventeen overlaps on a single location. Additional and duplicate weapons were 
assigned in profusion, even when the supplemental damage they would achieve 
was minimal.
924
 
 
Behind the closed doors of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by mid-1957 the Army and Navy 
arrived at virtually the same conclusion about SAC’s plans as Robert Oppenheimer did in 1951. 
It was the same concern GABRIEL expressed nearly a decade earlier. The cumulative fallout 
from a general nuclear war would quickly afflict the victors, as well as the defeated. In essence, 
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inside the Pentagon by 1957 the execution of SAC’s war plans was recognized as impractical, 
regardless of its morality. 
Fallout in the Consumer Society: No Shelter for the Mind – or the Budget 
Paradoxically, fallout became less of an intruding, concrete contingency in daily life as 
pragmatists grudgingly accepted it as an inevitability associated with nuclear weapons. Consider 
the distraction from thinking more broadly about the implications of fallout supplied by the mere 
discussion of fallout shelters. Marketing shelter turned the narrative toward a more comfortably 
narrow one of consumption. Once reduced to a consumer product, the enthusiasm for the whole 
discussion trailed off around America’s dinner tables during the nineteen-fifties. Even though the 
first “model” shelters went on display in 1955 in the wake of the CASTLE BRAVO report, sales 
were abysmal.
925
  
Laura McEnaney argued the inactive, passive nature of concept of shelter, and civil 
defense as a whole, acquired a gendered character as “feminine” prior to World War Two, a 
social norm of patriarchal society that persisted into the nuclear age. A 1960 survey 
commissioned by the House Military Operations Subcommittee found only 1,565 home shelters 
in the United States.
926
 The political preference for the active, masculine nature of military force, 
augmented by nuclear weapons, prevailed in terms of resources committed, publicly or privately, 
to protection for the population against fallout throughout the Cold War.
927
  
Even as Americans were extremely reluctant adopters of the feminized space of the 
shelter, the threat they faced grew relentlessly. Cumulative U.S./Soviet plutonium stocks stood at 
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11,511 kilograms (9,430/2,081) in 1956, growing to 34,333 kilograms (28,152/6,181) in 1960.
928
 
Fashioned into more than 20,000 nuclear weapons, the certainty that everyone would lose in such 
a conflict was not in question, simply the scope of such a tragedy.
929
 In the event of survival, 
how would one reclaim the world in the aftermath of apocalypse? It was easier for most to either 
ignore such disturbing thoughts or to simply conclude the powerlessness of the situation 
mandated moving on to purchases of a more practical nature for the growing families of the 
expanding suburbs, as well as residents from rural and urban areas presumed to be among the 
first targets of a nuclear war, because their association with or location in proximity to military 
and other strategic facilities meant even with shelter, their chance of survival was nil. 
Marketing and Consumption of Security 
While much of the growing policy discussion about the aversive subject of fallout’s 
effects on national security took place in secret among various elites, the conflict was 
nonetheless reflected in a growing awareness about it as a problem among ordinary American 
citizen/consumers. For advertisers, whose marketing magic so often depends on the manipulation 
of consumer anxieties, fallout seemed to offer the prospect of great returns for those with suitable 
products to exploit the public’s insecurities. Attempts to find gold among radioactive debris, 
which Albert Schweitzer described as “fallen down, is falling down, and will fall down” on 
everyone, everywhere, began showing up more often in ads in the press.
930
  
Among these efforts was a small advertisement promoting the May 1957 issue of Better 
Home & Gardens magazine, one of the postwar arbiters of commonplace suburban consumption. 
Boasting it would reveal the answer to “The truth about H-bomb fallout danger,” the article 
described findings on the matter by the AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory (HASL).931 The 
May fallout article followed a suggestive article, “Leukemia,” in the April issue, which discussed 
its rising rate among adults had many causes. Among them was “‘unnecessary’ exposure to 
radioactivity,” but cancer was not mentioned specifically connected to fallout by either article. 
May’s HASL feature, “Bomb Dust Radiation,” described HASL as a group of “atomic 
detectives.” Director Merrill Eisenbud noted the AEC organization was recently declassified “in 
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order to report on its work.” Part of that included Eisenbud’s characterization that claims there 
were 24 megatons of fallout yield in the stratosphere was “scientific double talk.” Not to worry, 
there were actually only 4,000 pounds of fallout from all nuclear testing, only half made it into 
the atmosphere, and it was “highly diluted with air.” Questions HASL answered included 
whether fallout was heavier in some places. Readers were reassured that, except for a slight 
concentration near the test sites, for the deposition of fallout “otherwise the rate is uniform…”932   
Given both HASL and the magazine were located in New York, the publishing capital of 
the nation, the article was likely prompted by Libby’s ongoing attempts to sustain the 
increasingly unsustainable – the AEC’s position that fallout from testing was a nearly irrelevant 
risk conflicted with the civil defense message one needed to take shelter from it in the event of 
war. Consumers who heard these mixed messages were confused and perplexed, even when they 
had funds to pursue such expensive courses of action as fallout shelters. Civil defense funding 
remained meager during the Eisenhower administration, a policy confirmed when the president 
chose to do nothing about recommendations in the 1957 Gaither Report, which called for 
massive construction of public shelter space, among other measures to deal with the new realities 
of nuclear war.
933
 
 Lack of government funding combined with Republican distaste for new government 
benefit programs did not seem to fully account for the lack of effort to encourage construction of 
private shelter space. Instead, in a demonstration of the sway nuclear absolutism continued to 
hold over strategy, 1957 saw two initiatives indicating many in the military command structure 
saw only more nuclear weapons as the answer to the threat their fallout posed. 
Gimme Shelter? Fallout’s Threat to Political Leadership Recognized 
Eisenhower grew to recognize the consequences and implications of fallout and its 
relationship to overall national security policy in large part because of his own long experience 
with it, a sort of personal fallout history; his familiarity with its use for strategic intelligence 
purposes exceeded the scope of most of his advisers and contemporaries in government service. 
The Gaither committee served as a means for Eisenhower to put specifics on the table in order to 
demonstrate investment in mass shelter was a strategically untenable approach, thus providing a 
stronger empirical basis for Eisenhower’s gut-level reaction to the problems posed by fallout. 
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Having established through the Human Effects Panel the supraconventional effects of any 
massed use of thermonuclear weapons in themselves, exclusive of fallout, cast grave doubt on 
national survival, Gaither reinforced those terrifying conclusions by questioning the feasibility of 
defending against the extraconventional effects of fallout inevitably associated with the 
supraconventional effects found so desirable by military target planners. Gaither thus served to 
mark a squaring of the circle that began with GABRIEL. It was matter of more than political 
interest at the Pentagon, with fallout as a factor undermining what remained of the Air Force’s 
illusive belief in the viability of victory in general nuclear war against the Soviets. Behind the 
scenes, Rabi’s efforts to address the fallout problem combined with a presidential mandate to 
accomplish the task bore fruit of a different kind as the Air Force unlocked the gates to research 
on fallout’s behavior in the stratosphere by means of its own U-2 fleet with a mission called 
CROWFLIGHT, a thread that will be picked up in the next chapter. 
By mid-1957, the blinders excluding fallout from significant influence as a factor in 
policy discussions were off behind closed doors, with a certain sense of panic setting in that was 
low-key, but indicative of the pressures fallout was exerting more broadly upon the national 
security bureaucracy. A gathering storm of public opposition only added to the incentive for 
fallout to remain ensconced in secrecy as it had been for the previous decade; the Hedley 
Marston affair in Australia demonstrated the crumbling of this shield in the face of growing 
transnational scientific expertise in the sampling of radiation as it was transported through the 
environment.
934
 At the 318
th
 meeting of the NSC on 4 April 1957, NSC-5709/SNIE-100-5-57, 
“A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense” was discussed in detail. The NSC Planning Board 
stated it was “deeply troubled” at the prospect of “protecting the civilian population” in the event 
of nuclear war. Prior planning assumed evacuation of urban areas in the event of war, but the 
potential for massive fallout sweeping over evacuation routes and refuge zones made that a moot 
point, suggesting shelter in place was the best course of action for survival.  
With “the full magnitude of the problem of radioactive fallout” understood, Robert Cutler 
pointed out the political conundrum the situation represented for the Eisenhower administration. 
Mr. Cutler then explained to the Council the serious dilemma that the 
Administration would find itself in if, when the issue [the threat posed by fallout] 
finally became clear [to the public] the administration had nothing to say one way 
                                                 
934
 Cross, Fallout, 9, 21-22, 152. 
349 
 
or another with respect to a shelter program. This would put the Administration in 
an indefensible position.
935
 
 
While the internal fallout anxieties of members of the administration were generally as well-
hidden as their views on the nuclear intelligence derived from it, Cutler’s statement on the 
potential for fallout to politically damage the president in multiple ways was clearly not far from 
all their minds given the levels of public controversy it generated even in the absence of the 
troubling data then flowing into the White House. 
Libby’s Striving Optimism Promotes Atmospheric Buffering 
Efforts flowered to position the new American emphasis on development of small tactical 
nuclear weapons as a policy of restraint, particularly in regard to the belief smaller bombs meant 
reduced fallout. Willard Libby argued weapons of less than one megaton “deposit all of the 
radioactivities [sic] within a matter of days or weeks around the globe corresponding generally to 
the latitude of the test site.” The AEC commissioner continued to insist on having it both ways, 
though, in his benignly optimistic view that larger yield explosions “shoot the bulk of their 
radioactivities so high that they take years to settle out.”936 Implicit in Libby’s simplistic problem 
formulation was fallout either came down quickly – it might drift far from the intended target, 
but in a predictable manner – or would take many years to do so, with the bulk of its most 
dangerous radioactivity safely decayed and diluted before returning to earth. The former 
assertion was marginally true, something Libby knew, while the latter sounded like a plausibly 
appealing theory, but one requiring confirmation.  Libby’s hopeful hypothesis resulted in 
planning for several high-altitude test shots during the upcoming 1958 Pacific test series to inject 
specific tracer isotopes in order to measure the speed of the downward drift of fallout from the 
stratosphere.
937
 
The New York Times did its part to manufacture public consent for tolerating radiation 
exposure by printing an unsigned opinion piece that supported Libby’s sunny positivism on 
fallout. At the same time, it belittled Japanese government warnings to its citizens that the 
increase in fallout the Japanese attributed to Soviet testing should require consumers to take 
                                                 
935
 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, 462. 
936
 “U.S. Experts Doubt Peril of Fallout,” Los Angeles Times, 21 April 1957. 
937
 TEAK (3.8 megatons, 1 August 1958, 252,000 feet) and ORANGE (12 August 1958, 3.8 megatons, 141,000 feet) 
were launched by rockets from Johnston Island in the Pacific. Spectacular light effects were visible in Hawaii. Both 
shots caused dramatic electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects that interfered with radio propagation. Salted with 
specific isotopes, these two shots helped demonstrate that fallout stayed aloft for far briefer periods of time than first 
believed. 
350 
 
precautions in preparing food.
938
 Libby published what the editorial referred to as “the first 
authentic studies ever made on the content in human bones of radioactive strontium-90, the most 
worrisome part of radioactive fallout.”939 The Times confused the “maximum permissible 
dosage” with the even more ambiguous “dose regarded as safe,” demonstrating how the media, 
through erroneous simplification and repetition of disinformation further muddied the waters of 
assessing radiation risk, all while remaining largely uncritical of those who claimed the mantle of 
scientific authority about fallout in the service of official policy.  
Certainly, one burning question in reporting on the research would be to ask about the 
basis of Libby’s certainty about the safety of fallout. 
…we do know that the effect of radioactive fallout from nuclear tests is not, nor is 
it likely to be, the danger to the human race in this generation or any generation or 
in later generations which many people had been led to believe.
940
 
 
On balance, in dismissing the possibility of risk from fallout, the Times’ editorial board 
argued a point of view encapsulating  the latest version  of the nuisance theory of fallout – 
nothing here to see, now move along. The editorial’s conclusion was the same as the military’s – 
whatever health risk fallout from testing held, it paled into insignificance against the national 
security needs of developing nuclear weapons. Interestingly, by 1957 AFOAT-1 and others 
responsible for radiation safety within the U.S. military were in the process of becoming more 
forthright in internally acknowledging the existence of risks from fallout than either the AEC or 
the Times were, even though all came to the same conclusion testing must continue.
941
 
However, the times were changing and fallout could no longer be dismissed as 
inconsequential. In 1950, there was no need to defend policy on fallout, but by 1957 fallout was 
a force to be reckoned with – and required the defense of policy about it in the press. The same 
edition of the New York Times that argued for the innocuous nature of fallout carried a letter to 
the editor from Norman Thomas, the American Socialist leader, who decried “the grave peril of 
ever-increasing radioactive fallout.” Thomas supported “a monitored moratorium” on nuclear 
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testing, pursuit of disarmament negotiations in the midst of such a halt, and holding the United 
States government as accountable as it desired the Russians to be in its framing of Soviet “atom 
diplomacy” as inimical. Thomas was careful to note the non-aligned, transnational nature of 
growing concern over fallout. 
What other people think is becoming ever more evident. The Pope has again 
expressed sympathy with opposition to further tests of nuclear weapons. The 
greatest scientists of Germany will have none of atomic experimentation…The 
Japanese government has repeatedly and vigorously protested both to Russia and 
now to Great Britain on nuclear tests…I could pile up further proof that the 
nations will not agree that it is only Russia which practices atom diplomacy.
942
 
 
The 21 April 1957 Times editorial, and most likely Thomas’ missive, too, were timed to 
address what the United States government saw as a threatening foreign scientific mission – the 
visit by Professor Masatoshi Matsushita, a scientific aide to the Japanese prime minister, to 
Washington, DC. There, according to the Times, he was “to plead his country’s case for an end 
to nuclear weapons tests.”943 Demonstrating the reach of the “special relationship” between the 
United States and Great Britain was increasingly affected by the political fallout of fallout, 
Matsushita’s mission was motivated in part to protest plans by the British to test their first 
thermonuclear device at Christmas Island in the Pacific.
944
  
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a point of personally welcoming Matsushita 
into his home, even though the Japanese scientific envoy “had merely asked to see an officer of 
the Far East Bureau of the State Department.” Dulles then explained to Matsushita “that the 
responsibilities of the United States in defending the free world made continuance of tests 
essential at present…” and that it was “impractical” to halt testing.945 While this position was 
couched in terms of U.S. policy, under the circumstances, Dulles was in fact defending a joint 
position of the Americans and British. The Japanese protest to the Americans about the proposed 
Christmas Island testing followed on from their previous protests against British testing in 
Australia, which saw little coverage in the ever-parochial U.S. press, but which Dulles, the 
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Pentagon and Eisenhower were quite aware of because of the close coordination between the two 
allies on nuclear intelligence, testing, and now running interference for each other in the press. 
Balancing Risk versus Security 
In contrast to both Defense and State’s positions arguing for the worthy risk of fallout 
stood Libby’s prevarications on behalf of the AEC, with Libby now all but officially declaring a 
closed case on the proven safety of atmospheric testing. Matsushita’s discussion with Dulles 
suggested that outside the AEC, U.S. government representatives could no longer evade pursuing 
an actual determination on the risks fallout posed, instead of simply stating no evidence existed 
of a risk. In contrast to Libby’s clumsy attempt at foreclosure on the subject, scientists now faced 
research questions about fallout that increasingly forced the AEC to deal with the problem as an 
open scientific question. 
[Matsushita] reported that Mr. Dulles felt it was up to the scientists now to prove 
or disprove the conflicting views as to the harmfulness of nuclear tests.
946
 
 
It was an invitation already being taken up by the Japanese, in Australia by Hedley 
Marston in connection with British testing there, and in the United States by scientists outside the 
AEC and, in some cases, within Project Sunshine and elsewhere in the AEC’s vast bureaucracy. 
Portending further problems for the AEC as it increasingly lost control of the fallout 
narrative, another article appeared in the New York Times on 23 April 1957, marking an 
escalation in the problems the Commission now faced in dealing with the consequences of 
radiation’s risk. At the annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Dr. Bentley Glass, 
professor of biology at Johns Hopkins University, gave a presentation that initially seemed 
reassuringly positive for the AEC’s position, but ultimately reinforced the argument that 
cumulative radiation posed a threat. Glass declared the risks of fallout from current military 
applications of nuclear power, short of war itself, in themselves were of  “‘of minor significance’ 
from a genetics standpoint and ‘need cause no further concern.’” However, Glass went on to 
emphasize the existing scientific consensus that risk was inherent in any amount of radiation, 
then threw a cautionary light on existing practices in medical radiology and the potential for 
widespread use of nuclear power generation. In his view, no single source of low-level radiation 
was inherently problematic, but the significantly increased overall exposure to radiation of 
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various populations underway at mid-century posed problems of uncertain, but definitely 
heightened risk as the rate of average individual exposures and body burdens increased. 
Dr. Glass estimated that man might be approaching 50 per cent of the permissible 
level of radiation recommended by the academy in a report on the hazards of 
atomic radiation…[suggesting] that it might be necessary…to revise it 
downward.
947
 
 
Thus, Glass framed the fallout problem – whatever its risk actually was and even when 
testing fallout was declared as having no or small consequence in and of itself – as linked to 
questions about the safety of other forms of nuclear power amid recognition the cumulative dose 
an individual experienced was better indicator for most about the risks they faced from radiation. 
Many who made such comparisons, like Glass, seemed to believe that the public would be 
persuaded to accept the risk of fallout if couched in terms of its relative safety in comparison to 
other uses of nuclear energy and other, more common risks. In the context of official policy, this 
made a certain amount of semantic and argumentative sense. If the anxieties fallout created could 
be dampened by such assertions and superficial changes made in other government policies, then 
this approach might have been persuasive. However, events led public opinion in the opposite 
direction, much to the distress of the AEC and other civil nuclear power boosters as fallout’s 
taint on the reputation of radiation spread to areas other than the use of nuclear weapons. While 
the argument here largely confines itself to the role of fallout in perceptions of radiation risk in 
relation to national security, public perceptions tend to generalize such argumentative 
differences, leading to the rash on fallout rubbing off onto more peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy. Glass’ remarks, intended to lessen public concern about fallout, in fact spread concerns 
about fallout more widely to all aspects of nuclear energy. By the time the 1963 Limited Test 
Ban Treaty addressed the problem of fallout weakening public support for national security 
policy, this uncomfortable linkage between military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy was 
well established. In effect, fallout as a wartime effect during peace made the idea of tolerable 
exposures from peaceful nuclear power an oxymoron. There was no way to distinguish between 
“good” and “bad” radiation, just as one could not sense radiation without an instrument. 
AFOAT-1’s mission was to distinguish between “their” fallout and “ours,” but this was a 
distinction of little importance to most. 
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 Just as Libby and Glass drew somewhat differing yet optimistic official and scientific 
lines in the sand on the issue of fallout risk, in April 1957 Dr. Albert Schweitzer, the 1952 Nobel 
Peace Prize recipient, issued a global appeal over Radio Oslo, demanding an end to nuclear 
testing in an address broadcast by shortwave radio and national networks in some fifty nations. 
The philosopher, doctor, musician, and missionary, in failing health but determined to “awaken 
public opinion,” argued humankind faced “the gravest and most terrible danger.” Schweitzer 
rejected the positions of those like Libby and Glass as morally incapable of “[taking] 
responsibility for the consequences it might have for our descendants.” Pulling no punches, 
Schweitzer charged “official and unofficial sources” of downplaying the potential for harm from 
fallout. The widely distributed speech was unheard by most Americans, as the national broadcast 
networks failed to pick it up and the press did little more than the brief, limited reporting about 
Schweitzer’s call.948 
Schweitzer was well-known enough among the intelligentsia, religious, and social service 
communities that the New York Times covered the story on its front page, along with a 
photograph of the Nobel prizewinner.
949
 With the passing of Gandhi and Einstein, Schweitzer’s 
prestige as a global champion of human rights perceived as neutral and unaligned with either 
East or West, as well as his fame as a physician, made him a potent spokesperson who extended 
the reach of powerful forces of political, social, and cultural pressure fallout generated against 
institutions involved in the development and testing of nuclear weapons. 
Thus, while it would have been easy enough for American officials to ignore 
Schweitzer’s appeal, they instead chose to take him on directly on the issue of fallout. Willard 
Libby made a very public point of issuing an eight-page open letter in response to Schweitzer. 
Libby insisted that “Schweitzer’s appeal was not based on the latest information on radioactive 
fallout,” in a follow-up story reported on the New York Times front page, but graced with no 
hagiographic image such as Schweitzer enjoyed. Libby’s tone was, however, now concessionary 
and stood in marked contrast to his earlier statements, including a bit of back-pedaling in how he 
had described the risk of fallout just days before Schweitzer’s appeal. Libby now conceded that 
he was referring to “observable effects” when he staked out his previous absolutist position on 
the safety of fallout. Libby disingenuously called on Schweitzer to join him in balancing the risks 
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of fallout against the need to defend “freedom loving people everywhere.” 950 For a scientifically 
observable phenomenon that was otherwise largely invisible and only demonstrated its full range 
of effects over a long temporal scale, Libby’s fallback position amounted to ignoring the 
potential lethality of an ingested poison because the patient was not yet demonstrating signs of 
its toxicity.  
The bulk of Libby’s argument assumed averaging a largely even spread of fallout over 
the affected landscape, a theory of  describing fallout dispersion long disproven by  AFOAT-1’s 
experience in tracking fallout plumes to conduct sampling for intelligence purposes. This was a 
fact Libby was likely familiar with, even if not fully briefed into the work of such a sensitive 
program.
951
 While there was some mixing and dispersion of fallout plumes, tracking these 
concentrations downwind was possible and their tracks were distinct and predictable enough 
based on observing the movements of winds carrying them. The Air Weather Service did this 
daily in support of AFOAT-1 sampling operations throughout the 1950s. Fallout’s travels 
through the ecology once back in the surface environment remained little understood; the 
problem was that fallout dispersed briefly after a nuclear explosion. Once loose in the 
environment, the tendency of various natural processes was to re-concentrate it through diverse 
pathways in the environment with the passage of time. Political and diplomatically, given the 
United States sent fallout elsewhere without asking anyone’s permission, Libby’s assertion that 
people should think more positively about it seemed like a rather forced bargain. It was a 
position undertaken largely without research, except for the word of Libby and the AEC, 
essentially public relations fluff dressed up as scientific authority. That was to soon change. 
1957: HARDTACK 
The AEC publicly announced the pending HARDTACK test series for 1958 on 29 May 
1957, the day after the first PLUMBBOB series shot in Nevada. Leaving no doubt testing would 
continue, the statement emphasized in particular the necessity of the next test series in helping 
develop “clean” weapon designs. It was only basic commonsense politics to mouth the words 
needed to reassure the nation and the world that the United States was making every possible 
effort to minimize fallout. The AEC marketing effort implicitly argued to the public that the best 
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way to limit fallout was to make more of it and study it. Still, the constraints fallout imposed 
were the order of the day. On 1 May, the AEC assessed “that in view of the present climate of 
world opinion, it would be unwise for the total fission yield of Operation HARDTACK to exceed 
that of Operation REDWING [the 1956 Pacific series].”952  
General Starbird, Military Liaison Committee (MLC) chair and the Pentagon’s primary 
representative at the AEC, was clearly uneasy about the surge in negative public opinion and the 
consequential need to address the calls to limit fallout from testing itself by proactively shaping 
the discussion.
953
 
I feel that we will have to give immediately before HARDTACK some indication 
as to how clean our weapons are. I do not believe this should be done until just 
before HARDTACK. We should use it at that strategic time to help overcome 
opposition to HARDTACK.”954 
 
 This mistaken logic, which privileged official control of the narrative by virtue of 
governmental capacity to rebrand at best incremental design changes in nuclear weapons as 
consequential and “clean,” failed to reflect that, like fallout itself, once created the government 
no longer had exclusive control of fallout’s own narrative. The very fact that Starbird implicitly 
acknowledged how fallout bent his intentions and will through the constraints it increasingly 
placed on nuclear weapons was also important as an indication that some in the military were 
coming to terms with the need to be far more circumspect in choosing a way forward.  What 
Starbird saw as obvious and useful low-hanging fruit needed to reassure a public increasingly 
anxious about the insecurity fallout was bringing into their daily lives, others in the military 
found to be an irritating diversion from the task at hand. Thus, the chain of secret decisions to 
limit total fission yields beginning with REDWING was said to cause many weapons designers 
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and military staff to rebel against even the slightest imposition on the their quest for dramatic 
explosive power, regardless of the consequences and risks.
955
  
Fallout from Fantasy to Fact 
The need for secrecy associated with fallout was self-reinforcing by 1957. If the limited 
fallout generated by testing was proven risky, it would call into question war plans assuming, 
regardless of the military’s ability to limit Soviet attacks on American targets, that the United 
States would detonate thousands of nuclear weapons against Russian targets, generating a rain of 
global fallout resembling the scenario outlined in the popular 1957 novel, On the Beach.
956
  
While technically questionable in several areas, including its 100 percent mortality rates, 
the novel’s narrative was compelling and plausible to a public primed on what they read and 
heard about fallout. One may quibble with its science and politics, but On the Beach was a 
masterfully timed example of transnational art interacting with reality. The plot served as a 
conceptual channel overcoming transnational communication barriers. On the Beach modeled 
how to think about or view fallout in a way that became not only widespread, but deeply rooted 
in many cultures in a rapidly globalizing world. Published in 1957, given the global timeframe 
needed for the process of promotion and marketing, in terms of its impact On the Beach was 
widely read in 1958 in connection with the often disturbing news of the latest nuclear and 
military developments.
957
 
For those in the Air Force still ambitious for higher yield weapons, among the chief 
irritants besides AEC Commissioner Murray was their commander-in-chief. Finally responding 
in late May 1957 to congressional inquiries on the matters Murray raised about fallout, 
Eisenhower demonstrated both his expectations of progress and a certain continuing naivety in 
his dependence on Strauss for advice on AEC progress in controlling fallout. 
Most recently, we have learned that certain of them can be made in such a manner 
that radioactive fall-out is very greatly minimized. The tactical usefulness of this 
latter development is known to you… I feel that our large weapons (incidentally, 
now susceptible of being relatively the cleanest in the sense of fission product 
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yield) are large enough… cleanliness, which, as of now at any rate, does not yet 
apply to weapons of small size and yield.
958
 
 
Citing his view on the matter, the president specifically rejected any plans to test 
weapons larger than CASTLE BRAVO’s yield and bluntly stated that if any such testing was 
contemplated, it would require his personal review and approval. Despite the secrecy associated 
with the Air Force’s plans for 60 megaton class weapons, the Washington pressure-cooker was 
apparently channeling just such rumors, which Eisenhower wanted put to rest. The increasing 
congressional interest in fallout transmitted via the JCAE was a situation brought about largely 
because of legislators’ fears of fallout’s potential for increasingly debilitating effects on political 
support for nuclear weapons, as well as in response to the increased agitation of their constituents 
on the issue.
959
  
Chuck Hansen nonetheless offered a stark judgment on the social effects of nuclear 
weapons and fallout, arguing that “the politics of ‘clean’ weapons could be just as powerful as 
the bombs themselves.”960 While Hansen’s comment shared the established frame of viewing 
fallout’s role primarily through the social results of its influence, rather than as a result of its 
empirical effects, his derivation posed the frequently unacknowledged and always uncontrolled 
spread of their fallout against the obvious explosive power of nuclear weapons that generated it 
as an inherently self-limiting dialectic of power, a point of view held in common by this project. 
The U-2 Begins Poking Gaps in the “Gaps” Controversies 
The American public and, for the most part, Congress, too, was led to believe that very 
little was known about Soviet strategic forces during the nineteen-fifties. While there were 
significant limitations, in fact the general scope of the potential nuclear threat was well-defined 
thanks to the effectiveness of AFOAT-1’s krypton-85 monitoring. Before ready access to aerial 
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and spaced-based imagery began with U-2 overflights over the Soviet Union in July 1956, 
estimates of Russian strategic bomber strength varied. In what was essentially the public side of 
the secret interservice intelligence conflict, Air Force supporters began arguing in support of 
SAC’s enormous buildup of thousands of bombers as needed to offset a presumed Soviet 
advantage, which was termed the “bomber gap.”961 The same basic argument was later recycled 
into a “missile gap.”  
Neither was the case, yet claims of significant American military weakness were 
politically explosive. One of the first public indications of the bomber “gap” controversy’s 
potential political ramifications came during House hearings on the 1958 Pentagon budget held 
in February 1957, as the first take from U-2’s intelligence imagery of the Soviet Union was 
secretly and without direct attribution incorporated into the latest NSC estimates of Russian 
strategic forces strength provided to Congress. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, Air Force 
Secretary Donald Quarles, and the new Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General 
Nathan Twining, were interrogated about these revised intelligence estimates of Soviet nuclear 
strategic strength made after Congress recessed prior to the 1956 election. Incensed over the lack 
of explanation given by the Pentagon on the basis for the changed numbers, Representative 
Daniel Flood (D-Pennsylvania) directly questioned Twining about the timeline of the revisions.  
What is the earliest date the Air Force and the Department of Defense, either or 
both, knew that the intelligence was fifty percent wrong on the heavy bomber 
figures on which the current fiscal budget was predicated? 
 
Twining hemmed and hawed without letting Flood pin him down or providing any 
substantive reason for the revision or the reasons behind its timing. In fact, Twining seemed to 
insist that any change was merely semantic, rather than a sharp reduction from previously 
estimated growth the numbers seemed to indicate. 
[T]here is no change in our estimate of the number of these modern long-range 
bombers the Soviets could provide for their forces during the next two years. The 
change that has been made is to revise our estimates of long-range bomber 
strength today and in the near future. 
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The congressman shot back that Twining’s explanation was “not responsive.” Air Force 
Secretary Quarles next tried to mollify Flood, while confirming the changes made were at the 
behest of the junior service.  
[T]hroughout the time of congressional action, we believed that the testimony 
given…on the Air Force was the best summary of our intelligence and there was 
no intelligence to the contrary that came to my attention.
962
 
 
Quarles then insisted that any revisions made were being provided to Congress at the first 
opportunity, to which a clearly irritated Flood retorted, “That is not an answer.”963  
In reality, the need to keep the U-2 itself secret was not the only or even the root cause of 
a lack of explanation for the sharply lowered estimates of Soviet strength. The 4080
th
 Strategic 
Reconnaissance Wing at Laughlin AFB, Texas (near Del Rio) was undertaking training flights 
and began its operational missions later that year in the aircraft; although low key, the unusual 
plane was on almost daily display operating out of the base on the Mexican border.
964
 While the 
secret overflights of the USSR by the CIA’s U-2 threw a new, more accurate light on estimates 
constructed from older, faulty intelligence estimates, the primary basis of Air Force estimates of 
Soviet nuclear strength remained the krypton-85/MUSIC data generated by AFOAT-1 – “…the 
Air Force was the best summary of our intelligence and there was no intelligence to the 
contrary…” The revisioning narrative here suggests the need for more attention to the paradigm 
the U-2 overthrew – the Air Force’s distorted analysis of AFOAT-1’s otherwise accurate 
estimates of Russian plutonium production. This obscured the original source and budgetary 
import of the intelligence overthrown by the U-2 from historians, just as it proved useful in 
concealing the aircraft’s full narrative from Congress in 1957. 
The U-2 was born as a strategic reconnaissance system in large part to fill in the gaps in 
Soviet force structure, delivery systems, their true numbers, and exact locations that the Air 
Force’s use of AFOAT-1’s otherwise reliable intelligence data failed to provide. Think of the 
AEDS as a camera with an excellent zoom lens, but a very narrow field of view. As a first 
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generation technical collection system, the AEDS was very good at a very narrow set of 
missions, but was quite limited in its ability to provide data that could synergize with other 
sources to provide unique insights into other important aspects of Soviet strategic forces, like 
delivery systems.  
The U-2’s CIA mission was to discern at least the outlines of Soviet intentions as well as 
to better define capabilities of the immense nuclear arsenal it was known to have accumulated by 
1956 and that the krypton-85 program revealed was well within its grasp, resolving that question 
in little more than year. The answer was, while apparently flush with the fissile material required 
to make weapons, the Soviet strategic threat was hobbled by its incapacity to project power 
effectively because of the deficiencies and limited numbers of its strategic bomber fleet and other 
delivery systems. If there was a bomber gap, the Soviets had it.  
One reason for the conflict between Congress and the Pentagon was, of course, the very 
typical motivation within bureaucracies to hide their failures with new promises of success. It 
was impossible to explain the change in estimated Soviet strength without going into more detail 
about the predominant role played by AFOAT-1’s data on which the earlier estimates were 
based. This stark, secret reality contrasted with the publicly hegemonic postwar American 
political consensus of anxiety that often simplistically defined the overarching national security 
mission as “avoiding a nuclear Pearl Harbor.”965 The Air Force, dependent on nuclear weapons, 
saw a diminution of its role take shape in the success of the CIA’s U-2 program, leading it to 
acquire its own U-2 fleet after initially rejecting the aircraft as unsuitable. 
These changes came at a time already fraught with tension over organizational turf 
between the Air Force and the CIA. The first U-2 overflights of Russian territory in the summer 
of 1956 provided enough hard photographic evidence for the CIA’s analysts to issue a report in 
November 1956 arguing for substantially lower estimates of Soviet bomber strength. The U-2 
provided an alternative source of quantitative data on Soviet nuclear strength for comparison 
with data provided by AFOAT-1’s tracking of Russian fissile material production.966 The 
problem was that the adjusted estimates of Soviet bomber strength, while still classified, were 
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provided to Congress in the middle of the election break without complete attribution as to their 
source or justification for the significant reduction in estimated Soviet strength. Thus the more 
accurate, but substantially lower numbers provided by the CIA, rather than resolving the problem 
for lawmakers, added considerable fuel to a growing bi-partisan fire over the relative balance of 
power between the two superpowers. While the drumbeat of anxiety over purported Soviet 
capabilities provided ample ammunition in the battle for higher Pentagon budgets, the secrecy 
shrouding U-2 imagery fed questioning about the real capabilities of intelligence assets and their 
estimates of Soviet strength in Congress, which helped drive the hungry spiral of escalating 
defense budgets Eisenhower denounced in his farewell address in January 1961. 
Without access to the same information Eisenhower held, the seeming sudden closure of 
the “bomber gap” raised eyebrows in Congress over whether the East or West held the lead in 
the nuclear arms race, an uncertainty that publicly festered for two years, expanding to include a 
similarly-supposed “missile gap” with the launch of Sputnik. Despite the source of these “gaps” 
in analytical gaffes, by the time of the 1960 presidential campaign, Democratic and Republican 
camps clashed over whether enough was being done in general to counter this concocted illusion 
of growing Soviet technical prowess.
967
 The issue of which nation held the lead in missile 
technology was clouded somewhat by the poor test performance of several ambitious U.S. 
missile systems, creating considerable public anxiety about the status of each program and 
raising questions about which nuclear power would first field a credible ICBM capability. This 
was a race the United States ultimately won, but which was very much an open question as 1957 
drew to a close. Behind the scenes, the explanation was simple: intelligence produced by the U-2 
provided the first empirical data that materially contested earlier estimates of Soviet bomber 
strength long derived almost exclusively from data produced by AFOAT-1. 
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Imagery: A New Generation of Intelligence 
Thus, from July 1956 on, the CIA’s clandestine U-2 overflights searched Soviet skies to 
locate the highest priority targets – nuclear installations of all types – as well as sought to 
confirm the actual strength of Soviet bomber forces and the state of its missile program.
968
 
Remarkably, despite the best efforts of the CIA assisted by fixes from AFOAT-1 infrasonic data, 
by this late date the exact site of the Soviet testing ground in Kazakhstan was not yet firmly 
fixed. The interagency Ad Hoc Requirements Committee placed it, along with several other 
nuclear sites, at the top of its list of priority targets for the CIA’s overflights of the USSR.969 The 
CIA’s Henry Lowenhaupt noted the location of what was eventually identified as the 
Semipalatinsk testing grounds, the Soviet equivalent of NTS, was only known within about thirty 
miles. This estimate provided indication that AFOAT-1’s seismic network, had not yet fully 
benefiting from the vast expansion in scientific knowledge of regional geology it was then 
sponsoring in the academic community.
970
 At the time, the U-2’s best cameras could only deliver 
views of a strip about five miles wide when operating at altitude, posing the chicken-or-egg 
conundrum of needing fairly exacting coordinates in order to improve the chances of precisely 
photographing the location of an as yet unknown site. 
In July 1957, Lowenhaupt asked Dr. Donald Rock, one of Doyle Northrup’s assistant 
technical directors at AFOAT-1, for an averaged location of the five largest seismic signals 
collected from Soviet tests conducted there. Lowenhaupt used this spot as the target center in 
order to align the U-2’s flight path over it to provide the greatest coverage on this leg of its 
route.
971
 Lowenhaupt was aided somewhat in choosing likely targets by images taken from the 
limited yield of useful photographic obtained from the 1955 GENETRIX balloon reconnaissance 
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missions. These balloons carried cameras, and perhaps sampling equipment, across the USSR 
and the People’s Republic of China for recovery by the U.S. in the Pacific.972 Gregory W. 
Pedlow and Donald E. Walzenbach archly observed the miniscule “success” rate of the 1955 
GENETRIX flights; less than seven percent out of 516 flights produced any photograph with 
useful intelligence value. Moreover, the clandestine lighter-than-air flights, supposedly 
concealed under the cover story that the balloons were engaged in “weather research” underway 
in support of the upcoming 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year, frequently were shot 
down or otherwise fell to be recovered and displayed as captured trophies to the world press, 
suggested the Russian and Chinese governments involved were likely just as sensitive to the 
prospect of aircraft overflights. Despite these failures, GENETRIX provided important 
information on Soviet anti-aircraft defenses that was of use in designing electronic 
countermeasures for the U-2 and other Air Force aircraft. A bar in the balloon’s rigging 
happened to resonate at the frequency used by the primary Soviet surveillance radar, so the 
flights provided unexpected opportunities to plumb signals from the Russian air defenses it 
reflected, indicating the probable location of the radars..
973
 Seemingly far afield for the topic at 
hand here, it was an impressive example of the synergistic benefits derived from the close 
association of data with imagery that became a hallmark of American second generation 
technical collection systems that eclipsed the capabilities of first generation system like the 
AEDS.
974
 In locating and capturing the imagery of actual targets, associating this data with 
location, and providing a contextual overview of the target defense, a comprehensive set of target 
data emerged to guide SAC’s war plans staff.  
In the end, the CIA’s U-2s played – and eventually lost – the cat-and-mouse game with 
Soviet defenses during a period of great diplomatic effort for arms control between the two 
superpowers. The shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers brought this hopeful diplomatic interlude 
to a sudden close in the last year of Ike’s presidency. Eisenhower understood the luck of the U-2 
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pilots was on borrowed time as Soviet air defenses improved. When it ran out in May 1960, it 
was two years past the time when the CIA warned Eisenhower the aircraft had become 
vulnerable to Soviet defenses.
975
 Ike’s reluctant determination in gambling to send the aircraft 
back again and again was not sparked by a simple desire to gather general intelligence on the 
Russians, although it did that admirably. Instead, the U-2 flights continued as the president 
sought to specifically resolve the Air Force’s consistently high estimates of the Soviet stockpile 
with U-2 imagery demonstrating the weakness of Russian forces, while providing better target 
data for those forces it was able to locate. 
The Furry Hat that Came in From the Cold 
The CIA used other ingenious methods, like interviews with returning Germans and other 
refugees, to develop leads to locate nuclear facilities in the Soviet Union. Most significant was 
an example of the telling importance of scientific intelligence even when using suitable human 
sources. A returning refugee tailor who had worked in Tomsk brought a fur hat with him when 
repatriated to the West in 1956. His CIA debriefers forwarded the hat to AFOAT-1 (not AFTAC, 
as Lowenhaupt misstates, which did not come into existence until 1959.) Analysis provided 
suggestive results for Lowenhaupt to utilize in suggesting targets for the CIA overflights: 
… its exterior surface contained 50 parts per billion of uranium that was slightly, 
but definitely, enriched in the U-235 isotope. Since no U-236 was detectable, the 
uranium was not from fall-out, nor had it been through a reactor. Additional 
analyses for plutonium, radio-iodine, and separated lithium isotopes were all 
negative… The evidence was against its being a reactor with associated chemical 
plant or a lithium isotope separator. I made my target a U-235 separation plant 
and centered it on the spot where the German tailor had seen 12,000 prisoners go 
to work.
976
 
 
This was especially significant, as detection of uranium separation facilities was a far 
tougher nut to crack for long range detection than locating evidence of plutonium production 
reactors or nuclear explosions. The limited effluents from uranium separation do not travel as 
indiscriminately as krypton-85 or iodine-131 do, so AFOAT-1’s techniques of direct 
measurements of environmental samples were far less effective in locating such plants. Prior to 
the U-2’s imagery, uranium enrichment facilities could only be located by means of less distinct 
indications such as provisions made for use of large amounts of electric power, vast new 
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complexes under roof, etc. Here was one of the rare cases where human agents provided telling 
evidence for nuclear intelligence from the USSR, but the findings still depended on exacting 
laboratory work to reveal the full implications of what the source offered, yielding facts most 
likely unknown to the person involved. Ultimately, such meager opportunities were largely 
eclipsed by the bounty of overhead imagery.  
In an earlier Studies in Intelligence article, “Mission to Birch Woods,” Lowenhaupt 
partially documented AFOAT-1’s support to the CIA in developing this critical information to 
direct the U-2 flights.
977
 One leg of the CIA U-2 mission on 22 August 1957 was charted to take 
the U-2 directly over the center of the averaged location of the seismic signals provided by 
AFOAT-1. As with the hat bearer, CIA Detachment B (Lahore, Pakistan) pilot Jim 
Cherbonneaux was not cognizant of the target Lowenhaupt hoped to photograph.
978
 Once over 
the target, having flown his training missions in the plane out of the CIA’s “ranch” at Groom 
Lake (known later as “Area 51”) adjacent to NTS, Cherbonneaux recognized what was on the 
flight-track below as the U-2 soared more than 70,000 feet overhead: a shot cab similar to what 
he saw erected before tests at NTS in Nevada. Lowenhaupt doubted that “anyone thought 
seriously about flying into a nuclear test.” But that was what nearly happened. The shot cab seen 
by Cherbonneaux was for a much smaller device shot less than a week later, but four hours after 
the U-2 cleared the area an air-dropped test (Joe-41, 520 kilotons, 22 August 1957) detonated.  
On 21 August 1957, the day before location of the Semipalatinsk testing ground, another 
U-2 mission was vectored against the Tomsk location suggested by the fur hat. Its film showed 
an immense installation covering some 40 square miles. Thus within two days in the summer of 
1957, the groundwork laid by AFOAT-1 was used in conjunction with the CIA’s U-2 to finally 
track back and confirm the locations of Semipalatinsk and Tomsk. Lowenhaupt recalled the 
excitement accompanying location of the Soviet facilities. 
Allen Dulles is said to have exclaimed jubilantly, when he heard the news, “You 
mean you really did know that something atomic was going on ‘way out there in 
the wilds of Siberia!’”979 
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Some argued the Agency at times placed itself more at the center of things than 
warranted by the evidence, failing to give others proper credit.
980
 It took ten years and resources 
beyond the Air Force’s own, but LeMay at last could be sure of the location of some of his most 
important targets. AFOAT-1 succeeded wildly, but the coverage gaps it left pointed toward the 
ensuing success of a new generation of imagery systems even as it provided them with important 
leads to focus upon. 
1958: Caught in a Lie 
It was unclear when Eisenhower found out that his statements about significant progress 
being made on the fallout problem were not supported by the facts, but within a year it became 
clear a discrepancy existed about what had been represented to him as fact about the status of 
“clean” weapons. This realization appeared to take place in between when HARDTACK I was 
concluding in the Pacific and HARDTACK II at NTS was poised to begin. In the middle of an 
even more intense public controversy over fallout just a year later, an anonymous member of the 
NSC staff prepared a summary of Eisenhower’s previous remarks as a “Clean Bombs” briefing 
paper.
981
 The usually ineffective OCB, while recently quiescent on nuclear issues, suddenly 
found “the major problem before the OCB Working Group is the current and continuous public 
discussion of the effects of nuclear fallout.”982 With the results of PLUMBBOB in hand and 
HARDTACK again plowing the same rough ground, this heretofore unnoticed “clean bomb” gap 
was more substantial than either the bomber or missile “gaps” ever were.  
At HARDTACK, longer term goals to limit fallout again contributed to increased short 
term fallout by virtue of efforts to rush as many designs as possible through the gate before 
testing ended; along with the AEC’s practice of adding tests of “clean” designs to the schedule, 
rather than substituting them in place of scheduled dirty shots, the shot list ballooned with last 
minute additions. In the end, rough calculations of fission yield at HARDTACK showed that it 
far exceeded, at 12.5 megatons fission yield, the 2.5 megatons fission equivalent yield originally 
thought to be available if the series were held to only the fission yield calculated to not increase 
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total atmospheric radioactivity following decay of fallout from previous American test series.
983
 
What was not understood at the time about the estimated 2.5 megaton fission yield deposition 
rate was that, based on early returns from CROWFLIGHT in 1958 and 1959, it apparently was 
later found that the actual deposition rate was roughly four times as much, around 10 megatons 
of fission yield a year.
984
 While that could have been considered good news for Starbird and 
Libby’s efforts to squeeze in as many shots as possible, in fact it was bad news for Libby’s 
theory that the stratosphere acted as a cooling reservoir so that fallout decayed before returning 
to earth. The accelerated deposition rate was even worse news for humanity, too, bringing 
strontium-90 back to earth much more quickly than originally believed. Unmentioned because of 
Project’s Sunshine’s primary focus on strontium-90, the accelerated fallout deposition had an 
even greater effect on shorter-lived isotopes. Those with half-lives of days, weeks, or even a few 
months, thought to for the most part decay safely in the sky under the original slow deposition 
model, would arrive in much larger quantities with the 400% increase in deposition rate. 
Late 1958 into 1959: Critical Mass 
Signs of impending change were everywhere, even as testing by East and West continued 
at a brisk pace during 1958. As HARDTACK I wound down in the Pacific and preparations were 
underway for HARDTACK II in October at NTS, behind the scenes Eisenhower maneuvered to 
gain consensus from the Pentagon and State in order to implement a temporary moratorium 
while negotiations on a permanent test ban agreement in Geneva edged forward. State worried 
“the political situation in the UN and the public opinion problem in Allied and neutral countries” 
made an agreement imperative. The Department of Defense supported a proposal, but only if tied 
to a fissile material cutoff and only down to the limits of a detectable signal, while leaving open 
the option to test below that minimum. The Joint Chiefs personally opposed any change in 
existing policy, while the AEC sought a 1 megaton atmospheric test yield annual limit it hoped 
would ensure no net additional radioactivity was added to the existing reservoir of atmospheric 
fallout.
985
 The next day, General Twining followed up for the JCS with a memo for the Secretary 
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of Defense insisting on the fissile material cutoff as a prerequisite, as well as emphasizing the 
need for continued testing.
986
  
A significant group of reports from the White House Office of the Special Assistant 
National Security Advisor generated at an August 1958 meeting with the president describe an 
effort to conclude a mutually agreed test moratorium beginning on 1 October 1958.
987
 The 
parties were unable to agree to end testing that soon, although British atmospheric testing ended 
with GRAPPLE Z (1 kiloton, 23 September 1958) in apparent attention to the original agreed 
effective date for test cessation of 1 October. The first fallout era finally closed in early 
November as the other parties, the United States and the Soviet Union, excused themselves to the 
negotiations in Geneva after wrapping up their respective final binges of atmospheric testing. 
Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs remained insistent on a fissile material cutoff agreement as a 
requirement for their support of any test ban agreement. This was a useful, substantive goal, but 
also seemingly quite superfluous, as MUSIC delivered this information to the JCS in great detail. 
On the other hand, treating such an initiative as a goal while insisting the Russians self-report 
their plutonium-239 production suggested the gambit was essentially an effort to compare that 
declaration with AFOAT-1’s documentation of Russian production through its krypton-85 
monitoring program.
988
 I.I. Rabi’s assertion that a test ban would preserve an American 
technological lead in weapon design was remarked upon by several observers, including 
statements found among Killian’s papers.989 But the crucial fact that the Pentagon had no real 
need for such a report went unnoticed in the extant archival record, even though it became clear 
they were in possession of essentially the same information with MUSIC they hoped to gain via 
such a disclosure by the Soviet Union. Discrepancies between Russian declarations and 
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American and British estimates of Soviet fissile material could serve as a pretext for contention 
if at substantial variance once the treaty was in effect.  
Essentially, the Pentagon sought to hold up an agreement until it reflected revisions that 
would provide AFOAT-1 with continued access to the best information on Soviet weapons 
available in lieu of the unit’s then-current emphasis on capturing fallout samples. It was only one 
among a number of objections filed to counter Rabi’s position a test ban was a net advantage to 
the West.
990
  Not the first or last of many prerequisites the Pentagon imposed to gain its 
cooperation, it was but one salient example of how closely vetted such agreements were prior to 
submission to the Senate for ratification. It was also important to note, given this explicit 
connection was likewise not reflected in these documents, that the Soviet plutonium-239 
stockpile was about 3,681 kilograms in 1958 compared to the United States stockpile of 13,150 
kilograms.
991
 Clearly, a fissile material cut-off would leave the United States with an enormous 
advantage, one that far exceeded any potential unmatched technical lead in weapon design that 
might be discovered by the Russians. The fact that this went unmentioned suggested two 
possibilities. One was that the classification of the linkage between AFOAT-1’s capabilities and 
the positions Defense and the White House took on diplomacy remains sensitive and thus is still 
classified. Alternatively, given comments from observers that AFOAT-1/AFTAC never gave up 
anything without being asked specifically for it even to those with the proper clearances, it was 
possible the Air Force chose to play these cards very close to its chest.
992
 The White House and 
State may not have realized the stark advantage of the American stockpile lead over Soviet 
holdings because it did not specifically ask about it in briefings by the military or DOD.   
While considerable pro forma political grandstanding over the viability and verifiability 
of arms control agreements remains typical of Senate review of arms control agreements, 
assessment of AFTAC’s capabilities in connection with American diplomatic initiatives that 
yielded the resulting 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty suggested the agreement was well within the 
capabilities of existing means of verification.
993
 American capacity to verify subsequent arms 
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control agreements appears to reflect a history of relative certainty in both the intelligence 
aspects and the necessary verification capabilities by the time they surface for Congressional 
review, a frame decidedly at odds with the Murphy/Walkowicz trope that U.S. nuclear weapon 
and intelligence efforts more often than not failed to deliver during the Cold War, a persistent 
theme of many critics of American foreign policy.
994
 Strikingly, the recurring accusatory back-
and-forth in the Senate about the constraints and limits of arms control effectiveness, which 
during the Cold War were dictated as much by what the Pentagon and its supporters in Congress 
found acceptable as what Moscow did, remains a model called upon to serve domestic and 
partisan interests as much as it aspires to serve the national interest.
995
 The two-decade long 
failure to so far ratify the 1995 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was probably the most important 
among several recent initiatives where the national interest has been sacrificed to political 
chicanery that festers in the general ignorance about the history of the extraordinary verification 
capabilities that support arms control diplomacy. 
1959: Senator Gore’s Problematic, But Eventually Useful Proposal 
Political pressures catalyzed by fallout mounted. A 13 January 1959 memo to 
Eisenhower from Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the president, described a proposal from 
Senator Albert Gore Sr.
996
 The senator wanted the Geneva talks to focus on ending fallout by 
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ending atmospheric testing if the current talks on a broad arms control and disarmament 
framework headed towards impasse. While Gray’s assessment of consensus from within the 
White House was the talks were not at that point, they also embraced the idea as consistent with 
the president’s August 1958 policy change delinking a nuclear arms control agreement from a 
general disarmament pact. The problem was Gore’s publicly floating the proposal, which could 
undermine its potential use as a unilateral “fallback” position should the talks fall apart.   
Such self-imposed moderation may be prudent because, even if the blame for the 
break in negotiations lies with the Soviet Union, increased pressure of public 
opinion for a cessation of tests can be expected to be directed against the U.S. and 
the USSR.
997
 
 
Having noted how transnational pressures fell equally on both the US and USSR because of 
fallout, the memo suggested reserving any comments or action on Gore’s proposal until the 
negotiations warranted playing this card. Eisenhower still wanted a total test ban, even after 
decoupling the test ban discussion from the previous linkage of it to an overall disarmament 
agreement in order to more expeditiously address the problems fallout created. 
Teller Adopts Low-Yield Strategy 
Gordon Gray’s January 1959 day was very busy, as the same day he also forwarded to 
the president’s military aide, General Andrew Goodpaster, a transcript of a talk given by Edward 
Teller on 20 November 1958 at the National War College.
998
 Classified Secret, the report 
reflected Teller’s belated, ironically implicit embrace of the Oppenheimer tactical weapons 
initiative, a transformation conducted behind closed curtains.
999
 While not renouncing his 
passion for high-yield weapons – “…I don’t want to eliminate big weapons from limited nuclear 
war…” – so much as embracing a trend toward what he argued were more practical weapons – 
“as you will see, use of nuclear weapons in limited warfare is to our advantage” –Teller’s 
shifting strategic enthusiasms represented a telling turnabout caused in large part by fallout’s 
cumulative threat, which made general nuclear war fought with high-yield weapons strategically 
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infeasible as a concept. The Hungarian-American physicist embraced the concept of limited 
nuclear war fought with low-yield weapons, in conflicts such as those “in Hungary and in 
Algeria,” arguing that change in the strategic situation versus the Russians over the last decade 
made this policy necessary, without explaining why things changed beyond the initial loss of the 
American nuclear monopoly in 1949. Teller argued the United States faced the “danger of being 
put into a position where the possibility of any kind of limited war will vanish.”  As General 
Power did a year later, Teller insisted “the danger is the cessation of nuclear testing,” given the 
need he saw to develop low-yield weapons to fight such limited wars.
1000
  
The need to continue testing to meet this research and development requirement for low-
yield weapons in turn paralleled the need to monitor the Soviet Union for similar efforts. Teller 
directly linked the controversy over the disputed viability of the lowest threshold of detection the 
proposed Geneva system of seismic monitoring was capable of and the fact this area of very low-
yield devices was exactly what was of most interest as fallout forced nuclear testing to turn in 
this direction and quite possibly go undetected. Teller furthermore alleged that, while Soviet 
institutions would have no trouble cheating at the low yield levels he claimed were undetectable, 
Americans were culturally too honest to support such subterfuge if the United States were party 
to a binding agreement prohibiting all testing. Teller argued this meant any agreement would 
turn into a decisive Russian advantage as they cheated and the West did not.
1001
  
Speaking within three weeks of the temporary test moratorium going into effect, Teller 
used the occasion to rally the troops around the need for a quick resumption of testing with 
promises of continuing development of a family of highly portable nuclear artillery. Teller 
enthused over a newly tested design for ground troops, the Davy Crockett short-range battlefield 
mortar, describing the way its portability would transform land warfare by sharply limiting the 
logistical requirements commanders faced when employing conventional weapons. Along with 
the Davy Crockett, Teller envisioned a family of weapons similar to it, but with longer range and 
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a selection of yields, all miniaturized to equip a specialized cadre of skilled nuclear- capable 
troops forming the core of future Army and Marine Corps combat formations. Teller implicitly 
argued these new weapons should be considered as conventional in nature through his choice of 
discourse, calling them “nuclear explosives,” and hardly mentioning the singular limiting factor 
in their use, the threat of their cumulative and local fallout even if nuclear war could be fought 
on a limited basis with them without escalation to general war.  
The Davy Crockett or W-54 warhead was one of the first post-Oppenheimer era tactical 
weapon designs. It sprang from a program initiated in early 1958 but was part of a class of 
weapons only made possible in a timely fashion by dint of the 1950 GAC’s sticking to its guns in 
pursuing tactical weapon designs at a time when the Air Force – and Teller – wanted only high-
yield weapons.  The Pentagon showed a distinct lack of interest in such low-yield designs when 
first proposed in 1952, but by 1958 the need to limit fallout exposures was among the 
motivations behind the Army seeking such a low yield weapon. The W-54 physics package 
underwent a series of tests at HARDTACK I and II in 1958, leading to weapon production and 
stockpiling beginning in 1961. The weapon was tested underground in Operation NOUGAT 
when the temporary test moratorium ended in fall1961, then was tested twice as part of the final 
series of atmospheric test in Nevada in 1962. This included the last of all atmospheric tests at 
NTS, a field demonstration of the Davy Crockett, with notable guests including Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor.
1002
  
The irony of Teller’s effort to find a weapon useful on the battle field was Eisenhower 
had already been there, done that by the time Teller found himself singing the praises of low 
yield tactical nuclear weaponry in late 1958. The atomic battlefield Teller anticipated was 
already obsolete in the president’s eyes, indiscernibly different from the president’s own myopic 
New Look when it came to fallout.  
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Chapter Five: Testing, the Limits of Fallout 
When historians use example, citation, and argument to explain and interpret the meaning 
of the past, it can be tempting for critics to declare that the resulting narrative comprises a 
selective, peculiaristic choice to fit a preconceived and largely invented opinion about the past. 
Setting the vagaries of individual subjectivity aside, the opportunity provided by stumbling 
across a quotable source from the era that rather compactly sums up a substantial part of a 
historian’s argument about it is always valued as a strong piece of evidence to bolster what might 
seem an esoteric point or two. All the more so when this labor must overcome what frequently 
remains a deliberately obscured record. Finding a source that speaks directly to a project’s 
primary premise readily available in compact form can fundamentally validate an argument 
forced to rely in part on some considered assumptions. While unsigned, the unamed author of the 
following reflection from 1959 represented at least a substantive body of belief about fallout 
among the officers and readers of Air Force, the Air Force Association’s monthly magazine.  
When the U.S. tested its first H-device, the amount of radioactivity released 
turned out to be considerably larger than had been anticipated.
1003
 The hydrogen 
weapon had been developed primarily to achieve maximum blast and heat effects. 
When it appeared that radioactivity was among the primary effects of H-weapons, 
the inclination was to use “fallout” as a bonus… 
 
Radioactivity, therefore, was the factor which made of the hydrogen bomb the 
first true area weapon of history… 
 
Subsequently, it became apparent that this very effectiveness…tends to make the 
weapon quite unmanageable and may prevent its utilization… 
 
Widespread, heavy fallout…would probably also “backfire” against friendly 
nations and cause heavy casualties among the very peoples, including one’s own, 
whom the military operations were designed to protect. 
 
Fallout may actually preclude success in war. 
 
The most basic objection to uncontrolled fallout, in fact, is that it would tend to 
render war unmanageable as a rational tool of policy and national security.
1004
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The evidence was clear that fallout would have given Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy 
plenty to think about if they ever found themselves in position of having mere minutes to 
consider unleashing “the great atomic power.”1005 Every United States president since, as well as 
Soviet and Russian leaders and those of the other nuclear arms possessing nations, has faced and 
will face the same pushback from fallout should such a situation arise. 
Anonymously authored, the best the Air Force magazine article could offer in December 
1959 was clearly a tested and failed solution. Developing a “clean weapons…capability as soon 
as possible” was already dismissed by the Pentagon’s leadership as pointless.1006 The general 
public did not know that dead-end had already been reached, even as Air Force boosters sought 
to whip up support for this illusory distraction as part of their argument for resumption of testing. 
While war plans included some qualitatively “clean” weapons, the quantity still totaled up to a 
dirty result that could not simply be washed out as detergent advertising insisted. Change, even 
when starkly necessary, came slowly. With the fallout stopped, opportunity for diplomacy 
expanded, only to be cut-short by crisis after crisis and contaminated by the worst year for fallout 
ever, 1962. Remarkably, desire to end fallout proved stronger than the lure of conflict.  
Tipping Point 
The years 1955 to 1958 represented an approach to a tipping point, a liminal interlude of 
transition between fallout as a vital secret enmeshed in the problematic glare of public attention 
amid a broadening nuclear intelligence program and Eisenhower’s conclusive recognition that 
fallout would remain a fundamental constraint on the military utility of nuclear weapons. Beyond 
advances in detection of nuclear explosions, hard won technical knowledge led to improved 
global networks to collect and process data on fissile material and weapon production and 
stockpiling, in the process shaping the basis for the technical support systems nuclear arms 
control pacts depend upon for verification. Testing during this three-year period produced more 
fallout than the total from all previous testing since 1945.
1007
 As fallout contaminated the entire 
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planet, both military personnel and academic sectors found increasingly sophisticated 
capabilities to detect and measure it in their hands.
1008
  
New fallout suddenly ceased at the end of 1958 as the United Kingdom, United States 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed to voluntarily suspend testing, take stock and 
pursue agreement on a permanent test ban. Despite the substantial increase in testing after 1955, 
through to the beginning of what turned out to be a temporary moratorium on all testing at the 
end of 1958 only about one-third of the total fallout generated during the Cold War had been 
created, with the first three nuclear powers conducting some 300 tests totaling roughly 174 
megatons of fission and fusion yield over the thirteen years since TRINITY in 1945.
1009
  
After taking a break from testing in 1959 and 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
resumed testing in a challenge to crisis-burdened President John F. Kennedy after he assumed 
office in 1961. The United States undertook a number of underground tests late that year in 
response, trying to draw a favorable comparison between those shots and the dirty and quite 
profligate Soviet atmospheric test series underway before the U.S. decided it, too, would join in. 
During 1962, the Americans dirtied the atmosphere again, but limited further atmospheric testing 
to 38 megatons of yield jam-packed with every possible device ready for the testing grounds.  
The Soviet Union, clearly making a point they could contaminate the environment just as handily 
as the Americans, over just fifteen months detonated an astonishing 220 megatons of weapons 
aboveground, a total that in itself exceeded all previous fallout produced, as well as 
concentrating 89% of total Soviet fallout yield into just one year, 1962. The 1962 Soviet test 
series alone represented some 42% of all fallout produced by atmospheric testing. Combined 
with U.S. fallout that year, the 1962 total of 258 megatons of yield tested in one year was 
roughly half of all fallout produced during the Cold War; two-thirds of all fallout produced was 
in 1961-1962. The Soviet Union surpassed the American atmospheric test total of 141 megatons 
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by more than 100 megatons for a total of 247 megatons after trailing the United States total until 
its final fallout binge of 1962.
1010
  
Closely monitored by the AFTAC-mission dedicated U-2 fleet, the massive injection of 
radioactive isotopes was the closest the world has yet come to encountering contamination from 
an actual nuclear war. Roughly four times as large as 60 megaton warning line originally 
suggested by GABRIEL that was reached over the course of nine years at roughly the conclusion 
of the CASTLE test series in 1954, samples from 1962 and 1963 offered a fourth, quite 
distinctive group of data to compare with that collected prior to July 1945, from then until the 
end of 1958, and for the period when the air began to clear from 1958 to 1961 during the 
temporary test moratorium. When and if released, analysis of this historic data will provide the 
best evidence available about the movement of fallout in the atmosphere and, after its return to 
the ground-level environment, its deposition and circulation in the biosphere. 
The narrative here goes in several directions, but connecting some of the essential dots 
for readers will aid in its digestibility. In a sense, this was because fallout acts as a universal 
contaminant insinuated into Cold War history as thoroughly as it spread into the global 
ecosystem and atmosphere. As with its role as an unseen yet intimately physical threat, once the 
proper instruments for detecting its meaning and role in the social order are at hand, fallout’s end 
game plays out in view. Kennedy’s presidency, begun with the fallout genie back in the bottle 
but with the diplomatic process congealed by the effects of Eisenhower’s authorization of one 
too many U-2 flights, demonstrated the two presidents largely hewed to a policy of continuity 
regarding fallout; this suggested the need to address fallout was a data-driven policy, rather than 
one driven by ideology, partisanship, or emotion. Considering the intervening multiple, nuclear-
enhanced crises and the AEC’s habit of engaging in wishful public statements, rather than factual 
thinking about fallout prior to 1963, it was an even more remarkable achievement.  
When the 1958 test moratorium went into effect, fallout represented an unusual policy 
continuity between East and West, opening lines of communication that eventually put the first 
three nuclear powers all on the same page of agreement to end fallout, despite their multiple 
other differences. These factors also suggest fallout’s end was due to something more than an era 
of good feeling breaking out, which was certainly not the case, or solely the result of public 
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pressures to end testing, which had relatively little effect on the Soviet Union. Implicit in the end 
of fallout from testing was recognition that the voluminous cumulative threat posed by wartime 
fallout largely undermined any practical rationale for the use of nuclear weapons, a stark fact that 
began to be recognized, as in this chapter’s opening vignette, act as a limit in the arms race .  
While political pressures mounted in public, behind the scenes a body of evidence was 
growing that suggested fallout need be taken far more seriously than many in the Eisenhower 
administration believed necessary in their prior public representations. At the same time, long-
unquestioned past assumptions derived from data produced by AFOAT-1/AFTAC on the Soviet 
stockpile that Air Force analysts used as the primary basis for the much-hypothesized, yet non-
existent bomber and missile gaps came under scrutiny. U-2 imagery pointed out significant 
issues with the accuracy of national intelligence estimates of the capabilities of Russian nuclear 
forces based on stockpile estimates.  
The success of the CIA’s U-2, which for the first time provided SAC’s bomber force with 
truly accurate information for many of its targets, was part of the process opening the door to the 
many advantages of satellites; here, too, fallout was deeply embedded within a familiar Cold 
War canon. Something as simple as knowing exactly where your target was lessened the need for 
excess megatons of unnecessarily destructive fallout yield previously required to provide the 
certainty of destruction needed to satisfy SAC’s target planners.  Ironically, at the same time CIA 
U-2 imagery brought into question the accuracy of some of the unit’s previous work, in the 
hands of the Air Force the aircraft also opened the door to the stratosphere for AFOAT-1 – and 
to researchers seeking to finally determine where all the fallout went and for how long. The 
answers to these questions eventually supported an end to fallout. Nuclear intelligence would 
remain important, but the quick pace and robust expansion of Soviet nuclear power meant that 
the weapons grew relatively less important compared to the need to better understand their 
delivery systems. Overhead imaging and its capacity to supply contextual, often compelling 
insights into Soviet intent and capabilities began to eclipse the need for much of the accurate, but 
far more narrowly focused results obtained by AFTAC from what seemed to be thin air. AFTAC 
was born in 1959 from AFOAT-1 into a transformative process where fallout grew relatively less 
important as imagery became the best means to monitor the global threat environment as part of 
a diverse and comprehensive suite of intelligence resources and – with the signing of the 1963 
Limited Test Ban Treaty – arms control agreement verification capabilities. 
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Wheat and Milk 
While part of fallout’s end game focuses on the policy perils of powerful politicians with 
the advanced technology of vast networks of military power at their fingertips, important roles 
remained for the humblest items of everyday consumption and the consumers who used them. 
Both Eisenhower and Kennedy publicly acted on fallout after newfound capacity for detecting 
fallout in the food supply brought about scares over wheat (1959) and milk (1962) respectively. 
While the circumstances of both events – somewhat controversially – suggested the need for 
immediate action to protect public health from ever more ubiquitous fallout, the facts are 
indisputable that the policy decisions made reflected the public evolution of a secret policy 
determination to end fallout. These decisions were based on quantifiable, empirical data that 
described fallout’s spread from the ecosystem into the food chain and elsewhere in the 
environment. Thus, this narrative casts a light on a dramatic, secret about-face on fallout by the 
atomic Air Force. The exact reason for this policy change remains unclear beyond that it was 
science-based and data-driven. The Air Force’s leadership, similar to how they were willing to 
bring up the intelligence aspects of fallout at the 1954 Oppenheimer hearing in order to preserve 
the discussion from veering toward fallout’s limits on nuclear war, apparently recognized the 
fallout that facilitated its rapid growth during the nineteen-fifties nonetheless forced it to shift to 
support restricting nuclear testing to underground locations in order to once again avoid a 
pointed discussion about the practicality of the very concept of nuclear war. Less than two 
decades after the first small increment of fallout went into the atmosphere at TRINITY and just 
fourteen years after the Soviet Union broke the American nuclear monopoly with its own first 
test, for the most part fallout was retired with the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
1011
 
AFOAT-1 Looks beyond Fallout 
After a decade of research, development, and operational refinement, 1958 marked the 
completion of the build out of the AEDS so that it was truly a network with global coverage, 
going beyond fallout in order to detect nuclear tests reliably by multiple means. This 
achievement was first partially met beginning in 1949, when the focus was solely on the Soviet 
Union. A view of this transformation was provided by an anonymous informant who served with 
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AFOAT-1 beginning in the mid-1950s. He described how the primitive second generation EMP 
detection system known as the Q2, composed of a limited network of four stations, three in the 
United States and a fourth in Lahore, Pakistan, was significantly upgraded. The Q2 could 
confirm the direction of the signal source and detonation time, but was not capable of recording 
the waveform for further analysis. The Q2 system was replaced in 1957 and 1958 with the Q3 
system, capable of recording the signal, but improved to operate on three different frequencies. 
Roughly a dozen stations were then involved, providing far more useful data, significantly more 
accurate direction-finding, and coverage that extended globally.
1012
 Plenty of work for Air Force 
Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) remained ahead, as AFOAT-1 became known in the 
summer of 1959, as well as for Eisenhower’s team at the White House, negotiators in Geneva, 
and activists in the streets as fallout fell from the sky, but which for the moment saw no further 
contributions from testing in the atmosphere. 
Nuclear Scarcity Banished, Global Environment Threatened 
By 1958, British interest in MUSIC waned.
1013
 For the British, once the joint U.S./U.K. 
effort to define Soviet plutonium production through sampling krypton-85 determined the threat 
was extensive, with a stockpile deep enough to sustain a war against the West and prevail under 
favorable circumstances, there was little to be gained by understanding what level of overkill 
existed beyond catastrophic. The krypton-85 data AFTAC continued to produce remained an 
essential part of the Air Force arsenal of justification for its annual budget; the Soviet threat it 
defined inspired Congressional willingness to fund SAC bombers and missiles. While the limited 
data set provided by rough comparisons of fissile material and weapons production in the 
appendices is only representative and suggestive, such force-to-force comparisons nonetheless 
represented substantial insight of the most extraordinary sensitivity, both militarily and 
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politically.
1014
 Most force comparisons count airframes, but counting what weapons were 
available to deliver was also important, just not as all important as was long argued by the Air 
Force. What was erroneous about the “gaps” was how Air Force analysts relied on krypton-85 
numbers as definitive. Imagery problematized these oversimplifications.   
What do the data on fissile material production show from 1959 onward through 
ratification of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty? What did the strategic significance of such 
comparisons mean at the time to those with clearance to read them? How did fallout play a role 
in informing and interpreting this data for policy makers? Significant growth in their respective 
cumulative plutonium stockpiles, the representative but not conclusive yardstick used here to 
illustrate the relative strength of American and Soviet nuclear forces during the early Cold War, 
was a basic fact known to be available to key policy makers; despite growing British disinterest, 
American efforts to track the Soviet stockpile continued apace in the second decade of nuclear 
weapons and fallout from 1956 to 1965. Investments in expanded production paid off in large 
yearly increases in fissile material production, sustaining the rapid deployment of new weapon 
designs.
1015
 The increases in yearly production were significant, but told only part of the story. 
What counted most of all was the cumulative total fallout potential from their anticipated use in 
war. The simple fact that the total megatonnage available to both East and West quickly made 
war itself an untenable instrument of national policy in the 1950s can be inferred from the rough 
estimates provided in Appendix B.  
AFOAT-1’s basic work of tracking fallout in the troposphere for intelligence purposes 
was substantially augmented by the U-2 aircraft’s stratospheric sampling after 1957.  The impact 
of the test moratorium and discovery of the subsequent relatively quick return rate of much of the 
fallout through sampling-oriented surveillance and collection programs provided a relatively 
concrete evaluation of yield versus fallout deposition on the order theorized as problematic by 
GABRIEL. The main difference was its deposition was spread over a considerably longer time 
frame than fallout from a nuclear war. While less intense than if due to a war, fallout generated 
from testing through the 1958 series nonetheless was on a scale that provided a rough baseline 
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for exposures comparable to the yield assumptions GABRIEL outlined under early nuclear war 
scenarios.
1016
  
The ad hoc, non-binding test moratorium John F. Kennedy inherited from Eisenhower 
lasted a total of two years and ten months before the Soviet Union reinitiated atmospheric testing 
in September 1961. This provided ample opportunity to document a sample group demonstrating 
the decay of fallout as the atmosphere cleansed itself. However, it also confirmed the worrisome 
finding that residence time for stratospheric fallout was far shorter than earlier theorized, thus 
intensifying the threat fallout posed to recovery from nuclear war and the period of sheltering 
and other protective measures required in such a war’s aftermath.  While ending fallout was not 
the only reason for the often fragile support the Joint Chiefs gave to arms control, whatever 
basis, political or empirical, supported their acquiescence to ending all but underground testing 
was accompanied by the crumbling of Willard Libby’s embrace of the theory of stratospheric 
residence that was previously believed to limit massive post-attack fallout.
1017
 The situation that 
forced the Joint Chiefs’ hand in 1958 to accept the concession of ending atmospheric testing 
eventually proved even grimmer. In itself, the immediate threat of post-attack prompt fallout 
near to and downwind from targeted areas by the early 1960s led to general recommendations 
from civil defense officials that Americans prepare for two-week long shelter stays. Little was 
said about the much longer post-attack period after the acute threat of fallout requiring full-time 
sheltering passed, in large part because doing so would require reference to this sensitive 
information, as well as navigating obvious political sensitivities about the post-attack 
environment the government showed little interest in confronting. 
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Atmospheric Buffering Revisited 
The Air Force’s low-key, yet fundamental shift on the matter of fallout strongly 
suggested it was driven by the failure of a theory that Willard Libby promoted suggesting a 
prolonged stratospheric residence time would keep the most dangerous fallout aloft to safely 
decay; instead, the atmosphere turned out to offer little protection or delay in fallout’s return to 
the earth’s surface. 1018 “Clean” weapons designs represented a fruitless and frustrating quest for 
fallout-free nuclear weapons. Substantial reductions in fallout relative to yield were possible, but 
war plans anticipating use of thousands of weapons still produced massive cumulative fallout 
totals. A little over a decade after the youngest military service fully embraced nuclear weapons, 
fallout cast a mordant pall over the prospects of relying on these weapons that inevitably 
produced it as a useful way to project military power. While there was grumbling from the rank-
and-file, crowned by SAC Commander General Thomas Power’s emotional plea to the JCS to 
put the American people on notice about how badly they needed fallout, the relative silence on 
the matter from Curtis LeMay and others at headquarters spoke to the fact that they grudgingly 
accepted fallout was a graver potential threat to their flexibility to respond militarily.
1019
 
Continuing to test in the atmosphere would mean a never ending increase in public attention to 
nuclear weapons themselves, a prospect that was poised to limit military prerogatives far more 
than doing without fallout from testing might. Reinforcing such protests would be samples 
collected and analyzed independently of the government. With certain brief exceptions since, 
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notably during the Reagan administration, ending fallout served remarkably well in demobilizing 
popular opposition to nuclear weapons.  
1957 and 1958: CROWFLIGHT and Strontium-90’s Atmospheric Residence Time 
While it was a problem seemingly resistant to the usual experimental methods, assessing 
the risk posed by wartime fallout was facilitated by the fact that testing produced what was in 
effect a global experiment facilitated by fallout’s contamination of the atmosphere.  The general 
thrust of the earlier Human Effects Panel and the Gaither Committee, discussed in the last 
chapter in terms of their specific relationship to fallout, were familiar to Cold War historians. 
Between publication of the Human Effects report and completion of Gaither’s work came a more 
significant signal that the problem of fallout was undergoing a substantial reevaluation.  
CROWFLIGHT was initiated by issuance of a set of Secret, “need-to-know” only basis orders 
dated 11 October 1957 to General LeMay’s U-2 fleet, flown by the 4080th Strategic 
Reconnaissance Wing (Light), “to determine the worldwide distribution of particulate and 
gaseous material in the upper atmosphere from detonations of nuclear weapons.”1020 In this 
striking way, the Air Force’s choice to put the exotic aircraft to work for science in order to 
better define the threat posed by fallout demonstrated how high the stakes now were over fallout 
by it being the first major assignment for the SAC U-2 unit. Until the 1963 LTBT was ratified 
and ended most atmospheric testing, the Laughlin AFB, Texas unit spent a large percentage of its 
available time and resources acting as a “contractor” for AFOAT-1, bringing back samples from 
the stratosphere via the reliable and repeatable method of capturing them with particulate and 
gaseous sampling devices aboard the U-2.
1021
 CROWFLIGHT discretely opened the Air Force’s 
closely controlled nuclear intelligence operations to provide a selected set of researchers with 
stratospheric fallout data to determine where fallout went to reside in order to test Libby’s 
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atmospheric buffering theory that aspired to account for the “missing” fallout. CROWFLIGHT 
made it possible to extrapolate the data gathered from test fallout to a model of potential wartime 
fallout. The CROWFLIGHT mission was apparently initiated by a far from mundane “weather 
report” that arrived to stoke the fires of reconsideration over SAC’s betting the house on massive 
retaliation with thermonuclear weapons. The result reconfigured national security priorities and 
policies, shaped by empirical evidence of fallout’s threat to the environment and human health. 
Weather Report: Weathering Fallout 
What prompted the Air Force’s sudden interest in supporting a better definition of the 
threat posed by fallout? As the National Security Council’s recognition of the historically far 
better-documented political pressures mounted over fallout, just days later came some of the first 
empirically-based indications a greater scientific focus on the general threat posed by fallout was 
unlikely to provide reassuring news. A 9 April 1957 memorandum from Harry Wexler, chair of 
the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Meteorological Aspects of the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation, reminded committee members of an upcoming meeting, while notifying them 
of an agenda change to discuss significant developing issues. Wexler’s primary concern was 
prompted by Dr. Lester Machta’s discovery that, instead of adhering to Libby’s theory that 
fallout dispersed more or less evenly into the environment into lower and lower concentrations as 
it decayed and was diluted by the atmosphere, recent research on soil and upper air samples 
indicated unknown processes caused global fallout deposition to occur unevenly. The equator’s 
boundary effect limited interhemispheric circulation; the vast majority of radiation loosed by 
testing into the Northern Hemisphere’s atmosphere remained there, instead of dispersing to the 
south. Even more disturbing was that fallout deposited from the stratosphere concentrated into 
bands across latitudes bisecting the bulk of the continental United States. The NAS committee 
Wexler chaired included a number of those whose organizational identification suggested a close 
association with the Air Force’s nuclear intelligence programs or research and development in 
support of it.
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A sudden spate of articles discussing “delayed” or global fallout from injections of it into 
the stratosphere due to thermonuclear testing that appeared in Science during 1957 were also 
cited as a concern by Wexler.
1023
 Instead of again initiating a dismissive public narrative by the 
AEC, this time suggestive empirical data found its way into the hands of a research group inside 
the government. The goal of these meteorological scientists in the U.S. Weather Bureau was to 
understand fallout rather than simply explain it away. To do that required routine access into the 
stratosphere to collect samples at various altitudes to better define the life cycle of fallout there.  
While rockets and balloons held some potential to reach altitudes of 90,000 feet or more, 
experience at that point suggested a piloted aircraft was required to reliably obtain samples 
across the wide geographic range required for this research at lower altitudes, but above the 
performance envelope of conventional aircraft.
1024
 Writing in support of funding a reliable means 
to gather samples from the upper atmosphere, the NAS committee composed a letter that was 
sent under the signature of Detlev Bronk, NAS president, to the AEC and DOD, arguing the 
urgent need to fund this research. The draft tiptoed around the sensitive aspects of sampling by 
referring only to “four balloon sampling stations,” describing them vaguely as an AEC 
program.
1025
 Informed by the committee’s call for improved capabilities needed to better 
document the stratospheric circulation of fallout, it implied better means were available but 
outlined these only to the extent that the “Department of Defense program was not described 
beyond that which appeared in newspaper reports.”1026 The draft of Bronk’s request for an 
intensified, expanded sampling program presumed the capability existed to meet the requirement 
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1110
th
 BAS during or prior to a reorganization that brought all such activities under the management of the Air 
Weather Service. During 1959, three of the four stations launching balloons (Albrook AFB, Panama Canal Zone, 
Sao Paulo Brazil, and Sioux City, Iowa) shut down, leaving San Angelo, Texas as the remaining site. AFTAC, 1959 
Unit History, 21. Like several other aspects in support of AFOAT-1’s work subject to public release, such as 
announcements of Soviet test shots, this information was described as an AEC project as a cover story when 
connections were made to fallout sampling. The unit and other AWS assets were saved from even deeper cuts in part 
through an appeal to General Thomas Power of SAC in April 1960 as a concrete follow-up to his earlier complaints 
about what Power saw as the painful loss of useful fallout due to the test moratorium then in place. 
1025
 These four sampling stations were apparently the same four Air Force balloon detachments pulling samples for 
AFOAT-1.  
1026
 Lester Machta, Cover Letter for Draft Detlev Bronk Memorandum to Members, Consultants, and Guests  of the 
National Academy of Sciences [Committee on Meteorological Aspects of the Effects of Atomic Radiation] Meeting 
of September 20, 1957,” 9 December 1957, NARA RG 326.73, Project Sunshine, Box 2. 
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for collection of samples from as far north and south as the polar regions, as well as above the 
existing 90,000 foot balloon ceiling, thus it implicitly recognized Defense possessed or could 
acquire the means to access these regions of the upper atmosphere beyond the limited balloon 
program described in the letter.
1027
  
The documentary context indicated Machta himself was aware of the U-2 and quite 
knowledgeable about AFOAT-1. As rapporteur for the NAS committee, he was responsible for 
communicating the group’s work to Doyle Northrup of AFOAT-1 for review and approval. With 
“no adverse comments on either the statement or the letter to Mr. Northrup” Machta intended to 
finalize both, get Bronk’s signature, and forward it all to Northrup, who apparently was the Air 
Force contact person on the matter.
1028
  The correspondence indicated Northrup was the key to 
unlocking access to the stratosphere for fallout research, a situation that clearly established direct 
Air Force control over the pace and quality of any fallout research performed under its aegis, 
largely because it operated the only practical, reliable means to access this region of upper 
air.
1029
  
Illuminating the Dispute over the Threat Posed by Wartime Fallout 
The particular issue of the rate of strontium-90 deposition from a stratospheric fallout 
reservoir hypothesized by Willard Libby was the major research focus of the CROWFLIGHT 
stratospheric sampling program. Soil samples that worried the Weather Bureau provided 
concrete evidence of a troubling problem with fallout from atmospheric testing, which likewise 
disputed Libby’s estimate that the existing stratospheric load of strontium-90 returned to earth 
slowly at a rate of 2.5% per year. Instead, the samples indicated accelerated exposures from a far 
more rapid and intensive deposition process. The AEC’s estimate rather implausibly indicated 
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cognizant of the U-2 program prior to the MIT meeting were two representatives from the Air Research and 
Development Command, and Dr. Heinz Lettau, of the Air Force Cambridge Air Research Center. Lettau was 
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the surface and atmosphere, an area of atmospheric science also of considerable interest to AFOAT-1. 
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of the Air Force’s 4080th SRW(L) show its U-2 operations focused primarily on sampling during the same period 
prior to 1963, although it also conducted electronic warfare and imagery missions. 
389 
 
nearly 90% of the strontium-90 generated by testing to date remained aloft.
1030
 The subject of 
residence time of strontium-90 in the stratosphere was of great interest to the AEC and the Air 
Force. Libby’s theory stretched the time aloft for the isotope to decay over a longer period of 
time. On paper, this diminished the relative intensity over time of the contribution that 
stratospheric fallout from high-yield explosions made to surface exposures from strontium-90 
and associated isotopes as they settled down into the troposphere. The Weather Bureau’s soil 
samples suggested this was not the case.
1031
 
To reliably capture and return samples from high altitude CROWFLIGHT utilized U-2 
aircraft from SAC’s 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, the Air Force’s counterpart to the 
CIA’s Project AQUATONE U-2 fleet.1032 In contrast with the primary product of AQUATONE, 
aerial imagery, CROWFLIGHT was among the multiple missions associated with fallout 
sampling and other aspects of nuclear intelligence that dominated the history of the 4080
th
 
between 1957, when the U-2 entered Air Force service, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. After 
1962, the aircraft’s role shifted towards imagery conducted by the Air Force with the fading 
away of CIA U-2 operations amid the plethora of new imagery associated with satellite photo-
reconnaissance and, eventually, a lessening demand for fallout sampling that followed the end of 
atmospheric testing by the first three nuclear powers after ratification of the 1963 LTBT.
1033
 
CROWFLIGHT involved a series of specific sampling profiles of the stratosphere, flying 
from bases in the United States and elsewhere on missions that ultimately ranged from the North 
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 Either the soil samples were accurate or the calculated fallout fission yield for the weapons tested during 
CASTLE was dramatically underestimated, which would mean even more fallout remained aloft. 
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 4080
th
 SRW Operations Order No. 74-57, “CROWFLIGHT,” 11 October 1957. While the order to initiate 
CROWFLIGHT came in October, the unit had been training for it since at least late spring after the initial cadre of 
training personnel departed the CIA’s Ranch next to NTS in Nevada for Laughlin AFB, Texas to begin crew training 
on the U-2. 
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Pole to south of Patagonia.
1034
 Because the tropopause varies with latitude and season, samples 
were gathered at a variety of heights up to the service ceiling for the early model U-2, 
somewhere above 70,000 feet. Samples analyzed for Project Sunshine focused on strontium-90 
and related isotopes, with sample collection overseen like other sampling operations by AFOAT-
1 technicians. Mission aircraft flew with both gas and particulate samplers, suggesting as broad a 
range of interest in what might be available at altitude as when the U-2 was being directed on a 
“special” mission at specific Soviet test plumes. Some limited detail on mission criteria and 
profiles became available with the Clinton-era declassification of the 4080
th
 SRW unit history, 
but AFOAT-1 involvement was described only cryptically for the most part in those 
documents.
1035
  
Stratospheric Science 
The Weather Bureau committee’s collective nominal ignorance about the general nature 
of the U-2 program apparently ended at a 27 September 1957 meeting, when Harry Wexler noted 
they were informed about an “AFSWP aircraft program” while noting that “some of the 
committee members have had limited access in other capacities.”1036 While the memorandum 
confirmed the group was briefed on capabilities of the system, it left an open question what 
details were given or the aircraft’s primary purpose, given the intense compartmentalization the 
letter intimated stood between the data and those who needed it. Wexler’s 9 April 1958 
memorandum contained a significant sign of change on that front in the form of a new 
“consultant” to the committee, Walter C. Singlevich. While the distribution lists of 1957 letters 
from Wexler to the committee included organizational affiliations for each member and 
consultant, the omission of these descriptors in the 1958 memo absolved the record from noting 
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efforts to keep up with the sheer volume of fallout emanating from the Soviet Union. Once the test ban treaty went 
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Singlevich’s affiliation with AFOAT-1.1037 What was clear from the letter was internal 
controversy was already stalking their work. 
A copy of Dr. Libby’s March 27, 1958 talk is included. Dr. Machta and Mr. List 
have taken exception to some of the data and conclusions in the talk and would 
like to send these to all members…it would be preferable to send comments by all 
members rather than those of only Machta and List…therefore soliciting remarks 
which any of the members or consultants, may wish to communicate to other 
members through this channel by April 20, 1958.
1038
 
 
Machta and List began by noting many of their concerns were communicated to Libby before he 
delivered the disputed address, but Libby apparently proceeded without acknowledging the 
issues they raised. They argued Libby’s handling of data tended to smooth out and make more 
uniform fallout deposition rates, a marked difference from the ongoing observations of 
considerable unevenness indicated in the data noted by Machta and List. 
The net effect of Libby’s mischaracterization of the data minimized the peaks in total 
fallout deposition recognized from the soil samples, which occurred as focused bands arrayed 
west to east across the continental United States. Libby would soon be awarded the 1960 Nobel 
Prize for his work on carbon-14 dating, but Machta and List proffered a brutal observation about 
the quality of the AEC director’s research.  Besides the issues with strontium-90 deposition rates, 
his critics found him particularly wanting in his analysis of global fallout deposition rates.
1039
 
The argument’s importance was hardly obscure. Libby’s model presumed a continuing dilution 
of fallout as it dispersed into the environment. Instead the data showed uneven deposition rates 
from global fallout. These peaked at 45 degrees North, essentially in a band bisecting the upper 
middle of the continental United States from Portland, Oregon, to Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
Minnesota, then across the border through Ottawa, Ontario and on eastward. Machta and List 
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hypothesized a combination of test sites close to 45 degrees North and global circulation patterns 
that converged and brought fallout along from other sites in the hemisphere further north and 
south (the USSR’s Novaya Zemlya and the United States Pacific Proving Grounds) created this 
distinctive pattern.
1040
 Libby’s smoothing of the data distorted the peaks of deposition away from 
the more complex behavior Machta and List described. Their preliminary findings significantly 
undermined his argument that a beneficial process of stratospheric fallout dispersal lessened the 
threat posed by the massive fallout produced by thermonuclear weapons and which the AEC had 
depended on in its representations to the White House going back to at least its December 1955 
report to Congress. 
It shows rather clearly that the stratospheric fallout is pronouncedly non-uniform 
with a peak in the north temperate latitudes
1041…The difference is not large but 
the figure definitely misleads the public…[the errors] all happen to be in the sense 
of making the model look better than it is.
1042
 
 
Beyond locating the most intense fallout over some of the most densely populated areas 
of the Northern Hemisphere, Machta and List also noted another significant error in the return 
rate of strontium-90 estimated by Libby. 
The hold-up time in the stratosphere is also a meteorological problem. Dr. Libby 
has estimated that the removal is at an exponential rate of about 10% of the 
stratospheric content coming out each year…this evidence, the best available, 
suggests that the rate at which the strontium-90 is leaving the stratosphere is about 
20% per year, if the amount of strontium-90 added to the stratosphere is 
correct…the carbon-14 data, if anything, more consistent, with a 20% removal 
rate…Although we have emphasized that the removal rate is 20% a year or more 
on the average, it should be pointed out even more strongly that we are entirely 
unsympathetic to the use of a fixed percentage removal independent of the 
latitude or altitude at which the material is present in the stratosphere…We are 
almost positive that there is nothing unique about the tropopause except that it is 
the bottom of the stratosphere.
1043
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Thus, beyond the geographical concentration just described, fallout’s net deposition 
intensity was also significantly greater because of the 100% or more increase in the rate of return 
of fallout lofted into the stratosphere Machta and List described versus Libby’s uniform 
deposition model. Libby’s embrace of the “tropopause as protective barrier” theory appears to 
have arisen out of efforts to account for the total radioactivity produced by thermonuclear 
weapons, a component of AFOAT-1’s capability to track and analyze Soviet test debris and other 
fallout. Their massive plumes, which punched a significant portion of their radiation into the 
stratosphere, caused delay in fallout’s return to lower altitudes, but the tropopause did not act as 
a long term barrier holding fallout back in an “ atmospheric reservoir” while it decayed, as Libby 
believed.
1044
 Instead of a lengthy stratosphere residence time, the data showed a much shorter 
period of decay that returned more intense fallout as the predictable result of both current testing 
and potential wartime use, since many targets also existed along or near this latitude.
1045
 These 
increases also appeared to follow a seasonal pattern, with significantly increased deposition 
during spring in the Northern hemisphere.
1046
  
Machta and List’s information undermined theoretical assumptions Libby made that the 
tropopause limited the return of fallout by some as yet unexplained mechanism, allowing it to 
safely decay before returning to the surface. Concentrated by geographical origin and 
meteorological processes, Machta and List noted they “observed accumulated deposition, from 
whatever source, equals 25 mc/mi² in the latitude band from about 30º to 50º N…The rate of 
injection of strontium-90 into the stratosphere is 9 MT/year or 4.5 mc/mi² averaged over the 
earth.” Using Libby’s model (10% yearly stratospheric fallout with uniform deposition rate) and 
their own (20% yearly non-uniform rate), the report calculated the projected cumulative 
exposures as if the tests stopped in December 1957 (they did not, as it was noted in the 
discussion as a factor making these 1958 predictions more conservative than intended.) The two 
models then calculated under the assumption testing continued at the 9 megaton per annum rate 
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for 100 years. The cumulative result was a disturbing 354 mc/mi² with Libby’s uniform 
distribution formula or as much as the even more alarming 540 mc/mi² with Machta and List’s 
non-uniform model. 
1047
  
At about 45º N, the latitude of the heaviest fallout, the non-uniform stratosphere 
model predicts about 75% more than the uniform model. 
 
In effect, continued testing was essentially a drawn-out war, at least in terms of its fallout. 
Although Machta and List’s argument was primarily about stratospheric or long term 
fallout, the data for tropospheric fallout showed similar behavior at lower levels when it was 
studied. Both test series examined, one in Nevada, the 1953 UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE test series, 
and the other in the Pacific, 1954’s CASTLE series, likewise created sharp profiles of increased 
deposition at the respective latitudes of the test sites. This cumulative data for U.S. shots was 
added together with Soviet and British contributions to arrive at a total for global tropospheric 
fallout. Graphs of it shared a similar pattern as the observations about stratospheric fallout. When 
totaled across the Northern Hemisphere, the overlapping data blended together, even as the 
observed higher readings tended to match the latitudes of national test sites. The graph of total 
cumulative tropospheric fallout deposition versus latitude was then superimposed on a similar 
graph of stratospheric fallout. Stratospheric fallout’s dramatic spike in deposition peaked at a rate 
roughly five times the rate of the peak tropospheric fallout in the Northern Hemisphere.
1048
 The 
location of the stratospheric fallout deposition peak, with its feet rooted amongst the lesser 
tropospheric peaks created by testing at national proving grounds at different latitudes, strongly 
suggested the pattern of concentration Machta and List observed brought the heaviest injections 
of stratospheric fallout from thermonuclear test grounds to the north (Novaya Zemlya) and south 
(Bikini Atoll and the associated Pacific Proving Ground) together by an as yet undefined global 
circulation process to create the band of heaviest deposition density centered along 45º North. 
Understanding that process meant understanding it required joint action to alter, given 
stratospheric fallout now was a common inheritance of the global population, even as the irony 
of it falling more heavily on those who felt the need for such weapons went unremarked. The 
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information about it was classified; the political import of such findings was obviously 
momentous, given Robert Cutler’s earlier troubling observation on the political implications of 
fallout for the Eisenhower administration. 
Understanding the import of this finding also suggests an important analogy at the 
environmental level of the action of young bodies storing away iodine-131 in their thyroids at 
rates many times higher than adults because of a combination of the bio-concentration of the 
short-lived isotope into milk in its rapid passage through the food chain and the rapid 
metabolisms of children. While Hedley Marston’s efforts in tracing iodine-131 in Australia were 
pioneering in terms of fallout science done outside of formal government direction, it was the 
1957 Windscale accident that brought the iodine problem into public focus.
1049
 Begun as an 
assessment of the global fallout ecology at least partly in order to unwind the disturbing direction 
of research on the limits of nuclear war GABRIEL took at a most inconvenient time for 
thermonuclear research, by 1958 Libby’s Project Sunshine found itself under the lens for its 
myopic focus on strontium-90. In secret, the problem of fallout’s empirical effects was 
increasingly recognized as far more substantial than ephemeral, even as the AEC continued to 
argue it was inconsequential to the public. Fallout did not have a mind, but it had a mind of its 
own. Fallout’s unquenchable independence from control by national security structures wedded 
to nuclear weapons represented an ongoing process that corroded their military utility at the same 
time it called into question foundational issues such as the reliability and value of their deterrent 
effect. 
Evidence in NARA’s Project Sunshine documents, as well as others previously discussed 
here, clearly suggested the often tenuous connections, obscured because of their sensitive nature, 
between research and intelligence. Other evidence suggested neither Walter Singlevich’s sudden 
availability as an adviser or Doyle Northrup’s signing off on the plans solely defined AFOAT-
1’s interest in the research problem set before the NAS committee. An oral history transcript 
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from an interview with Lester Machta made clear that, as in Australia, even when usefully 
engaged in legitimate research, his team often acted as creatures of the intelligence services, 
sometimes witting, sometimes not.
1050
 With outside contractors, AFOAT-1’s interest was usually 
thoroughly disguised, but Machta’s team was an exception in generally understanding how their 
work applied to the unit’s mission. As with the Oppenheimer hearing, the organization’s interest 
was present in the record – at least after declassification – even if at times still superficially 
disguised, was indicative of the relative importance of the issue at hand to the Air Force. Along 
with the timing of its meetings that addressed the issues raised by the most recent test series, 
REDWING and PLUMBBOB, while moving forward with opportunities presented by the 
upcoming HARDTACK series, the urgency of addressing fallout in light of Machta’s findings 
came into clear focus. It was clearly a matter of science, not public perception or even personal 
opinion. It certainly was not a matter of ambiguous “nuclear fear.” 
While the NAS committee pursued several experimental approaches to gather data on 
stratospheric fallout deposition, the means eventually chosen was to “salt” the two HARDTACK 
high-altitude shots, TEAK and ORANGE, with distinctive isotopes. This experiment was 
predicated on establishing the actual rate of return of stratospheric fallout to the troposphere in 
an effort to resolve the conflict between the competing uniform and non-uniform deposition 
models advocated by Libby and Machta, respectively. In an extension of the 4080
th
 SRW U-2 
program’s CROWFLIGHT mission, the planes would initially pick up the samples indicating the 
movement of fallout from the TEAK and ORANGE detonations lower in the stratosphere, then 
track and sample the rate at which the marker isotopes appeared in the troposphere as it 
descended further towards eventual deposition at ground level.  
Fallout’s Political and Policy Effects 
Despite the obvious limitations it maintained on access, its effort to provide carefully-
vetted researchers with data obtained from samples through CROWFLIGHT was perhaps the 
strongest signal yet someone on the Air Force staff finally was coming to grips with the fact 
thermonuclear weapons and their associated fallout represented an irresolvable problem of 
national security. This development brought about a paralysis of strategy despite the newfound 
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clarity the U-2 contributed by both supporting basic research on fallout’s atmospheric circulation 
and resolving the primary strategic ambiguities of the early Cold War brought on by Air Force 
intelligence’s misreading the import of krypton-85 data on Soviet plutonium production. What 
were the real capabilities of Soviet nuclear forces? Was a disabling attack possible without 
inflicting intolerable damage outside the Soviet Union by means of fallout? While the NAS 
committee as a whole was not privy to it, thanks to the CIA’s U-2 by 1958 Eisenhower and the 
Pentagon were all acutely aware the United States possessed military forces that outclassed 
Soviet assets in virtually every category, despite the anguished belief of many in a significant 
Soviet military advantage amid a threat accentuated by Sputnik.
1051
 While SAC was potentially 
capable of quickly concluding hostilities, fallout would make the price that Americans might 
potentially pay for such a victory unbearable. 
Because of the generally public nature of weapons acquisition and production in the 
West, the Soviet Union’ leadership was always aware of the general outline of this substantial 
difference, but was naturally disinclined to clarify its own weaknesses. For Eisenhower and the 
Pentagon, the conundrum presented by Sputnik was how to reassure Americans their military 
was not falling behind, without directly addressing how knowledge came about of the vast 
superiority of force that became evident as the CIA’s U-2 imagery clarified the actual balance of 
forces as decidedly in favor of the West. Certainly, the White House was loath to explain the 
miscues leading to the faulty analyses that formed the basis of the bomber and missile “gaps.” 
Explaining what the pursuit of Oppenheimer accomplished would be even more difficult. At the 
same historical moment, just as fallout undermined the military utility of nuclear weapons, the 
research effort supported by the U-2 undermined the utility of using fallout to produce 
intelligence by producing empirical evidence of fallout’s increasingly clear threat from testing 
alone, as well as from war itself. 
Sometimes, You Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Is Blowing 
As with other aspects of nuclear intelligence, when public announcements of Soviet tests 
made it obvious someone, somehow was counting Soviet tests even as the AEC took credit for it, 
Machta remained at work, outside the AEC and Department of Defense, but as part of the same 
cohort. It was an independent set of eyes for science that proved invaluable. Machta entered 
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meteorology through military service and in a manner that provided an interesting bookend to 
Paul Fackler’s semi-intentional diversion of his sampler and its crew into the nuclear cloud at 
SANDSTONE, verifying the feasibility of using aerial samplers to document potential Soviet 
testing. Fackler hailed from Tolono, Illinois in southern Champaign County. Machta’s especially 
intimate career that eventually focused on fallout included a stint at Chanute Air Force Base, 
outside Rantoul, Illinois in northern Champaign County, where Harry Wexler was among his 
instructors in the weather forecaster course during World War Two. After the war, Machta went 
to MIT for his doctorate from 1946 to 1948. Then Wexler, directing research at the Weather 
Bureau, offered Machta a job. 
Although we couldn’t talk about it at the time…Harry Wexler brought me in to be 
in charge of the unit he called “Special Projects Section” (a meaningless title), it 
was to work in an area involved in atomic energy…Wexler at that time was 
extremely powerful in military advisory circles. He knew Colonel Ben 
Holtzman…also heavily involved in atomic energy matters, so when AFOAT-1, 
among its different charges, was going to try to detect radioactivity in the air, they 
realized that winds would carry that radioactivity and AFOAT-1 ought to have 
some knowledge of such air transport. So they gave [Wexler] a small amount of 
money to set up a unit in the Weather Bureau to study winds primarily coming out 
of the Soviet Union…it was for that job he brought me in…the Office of 
Management and Budget…made a decision that the other agencies of the 
government ought not set up their competitive weather services…that’s why the 
Air Force came to Wexler presumably, to ask him to work out AFOAT-1’s 
problem, rather than set up a new weather unit. The AEC was in the same 
boat.
1052
 
 
While Machta directly noted the importance of accurately reporting Soviet weather data 
to assist AFOAT-1’s mission, left unsaid was the fact that such data was also essential to 
strategic operations, including execution of SAC’s war plans. Between the two missions, already 
intertwined as they are in this narrative, it was imperative that tracking of this data was continual 
to facilitate sampling operations.
1053
 Likewise, the need for constantly updated weather data 
within the USSR also reflected AFOAT-1/AFTAC’s discrete supporting role in SAC’s 
warfighting mission, a deeply buried aspect of its mission serving to make information about it 
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even more a touchy subject than expectations of its sensitivity due to its relation to nuclear 
weapons and strategic intelligence superficially indicated. During war, knowledge of fallout’s 
drift and intensity would be crucial to intelligence gathering and warning to take shelter during 
ongoing operations. Likewise, the unit’s ability to instantaneously detect the location of nuclear 
explosions would in battle damage assessment.
1054
 
Noting Harry Wexler was chief of research at the Weather Bureau after World War Two 
and that the Office of Management and Budget had a policy of directing agencies with weather 
research needs to engage with the Weather Bureau, rather than create their own parallel weather 
agencies, Machta’s oral history interview related background information strongly suggesting 
knowledge of the unevenly distributed fallout originated within the Air Force itself in the course 
of operating the AEDS. 
…there was a concern as to whether or not the Soviet Union would or would not 
be able to develop the atomic bomb, and if they did, how would we know this 
would be the case? A decision was made to assign this problem to the Air Force, 
and an Office of Atomic Energy was set up by the Air Force called “AFOAT-
1.”1055 
 
The cover was deep and still strong in 1958, but Machta and the small group he directed 
within the Weather Bureau were there almost from the beginning of this narrative.
1056
 Treating 
fallout as if it was another natural phenomenon, discovery of Weather Bureau involvement was 
another example of how this project moved forward incrementally by looking in likely places 
and finding, repeatedly, surprisingly robust connections.  Machta’s name came up periodically in 
the course of research, but his specific contributions and those of the Weather Bureau were 
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obscure until a transcript from his 1993 American Meteorological Society oral history interview 
came to light and made these connections explicit.  
Somewhat optimistically, Machta recalled fallout was not completely without value 
beyond intelligence purposes, observing its scientific utility in what was essentially a giant 
experiment with the earth as its laboratory and its population as test subjects.  
…in the early days following radioactive debris contributed significantly and 
perhaps even more, they stimulated some of the global circulation modeling. 
 
As Oppenheimer noted in supporting the 1952 State Department proposal to pursue an 
agreement with the Russians to forego any immediate effort to test a thermonuclear weapon, 
Machta understood there was no means to conceal an atmospheric test of a thermonuclear 
weapon or to prevent identification of it as such. 
…when the first megaton yield hydrogen bomb took place which put radioactivity 
into the stratosphere [IVY MIKE, 10.4 megaton, 1 November 1952], each spring 
thereafter, even with no new tests going on, we found radioactivity being 
deposited on the ground. And it got to the point where we knew that the 
stratosphere was emptying itself into the troposphere mainly in the 
springtime…1057 
 
Machta was not a man given to running in an ideological rut, as he discussed his slow-growing 
realization something was profoundly disquieting about the data. 
In retrospect, I’m not sure if I knew now what I knew then, I would not have been 
so keen to have been a party to the testing of nuclear devices. At the time, we 
were told by Admiral Strauss and by others that the Soviet Union was a menace to 
us – and maybe then they really were – and we had to test our nuclear weapons. 
Some people suffered on account of it. I just tried to minimize the fallout on 
populated areas.
1058
 
 
Thus, four years after Robert Oppenheimer was forced out of government in disgrace, in 
substantial part due to his raising the issue of fallout as a limiting factor on the use of nuclear 
weapons, both Walter Singlevich and Lester Machta, almost singularly qualified in their 
respective fields of tracking fallout and compiling data to track the consequences of its spread, 
were in position to digest and outline an overall view of the situation of fallout’s negative impact 
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on national security policy. They found themselves in a meeting in 1958 as momentous and 
consequential in its own way as the 1956 meeting between Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs that 
Campbell Craig identified as a turning point on presidential direction of nuclear strategy.
1059
 
While the public defense of nuclear strategy, as well as testing, continued, behind closed doors 
the wheels were falling off defense policy centered on nuclear weapons because of fallout. The 
consequences of fallout from nuclear war seemed remote until one looked at the compelling 
evidence of its accumulation simply from ongoing testing.  
Machta’s job was to accurately explain what was underway with the fallout already in the 
atmosphere. In contrast to GABRIEL’s attention to establishing an ultimate, yet still theoretical 
limit on wartime weapon expenditure, the Weather Service program focused on tracking fallout 
as it moved through the environment in the present. The basic starting point was the calculated 
production of fallout from each device detonated according to its yield.
1060
 Then the rate of its 
return to earth was calculated with the goal of determining its accounted-for volume, as well as 
determining the remaining “reservoir” of fallout. With the limited yields of most fission weapons 
and their relatively quick return or deposition rate due to precipitation and other processes acting 
upon this fallout as it generally pushed no higher than the troposphere, the calculations involved 
were akin to those in the krypton-85 collection program.  
Thermonuclear weapons presented a far more complex problem, given their towering 
stems carried fallout directly to the stratosphere as their boiling rise broke through what many 
scientists, including Willard Libby, previously considered an otherwise largely impenetrable 
tropopause, depositing a large proportion of the massive quantities of fallout they generated into 
the stratosphere. By 1956, two years after CASTLE BRAVO raised the priority of fallout 
research in reflection of its impact on policy, Machta and other Weather Bureau scientists 
became convinced they knew where the fallout calculated as missing went – into the stratosphere 
– but needed evidence of it as well as estimates on how long it stayed there, how much remained, 
and how it returned to the surface. The problem was obtaining samples from this liminal area 
between the earth and space, given the limitations of balloons and rockets and the known 
incapacity of current aircraft to exceed altitudes above 60,000 feet. 
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Machta remarked on the unique perspective and responsibility accorded by his work. 
At the time, the United States was the world leader in atomic testing and the 
science connected with it. And I think the leader as well in the consequences of 
the radioactive fallout from the nuclear tests. I was, at that time, among the few 
people who had knowledge of most of what was going on.
1061
 
 
What an understatement. Keep in mind the Weather Bureau was an even more data-driven 
organization than the Air Force was. Narrowly focused on the collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of data, the Weather Bureau possessed unassailable credibility. Unlike Hedley 
Marston’s outsider critique, which could be marginalized despite its disturbing data on fallout 
revealing significant official prevarications, Machta’s insider version of fallout science could not 
be ignored or suppressed, at least internally. It was not a matter of interpretation or opinion in the 
vein of Oppenheimer’s persistently inconvenient objections to the questionable value and 
nagging constraints of thermonuclear weapons or the global threat posed by SAC’s war plans. 
Like the weather, it simply was. 
Walter Singlevich’s mere presence at the meeting was a substantial indication the Air 
Force was at last, at least in secret, taking fallout as a problem seriously. Unlike Machta’s view 
of the meeting and its context, Singlevich’s insights remain locked away.1062 Machta’s opinion 
reflects on the resiliency of the cautions about the constraints fallout imposed on the use of 
nuclear weapons, which Oppenheimer raised to the best of his ability, as did other scientists like 
Mark Oliphant, Hedley Marston, Karl Z. Morgan, and a growing host of others. 
I think I was misled, not being a health physicist in underestimating what 
potential damage might actually have occurred from the fallout from U.S. tests. 
Although by publicizing the fallout, as I did, I think the world got quite an 
abhorrence to nuclear testing and contributed, in my opinion, significantly to the 
nuclear test ban…1063 
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Machta likely had not come to quite so fully-formed a description of how fallout’s 
influence would reshape policy at the time of the 1958 meeting, but certainly his experiences 
then led to his eventual conclusion about the outcome, a conclusion driven by his data, not his 
opinion. His case was also apparently compelling enough to constructively engage the Air Force. 
While the service still played along with the pretense of designing “clean” weapons, that year’s 
two HARDTACK series treated these designs as largely irrelevant afterthoughts.
1064
 
Given AFOAT-1’s management by the Air Force and direct reporting line to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Singlevich’s participation in the 9 April 1958 NAS committee meeting was 
certainly a clear marker the Pentagon had a dog in this fight. An effort to stall or stonewall such a 
project was certainly within the imagination and experience of the military, in particular the Air 
Force, given Oppenheimer’s ordeal and SAC’s longstanding stubbornness about the irrelevance 
of fallout to its planning process. That did not seem to be the case with the issues Machta and the 
Weather Bureau raised about fallout. While Oppenheimer’s insider status did not prevent his 
suffering at the hands of inquisitors, for the most part Machta managed to avoid the 
marginalization of his ideas. If anything, circumstances suggest the Air Force facilitated this 
aspect of his work. There was little speculative about Machta’s position, given it was based on 
data, rather than the far more diffuse and prospective hypothetical policy argument about their 
fallout Oppenheimer was forced by circumstances to rely upon in raising his cautions about the 
Air Force’s reliance on the massed power of thermonuclear weapons.  
 Fallout Swerves Over the Line  
The Air Force’s refusal to declassify the detailed fallout data requested by the Centers for 
Disease Control and National Cancer Institute to better gauge its impacts reflects the studied, 
long-standing ambiguity of the U.S. government’s commitment to resolving the relationship 
between empirical measurements of fallout exposures and the range of injuries statistically likely 
to result across human populations from exposure to wartime fallout. This left the actual risks 
plumbed by GABRIEL and subsequent studies on the potential outcome of nuclear war 
unresolved. Moreover, it also prevented an honest discussion about the actual military utility of 
the investments made in these weapons. Releasing this data would cast in concrete form the 
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limitations of weapons most now hope to never use. Nonetheless, whatever consequential value 
exposure data might eventually establish for health impacts from fallout, the two presidents 
under which the bulk of American fallout was created took decisive action to limit testing in 
anticipation of the outcome of diplomacy because fallout’s presence in the food supply chain 
exceeded standards the federal government itself promulgated.  
The political significance of exceeding the exposure standards was clear at the White 
House, given Robert Cutler’s earlier statement about the domestic political dangers of fallout. 
Even if handled in discrete secrecy, these empirical factors threatened to throw fuel on the fires 
of public and diplomatic protest. In a disturbing development for those who argued the safety of 
exposure standards in testing compared to wartime fallout, these executive actions were taken, 
not because war produced threatening exposure levels, but because simply testing these weapons 
did so. However profligate both the United States and the Soviet Union were with their testing 
by the late 1950s, though, the volume of testing fallout paled in comparison with what war would 
bring. Previous work has often touched on these decisions by Eisenhower and Kennedy 
separately, but here they are examined as directly linked by context and circumstances, as the 
executive office of the president pulled for a permanent test ban and the AEC and armed services 
pulled for a limited test ban allowing them to continue testing underground.
1065
 
By March 1959, Eisenhower determined he would press forward with policy and 
diplomacy to address what he saw as intolerable risk and proven liability, given most indications 
in the now-rapidly accumulating data were that fallout was widespread, increasing, and posed 
short- and long-term threats difficult to evaluate let alone mitigate or treat. For Eisenhower, 
beaten by the winds of change, fallout, and the fate of choosing some advisers poorly, the 
conclusive turning point on fallout proved a humbly empirical one. Greene efficiently 
summarized the circumstances, just as the dispute over stratospheric residence times that festered 
in the Weather Bureau was roiling the legislative waters for the AEC. Once again, with no public 
notice, behind the scenes fallout took its place in the thick of the dialogue squarely among other 
actors, making another cameo appearance on the way to a presidential decision about its fate. 
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Ironically, AEC Commissioner Willard Libby convinced Eisenhower to abandon 
atmospheric tests…At a meeting on 6 March [1959], Libby briefed Eisenhower 
and the Cabinet that the amount of radioactive strontium-90 in Minnesota wheat 
was nearing dangerous levels…Moreover, a recent study concluded radioactive 
strontium-90 spent one year, instead of ten as originally believed, deteriorating in 
the stratosphere before returning to the earth...Libby’s information had an 
immediate impact on Eisenhower, convincing him to not authorize any additional 
atmospheric tests for the remainder of his presidency…[to his advisers, 
Eisenhower] acknowledged “all available evidence indicates that nuclear testing 
is bad.” Eisenhower revealed that he had “come to the conclusion that testing in 
the atmosphere was something we wouldn’t do in any event.”1066  
 
Obviously, Eisenhower’s conclusion was not something to be shared with the Soviet 
Union immediately, but instead was negotiated, another narrative likely to be better informed by 
articulating the history of the Air Force’s efforts to build and operate the AEDS through 
AFOAT-1/AFTAC to the extensive political narratives of arms control. But sharing it directly 
with Congress, the American people, or even the Pentagon itself was also problematic for the 
reasons Robert Cutler stated earlier and more. Particularly interesting was how Libby managed 
to come off so well, considering he was forced into directly addressing the fallout issues at direct 
variance to the position he took against Machta and List’s recent criticism. Greene saw Libby’s 
artful landing, but not the clumsy maneuvering that preceded it that Machta and List described in 
the Project Sunshine documents. 
Libby may have been saved by quoting the facts and acting on them once he was backed 
into a corner by circumstances, accounting for why he saw the need to act in March 1959 when 
he previously disdained the need for action. 
Libby stated that experts agreed that the maximum permissible dose levels of 
radiation ranged from 50 to 100 units, as contrasted with the present general level 
in individuals of 1-2 units. Samples of Minnesota wheat showed a radiation level 
of 105 in 1957 and 155 in 1958.
1067
 
 
Libby continued to assert “the hazard of radiation to be very small compared to the other 
hazards of life.” The president drove right into that thinking, illustrating how he now regarded 
this line of argument about test fallout as missing the forest for the trees in terms of public 
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opinion, opinion that was certain to be inflamed beyond its already nearly untenable nature 
considering the Cold War context. 
The president concluded the discussion with a comment on the difficulty of any 
assumption there could be a nuclear war, since the radioactivity level from a 
massive attack would be just tremendous compared with what was evident in 
Minnesota wheat as the result of merely a few tests.
1068
 
  
The need to change policy because of fallout based on its empirical effects was then clear 
behind closed doors within the cabinet. What the public heard about it was entirely different. The 
president’s briefing notes for a news conference a few days later delivered a stay-the-course 
message. If strontium-90 came up, the president’s response would be that Health, Education, and 
Welfare Secretary Arthur Flemming would shortly issue a “statement saying no reason to believe 
any health hazard at the present time.”1069  
Greene summed up the difficulties the president faced with his next steps by citing AEC 
Chair John McCone’s assessment that a comprehensive test ban was a non-starter, joining in the 
armed services’ support for underground testing as a feasible alternative they required.1070 
Edward Teller remained an enthusiastic backer of testing, pledging to continue the fight even 
after Eisenhower finally dismissed Lewis Strauss. Greene argued it was Killian’s defection to the 
atmospheric only test ban camp that contributed to his own replacement in July 1959 as science 
advisor by George Kistiakowsky, a supporter of the comprehensive test ban.
1071
 Greene focused 
on the role of personalities and institutional interests as the engines of change regarding fallout, 
but ultimately policy was made by the president; his views carried substantially more weight 
even if still insufficient to fully prevail against the hidebound national security bureaucracy. 
Giving partial credit to public and world opinion, Greene argued “the most important factor” was 
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a “broadened range of scientific advice.”1072 Eisenhower’s long and often fraught relationship 
with both science and fallout certainly framed his decisions on national security in the last few 
years of his public service. This was another case where incomplete knowledge about the role of 
the AEDS led to a strong but ultimately insufficient argument, as it remained fundamentally soft 
in the center by only incompletely describing fallout’s key role in shaping policy. 
The argument that psycho-social factors predominated in human decision making in 
relation to fallout is not essentially wrong, but it fails to fully inform about the extent to which 
the lack of factual data to properly evaluate fallout’s risks was a constructed and intentional 
ignorance. In this example, it happened even as Greene presented a litany of evidence about 
fallout’s political, military, and scientific effects. Most telling was the primary reason 
Eisenhower and Dulles concluded a comprehensive test ban was preferable to the atmospheric 
test ban. 
“Eisenhower…privately discussed Gore’s proposal [for a partial test ban proposal 
in Geneva as a backup to failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban] with 
Dulles. They were both concerned that banning only atmospheric testing would 
signal a reversal of the public assurances that there were no significant health 
hazards from testing.
1073
 
  
Gore’s proposal was also discussed by the Presidential Scientific Advisory Committee, which 
was just as alarmed about the clarity of the implicit message such a decision would send. 
…Bethe and Rabi reached a similar conclusion on the political implications of 
pursuing a ban limited to atmospheric tests. They wondered how the 
administration could make such a proposal “without national embarrassment and 
a severe propaganda setback.”1074 
 
Greene observed “Most PSAC scientists discounted the health hazards of fallout…” 
Most, however, were likely ignorant of GABRIEL’s history. Although Rabi likely knew about it, 
it was uncertain how much others in PSAC knew about the ongoing CROWFLIGHT program. 
Bethe and Rabi of PSAC framing of their reaction to pursuit of only an atmospheric ban as a 
“severe propaganda setback” expressed fear that the government’s public discounting of fallout’s 
significance Greene concluded was underway could backfire if government suddenly issued 
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statements contradicting that stance.
1075
 Most policy makers still believed they were dealing 
primarily in mistaken popular assumptions about fallout and the political costs it imposed, not a 
fundamental threat to the most powerful of all weapons systems. In this sense, Weart’s findings 
on nuclear fear certainly account for the reaction of many of the actors involved, but this was an 
artificially myopic view, failing to take into account what was artfully hidden. Machta’s findings 
on the concentrating behavior of global fallout deposition still awaited confirmation in the results 
of CROWFLIGHT, but work like his and that of Hedley Marston and other scientists 
demonstrated fallout’s days as a useful if otherwise inconsequential secret were largely over as 
scientific scrutiny of it intensified. 
Capped by the collapse of Libby’s support for tolerating testing fallout and the crumbling 
of his overly optimistic theory of fallout deposition, the eventual fate of testing fallout was 
sealed, even as politico-diplomatic circumstances delayed and added complexity to the national 
security policy problems of the Cold War over the next four years. The Limited Test Ban Treaty 
was not signed and ratified until 1963 under another president. John F. Kennedy would inherit, 
not a fait accompli, but an urgent need, one Eisenhower ensured he was briefed on specifically in 
the transition.
1076
 Despite tough talk of confronting Communism made during his campaign 
against Richard Nixon, which carried over into his brief, crisis-laden term, Kennedy, too, 
directed his administration to pursue nuclear diplomacy at least as ardently as it sought 
confrontation with the Soviet Union.  
The 1959 Fallout Hearings 
The 1959 fallout hearings in Congress were a further sign the Pentagon finally realized 
fallout was creating a fundamental political vulnerability. Its strategic dependence on nuclear 
weapons revealed a conventional arms “gap” of sorts. Amidst demands from Congress and the 
public for more information, the military asserted secrecy about fallout must continue or they 
would otherwise face increasing political constraints because fallout would be perceived as 
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limiting the use of nuclear weapons.
1077
 May 1959 offered an extended reprise of the 1957 fallout 
hearings. Tellingly, whether for socio-political or empirical reasons, Hewlett and Holl drew a 
firm conclusion of fallout’s growing influence on policy. 
The [1959] Joint Committee [JCAE] hearings amply justified the principals’ 
conclusion that fallout had become a controlling factor in test-ban policy.
1078
 
 
The corollary, given that fallout from testing had long been argued to be “safe” even if it 
might become a threat during wartime, was that if fallout from testing was determined to be 
problematic, it amplified the assumptions one could draw about its wartime impact and the 
implicit limitations this placed on war planning. 
Indicative of growing Congressional and public doubts about whether the Commission 
took fallout seriously, in reporting on the AEC’s efforts to promote “Fallout Research and 
Organization” AEC Chair John McCone was forced to humbly begin his statement by insisting 
the Commission was serious about fallout and devoting considerable resources to the problem. 
We do not take this question lightly; we have not dismissed it as unimportant to 
the people of this country and, indeed, the world…The equivalent of 800 
scientists are engaged in this work….No Atomic Energy Commission information 
relating to radioactive content of the atmosphere and the amount of fallout has 
been withheld from the public or from the United Nations.
1079
 
 
Despite his oath to testify fully and completely, McCone was nonetheless evasive, if not simply 
lying, on that and several other points he addressed.  
The AEC is the only agency in Government that has engaged in extensive 
research work in the sampling of the atmosphere and conducting fallout studies on 
a worldwide basis…I assure this committee most emphatically and unequivocally 
that so long as I am Chairman…I shall not be party to the suppression or 
distortion of any information bearing on the safety or health of the American 
public. 
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In part, McCone’s description of what the AEC was supposedly engaged in used 
language that sounded suspiciously similar to the original 1947 orders issued by Eisenhower 
standing up AFOAT-1’s mission.1081 At a minimum McCone failed to explain that it was far 
from being solely the AEC’s efforts he was describing. Rather, the project was in large part that 
of the secret Air Force intelligence unit on behalf of the AEC, with the AEC essentially making 
do with whatever information the military deigned to pass along, never mind the fact that the 
AEC was clearly not “the only agency in Government” engaged in this effort.1082 The manifest 
conflicts of interest and the sheer lack of accountability implicit in McCone’s shading of the 
truth about fallout research would have waved a red flag in front of the congressional bull if 
McCone had fully and completely disclosed it to the committee, given one goal of Congress was 
to ensure making at least a gesture toward independent oversight in protecting the public interest 
from fallout. Evidence of intensifying public interest in fallout was reflected in the heightened 
attention of Congress to the issue. 
Fallout Finds Its Way Home 
McCone’s knowingly duplicitous hearing statement was in reaction to a controversy that 
arose between the two major Congressional hearings on fallout after McCone assumed the AEC 
chair following Strauss’ departure after the 1957 hearing. As the 1959 hearing neared, concerns 
were raised the AEC was responding inadequately to the committee’s request for a number of 
classified documents on fallout. Of greatest concern was a response by General Herbert B. 
Loper, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, to questions raised about the 
residence time of strontium-90 (28.8 year half-life) in the stratosphere. During the 1957 fallout 
hearing, testimony was dominated by Willard Libby’s position on fallout’s life cycle; Libby 
presented his estimate that injections of this isotope into the stratosphere resided there for an 
average of seven years before reentering the troposphere.  With the relatively high yields of 
thermonuclear weapons depositing a large amount of strontium-90 into the stratosphere and the 
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threat its bone-seeking properties posed to increased incidence of blood and bone cancers, an 
estimated residence time of seven years would allow a substantial part of the strontoum-90 to 
decay before it moved to lower altitudes and then into terrestrial food chains. But Libby’s 
estimates were based on fallout from testing conducted only through 1956.  
Gioacchino Failla, chair of the AEC’s advisory committee on biology and medicine, 
argued that projected testing need also be accounted for by means of estimates, resulting in body 
burden limits for strontium-90 that exceeded current standards in about 28 years. Prior to 
HARDTACK during the 1957 fallout hearings,  the AEC suggested there was a “safe” level of 
additional fallout, 10 megatons, that could be introduced annually into the atmosphere through 
testing by limiting new additions to no greater than the predicted rate of decay of fallout already 
aloft to avoid raising exposure levels from fallout deposited back to earth. 
1083
 Such reasoning 
presumed acceptance of already increased levels of exposure since 1945, as well as presumed 
that other nations like the Soviet Union would similarly limit their test programs. It also 
presumed the AEC could confirm how much fallout actually left the atmosphere, which the 
Weather Bureau data by 1958 suggested was uncertain. 
In reality, Libby’s theoretical assumptions were nearly as optimistic about the behavior of 
strontium-90 and other fallout as the Air Force’s estimates of Soviet nuclear forces derived from 
krypton-85 monitoring were pessimistic. By 13 March 1959, Libby reduced his estimate of 
stratospheric fallout residence time to four years. A week later, General Loper had the misfortune 
of breaking the bad news to Congress that new data collected from the high-altitude experiments 
at HARDTACK suggested the stratospheric residence time was much shorter than originally 
estimated and even shorter than Libby’s new estimate, just two years.1084 Even worse, instead of 
being distributed relatively equally as Libby’s 1957 model suggested, it confirmed Machta’s and 
List’s findings that global circulation patterns concentrated this stratospheric “drip-out” between 
35 and 50 degrees latitude. The picture Loper painted was alarming, because most testing 
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occurred in the Northern Hemisphere with the elevated drip-out latitudes covering most of the 
continental United States.
1085
 It did not help that Congress was also complaining about being 
kept in the dark about ARGUS (after the story was leaked to the New York Times) and its secret 
nuclear shots above the South Atlantic that supplemented the high-altitude shots at HARDTACK 
and what it saw as Loper’s selective approach to keeping Congress current on fallout.1086 While 
testing of all high-yield devices and many lower yield ones was conducted in the remote Pacific, 
fallout was relentlessly finding its way home, rather than dispersing, making a telling point about 
how humans only imagined they were fully in control of nuclear weapons.
1087
  
Loper’s response was conciliatory, but somewhat arrogant, arguing several of the points 
had been previously communicated to the committee. Loper then proffered an argument that 
even more testing was needed to better understand fallout effects. It was not exactly what 
Congress wanted to hear, prompting Willard Libby to attempt to calm the troubled waters he 
successfully navigated previously in 1957. Libby disagreed with a revised estimate Loper offered 
for stratospheric residence time, insisting he had seen no evidence of it being less than four 
years.
1088
 Libby argued his estimate of the current fallout present in the atmospheric “reservoir” 
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was equivalent to a total yield of 42 megatons. Libby acknowledged evidence was building for 
the thesis Loper articulated that atmospheric circulation concentrated fallout deposition in the 
temperate latitudes, i.e. between 35 and 50 degrees latitude, but insisted it was not conclusive 
yet.
1089
  
Muddying the waters further, A.R. Luedecke, general manager of the AEC, then argued 
the differences and uncertainties between the two men’s accounts reflected the active workings 
of science, not an attempt to deceive Congress. Luedecke did spill the beans partially when he 
revealed that tungsten- and rhodium-salted devices were used at HARDTACK, in surface-burst 
and high altitude shots respectively, as this data would help differentiate between fallout 
contributed by the Soviet Union and that from the U.S. and its allies and between surface shots 
and those detonated in the upper atmosphere for research purposes. Meanwhile, the Department 
of Defense insisted that only one sentence in its report to the committee on the issue was 
classified, but “the Department recommends that it not be discussed in public because there is 
not full agreement as to the interpretation of the data obtained so far.”1090 Small wonder McCone 
felt obligated to try to smooth the waters by insisting on the AEC’s assertion that it was being 
entirely forthcoming on fallout data. Aiding him in this was a report issued by the 1959 General 
Advisory Committee, led by Warren C. Johnson, that insisted fallout was a negligible threat. 
This ended a long silence on the matter, as the 1950 GAC was never offered an opportunity to 
make its case to the public in such unrestricted fashion.
1091
 Behind all the smoke and mirrors that 
the AEC and Defense used to walk Congress through on fallout, it was obvious that a pointed 
effort was being made to deceive the legislative branch about the effectiveness of policy changes 
already wrought by fallout and limit the potential flow of information about it over fear it might 
damage the nuclear intelligence effort, support for nuclear weapons as a whole, and threaten the 
limited efforts then underway to strengthen civil defense as largely pointless.  
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What was the connection between the congressional testimony and troubling data Loper 
and Libby exchanged fire over, the same data that the Machta and List of the Weather Bureau 
raised questions about? The data being discussed was produced by the ongoing CROWFLIGHT 
high altitude sample data collected by the 4080
th
 SRW U-2 aircraft at the behest of AFOAT-1, 
along with a far more modest set of samples returned by a recent, marginally successful balloon 
sampling program even then in the process of being reduced from four detachments to one 
because of the limited results obtained.
1092
 CROWFLIGHT representatively sampled whole air, 
primarily from the stratosphere, rather than trying to vector in on the concentrated plumes from 
specific test shots. Its samples were not typically as “hot” as the test shot samples and missions 
directly vectored against Soviet fallout plumes were, although the dangers of flying at altitude in 
the U-2 remained ever present for the aircraft’s pilots.  
1959: Fallout: Replacing the Life-Blood of the Air Force 
Efforts to repackage the production of fallout through testing as an explicit yardstick by 
which to gauge the strength of American national security were well underway by March 1959, 
thus returning to the beginning of this narrative about fallout with a better understanding about 
the alarm expressed by General Thomas S. Power, successor to General LeMay as SAC 
commander, on the effect of fallout’s loss on the Air Force after Eisenhower’s test ban halt went 
into effect. To review, Power argued in secret to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Americans 
needed to be exposed to a stark choice.
1093
 
[T]he JCS should request the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to launch 
a campaign to persuade the American people that fallout from nuclear weapons 
tests was a negligible hazard compared to the peril that would result from failure, 
through insufficient testing, to maintain an adequate nuclear deterrent.
1094
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Putting aside the fact Power seemed to not notice the Cold War Air Force had been 
engaged in a very similar, if studiously less specific campaign since 1947, Power explicitly 
framed the need to evaluate American national security in terms of its capability and freedom to 
produce fallout in order to develop new weapons to maintain the balance of terror. Another part 
of Power’s comment invoked aspects of nuclear absolutism in his use of Russian fallout as the 
justification for American fallout, without noting the vast disparity in those numbers as of 1959. 
General Power saw the Russians as an obviously greater threat than any namby-pamby fallout 
ever could be and the weapons under his command as largely without limitations on their use. 
Whatever academic or ideological theoretical flavor one prefers to read them in light of, Power’s 
words illustrate the strength and centrality of fallout’s continuing influence on the policy cycle at 
the time. Power’s candor, if not his wisdom, in problem formulation still left several things 
unsaid about the role and influence of fallout on the decisions of military leaders such as himself 
and others like LeMay and Twining. 
As a publicly-recognized feature of high-yield weapons, fallout’s threat – in the absence 
of other options – helped maintain the counter- direction of weapons development established by 
the Oppenheimer-led GAC, balancing against the influence of scientists like Teller and leaders 
like LeMay and Power within the Air Force leadership.
1095
  This core group inside the Air Force 
remained enthralled with the quest for high-yield weapons long after it became clear the 
president saw no advantage in their military effects over increasingly accurate low-yield 
weapons. Recognition that fallout was a problem after 1954 thus resulted in an even more 
preponderant emphasis on development of smaller, more tactically agile weapons. Fallout 
facilitated Oppenheimer’s continuing influence on stockpile composition while simultaneously 
limiting the influence of Teller’s inclinations at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory long 
after the man it was formed to undermine was forced out of government service in 1954. 
The lack of fallout that prompted and energized Power’s ire, helping explain the general’s 
classified diatribe on the need to persuade Americans that they should think of fallout as 
tolerable, was due to the informal halt to testing by the three original nuclear powers that took 
effect at the end of 1958. Not bound by any diplomatic agreement, the United States could 
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decide to end its participation in the moratorium if it must. The test moratorium was unilaterally 
proposed by the Soviet Union in 1958, with the United States and the United Kingdom joining 
independently in suspending testing. The Air Force began seriously fretting about the possibility 
of the test ban after Russian diplomats first proposed what was characterized as “an unspecified 
system of controls in return for a two-to-three year moratorium on testing,” which was followed 
at the end of an earlier Soviet test series in March 1958 by the announcement they would cease 
testing soon. In August 1958, President Eisenhower announced his intent to join in a moratorium 
– on 31 October 1958 after the end of the already-scheduled HARDTACK test series. Power 
facetiously characterized the test halt’s resulting dearth of fallout as “placing a severe strain on 
the nation’s military strength.” After Eisenhower extended U.S. participation in the informal test 
moratorium into the election year of 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff joined in supporting Power’s 
anxieties, arguing “continuation of the unpoliced moratorium was an unacceptable military 
risk.”1096 The JCS claim that the test moratorium was “unpoliced” was a particularly laughable 
assertion, given the considerable efforts devoted to the capabilities of long range detection 
managed by the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), the newly-named 
organization that assumed the mission of AFOAT-1 in July 1959, a unit directly under JCS 
command and control. It was a dubious contention made secure in the knowledge the president 
could not offer the public a classified refutation to it. 
The Cold War canon holds the motivations for remarks such as Power’s were a product 
of the need to continue development of various new nuclear warheads to equip a variety of new 
offensive weapons systems scheduled as a quick follow-on to first generation platforms; most 
important to the Air Force in 1959 and 1960 were those connected to the development of the 
Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to deliver thermonuclear warheads 
and due to replace legacy pilotless cruise missiles with a shorter range like the Mace and 
Matador. However, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) warheads were frequently cited in such 
discussions of developmental goals, given their “defensive” nature was often regarded as the 
preferable message to send given the controversy over the effects of their use. Certainly as 
commander of SAC, Power was interested in offensive strength. Power, like Twining, 
understood how important the role of the nuclear intelligence portfolio managed by AFOAT-1 
was in justifying the power at his command. And no fallout meant that a major Air Force 
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intelligence system, the AEDS, no longer had access to the fresh stream of information it 
produced from Soviet testing debris. The Air Force’s thirst for new weapons was not, however, 
the sole or even primary motivation behind Power’s objection to the test halt, a need that was 
addressed satisfactorily by underground testing provisions in the eventual 1963 test ban 
agreement.
1097
 Here the real value of fallout was the other side of the coin. The cut-off in 
information from Soviet fallout due to the moratorium on testing, which up until the 1958 test 
halt provided the primary underpinning of SAC’s rationale for its own massive force expansion, 
was something that pained Power deeply.  
It was a liminal moment centered on development of new technology, but not entirely in 
the way the Joint Chiefs cast it. The test moratorium proved to be a watershed in the shifting 
influence of intelligence approaches between the decade-long incumbent, nuclear intelligence, 
largely derived from the Air Force’s operation of the AEDS, and imagery, provided at first by 
the CIA and Air Force U-2 fleets, then by CORONA and other follow-on satellite imagery 
systems.
1098
 By the time testing resumed temporarily in 1961, space-based platforms provided a 
far more comprehensive picture of the actual Soviet threat, capabilities, and readiness, all factors 
more relevant in assessing the possibility of Eisenhower’s central fear of surprise attack through 
two terms in office. While information derived from the AEDS was effective in generating worst 
case scenarios of Soviet nuclear power, its strategic weakness was in providing little rationale or 
nuance for anything short of a maximum effort reaction. The limitations of accuracy and analysis 
inherent in the various technological components of the AEDS network, even with the 
remarkably accurate krypton-85 method of assessing Soviet plutonium stockpile growth, served 
as a peculiar, but imprecise intelligence source to justify the scale of the postwar buildup of 
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SAC. AFOAT-1/AFTAC’s work product was compelling due to its very nature, an effect 
enhanced by nuclear absolutism, leaving what some preferred to see as a blank check in terms of 
the scale of response required to address the threat it described.  With a sales force like 
Vandenberg, Doolittle, LeMay, and Power, aided by the lobbying of a quickly growing Air Force 
Association, the ambitious Air Force more often than not made its case for that budget and force 
level number to be larger rather than smaller during the nineteen-fifties. Walter Rostow’s call to 
essentially pay any price to counter the Soviet threat was but one example of the prevailing 
mindset among Air Force boosters. 
…there is no proof whatsoever that the Soviet military effort is being reduced, 
and there are no grounds for building American policy on the assumption that if 
the Soviet government believed it enjoyed a sufficient advantage in nuclear 
weapons to take out American retaliatory power at a blow, it would not do so. 
Inhibitions may well exist in the Soviet political system against such a course of 
action…[but] we Americans have no right before man or God to tempt Moscow’s 
planners with this possibility.
1099
  
 
Perhaps Rostow, then at MIT, did not possess the appropriate clearance for the AFTAC briefing 
or, like many whose government service took them higher up in the bureaucracy, knew nothing 
of GABRIEL’s decade-old findings describing the limits cumulative fallout imposed on war?  
Whatever the failings of the Soviet system, including the tendency shared with elements in the 
Pentagon to simply put aside inconvenient science, even when Air Force boosters like Power 
implied otherwise, the East was governed by the same rules of physics and radiochemistry as in 
the West. Fallout was an inevitable factor constraining Soviet strategic forces as it was for SAC.  
The Pugwash conference process ensured that such concerns were shared between the 
respective political and military leaderships by top scientists of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the 
United States, as well as other nations; they met on an annual basis beginning in 1957. Founded 
by Joseph Rotblat, a close colleague of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists founder and University of 
Illinois Professor Eugene Rabinowitch, Pugwash’s impetus was the call in the Russell-Einstein 
Manifesto of 7 July 1955 to ban nuclear weapons. Their joint initiative was quite specific in 
noting one of their motivations was the threat of fallout from thermonuclear weapons. 
It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can be manufactured which will be 
2.500 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if 
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exploded near the ground or under water, sends radioactive particles into the 
upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of 
deadly dust or rain…No one knows how widely such lethal radioactive particles 
might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with 
H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race.
1100
 
 
Thus, the Soviet leadership, as well as the Western nuclear powers, were well aware of the 
cataclysmic potential of wartime fallout well before 1959, although considerably less well 
equipped to deliver weapons on the scale than SAC could potentially rain upon the Soviet Union. 
Only if one assumed that military leaders on both sides were equally dismissive of the threat 
posed by their fallout to their own peoples could assumptions like those which guided the editors 
of Air Force ring true. Still, this editorial fit a pattern with the worst-case scenario analytical 
theme the Air Force tended to invoke. By 1959, Eisenhower was largely personally immune to 
such entreaties, given the availability of significant counter-evidence from U-2 imagery and the 
AEDS of a substantial American lead in nuclear capabilities. Armoring that was Ike’s knowledge 
there was little to be gained in terms of advantage once the capability to destroy the enemy was 
in hand, accompanied by more than enough fallout to poison one’s own people. While the 
American public knew little about the strength of Soviet forces beyond the periodic and rather 
selective State Department denunciations of Soviet testing or about the stark limits fallout placed 
on the use of nuclear weapons in war, their naivety sustained by secrecy about fallout could be 
exploited to support assertions like those of Air Force magazine’s editorial board.   
As the Sixties dawned, the AEDS served less well in addressing such factors as the scope 
of deterrence once significant discrepancies between national intelligence estimates derived from 
AEDS data and the empty airfields and missing launch sites depicted in U-2 imagery were 
resolved by CORONA imagery that provided a more accurate assessment of the stark limitations 
of Soviet strategic forces. The U-2 imagery’s lifting of ambiguity about the Soviet threat posture 
acted to put the brakes on an impressive decade-long run of Air Force budget and funding 
success. Power’s location of the Air Force’s vitality as embodied in fallout could simply have 
been his impassioned observation. However, it may be more accurate to assess Power’s 
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statement as a call to action to recapture a dependable source that had long proved effective in 
meeting the service’s needs. 
Beyond the political uses of fallout, the AEDS provided relatively little new weapons 
intelligence so long as the Soviets continued with their test halt. The U-2, Air Weather Service 
aircraft, and stratospheric balloons continued to fly and gather samples that captured significant 
scientific data on the results from previous testing. This interlude provided an opportunity for 
assessment of how quickly the atmosphere cleansed itself and additional leads to where and how 
quickly fallout went as it underwent weathering and decay in the environment.   
A contentious difference in goals was at the core of Eisenhower’s fears about the pace 
and scope of the arms race. Evidence here indicated that fallout served as a substantial and 
growing aggravation of Eisenhower’s already deep-seated concerns stemming from his 
fundamental fear of surprise attack expressed several years prior to his “cross of iron” speech in 
the spring of 1953 after the 1951 sessions with Oppenheimer and the others working on VISTA. 
It also imposed a substantive limit on the employment of both strategic and tactical nuclear 
forces. The Air Force position remained, as Power argued, that fallout was at best a minor 
concern when so much else was put at stake by the existence of thermonuclear weapons. Limits 
were irrelevant so long as there was a war to be won. Arguably, the tone of Eisenhower’s more 
sharply critical speech on the threat posed by the military-industrial-scientific-intelligence 
complex (as described per Greene) delivered as his farewell to government service was framed in 
considerable part by fallout’s frustration of his ability as commander-in-chief to untie the 
strategic Gordian knot of nuclear weapons.
1101
 Even with substantial adjustments in war 
planning, including enactment of the first joint services war plan, SIOP-62, and the inclusion of a 
wide variety of relatively low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, fallout’s disruption of the initial 
promise of his effort to forge a more affordable New Look military based on massive retaliation 
left him grasping for peace after two terms in office, unable to rely on either the thermonuclear 
weapons that dictated the first strategic military realignment of the nuclear era just eight years 
earlier or the tactical weapons that Air Force leaders like LeMay and Power still found 
inadequate to the task.  
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Thus, while only infrequently attributed to concerns about fallout, the Air Force’s well-
documented concerns about the impact of the test ban on development of new weapons was 
likely matched by secret concerns like those Power expressed over the disconcerting reduction in 
its take of intelligence data from fallout. Even more curious was the way the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, AFTAC’s command authority, portrayed this absence of fallout, terming the test ban an 
“unpoliced moratorium.”1102 The JCS knew this statement was factually inaccurate, but 
apparently believed it could hold up to public scrutiny because AFTAC and the AEDS were 
concealed by official secrecy. Most remarkable was how little stock the Pentagon’s public 
statements put in the viability of a test moratorium, while at the same time the very same unit, 
which reported directly to the Joint Chiefs, was recognized for conducting such work with 
considerable praise and honor.
1103
 Despite arriving at the far end of a decade of stunningly 
successful scientific intelligence generated by means of the AEDS, powered by literally 
thousands of samples taken to build a quantifiable case for the costly expansion of SAC, it was 
still the military’s public position that too little was known about the Soviet threat to justify its 
support for a diplomatic agreement to implement a test ban. While there were certainly areas of 
ambiguity and uncertainty in the state of knowledge about the threat posed by the Soviet Union, 
protestations about a lack of clarity in this area appear deliberately deceptive in retrospect in 
light of AFOAT-1/AFTAC’s history of achievement. 
Need for Fallout Defines Negotiating Strategy Even as It Reveals Secrets 
The American military understood the capabilities of scientific intelligence systems far 
exceeded those of mere individual human agency, no matter how well-placed an individual spy 
might be. The United States maintained position the during much of the Geneva talks that 
physical inspection was a necessary part of a final agreement was directly at odds with American 
capabilities and experience.
1104
 Human inspectors might provide a different range of assessments 
of Soviet nuclear capabilities than the AEDS, assuming some agreement could be reached with 
the Russians, but they were unlikely to provide a better overall assessment of Russian strategic 
forces than already described by the AEDS and the U-2 – and far less than satellites were 
expected to provide.  
                                                 
1102
 Nalty, The Air Force and Nuclear Testing, 4. 
1103
 Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, http://www.afpc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=7785. AFOAT-1 
and AFTAC shared in ten Outstanding Unit Awards during the Cold War. It was among the first awardees in 1954, 
picked up another in 1958, and then received eight more between 1961 and 1982. 
1104
 Nalty, The Air Force and Nuclear Testing, 4. 
422 
 
The Russians stubbornly objected to intrusive methods such as physical inspection for 
good reason. An inspector could likely provide rather accurate location data, which might then 
be exploited for targeting purposes, a reasonable assumption of American intent under the 
circumstances, given the irritations and limitations of PARPRO (Peacetime Airborne 
Reconnaissance Program); it was not until the advent of the U-2 as a CIA intelligence resource 
followed by early satellite imagery that the targeting data gap began to be filled in SAC’s war 
plans.
1105
 Likewise, between the contingencies of human agents such as Kim Philby and 
statements regarding Soviet testing from the AEC, the Russians were undoubtedly cognizant of 
American efforts focused on determining Soviet nuclear capabilities and locating its supporting 
infrastructure, which they understood to be largely a result of the fallout and seismic signals that 
escaped from their testing.
1106
 The launch of Sputnik made it doubly clear the Soviets, too, were 
aware the era of closed air space as a means of information denial was drawing to a close. 
Despite the common claim during the Cold War that an immutable wall prevented knowing the 
other, the action of parties in both the East and West in generating telltale fallout, while 
exploiting the fallout of their peers, demonstrated the parties also relied on fallout as a 
fundamental means to communicate their strategic military capabilities to others. More than 
anything else, this meant atmospheric testing was, far and away, the greatest intentional source 
of compromise of nuclear secrets, not human agents. With access to space for capturing 
comprehensive imagery virtually on the doorstep at the end of the 1950s, conceding the long-
standing U.S. demand for physical inspection of Soviet nuclear facilities was a bargaining chip 
that needed to be used before it lost its value at the negotiating table as the parties to the talks 
discovered the rich advantages of such a vantage point. The need for physical inspection, a 
persistent stumbling point when only the AEDS was available to provide intelligence on Soviet 
strategic forces, withered away with the vastly greater capabilities for targeting and other data 
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provided by the U-2 and satellites.  Thus, while updates of the AEDS substantially improved its 
capabilities by the end of the Eisenhower administration, the addition of imagery capabilities 
quickly moved from supplementing the AEDS to become the predominant factor in the 
production of national intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities. 
Aided by the highly classified nature of the program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could 
selectively reveal or obfuscate the actual intelligence capabilities available to the military. Their 
public claims, and even classified ones such as Power’s, strongly suggested any test halt was 
based on mistaken beliefs about American offensive or intelligence capabilities – or worse, 
perhaps supported by nothing more than simply trusting the Soviets would not violate it. To 
imply that nothing more than trust sustained the test moratorium was an obvious attempt to 
impose political limitations on policy change during an era when McCarthyism remained very 
much alive. Small wonder their retiring commander called them out as part of the problem of 
peace, rather than excluding them from his critical summing up before Congress upon his 
departure from a command he held longer than any other, the presidency. 
1959: “…nuclear testing is bad…” 
James Killian, the president’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for arms 
control and fallout issues, summed up the conundrum in a memorandum later in March 1959 
after the president told his advisers that he concluded “nuclear testing is bad.” Reflecting this 
conclusion, Killian clearly identified fallout as at the root of the problem of both developing and 
using nuclear weapons. 
The overriding technological fact, however, is the continued build-up of improved 
high-performance nuclear weapons on both sides make possible catastrophic 
effects if they are used in massive attacks. 
 
Another technological factor involving uncertainties is the problem of fallout. The 
biological effects of radiation involve uncertainties, particularly in the genetic 
area, and we may possibly face a growing body of sober scientific judgment that 
the fallout hazard is greater than we now believe. 
 
The profound over-all effect of these trends points to the great urgency and 
importance of our diligently and creatively seeking methods of arms limitation – 
limitation which will not weaken our position relative to the Soviets.
1107
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While not explicitly mentioned in the first paragraph about the wartime dangers of 
nuclear weapons, it was no longer 1953, it was 1959 and the cat was out of the bag in terms of 
public knowledge of fallout being among those dangers; catastrophic weapons effects now 
clearly included the problems of both prompt and cumulative fallout. That inclusionary meaning 
was contextualized by the explicit meaning of existing fallout from testing itself Killian sketched 
as the topic of the second paragraph.  
That fallout was at the center of the testing problem in Killian’s view was further 
reinforced by his discussion on how to define the limits of the atmosphere under an atmospheric 
test ban agreement. Killian argued whatever the definition of tests conducted in space was, it 
must be undertaken far enough away to preclude their fallout from returning to Earth. In terms of 
moving the policy argument forward, Killian noted the need to revise an American priority: any 
agreement must be capable of being effectively monitored, a somewhat different formulation of 
the earlier “subject to inspection” mandate. Killian’s reformulation of the inspection problem 
was dependent on capabilities that up to this point were almost exclusively intelligence activities 
of the most exquisite sensitivity. 
While surprisingly disclaiming any priority for “…technical factors [that] probably are of 
secondary importance to political or policy objectives…” Killian’s memo did not merely fall on 
fertile ground, but as pollen on a fertile policy field that was at that moment being forced to 
conclusively reevaluate erroneous assumptions about the military utility of nuclear weapons in 
light of the contingency of fallout.
1108
 Killian may not have explicitly mentioned fallout in terms 
of the “catastrophic effects” of nuclear war, but it was clear from the government’s own post-
CASTLE BRAVO reports that the combination of acute local and cumulative global fallout in 
most nuclear war scenarios would far exceed the parameters of risk defined by Project 
GABRIEL. The fear of fallout from testing Killian related indicated even detection of low level 
fallout in the food supply was seen as imminently threatening, even as it strongly suggested 
worse was to come.
1109
 For the president, Killian offered substantive, articulable and cogent 
narrative and commentary reinforcing his own much longer view of the situation.  
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Where they differed was on the question of the reliability of seismic detection, which 
Killian concluded was not absolute, siding with the Pentagon and AEC Chair John McCone on 
continuing underground testing. Eisenhower took the more practical approach that cheaters 
would eventually be caught and relatively little was left to learn of importance through testing 
anyway. Eisenhower understood the AEDS did not have to be 100% accurate so long as the vast 
bulk of nuclear events were recorded.
1110
 Strikingly, in the decades since, Eisenhower’s 
pragmatic view has been largely eclipsed by the military’s argument that technology that served 
well for intelligence purposes arms must, once converted to arms control verification purposes, 
be unfailingly accurate. 
1959: Limiting the Political Threat Posed by Fallout 
Given the continuing disappointing results of testing “clean” designs at HARDTACK, it 
was not surprising that afterwards the military insisted on portraying fallout primarily as a 
problematic technical issue that must be accepted in a world where nuclear weapons existed, 
rather than as a problem worth spending additional effort and expense to pursue a solution. Such 
a conclusion fit with seeing deterrence as an ameliorative policy frame that seductively 
suggested the same weapons said to prevent nuclear war could also be counted upon to prevent 
fallout, too. The primary attractive feature of the appeal of using arms control as a justification to 
end atmospheric testing, rather than framing an agreement as being necessary to end fallout, was 
that it provided an alternative justification that avoided bringing into question the entire nuclear 
enterprise. Moreover, the term “arms control” was politically useful since it suggested humans 
were in charge and able to safely manage nuclear power, even as fallout was clearly one aspect 
of nuclear weapons at direct odds with the notion of their control by humans. Ending fallout for 
this reason served to avoid laying blame on the weapons and the decisions made by the all too 
human military and civilian managers who created them. Likewise, the term “arms control” 
suggested it was a measure to prevent fallout from a future war, when in fact a test ban 
agreement was at least as much a decision to end an ongoing substantive risk created by fallout 
from past and current testing. 
Fallout’s role in the Pentagon’s suddenly acceding to an end to atmospheric testing was a 
position forced upon the military by circumstances, not choice, by data, not emotion.  Potential 
military support for an end to testing also addressed increasing concern about the risks posed by 
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fallout, only became a distinct possibility once the problem of the accelerated deposition return 
rate from the upper air was identified. Initiating CROWFLIGHT to gather better data was one 
response to this problem, so the issue arose irreconcilably at some time prior to mid-1957, 
motivated by the high deposition rates typical of spring. The data was thus based on testing in 
1956 and before.
1111
 By appearing to address public concerns, if only indirectly and at a snail’s 
pace, the government’s cat and mouse relationship with fallout embraced the concept of using 
arms control as the justification for a test halt agreement. While fallout was not specifically 
mentioned, an omission that should now seem both pro forma and more telling than not to 
readers, there was considerable discussion about the status of the negotiations in Geneva; 
confirmation from Secretary of Defense Gates that “all the people , both in the Defense 
Department and in the Congress who have to deal with defense, are fully convinced of our 
relative military superiority;” and Eisenhower himself “pointed out that the great problem is 
keeping a big war from starting.”1112 
The dog-and-pony show before Congress in the 1959 fallout hearings seemed primarily 
intended to reassure the public an end to atmospheric testing should not imply fallout was a 
threat or that it imposed limitations on the use of nuclear weapons.
1113
 The AEC’s reframing of 
actions taken to reduce the risks of fallout claimed they were prompted by an abundance of 
caution in order to more safely test weapons. Such a position reflected a revision of the 
government’s previous assertions it paid close attention to the risks posed by fallout, despite an 
at best spotty record, lack of institutional control and oversight, as well as limited evidence the 
AEC managed this risk effectively in the public interest. Only because of the secrecy associated 
with AFOAT-1 and its mission did the rather obvious conflict of interest involved in permitting 
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the part of the Pentagon with the most skin in the fight over fallout, the Air Force, determine 
research access to fallout data go unnoticed. 
1959: Year of Continuity and Change at AFTAC 
1959 was the end of an era in another way, when AFOAT-1 formally stood down that 
July and a new unit was established, Air Force Technical Applications Center or AFTAC, an 
ambiguous and not very informative designation the unit continues to employ to this day. The 
ambiguity of the title was likely intentional, saying as little as possible about what its mission 
actually was. In 1959, the entire enterprise remained highly classified, so the parent organization 
again adopted a dual-identity, with the 1035
th
 Field Activities Group (1035
th
 FAG – an acronym 
that in the context of a profoundly homophobic federal government of that era suggested it was 
chosen as unlikely to be carelessly repeated in casual conversation) replacing the 1009
th
 Special 
Weapons Squadron as the cover military unit designation did for AFOAT-1. The system of 
intentionally deceptive double unit designations persisted in multiple iterations until 1980, when 
the last of these parallel organizations, the 1035
th
 Technical Operations Group, was folded into 
AFTAC as its Headquarters section.
1114
 By redesignating the unit from AFOAT-1 to AFTAC in 
July 1959, the Air Force seemed to want a clean break with the unit’s top secret past dedicated 
solely to intelligence, given the fraught role of fallout as a very public problem, no longer 
capable of concealment as one of the deepest of state secrets.
1115
 
Covering the year of the unit’s redesignation, 1959, AFTAC’s first post-AFOAT-1 
history told a somewhat unconvincing tale, given multiple similar earlier compromises, some 
cited herein, provoked no earlier name change. Given the restrictions in place on use of 
identifying information and multiple identities, the argument that several recent news articles 
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necessitated the change for security purposes was not entirely persuasive.
1116
 Isolated cases 
largely without context, it was unlikely anyone without the proper clearances to understand their 
significance learned much of significance. Tight information control about the unit largely 
prevented the press or public from cognizance of the context, extent, and capabilities of nuclear 
intelligence operations in assessing what little information escaped the otherwise hermetically-
sealed chamber enclosing AFTAC.  
1960: The Democrats and Fallout 
For Democrats, fallout policy in the second Eisenhower administration was more 
complex and contradictory, alternating between one-upping Eisenhower as too weak on national 
security; raising concerns over the health risks posed by fallout as Adlai Stevenson II did in the 
1956 campaign versus Eisenhower; using it as an aggravating factor to foster the unsubstantiated 
growth of belief in both the bomber and missile “gaps;” and as a threat to their abiding 
fascination with the use of military spending as economic policy.  Many grew increasingly 
cautious about the problem of fallout. Among the Democrats on the forks of this nuclear 
dilemma was Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Kennedy’s pre-presidential papers 
contained Democratic Party research on what it saw as the Eisenhower administration’s blithe 
dismissal of the implications of Sputnik, symbolic of what they saw as the technological lag 
caused by Eisenhower’s economies of government, which the Democrats argued was an inherent 
cause of the “gaps” instead of inaccurate spin the Air Force put on its selective release of 
classified intelligence information. Headlines in the Democratic Fact Sheet, produced by the 
national party’s research division, quoted Eisenhower saying the Soviet satellite did not “bother 
me ‘one iota.’”1117 The next edition of the Fact Sheet was chock full of items, the leading wave 
of a Democratic theme that bore the political sticks and stones Eisenhower faced in his last two 
years in office – and which Richard Nixon confronted in his ill-fated 1960 campaign. While 
                                                 
1116
 AFTAC, 1959 Unit History, 41-42; AFTAC, A 50 Year Commemorative History, 41. The security compromises 
involved the White House, when Doyle Northrup received the President’s Award for Distinguished Civilian Service 
with a far too specific citation of his service; a Defense official who referred the New York Times to Northrup in 
reference to a report on seismic system improvements; an aggressive reporter for Newsweek who linked AFTAC 
and Project VELA (the overall program to improve the AEDS in anticipation of the need for increased verification 
capabilities following a partial test ban); and a magazine article (not specifically cited) that revealed the 56
th
 
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, based in Japan, conducted air sampling , given the Japanese government had not 
previously been informed about the practice. Fatzinger’s focus on the identification of Northrup hardly seemed to be 
the sensitive matter to spark such a change. Northrup gave “expert scientific testimony” at a “Conference of 
Experts” in the summer of 1958 in Geneva where his Soviet counterparts were also participants.  
1117
 Democratic Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: Research Division, Democratic National Committee), 10 October 
1957, Kennedy Archive, Pre-Presidential Files, 1957. 
429 
 
other quotes addressed the need for American engagement in the scientific struggle that resulted 
in humans walking the Moon before the next decade ended, the main thrust of informed opinion 
the Democratic Party sought to exploit was that Sputnik was an American military defeat.
1118
 
Fortunately, the future president was, like Eisenhower, a leader who valued thoughtful advice as 
an essential element of the policy-making process. After the initial national security transition 
briefings, Kennedy’s priorities changed and the “gaps” quickly disappeared from the political 
narrative. Fallout did not. 
1960: Defining the End Game 
The 1960 presidential campaign pitted John F. Kennedy against Eisenhower’s vice-
president, Richard M. Nixon, in a down-to-the-wire contest where Kennedy prevailed. The 
victorious Democrat’s campaign hammered at supposed Republican fostering of military 
weakness by repeated references to the bomber and missile “gaps” in a political space ripe to 
foster nuclear belligerence – except for the persistent, intruding presence of fallout. 
Historians noted Eisenhower keenly passed on to John F. Kennedy the information 
refuting the existence of the bomber and missile gaps during the presidential transition; the 
thirty-fifth president immediately ceased flogging them as issues and moved on to confront the 
even more grim realities passed on by his predecessor.
1119
 As with much else of its history, 
extant documentation  left it uncertain if Ike took the time to fully explain the historical 
complexities of fallout as a problem, which backed him into the corner he found himself in with 
nuclear weapons as commander-in-chief. Certainly the test moratorium was among topics 
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discussed between the two leaders, still in place but teetering after the U-2 shootdown in May 
1960. However, there can be little doubt Eisenhower made it clear to Kennedy fallout’s threat 
motivated his decision to maintain the moratorium; thus, Eisenhower handed off this 
radioactively “hot” potato of a largely implicit, ad hoc, and “in effect” fallout policy to his 
successor with a clear conscience. Having learned the difficult ropes of state armed with his 
considerable experience as a general, the lesson of fallout’s significance in its central role in the 
Cold War to that point made it an essential topic in meeting Ike’s need to fully brief the junior 
officer that succeeded him on the most important of his lessons learned about nuclear weapons. 
By now familiar with the effectiveness of the AEDS network to provide reliable global 
detection of fallout and other significant phenomenon, toward the end of his second term 
Eisenhower chose to open the door to using the well-worn, tested tools provided by fallout for a 
different purpose – verifying a nuclear arms control regime. Besides reflecting in his 
valedictorian speech on the perils of the military-industrial-scientific-technological complex, as 
Benjamin Greene more accurately described the multilayered subject of his frustrations and 
cautions, Eisenhower later described the failure to conclude a test ban treaty as the greatest regret 
of his presidency.
1120
 In essence, after the dust of fallout settled, Eisenhower ended up back at 
the same place that Vannevar Bush and Oppenheimer arrived at in 1952 before IVY MIKE, 
except with much more fallout. These and other factors point toward Eisenhower making sure 
the ball was not dropped on fallout in the transition, despite it not being listed separately from the 
topic of disarmament and the test ban negotiations. Fallout was clearly unfinished business, a 
perplexing problem which every president since has likewise left to those who follow. In 1961, it 
was important enough that a successor needed to be aware of it as he prepared to live with the 
nuclear “button” in the White House. Fallout taught a fundamental lesson in presidential power 
and its limits that even a sharp character like Eisenhower found required most of his presidency 
to understand. Knowing the arsenals of both East and West were fully stocked, Eisenhower 
likely emphasized to Kennedy that he would not have the relative luxury of time, distance, or 
military advantage he enjoyed during most of his two terms in office. Fallout was far from 
resolved, as Khrushchev soon made clear.  
                                                 
1120
 Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, 1-8; Glenn Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1981), (citing Herbert York), 10. 
431 
 
Without a formal agreement in place to end fallout, at the end of Eisenhower’s second 
term the unilateral moratoriums initiated by the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United 
States remained precariously in place, with negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and related 
matters largely frozen by the corrosive effects of the May 1960 shootdown of F.G. Powers’ U-2. 
World weariness with fallout documented in great detail by the existing historiographic focus on 
the social and cultural boundaries made and broken by fallout and the simple fact that the 1963 
Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed and ratified despite the brief, crisis-laden span of Kennedy’s 
presidency demonstrated fallout was a pivotal sticking point in political and military strategy of 
the early Cold War. The Bay of Pigs, Berlin, and the Cuban missile crisis – the superpower 
confrontation brought East and West to rhetorical blows, backed by their respective 
thermonuclear arsenals, but the next-to-warring parties nonetheless pursued a consensus to end 
fallout, at least for cases short of war. By 1961, fallout was a telling portent of the necessity of 
the nuclear superpowers avoiding war, still successfully, if you are reading this now rather than 
burning it to keep warm through some long, post-attack winter of discontent in the future. 
However clear-cut the issues may have seemed at the transition from Eisenhower to 
Kennedy in 1961, the 1963 agreement came at a price – a veritable deluge of more fallout than 
ever generated before as the Soviet Union engaged in a series of high-yield tests that matched or 
exceeded the U.S. Air Force’s own ambitions for such weaponry. With the “tsar bomb” (~56 
megatons, 30 October 1961) just the mightiest among those forming a veritable fallout flood 
from Soviet testing, the USSR deployed as harsh and damaging a weapon of diplomacy ever 
used short of war itself.
1121
 Paradoxically, during crisis after crisis in Kennedy’s short term in 
office, fallout’s deterrent effect also contributed to human survival. Diplomatic engagement at 
Geneva on the test ban negotiations, along with exchanges between scientists facilitated by 
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Pugwash, led to both East and West understanding fallout that nuclear war would only yield 
losers: belief that a nuclear war could be “won” was obvious hubris. 
1961: Science, Health, and Politics of I-131 and Milk 
The critical role of iodine-131 as the primary immediate health threat posed by local and 
regional fallout has been examined at length previously, although its connection to nuclear 
intelligence has received remarkably little notice.
1122
 Following the 1957 Windscale plutonium 
reactor fire, milk attracted considerable public interest and research attention as fallout was 
recognized from that point forward as finding its way quickly and insidiously into this intimate 
object of consumption, becoming a tipping point for policy change with special resonance for 
women and families with children.
1123
 In a memo dated 20 June 1962, Jerry Wiesner, Kennedy’s 
science advisor, briefed the President on the especially problematic nature of iodine-131 in the 
heavy fallout then underway from the relapse to atmospheric testing. 
1124
 The crisis over iodine-
131 levels in milk arose due to the sharply spiking overall total volumes of fresh fallout, with 
roughly 80% of it contributed by the larger Soviet tests, accompanied by smaller amounts of 
fallout from U.S. tests after testing resumed in April 1962. Wiesner observed the milksheds of 
several communities known to be most affected (Minneapolis, Des Moines, and Kansas City) by 
the intensified fallout deposition described by Machta and List would not pass what the Federal 
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Radiation Council (FRC) called a “guide level” for fallout levels present, somewhat 
disingenuously blaming Soviet nuclear profligacy as the root of the problem. The milk exposure 
levels were set by the FRC in 1961 based on limits it then paradoxically claimed were unsuitable 
as a food standard in 1962 because they were intended for industrial work.
1125
 The U.S. Public 
Health Service argued if additional fallout pushed the exposures over the limit, counter-measures 
should be taken, such as switching to stored feed for dairy cows or feeding children only with 
powdered or other processed milk with enough lag time since processing and storage allowed 
enough time to pass for any iodine-131 present in it to decay to safe levels.
1126
 The U.S. 
government was effectively stuck between mostly Soviet fallout bringing iodine-131 to dairy 
grazing land and the U.S. government’s own standards of what was considered a safe level.  
Despite the risks, Kennedy officially set in motion the effort to undertake the last few 
atmospheric tests at NTS, as well as SEDAN’s ultimately rather dirty “underground” shot, but 
withheld final approval for what became the last U.S. atmospheric test, LITTLE FELLER I, the 
Davy Crockett troop maneuver test shot.
1127
 The relatively careful pace of American testing that 
remained within the same order of magnitude as originally suggested by GABRIEL served to 
cushion the impact of this issue from rising into widespread public awareness, because unlike 
with the CASTLE BRAVO incident, there was no dramatic association between a problem and 
its cause with fallout from NTS after its early years.
1128
 The American effort to minimize test 
fallout so as to limit public concerns to the extent possible stood in dramatic contrast to the 1961-
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1962 Russian test campaign, which dropped any pretense of carefully controlled nuclear 
weapons without consequence, creating a policy crisis that forced the fallout issue onto the table. 
Placing the blame for the larger amount of fallout on the Soviets failed to reassure consumers. 
The problem was that Americans generally saw any amount of I-131 in milk as detrimental to 
health, no matter what its source. With state authorities closing milksheds over the high readings 
per previously agreed protocols, pressure to act on atmospheric testing peaked at the White 
House, just as it had with strontium levels in wheat under Eisenhower in 1959.
1129
  Cumulative 
fallout proved to be a problem, not only as theorized with general nuclear war, but even with the 
far more limited fallout from testing. 
1961: Back to a Future of Fallout 
In addition to suspicions it could be used to evade detection, it was understood testing in 
space could contribute to threatening global fallout deposition rates unless detonated well beyond 
the atmosphere. 
Out-of-Atmosphere Testing 
Objective – Capability of (1) testing large yield weapons with reduced fallout in 
the event surface testing is not authorized; (2) testing large yield weapons in the 
event unacceptable atmospheric contamination is reached by the United States 
and/or Russian surface tests…1130 
 
Notably absent from the list of possible motivations for such a technologically challenging 
testing solution was any reference to subjective forces such as public opinion or political 
pressure. The term “unacceptable atmospheric contamination” could be read as entirely 
anticipatory, but given the effort to document existing fallout then underway, the need for 
potential atmospheric testing to be avoided entirely suggested further significant testing would 
push existing levels of fallout rather quickly towards unacceptable levels.  
Planning for the 1962 DOMINIC test series continued a trend of increasing restrictions 
on testing itself that began during the first post-CASTLE series tests, the 1955 TEAPOT series at 
NTS, but which was now clearly in reaction to the empirical threat of cumulative fallout. 
Even in this new series, as in HARDTACK, total fission yield would be limited to 
minimize worldwide radioactive fallout. All weapon development tests would be 
fired as medium-altitude airbursts to keep fireballs from reaching the surface, 
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further minimizing fallout… The fission yield fraction of [at least one high-
altitude shot] shot would also have to be minimized.
1131
 
 
Here, too, was another irony in Wiesner’s memo arguing it was bad Soviet fallout, not 
good American fallout, which would push iodine-131 in Midwest milksheds past the FRC’s 1961 
guidelines. While the United States was taking great pains to reduce fallout from testing itself 
and in a limited number of its new “clean” designs, this did not address the fundamental problem 
of the threat posed by the cumulative wartime fallout if SAC’s war plans were carried out. On 
the other hand, given the stark realities of wartime fallout, the cavalier, promiscuous Soviet 
approach to testing and the resulting over-the-top yields was also a fundamentally honest one, for 
all its rough edges.  
How close the resulting fallout from all parties pushed global fallout deposition toward 
the levels GABRIEL predicted as problematic remains a question the Air Force has the best 
answer for. Given the known yields, the testing trends and the subsequent troubling record of 
longer half-lived isotopes mapped out in everything from reindeer meat to the lead that AFTAC 
used to shield its more sensitive instruments, if the data was exculpatory about the risks posed by 
shorter half-lived isotopes in fallout, particularly iodine-131, significant portions of it would 
most likely have been declassified.
1132
 The wall of silence on this matter will have to continue to 
speak for itself, but now it will be a silence informed by basic knowledge of the context and 
circumstances about how and why basic information on the circulation and potential deposition 
of the most damaging isotopes found in fallout remains off-limits to researchers. 
Lurking just off-shore in the Pacific as the American test series was conducted at the 
British possession, Christmas Island, in 1962 was another reason why fallout was increasingly 
problematic, even for the military – a small fleet of Soviet intelligence vessels, led by a 3,600 ton 
research vessel equipped with sixteen laboratories.
1133
 The effort was not new, but the scope of it 
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was; the obvious Soviet presence suggested a turning of the tables on nuclear intelligence, as 
well as represented a thorny political problem. The Soviet trawlers and their headquarters ship 
made clear what a relatively small group within the government always knew – testing in the 
atmosphere was a sure way to give away your secrets. 
1962: Nuclear Absolutism 
On 23 July 1962, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) heard testimony about 
the U.S. position at Geneva. William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, testified, as did a number of other officials involved in arms control and 
nuclear intelligence efforts, including Doyle Northrup, the Technical Director of AFTAC. The 
committee was concerned disputes similar to those centered around the seismic capabilities in 
the 1958 test ban proposal due to belated assessment of the results of the 1957 RAINIER test did 
not recur at Geneva. At the same time JCAE Chair Representative Chet Holifield (D-CA) 
worried the U.S. was “too eager to make concessions in order to give the appearance of progress 
in terms of world opinion.”1134 The political fears surrounding the issue were bipartisan, as stated 
by Representative Craig Hosmer (R-CA), who reminded again of how ignorance generated 
misgivings about arms control measures in Congress, “I am unhappy with [the] State Department 
and your preoccupation with the opinion of other nations around the world.”1135 Hosmer 
disclaimed any “demand for a ‘foolproof’ treaty,” yet his formulation clearly called for 
assurances that would be technically, if not politically impossible to deliver.
1136
 Despite the 
insistence the United States should ignore the influence of transnational public opinion, the 
repeated calls to disregard it demonstrated how fallout’s continuing generation of these public 
pressures created a dynamic that could only be addressed by ending the production of fallout 
from testing. However, these political disclaimers served to provide cover for why the 
government found motivation to end fallout by constructing the pretense that public opinion 
alone was the driving force behind pressures to eliminate fallout. Largely a parade of witnesses 
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offering reassurance of the relatively innocuous nature of testing fallout, the hearing emphasized 
the relatively benign nature of nuclear weapons. 
The JCAE hearing was considered secret because it discussed the U.S. negotiating 
strategy for the talks in Geneva, not because those present discussed classified information on 
weapons or intelligence. Foster specifically noted that it should be classified as “Limited Official 
Use” solely because of the need to avoid disclosure of the U.S. negotiating position.1137 Yet the 
hearing transcript was another example of the persistent habit of over-classifying national 
security information, since it was subsequently classified as Restricted Data. Even after 
declassification in May 2009, several excisions remained in place, a typical situation facing 
historians pursuing a more comprehensive history of arms control. The primary concern at the 
time focused on the administration’s witnesses’ recounting of alternatives to move the Geneva 
process ahead, including the position eventually adopted that ended all but underground testing. 
Under discussion was the Defense Department’s recent announcement of improved 
capabilities to detect underground tests within the Soviet Union. While the negotiations in 
Geneva had struggled along since the U.S. backed away from a preliminary finding in 1958 that 
verification of a comprehensive test ban was possible, including underground testing, as it turned 
out, AFOAT-1/AFTAC apparently rather quickly discovered the doubts the Air Force and other 
test ban opponents fostered about U.S. capabilities to detect underground nuclear tests were 
themselves erroneous. The Air Force overestimated the number of small quakes within the 
Soviet Union that could generate suspicious signals the Americans wanted the right to inspect. 
Likewise, the models used were based on data from testing in Nevada, where the test site’s 
geology tended to muffle seismic signals, while testing in Russia at the Semipalatinsk site 
generated especially strong signals; the geological differences prevented the sort of exact 
comparisons that policy makers found comfort in, as well as helped feed the controversies 
associated with such red herrings as the Teller/Latter decoupling theory.
1138
 One example was 
                                                 
1137
 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, “Transcript of Executive Session, 23 July 1962,” [Note: 
typed date of 29 July was corrected by pen to 23 July], Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and 
Agencies, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Testing Hearings, Box 282, 4. 
1138
 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, “Transcript of Executive Session, 23 July 1962,” [Note: 
typed date of 29 July was corrected by pen to 23 July], Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and 
Agencies, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Testing Hearings, Box 282, 19-20. Foster asserted that the way in 
which tests conducted in the alluvium deposits in Nevada were transmitted amounted to “decoupling.” This was a 
technically questionable assertion, since alluvium deposits are better said to attenuate the signal. Decoupling 
attempts to limit the initial transmission of a signal into the surrounding geology. 
438 
 
Senator Henry Jackson’s (D – WA) belief in the permanent, mysterious nature of the Soviet 
threat. 
The real problem is the Soviet’s unwillingness to give up what they continually 
brag about, secrecy.
1139
 
 
Also known as the “Senator from Boeing,” Jackson built his political career much the 
same way General LeMay built SAC, the customer for thousands of Boeing’s aircraft, on a 
foundation that depended on construction of the ominous, unfathomable nature of an inscrutable 
Communist threat.
1140
 Unlike LeMay, Jackson did not have access to the inside story of what the 
government really knew about the Soviet Union, which helped sustain his unremitting support 
for virtually every weapons system that crossed his desk. 
Also disclaiming the effect of world opinion on the test ban negotiations, Foster noted a 
partial ban on atmospheric testing was enforceable without the need for inspections or 
monitoring locations in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Foster observed the positive political 
effects of such a ban as an alternative to a comprehensive test ban, since it “would have the 
advantage of stopping those tests which have caused greatest concern around the world, namely, 
tests producing radioactive debris.”1141 Despite several rejections of a partial test ban by the 
USSR, Foster observed a partial test ban was still in play behind the scenes in the negotiations. 
Foster stated “substantial improvements in the ability to detect at long distances” were 
now available, yet members of the committee remained skeptical amid a chorus of political fears 
about the assumed inadequacy of the U.S. nuclear intelligence system. Despite most present 
being veteran members of JCAE, the naivety in evidence demonstrated the committee was 
largely unfamiliar with past and present nuclear intelligence efforts. Doyle Northrup responded 
to a question about the recent improvements in the capability of the AEDS, only to have 
Chairman Chet Holifield ask “What is this ADS[sic]?” Northrup rather cryptically advised the 
JCAE chair the AEDS was “the U.S. unilateral detection system.” While Holifield was generally 
aware of what AFTAC was engaged in, his grasp of details was surprisingly weak, as he was 
referring to the AEDS or Atomic Energy Detection System, the Air Force’s acronym for the 
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combined networks of infrasonic, seismic, fallout sampling and other “unilateral” technical 
systems used to detect non-U.S. nuclear detonations and fissile material production, which 
AFTAC operated at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Northrup then moved on to note the 
AEDS could in many cases now distinguish between seismic signals created by deep earthquakes 
and the signal of a nuclear test at more shallow depths, a capability to discriminate between 
natural and human-initiated signals he noted was not available in 1958. What worried Holifield, 
Representative Craig Hosmer (R-CA), and others was the proposed system was viewed as unable 
to pick up most of the recent low-yield underground shots in Nevada, raising questions about its 
detection capabilities.  
In his questioning of Northrup, committee chair Holifield asserted “80 percent of the 
Nevada tests generated seismic signals so small as to make individual detection unlikely.” 
AFTAC Technical Director Northup advised the JCAE the findings were not entirely new, but 
represented an evolving understanding of seismic wave behavior by AFTAC. Representative 
Hosmer was offended more certainty could not yet be attached to estimated capabilities of the 
monitoring system then under proposal.
1142
 The committee’s demonstrated general ignorance 
regarding AFTAC and its operations and capabilities was reinforced by badgering questions, 
such as Representative Hosmer’s challenge to Foster, posed as, “Would you want to commit the 
security of the United States upon an empirical theory that has not been tested and has been 
evolved [sic] by one event?”1143 Those charged with nominal oversight of the military and 
national security policy involving nuclear weapons remained remarkably uninformed about the 
role of fallout and nuclear intelligence despite several rounds of hearings on the matter. 
Ultimately, Hosmer practically begged for a “range in terms of percentage possibilities of 
detecting and confirming.” Foster replied, “I am not sure you can put a mathematical number on 
political factors. It is a matter of judgment.”  Hosmer charged “you are looking at the bright side 
of all this detection and inspection business and not equally evaluating the possibilities that 
might not be as happy for us.” 1144 The exchange pointed out how persistent the clinging tentacles 
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of nuclear absolutism remained. Even if it went undetected, no single nuclear test or weapon that 
might be missed by an otherwise extraordinarily effective technical surveillance system could 
fundamentally alter the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR at the point where each 
already possessed thousands of these weapons.
1145
 Hosmer found nothing publicly available to 
give confidence to his constituents, while seeing political gains could be made by raising 
questions about what was largely unknown even to representatives in Congress. Certainly, the 
first test by a new member of the nuclear club, as was readily detected by AFOAT-1 within 
Russia in 1949, was a matter of concern, but one in which the AEDS demonstrated an impressive 
track record of detection despite congressional ignorance about its accomplishments. By 1962, 
the bellicose oratory and political fears of the JCAE that defined the committee’s very limited 
grasp of the capabilities of AFTAC also defined a virtual political requirement for the AEDS to 
detect each and every nuclear test, a quaintly obsolete standard amid the landscape of nuclear 
plenty that served far better as a poison pill to obstruct arms control initiatives than as a real-
world assessment of what was necessary to ensure national security. 
1962: Ten Years and a Cloud of Dust 
Given the Cold War confrontation, it was surprising the Limited Test Ban Treaty was 
ratified just fourteen years after the Soviet Union acquired nuclear capability; it was also 
remarkable the United States came to terms with the hubris Robert Oppenheimer encountered 
when interacting with the United States military over the leap to thermonuclear weapons in just 
less than a decade after the IVY MIKE test. The conflict in evidence at the 1962 hearing between 
representatives of executive branch agencies and members of Congress who remained fearful of 
what they supposed were the many unfathomable secrets of the Soviet Union’s nuclear program 
was emblematic of pervasive ignorance still surrounding virtually every aspect of AFTAC’s 
operations and capabilities in 1962.  
With testing underway in Nevada and near Christmas and Johnson Islands in the Pacific, 
along with preliminary negotiations with the Soviets on a test ban, on the cusp of the Cuban 
missile crisis Carl Kaysen prepared a 20 July 1962 memorandum for the president that discussed 
“New Data on Detecting Underground Nuclear Explosions.” Kaysen explained AFTAC knew 
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since 1958 the discrepancy existed in the measurement and recording of seismic signals, 
significantly attenuating signals from testing at NTS. Mistakenly assuming essentially the same 
geologic conditions prevailed at Semipalatinsk, AFOAT-1 analysts believed Soviet tests it 
recorded were of devices with considerably higher yields than in fact were tested. With less 
attenuation, these devices simply appeared to have higher yields. Nevada’s geology contributed 
to a significant misunderstanding in applying this data to earlier yield measurements, but Kaysen 
related its exact nature only became clear during research conducted in the summer of 1961 as 
part of the VELA UNIFORM program on seismic detection improvement and only confirmed in 
the spate of testing beginning that fall.
1146
 Kaysen’s memo did not clarify the fact that seismic 
detection of many atmospheric tests, those on the surface, on towers, and detonated at similar, 
somewhat higher air burst heights, occurred even if not buried deep beneath the surface. 
Another politically charged change anticipated at Geneva was the American decision to 
revise their estimate of the number of earthquakes whose characteristics could be mistaken for a 
nuclear test within the Soviet Union significantly downward in light of data generated by the 
upgraded seismic system put in place during the last years of the Eisenhower administration. 
This number was significant because it helped drive U.S. demands for the number of on-site 
inspections to resolve the origin of events demonstrating characteristics of nuclear explosions. 
The resolution was especially politically sensitive domestically because it happened to depend on 
a revised interpretation that arrived at a number that some were taken aback to find correlated 
with the original 1958 Soviet position.
1147
  
Kaysen assessed a large part of the problem with evaluating detection capabilities was the 
intensely compartmented nature of AFTAC’s operations. 
I think there is a significant moral to [be] drawn from the story. It is the fact that 
the highly accurate data which AFTAC collected on its new system was highly 
classified and its existence in detail was unknown to all except a few scientists 
inside the government…If the AFTAC figures had been made more widely 
available, or if AFTAC’s activities had been reviewed in detail more frequently 
by outside scientists, the change in understanding and evaluation might have 
come a good deal more quickly. It is fair to say, of course, that this is speculation. 
How hard and how long a man has to look at new figures before he sees that they 
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are inconsistent with an old theory remains one of the inscrutable mysteries of 
science.
1148
 
 
In essence, the revision in assumptions underlying seismic detection appeared to present the 
possibility of political embarrassment, while offering a difficult narrative to explain to legislators 
and the public, let alone fully understand. But there were significant indications Kaysen was far 
too generous in his evaluation of what the Air Force was up to in sitting on such a significant 
revision in assumptions about the capabilities of a system to support a comprehensive test ban. 
Gaming Seismic Capabilities to Shape Diplomatic Options 
Oral history interviews with a number of scientists working on the seismic detection 
problem indicated less charitable reasons why it took years before anyone but the Air Force was 
aware of the significant new findings about these capabilities. Jack P. Ruina was a professor of 
electrical engineering at the University of Illinois and director of a group doing radar work there. 
Taking leave from the University, he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
for Research and Development. Herbert York asked him to become director of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, where he served from 1961 to 1963 at a time when the VELA 
UNIFORM underground detection R&D program was a high priority. Ruina’s primary contact 
with the White House was through Carl Kaysen, who received a briefing from Ruina and others 
on the detection issue as did Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Ruina’s impression of 
AFTAC’s Carl Romney was his work was “most expert” but “nobody could argue with him” 
because he alone held access to AFTAC. The meeting where Romney sprang news of the 
revision in Russian earthquake estimates at the State Department came “as a total surprise.” 
While AFTAC’s handling of the data seemed forthright to Ruina when he explained it to 
McNamara in a memorandum analyzing the history of the problem, his conclusion was one that 
went the root of the matter. When one person, or organization in this case, interprets the data 
without peer review “mistakes can occur.” With the proper clearances, Ruina never felt AFTAC 
withheld data, but “they would never volunteer.”1149  It was one thing to ask, holding the proper 
clearances as Ruina did, for sensitive data and get it. Conflicts over seismology presented none 
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of the existential issues for the Air Force that fallout did. Thereby hangs the thread of why the 
military made the initial proposal for a test ban with an underground exception to Eisenhower in 
1958. Carl Romney’s timing in announcing a breakthrough satisfying the Air Force’s concerns in 
adequately monitoring the Soviet nuclear program under a test ban sharply limiting fallout by 
pushing testing underground may have been coincidental, but the selective and restrictive release 
of such data clearly reflected internal processes ensuring such decisions on policy were neither 
accidental or unplanned.  
Others with even closer experience with AFTAC during this period suggest an even less 
charitable interpretation. Charles B. Archambeau was another seismologist who owed his 
education to VELA UNIFORM, leading to a contract job setting up and operating the data center 
AFTAC used to monitor incoming seismological data from the AEDS. His view was that 
Romney had a “cynical view of the detection problem…did not believe it had a solution…and 
didn’t care whether the problem got solved or not.” In at least one case, Archambeau believed he 
had a workable solution for a problem, but was actively discouraged from pursuing it. While 
Archambeau did not feel there was a “conspiracy” to obstruct science, he agreed there was at 
least some truth to a colleague’s assessment that VELA UNIFORM “was just a charade.”1150  
The curious timing of Romney’s seismic revelation makes more sense once placed in the 
context of the Pentagon’s 1958 conditional initiative to end atmospheric testing. These events 
could be read simplistically as the results of the Air Force gaming things to its benefit. But 
consider Jack Ruina’s evaluation of Romney and AFTAC – “they would never volunteer” 
information unless specifically asked. Both instances reflect remarkable exceptions to that rough 
rule of bureaucratic thumb, as if the military was asking to be relieved of a burden, on the one 
hand, and sharply defining what it found acceptable policy in its place with the other one.  And if 
one takes the same general approach of Romney, where secrecy ensured he had expertise in his 
corner, and applied it to the rest of AFTAC mission, the unit was, of course, well aware of the 
significantly increased fallout from the moment its sensors first detected the wave form of radio 
signals on the EMP detectors of the AEDS from each nuclear event.  
Evidence of the Air Force volunteering a solution to the fallout problem in 1958 strongly 
suggested that as American fallout production nudged up to and over the original 60 megaton 
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limit first suggested by GABRIEL, those who initially wanted to suppress that study now looked 
to it as a rough yardstick suggesting caution – and they had the lab reports in hand to reinforce 
those concerns.
1151
 Romney’s role in the summer of 1962 was as a closer – he was there to 
declare they had the best deal possible on the table and that it was acceptable to the Air Force 
provided the underground exception was maintained on principle. Seismic methods were vastly 
improved and regional geologies better understood, so it could better serve than previously for 
intelligence purposes. However, political realities meant the difficulty of discriminating seismic 
signals from noise at the limits of detection ruled out a comprehensive arms control treaty, an 
absolutist standard that was far more effective serving as political boilerplate for nervous 
politicians than an assessment of the overall capabilities of the seismic technique, given the 
record of remarkable success established by the AEDS of using multiple techniques to detect 
each test. 
As with the 1949 public announcement of Joe-1, secrecy inside the government proved 
amendable, especially when it served the institutional interests of the Air Force. This institutional 
interest now included putting a stop to fallout in order to limit future access to fallout data by 
researchers, as the Air Force recognized its growing ubiquity in the environment meant loss of its 
near exclusive access to this previously held virtual monopoly even as fallout continued to rain 
down was now being transformed into an increasingly troublesome body of evidence. After little 
more than a decade, the 1961-1962 Russian fallout campaign also sundered the cumulative limits 
the AEC apparently closely observed in its test series following the 1954 CASTLE BRAVO 
incident, limits on fallout the United States hoped would limit the controversy it produced when 
generated by testing. Presumably, the reasons to end fallout were as objective and empirically 
based as those applied to conflicts over seismology, yet fallout remains a surprisingly sensitive 
subject, with the substance of the key data that shaped this policy change still largely off-limits 
for reasons of national security.
1152
 The Air Force’s voluntary proactive action setting the bounds 
for post-atmospheric nuclear testing strongly suggested its empirical findings on fallout turned 
out to be alarming and constraining enough to cause it to convert to caution in 1958 and follow 
up that with support for ending fallout four years later in 1962. There certainly was no effort to 
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explain this significant, even jarring change, why it abruptly shifted from treating fallout as 
inconsequential to promoting its end as a policy. However, it did buy time and opportunity for 
another couple of rounds of testing devoted to arming another generation of bombs, newly 
arming missiles and exploring electromagnetic pulse effects. In effect, the Air Force appeared to 
have chosen a delaying action in order to avoid the stringency of an abrupt halt to fallout by 
choosing when to “volunteer” new information about seismic detection capabilities in 
conjunction after having aligned the moon and the stars to bring stratospheric fallout back to 
earth to test the theories of Libby and the Weather Bureau on the pace of fallout’s return from the 
upper atmosphere. 
Enough Numbers to Know 
With statements like those of General Power accompanying General LeMay’s somewhat 
more tight-lipped leadership, the Air Force remained outwardly untroubled by the potential for 
cumulative fallout that apparently alarmed Oppenheimer and others in the scientific community 
through the bulk of the nineteen-fifties. First expressed in the initial findings of the GABRIEL 
study, which found the allowable scope of an American attack on the Soviet Union was limited 
to 60 megatons of fission yield before it created significant health impacts on Americans, 
GABRIEL’s limits were later revised upwards to 2,000 megatons in an apparent accommodation 
that correlated with the Air Force’s waxing aspirations for thermonuclear weapons after Joe-1. 
Following Oppenheimer’s mid-1952 departure as the GAC chair and after the 1953 RAND 
conference, GABRIEL was buried deeply in Libby’s Project Sunshine. By the time that Kennedy 
took office, the United States stockpile could support an attack with a total yield of roughly ten 
times the later yield (2,000 megatons) or 333 times the original yield (60 megatons).
1153
 While 
total stockpile yield includes both fusion and fission, unlike GABRIEL’s pre-thermonuclear 
estimate of fission yield, the approximately 20,000 megatons in the stockpile circa 1960 
represented roughly an order of magnitude larger potential fallout threat than that provided by 
the circa 1950 revised GABRIEL 2,000 megaton fission yield total. The calculations may be 
more fuzzy than exact, but in the absence of the classified data and conclusions that could best 
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describe the issues at stake, they will do. Regardless of the exact outcome of combat between 
two or more nuclear-armed parties, the resulting fallout would clearly be on a scale that would 
devastate human health and the environment.
1154
  
Between information revealed at the 1957 and 1959 fallout hearings and the incidents 
involving wheat and milk contamination, another rough but extraordinarily revealing comparison 
becomes possible that illuminates the circumstances behind the decision to cease atmospheric 
testing due to the threat of fallout. Ralph E. Lapp summarized most of the relevant statistics and 
data in a report after the 1959 hearing, “Fallout Hearings: Second Round,” in the September 
1959 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Lapp observed that the 1957 fallout hearing saw the AEC 
reveal an annual quota for adding fallout to the atmosphere, 10 megatons of fission yield. The 
AEC argued that if no more than this amount of fallout was added, decay of previous fallout 
would result in no net increase in annual exposures due to global fallout from testing. Two years 
later during the second round of fallout hearings, it was revealed as of the May 1959 date of the 
hearing that total yield from testing by all nations (US, UK, and USSR) was 173.4 megatons, 
including 91.7 megatons of fission yield (or ~53% fission yield). One important disclosure that 
Lapp noted received no publicity at all was confirmation that CASTLE BRAVO and likely many 
other thermonuclear weapons derived a large part of their yield from fissioning of their uranium 
tamper and case, as well as other components, part of the technology that implemented the multi-
stage design of the Teller-Ulam concept. Since CASTLE BRAVO, the AEC encouraged the 
president and public to believe that fusion could theoretically provide “clean” weapons, but this 
admission demonstrated for all practical purposes there was still plenty of fallout produced by 
thermonuclear weapons. Lapp then noted the varying interpretations of the rate at which fallout 
deposition of strontium-90 was reflected in its uptake by humans, highlighting a disagreement 
between Libby and J. Lawrence Kulp, another Sunshine researcher, over the permissible levels 
of strontium-90 in food and human beings.
1155
 What was most notable was that the dispute 
indicated the argument about the threat posed by wartime fallout now resolved toward the low 
end of GABRIEL’s estimates. Libby’s argument with Kulp was over how deposition rates 
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affected the relative odds of exceeding the recommended maximum body burden level of 
strontium-90, rather a case of trying to move the goal posts in the middle of the game. The fact 
that an argument intended to apply to wartime fallout was under discussion in regard to fallout 
from protracted testing in itself gave away the game that such effects took place at the lower end 
of the scale GABRIEL calculated. As a quick, back-of-the napkin calculation here is why. 
With the end of testing due to the temporary test moratorium, Libby estimated that as of 
early 1959 about 42 megatons of fission yield remained aloft, primarily in the stratosphere.
1156
 
This correlated with findings of the AEC Fallout Prediction Panel, also presented at the 1959 
hearings, which found that of the approximately 90 megatons total of fission products injected 
into the atmosphere, one third was deposited as local fallout in relatively close proximity to the 
point of detonation, one third was carried aloft and already fallen back to earth as global fallout, 
and one third, or 30 megatons, remained aloft. The panel estimated the United States and British 
fission products total for testing during 1957 and 1958 as equivalent to 19 megatons, based on a 
total yield of 42.3 megatons. Soviet total fallout for the same period was 22.5 megatons, 
suggesting a Russian fission fallout total of roughly 12 megatons
1157
 Add the two estimates of 
fission products aloft from recent testing in both East and West provided essentially the same 
estimate of the equivalent fission products still aloft as that of Libby, 42 megatons.
1158
 Then for a 
little over two years, there was no new fallout. 
Greene made it clear that in secret Eisenhower concluded by March 1959 that “…nuclear 
testing is bad,” a decision reinforced by the scare over rising strontium-90 levels in Minnesota 
wheat before the 1959 hearings.
1159
 Set aside the specific arguments, and there were no 
conclusive ones, over what level of which isotope was tolerable in wheat, bread, or humans. 
Fallout might not immediately sicken anyone, but it was politically intolerable for wheat to 
expose humans to it in excess of a level the government itself set. Although they did not call 
attention to this fact, Libby and the Fallout Prediction Panel both essentially agreed even as they 
argued that the AEC data showed the atmosphere held substantially less than 60 megatons of 
fallout generated over a period of years, rather than that which would be released within a few 
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hours by a nuclear attack likely to take global cumulative fallout to far past that original 
GABRIEL-predicted level. Given Eisenhower’s lengthy history with fallout, whether or not he 
was specifically cognizant of the GABRIEL findings was less relevant than the significance of 
those around him who likely were aware of it, like Libby, Teller, Twining, and LeMay, turning 
more cautious about fallout. Given the controversy, lengthy lead time, and the classification 
barriers to be overcome for such research, the data analyzed by the Fallout Prediction Panel was 
already being assembled in 1958 when Walter Singlevich began showing up to represent the Air 
Force’s interests in the dispute between the Weather Bureau and Libby over fallout residence 
time. 
Forward the narrative to Carl Kaysen’s advising John F. Kennedy on arms control and 
the picture was even grimmer by the time he wrote the July 1962 memo on the potential to 
seismically verify a comprehensive test ban. The Soviet Union generated 83 megatons in total 
yield in 1961. Before Kaysen’s July memo, there was only one Soviet test in 1962, the somewhat 
hopeful second Soviet underground test on 2 February 1962, a tiny device with a yield estimated 
as between 10 tons and 20 kilotons. About half of the total 1962 United States atmospheric yield 
of 36 megatons was already mixing with the Soviet fallout. Spring brought with it the deluge of 
iodine-131 and other isotopes Lester Machta came to expect and that Jerry Wiesner was forced 
to deal with beginning in June 1962 as it pushed up radiation levels in milk that alarmed mothers 
across the United States and around the globe. With a metaphorical napkin at hand, let us jot 
down what is known from the evidence in this narrative. 
42 megatons  Libby estimated fission yield fallout aloft, 1959
1160
 
Minus 28.3 megatons             Estimated fallout deposited (-10 megatons annual rate for 34 
months)
1161
 
       13.7 megatons      Estimated fallout aloft when testing resumed, 1 September 1961 
           28 megatons             Estimated Soviet fission fallout products added, 1961
1162
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       42 megatons  Estimated fission fallout aloft, 1 January 1962 
 
Within a few months of the resumption of atmospheric testing, in late 1961 by the Russians and 
then in 1962 by the United States, the calculated global atmospheric fission fallout burden rose 
quickly back to early 1959 levels.
1163
 It was also fresher, which helped account for the problems 
with iodine-131, a relatively short-lived isotope produced in such quantity that it spread like 
never before. Fallout’s threat was direct and already present even in peacetime in the eyes of 
mothers caring for vulnerable children.  
Note carefully which GABRIEL estimate of unacceptable fallout was closer to the 
magnitude of observed results of actual fallout, 60 megatons or 2,000 megatons?  
Certainly, the actions taken by the executive branch were significantly influenced by 
public opinion and political pressures. Kennedy’s decision mirrored Eisenhower’s in reacting 
swiftly to stem the political bombshell of citizen-consumer response to an attack on the world’s 
children. In acting to address problematic milksheds, Kennedy’s decision to cease atmospheric 
testing was also clearly tied to standards the government set, not simply the product of the vague 
moral considerations cited by both sides at the Oppenheimer hearing as a partial explanation 
motivating his actions. However uncertain or scientifically controversial they may have been, 
these standards provided empirical yardsticks that played major roles in both Eisenhower’s and 
Kennedy’s decisions to end fallout.1164 The controversy between Libby, Kulp and others in the 
scientific community over strontium-90 body burden limits was just one example among many. 
There was substantial certainty, though, directly demonstrated under two presidents who dealt 
with the national security and public health consequences of fallout that the order of magnitude 
of its ill-effects on human health and the environment became a policy problem far closer to 
GABRIEL’s 60 megaton original limit than it was to the sharply revised upward 2,000 megaton 
limit GABRIEL later suggested. Some in the Air Force could argue in secret for a redoubled 
effort to sell the public on tolerance for higher fallout exposures, but it was an idea that was 
politically, if not radiologically, sterile long before Kennedy took office.  
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LITTLE FELLER, Big SEDAN, and Big Fallout 
In an otherwise crisis-filled year, atmospheric testing ended with several dozen bangs in 
the remote Pacific, but just a relative whimper of four very low yield shots in Nevada.
1165
 The 
largest was but 1.65 kilotons, while two tests of the Davy Crockett battlefield nuclear rocket 
generated just 18 and 22 ton yields, respectively. A Department of the Army film emphasized the 
weapon’s prompt radiation effects as a killing and incapacitating feature, but downplayed the 
lingering threat of fallout by focusing coverage about it on a recitation of protection measures 
taken against it.
1166
 Describing LITTLE FELLER I, the narrator breathlessly noted the precision 
of the maneuver and then pointedly observed an explicit inclusion of an extraconventional effect.  
It detonated perfectly, releasing its lethal radiation…[which is among] the three 
basic effects of nuclear weapons, heat, blast, and nuclear radiation.
1167
 
 
The bigger fallout issue at NTS in 1962 was an ostensibly underground, but only partially 
contained cratering shot in Edward Teller’s Plowshare program to utilize nuclear devices for 
peaceful civil engineering and other purposes. Just prior to the DOMINIC II shots, shot SEDAN 
(104 kilotons, 6 July 1962) released 880,000 curies of iodine-131, placing it just behind HARRY 
(32 kilotons, 19 May 1953) in producing the most intense fallout over the continental United 
States from testing in Nevada.
1168
 The dirty nature of the shot was first discovered by the public 
when a University of Utah radiology professor leading a field trip for graduate students noted 
“all the measurements began to go nuts.”1169 While touted as sharply limiting fallout, the fact that 
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both of the DAVY CROCKETT test devices were detonated three feet above ground level, as 
well as once more as a special atomic demolition mine in a shallow, two foot deep burial site 
mimicking a hasty, improvised emplacement, suggested adoption of tactical weapons failed to 
make much of a difference in the threat posed by fallout under battlefield conditions. The results 
from SEDAN suggested so-called peaceful nuclear explosions shared much the same hazard as 
military weapons did, unless fully contained underground. Even underground testing, while by 
intent better contained than SEDAN was, frequently leaked detectable levels of fallout due to 
containment failure during underground test shots.
1170
 It was rather remarkable SEDAN did not 
draw the same interest in radiological safety and monitoring that LITTLE FELLER did.
1171
 At 
the end of atmospheric testing in 1962, NTS supported only the lowest yield testing and 
remained the site of miscalculation about the potential for tests to go awry due to escaping 
fallout. 
1962: Almost War: Fallout and the 4080
th’s Cuban Missile Crisis 
As another significant part of the narrative whose essential role we have only touched 
upon briefly, pointing to the value of the unit’s declassified history as well as to the contributions 
of its exploits, the 4080
th
 Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and its U-2 aircraft were remarkably 
busy during that fateful October when the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the superpowers to the 
brink of nuclear war over Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. Twenty-three of the wing’s U-2 
aircraft were assigned to seven operating locations that ranged from Alaska to Australia. To the 
already far-flung missions of the 4080
th
 SRW were added monitoring and sampling test shots in 
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the DOMINIC series in the Pacific, operating samplers directed at Soviet nuclear test plumes, 
and training for its emergency war order (EWO) role, was an additional operating location, OL 
X. The unusual domestic OL was established at McCoy Air Force Base, Florida with five U-2s 
deployed from the 4080
th
 home base of Laughlin AFB, Texas on a mission code-named BRASS 
RAIL. While photographic and electronic reconnaissance missions were practiced, operational 
deployments were primarily nuclear intelligence operations dedicated to capturing samples at 
various altitudes and locations. The exception was newly-minted OL X, where in the more 
conventional role of aerial photography a 4080th SRW U-2 flying from Laughlin AFB in Texas 
landed after crossing the island on Mission 3101 on 14 October 1962.
1172
 The imagery that 
Mission 3101 returned for analysis offered proof of suspicions gathering for weeks before the 
fateful October 1962 day, when it precipitated the crisis in the form of images of a Soviet 
intermediate-range ballistic missile battery under construction. The wing later lost one of its 
own, Major Rudolf Anderson Jr., when his aircraft was brought down by a SAM (surface-to-air 
missile) on a mission over Cuba in the midst of the crisis on 27 October. The bulk of BRASS 
RAIL operations directed at Cuba during the crisis remain classified, however, contained in a 
Top Secret appendix to the unit history.
1173
  
While the plane went into Air Force service in 1957, was a familiar sight around its home 
base in Texas and written about in its international travels to Argentina, Australia, and Japan, 
among other operating locations, the public knew it primarily as the “spy plane” flown by the 
CIA given most first heard if it following the Powers shootdown in 1960.
1174
 Cuba was the debut 
of the U-2 in the public’s eyes as a familiar part of the Air Force’s military operations. With so 
little understood about fallout’s Cold War role, this mantle of spying inherited from the CIA was 
attractive enough to lead the public and most historians away from the aircraft’s original Air 
Force mission, as a valued asset used for nuclear intelligence and fallout sampling at previously 
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 The author saw U-2 aircraft of the 4080
th
 SRW perform several times at airshows in Texas in 1961-1963. The 
aircraft would roll from a taxi onto the runway, lift off in short order, and then the pilot would stand the plane on its 
tail as it climbed vertically out of sight, an impressive feat for what was basically a powered glider. The 4080
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unit histories show it tracked reports in the local press about the unit’s various deployments, with copies of various 
clippings often forming part of an appendix to monthly reports. 
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virtually unreachable altitudes. As with much else about fallout, once the LTBT was ratified, this 
niche fallout carved for itself just beyond sight of historians and the public’s imagination faded 
out of Air Force history.  However, a 4080
th
 SRW U-2 did come within spitting distance of 
making an even more tragic sort of history – nearly precipitating nuclear war at the very moment 
the crisis over Cuba peaked because SAC, still led by General Power, prioritized fallout 
sampling over what in retrospect was basic common sense.
1175
 
Flying from OL 5 at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska, a 4080
th
 SRW sampling mission 
on behalf of AFTAC resulted in a U-2 straying into Soviet airspace over Siberia late on the night 
of 26 October 1962, lasting into the day Major Anderson was killed by a SAM over Cuba.
1176
 
While this project’s view of fallout as a material actor was intended in part to avoid the pointless 
anthropomorphism of assigning it human characteristics, the Air Force’s stubborn pursuit of 
fallout came close to fostering its spawning by means of nuclear war, as if it were a parasite 
seeking to trick its host into aiding its reproduction. While the potential consequences remain a 
hypothetical, what was particularly alarming about the incident was that a slightly different 
outcome very well could have brought that to pass even without the creative fiction of 
intentional, self-serving fallout. Chris Pocock’s description of the incident was accurate and 
clear.  
Piloted by Major Charles Maultsby, the plane flew a mission first accomplished twice the 
month before, a grueling trip of at least eight hours to the North Pole and back, most of it 
navigated by celestial sightings given the disruptions to magnetism and radio waves produced by 
the polar region. It was a time of maximal effort in testing, so tense already. The USSR was the 
last in terminating this fevered pitch of testing, detonating forty-five tests in the last three months 
of 1962 before its final atmospheric shot on 25 December 1962.  The risky polar flights ensured 
fallout from the USSR’s Novaya Zemlya testing ground was captured. In a high-altitude pressure 
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suit in the cramped U-2 cockpit, the lone pilot could move just enough to work the controls and 
the sextant needed to “shoot the stars” for position reports. Maultsby ran into a common problem 
with this otherwise venerable, reliable method for navigation in northern latitudes – an intensely 
bright aurora borealis obscured his vision, blotting out his ability to focus on the specific stars he 
needed for navigation. Flying by dead reckoning, Maultsby crossed what he hoped was the North 
Pole, where any turn was south. Emerging from clouds that also plagued his flight, further 
sightings revealed he was far off track, but exactly where was uncertain until his radio began 
picking up Russian music as he neared the coast visible ahead! With fuel running low, Maultsby 
made a left turn in the general direction of Alaska. Pocock related McNamara ordered all 
sampling missions worldwide cancelled the next day, after Maultsby’s wandering flight drew the 
attention of Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet air defenses, though they proved unable to 
intercept him. John F. Kennedy bluntly assessed, “there’s always some sonofabitch that doesn’t 
get the word.” Robert Kennedy recalled the Soviet leader’s pained reaction in a diplomatic note 
to his brother in the midst of the ongoing crisis the day after. 
What is this, a provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this 
anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat 
readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could easily be taken 
for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step?
1177
 
  
Pocock argued it was uncertain whether the president’s earthy language referred to Maultsby or 
to the commanders who assigned the mission; Kennedy then let the matter drop, suggesting the 
whole affair was largely incidental or an oversight.  
Given Maultsby’s flight was directed by AFTAC on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
there was little doubt who produced the orders for the mission. The extant order reflected a 
confused chain of command fixated on fallout even in the midst of preparing for imminent war. 
In fact, the stand-down imposed on the Air Force U-2 sampling fleet on 27 October, which 
shifted its operational status to comply with the DEFCON II status SAC generally observed due 
to the crisis, was short-lived and unevenly applied.
1178
 Putting emergency war order (EWO) 
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 The 4080
th
 SRW was a SAC unit, one of several specialized reconnaissance units LeMay established. While 
they were SAC-controlled units for normal operations, like the 4080
th
 they frequently operated under JCS or other 
national command authority orders.  While SAC and much of the rest of the U.S. military went to DEFCON III 
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operations into effect with the U-2 required downloading the various sampler modules used to 
acquire and collect fallout and other nuclear materials.
1179
 This made room for equipment 
required to meet the EWO mission. While not specified in the official history, this probably 
included aerial photographic equipment for bomb damage assessment, the airborne “sferic” or 
EMP detection system, and likely included the limited electronic countermeasures available at 
the time. Exemplary of the confusion was OL 14 on Guam. Having made the switch-over to 
EWO alert status and prepared its aircraft for orders to launch, OL 14  was informed on 28 
October that the “…sampling missions had a higher priority than DEFCON II.” The EWO gear 
was off-loaded and the sampling gear re-installed. New orders then arrived from SAC “that all 
air sampling missions were cancelled until further notice.” The uncertainty was recalled as 
finally resolving itself when orders arrived on 31 October to return to the assigned sampling 
mission routine.
1180
   
Amid the confusion, Airman Warfel’s official narrative and Pocock’s adherence to it 
were called into question by a supporting document in the unit history appendix indicating their 
interpretation’s underestimation of fallout’s value to SAC. SAC message ZIPPO 10-695 on 28 
October 1962 addressed to OL 14, corrected ZIPPO 10-686 from the same date. Whether 
initially issued in error or reconsidered after the fact, the message indicated the original stand 
down order for sampling applied only to OL 5, Eielson AFB, Alaska, and OL 7, Upper Heyford 
Air Force Base, United Kingdom.
1181
 OL 7 handled sampling flights targeted from the west at 
plumes drifting out of Novaya Zemlya, essentially a bookend to the work of Alaska-based OL 5 
over on the Siberian side of the polar circulation patterns, while maneuvering past nervous 
NATO partner Norway’s territory. Shutting down sampling from OL5 and OL7 virtually 
eliminated the chance of coming into conflict under mistaken intentions; the other operating 
locations were distant enough from the Soviet Union for straying penetration flights to not be a 
factor, an order for all but the two affected operating locations to continue sampling operations. 
Given the circumstances, the high priority SAC continued to assign to nuclear intelligence 
operations was remarkable even as it prepared thousands of bombers and missiles for war.  
                                                 
1179
 The aircraft were often configured differently depending on the mission. In addition to the usual particle filter, a 
compressor and high pressure storage bottles often collected gases, although the compressor proved mechanically 
problematic early in the program. 
1180
 4080
th
 SRW, 1962 Unit History, October 1962, 22. 
1181
 4080th SRW, 1962 Unit History, October 1962, Appendix, SAC message ZIPPO 10-695, 28 October 1962. The 
addressees specifically included “CSAF,” General LeMay, in its distribution list, as well as AFTAC, intermediate 
headquarters, 4080
th
 SRW headquarters in Texas, and the various operating locations. 
456 
 
SAC was poised to go to war at DEFCON II beginning on 22 October and did so a day 
later, yet it took until late in the day on 28 October before the clumsily handled matter of what 
the 4080
th’s U-2s should do resolved back to collecting fallout, while avoiding the possibility of 
sending mixed messages to the Soviet Union by cancelling missions from operating locations 
with the greatest potential for catastrophic misinterpretation. Certainly, getting badly disoriented 
during polar flight was a well-known problem and the challenges of doing so in the U-2 even 
more daunting; the potential for error played a significant role, given  the Air Force’s tendency to 
push the limits imposed by political authority, a force General Curtis LeMay led from 1961 until 
his retirement in early 1965. LeMay apparently conceded the danger, both of accidental nuclear 
war and that he was the misbegotten character the president was referring to in ensuring the 
problem was resolved; his own personal intolerance of incompetence likely ensured the “follow-
up” down the ranks resulted in the confusing series of orders from SAC sending the 4080th’s 
crews scrambling back and forth for the 48 hours or so following the fortunate recovery of 
Maultsby’s errant mission. The order of business was then resolved with a stand-down of OL 5 
and OL 7 and business as usual for the other sampling crews and support staff scattered around 
the globe. This may have reflected the persistence of General Power’s frustration with the end of 
fallout coming into conflict with might have been seen as LeMay’s accomodationist stance, 
where the Air Force quietly surrendered fallout to undercut the possibility of even more 
restrictive policy directives from civilian leadership that were the real threat to the Air Force’s 
freedom of action. 
What to Tell the White House 
Indecision over readying the U-2 for war or for sampling at the height of the Cuban 
missile crisis was driven by the Air Force’s long-standing goal of documenting fallout from the 
Soviet Union’s testing campaign as accurately as possible in order to justify its own policies and 
budgets. This project has documented the potential stockpiles of fissile material and fallout 
production through testing that provided AFOAT-1/AFTAC with data on the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union, under the assumption this information was reported up through the chain of 
command for use in shaping policy. The emphasis placed in the 4080
th
 SRW October 1962 unit 
history on high aircraft availability, mission completion, and systems effectiveness rates also 
reflected the maximum efforts made to keep up with the prodigious quantities of fallout available 
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for sampling from the 1962 test series, more than in any other year.
1182
 AFTAC was apparently 
trying to gather as complete a record as possible under the circumstances in anticipation that this 
was the final opportunity to so completely document the state of Soviet nuclear art. The United 
States itself tested nine weapons via air drops or missile shots in October and into early 
November before its last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962. The Soviets tested sixteen in 
October alone and twenty-nine more before their last shot on Christmas Day. While testing as a 
coincidental factor has frequently been noted in histories of the Cuban missile crisis and the role 
of the U-2 acknowledged as seminal in precipitating it, the secret pursuit of fallout at virtually 
any cost was indicative of command obsession with what the Air Force saw as the all but 
incalculable institutional value of fallout. Letting go was difficult for General Power and others, 
most notably General LeMay, who came to depend on it, along with krypton-85 and the other 
nuclear intelligence data produced by the AEDS. These radioactive samples and other related 
findings were substantive talismans that served it well in justifying the enormous budgets 
required to build and maintain the nuclear Air Force. The cumulative benefits of fallout 
documented in the data AFTAC produced so assiduously were clear to Air Force leaders. The 
cumulative risks outlined by the very same data loomed larger in the eyes of others, including at 
the White House. 
1962: Counting the Costs of the Fallout War 
In Nevada, the American testing program turned largely underground when the United 
States initially joined in after resumption of testing by the Soviet Union in 1961.
1183
 However, 
the U.S. continued atmospheric testing of multi-megaton devices in the remote Pacific in a 
lengthy, final 1962 series. American testing was forced to relocate to the waters surrounding a 
base on the isolated British possession of Christmas Island, with high altitude shots launched 
from a U.S. base on Johnston Island.
1184
 The Soviets were vague about the end date of their 
testing even into early December 1962, with the last Soviet atmospheric test taking place on 25 
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December 1962, a relatively modest 8.5 kiloton shot that ended a month of testing with a yield 
total of ~29.5 megatons. Like much of the discussion of testing by the Soviets, hindsight is 
roughly 20/20, but it was clear that some information was known quite accurately at the time. 
The intelligence capabilities available from an early date to the Air Force provided by AFOAT-
1/AFTAC appeared to read the actual quantities of the Soviet plutonium stockpile with 
remarkable accuracy throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, based on the evidence now 
available.
1185
 It has been assumed for the most part in discussing the estimates AFOAT-1 derived 
from the MUSIC data here that the president had the best estimates available of the balance of 
nuclear power with the Soviet Union to shape his decisions; certainly he was informed by 
advisers of the summaries and conclusions drawn from Soviet stockpile and weapon estimates, if 
not the detailed relevant reports.  
A recent declassification squared this circle, making it clear President Kennedy, and most 
likely his predecessors Dwight Eisenhower and Harry Truman, were provided with fairly 
concrete numbers to use in crafting policy to address the Soviet threat. By late 1962, the most 
immediate Soviet threat was the effect of a wartime weapon that was also experienced even in a 
time of relative peace – fallout. Presidential advisors kept a close eye on certain significant 
statistics, including tracking cumulative Soviet testing fallout – as well as that from American 
testing. In practical terms, GABRIEL was deceased a decade previous, but the one significant 
question that was its focus lived on in secret – attention to the risk posed by cumulative fallout. 
Originally conceived as a research question when it was imagined only war itself could bring a 
large enough expenditure of nuclear weapons to pose a global fallout threat, whatever their real 
intent the Soviet actions in 1961 and 1962 made clear testing itself could also push fallout to 
alarming levels.  
In the form of a memorandum to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy dated 26 
December 1962, Deputy National Security Adviser Carl Kaysen laid out the fallout situation as 
of the moment when the Soviets concluded their most recent, and as it proved last, atmospheric 
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test series.
1186
 Originally accompanied by a draft version of what was anticipated to be 
Kennedy’s rejoinder to an anticipated Soviet announcement of the end of their test series, 
Kaysen’s memo presumably addressed their joint interests in peace prospects at the negotiating 
table in Geneva. Kaysen offered his own take on the situation, advising Bundy that the White 
House was aware and tracking the alarming numbers regarding the cumulative yield, thus the 
fallout, of the massive test series. Kaysen argued they wanted to avoid a congressional backlash 
over Soviet fallout, which would make any agreement to end the problem that much more 
difficult to reach. Kaysen hoped taking a “soft line” in addressing the topic would keep the 
situation in perspective. Kaysen’s second paragraph reeled off the numbers. The U.S. tested “69 
underground, one under water and 38 atmospheric and space shots. Nine of the 69 have not been 
publicly announced.”1187 This created the public impression the U.S. conducted some 60 shots 
over the less than two year period. The remainder of the discussion of U.S. testing was redacted 
from the document, but context strongly suggested the redaction referred at least in part to the 
cumulative yield from U.S. testing. Reconstruction from available data indicates the total yield 
the U.S. expended in post-1960 atmospheric testing was about 31 megatons.
1188
 
Kaysen went on to note the U.S. announced all but 26 of the 114 Soviet shots 
“conducted,” thus giving an apparent total of 88 shots.1189 While the shot totals were not greatly 
different, despite a clear Soviet numeric lead, the yield totals showed a stunning policy contrast. 
For the Soviets in 1961, the tests totaled 122 megatons and for 1962, 178 megatons, for a total of 
300 megatons over a period of fifteen months.
1190
 What compelled the Americans to curtail their 
own fallout to less than 30 megatons, even as the Soviet Union dramatically ramped-up 
production of fallout through their own testing? Kaysen’s memo was aimed at determining how 
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to spin potential future American testing in light of the Soviet campaign, while creating political 
space to foster an eventual agreement by seeking to avoid “the kind of Congressional noise we 
don’t particularly want.”1191 The memo confirmed the Pentagon had no need for atmospheric 
testing until 1964, while the AEC could test in late 1963, but would find it more expeditious to 
wait until 1964 so the military could support their joint operations. 
In arguing for an empirical basis for the decision to end fallout, the overwhelming bulk of 
the evidence, once brought together and used to frame the evolution of understanding within the 
government of the Bomb’s threat to humanity, indicated in the end the United States government 
could be taken at its word that it would only act to limit fallout risk if based on scientific 
knowledge and empirical fact. While it remains unwilling to release the largest, most detailed set 
of fallout data, it was clear over the first decade and a half of the Cold War the government was 
forced to repeatedly radically alter its policies to deal with the threat posed by fallout. One need 
only take the government at its word that it indeed did put an end to fallout from testing as 
evidence emerged of its threat to human health. While they remained relevant, testing did not 
end because of public and political pressures brought about by fallout, as vital as those were to 
reminding the White House about the almost wholly negative public reaction to fallout.  
As knowledge of the nature and effects of fallout increased, and as it became 
apparent that no region was untouched by radioactive debris, the issue of 
continued nuclear tests drew widened and intensified public attention.
1192
 
 
While the only definitive answer to this problem can be found in the withheld data, the 
fact it remains off-limits to research decades after it was applied to evaluate the scientific mettle 
of Machta’s Weather Service model of uneven fallout disposition is highly suggestive there is 
little chance it supports a benign interpretation of the scope or impact of fallout risks. That 
fallout creation ended rapidly and in consensus with the Soviets is another factor highly 
suggestive that, at a minimum, the AFOAT-1/AFTAC data was supportive of a decision to end 
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atmospheric testing. Given the relative American caution in testing that saw it take nearly a 
decade to break the 60 megaton total yield line originally suggested by GABRIEL, the 
subsequent Soviet fallout profligacy spike in 1961-1962 effectively more than doubled their 
fallout contribution over that of the Americans, likely providing additional evidence of the 
dangers of cumulative fallout from even a relatively limited nuclear war. In almost every 
important aspect, most trends regarding fallout that were known or at least partially understood 
by the early sixties were of a problematically negative slope versus the sunny optimism of the 
fifties promoted by Strauss, Teller, Libby, and others that fallout was a controllable effect. 
Importantly, while the exact level at which fallout becomes a global problem depends on many 
factors, the evidence clearly points to the order of magnitude when fallout becomes a global 
threat as being far closer to GABRIEL’s original estimate of 60 megatons than the later, sharply 
revised estimates of 2,000 megatons of yield or more suggests.  
1963: Endgame: Telling Congress Just Enough to Win Support 
With testing fallout raining down or otherwise deposited on the heads of those they 
represented, Congress continued to alternately scorn and support test ban proposals. Senator 
William Proxmire (D-WI), who personally supported a test ban treaty that was “essential lest 
mankind in a few years ‘simply choke to death on fallout,” nonetheless observed if such a 
proposal was brought to the Senate for ratification, “it would not get the two-thirds support it 
would require.” Columnists argued this was largely because “we won’t trust the Russians on 
such an agreement.”1193 But Congress no longer felt it could trust the reassurance of reports such 
as that from the Federal Radiation Council, either, apparently deeming the risk of backlash over 
fallout as a greater potential problem than voting in support of a treaty with the Russians to end 
it. Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL) demanded “proof” that the U.S. could detect potential cheating 
by the USSR.
1194
 In the end little was publicly said about the means of verification for the treaty, 
as such reassurances were communicated in secret to Congress. Thus, knowledge of the 
exceptional work of AFTAC and its predecessors in nuclear intelligence remained hidden from 
the public and only incompletely known to Congress. This situation persists, with the matter of 
“trust” hanging over all such agreements with the Soviet Union, then continuing long after the 
Cold War ended as the apparent primary basis for their enforcement known to the public.  
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At the time, Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT) – a long-time critic of arms control – was 
compelled by public opposition to fallout to adapt his position so that it would conform to the 
constraints placed on nuclear weapons by it. By calling for an end to atmospheric and underwater 
testing, a position that was increasingly seen as the solution to ending fallout, Dodd’s shift 
opened the way for the legislative compromise necessary for the Limited Test Ban Treaty to 
achieve ratification in the Senate. Although the exact means and methods of detecting potential 
Soviet cheating remained concealed, the political elites represented in the Senate were apparently 
satisfied the United States possessed the capability to reliably detect Soviet violations.
1195
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Chapter Six: Conclusions – There Is Still Time 
Taking the Temperature of Real and Imagined Wars 
[in the war room, Dr. Strangelove] 
Soviet Ambassador DeSadesky:  
A lethal cloud of radioactivity…will encircle the earth… 
U.S. General Turgidson:  
Ah, what a load of commie bull…1196 
Benjamin P. Greene was correct to urge historians to give attention to an increased role 
for science in shaping Eisenhower’s anxieties over the military industrial complex. Arguably, 
there was no clearer marker of Ike’s disappointment with scientific advice from the Strauss-led 
AEC than his stubborn insistence that, after putting its chair out to pasture, whatever way 
forward that came about from the Geneva process must put an end to fallout.
1197
 Does a clear 
statement of this quid pro quo exist? Perhaps, but it was nonetheless implicit in the policies 
Eisenhower adopted. The facts, context, and totality of knowledge about fallout present only 
with Eisenhower, a select few in the Pentagon and shared among even fewer key presidential 
science advisers played out in the hands of a man well aware of how the political ramifications 
of public sensitivities over fallout could deliver a crippling blow to faith in nuclear weapons as a 
means to ensure national security. It was knowledge he shared with his successor, yet this 
knowledge also offered no easy alternatives. Widespread evidence of how fallout acted socially 
and psychologically on ordinary citizens has been covered by researchers across the spectrum, 
from Miller to Weart to Tannenwald. Leadership elites, obviously imperfectly, sought to allay 
the fears of ordinary citizens about fallout, but even the most basic materials to reconstruct their 
contextualized motivations and actions necessary to provide better insight into their actions 
remained mostly inaccessible until recently. Irrational fears may drive some of our perceptions of 
nuclear power, but marked tolerance for nuclear weapons remains driven largely by our carefully 
cultivated ignorance about the risks posed by fallout in the event of a nuclear war. 
By the mid-1950s, fallout’s secret utility as a vital intelligence resource was increasingly 
undermined by recognition it was a public, yet carefully concealed strategic liability of nuclear 
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weapons. This transformation suggests the historiography of fallout would benefit by re-
centering from the current model analyzing its effects as primarily a psycho-social matter of 
fearful perceptions into a more comprehensive model that includes its study as an empirical 
phenomenon that sparked a fundamental crisis of strategy throughout Dwight Eisenhower’s 
administration. In its most manipulative form, the fundamental reason for persistence of secrecy 
about fallout was to preserve the perception of a need for a vast nuclear stockpile that 
coincidentally sustains the threat their cumulative fallout poses to our only planet.  Massive use 
of these weapons would substantially alter life as we know it, those infamous words, probed so 
thoroughly in 1954 even as the fundamental reason for that topic to arise – fallout – could not be 
mentioned. The effective operational military requirement to ensure deterrence is probably closer 
to just dozens of weapons, rather than the thousands of weapons still in service, in order to avoid 
risking politically and environmentally, if not genetically and medically intolerable levels of 
fallout.
1198
  
The real secret to fallout, in the past and on into the present, was never simply confined 
its own narrative, but the light it threw on a national security strategy top-heavy with nuclear 
weapons. Fallout fundamentally called into question the U.S. military’s dependence on the 
deterrent effects of weapons in numbers they dare not use except under the most extreme duress. 
Many subject matter experts suggest nuclear weapons made the Cold War conflict a game of 
chess. Fallout’s story suggests it was more akin to the far simpler game of Russian roulette, 
perhaps better termed now as Russian-American roulette, but played with only one chamber 
empty; who dares go first? In the end, it was not so surprising to find political and military elites 
conceding an end to fallout because it represented a threatening, even a potentially fatal blow to 
popular faith in the central technological achievement of the nation-state in the twentieth-
century, nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons remain as iconic tokens of power, but any other 
costly weapon so lacking in military utility would have been retired long ago. 
Long-eluding examination by dint of its classification, declassification continues to yield 
a growing body of evidence that fallout undermined the fundamental basis of national security 
policy based on nuclear weapons. A significant trove of empirical evidence about fallout’s role 
in underwriting the policy changes its uncertain risks brought about exists just out of reach. It is 
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important to keep in mind, as with the Oppenheimer case, fallout was often not permitted to 
appear in certain documentary contexts despite being intimately connected to what was recorded. 
Historians have been patient, but also must begin to describe as best they can what we know 
must be on the few pieces that appear to be intentionally missing from this puzzle, but which 
nonetheless can be outlined and clearly communicated in general terms through interpretation of 
their surrounding factual basis in Cold War narratives that remain subject to extraordinary 
classification regimes. 
Besides the new insights developed in inquiring about the missing fallout in the 
Oppenheimer case, among the most telling observations was the direct line of rough correlation 
that connected GABRIEL’s 60 megaton limit from a time when only fission weapons existed to 
evidence of its continuing constraint on the American nuclear weapons program. Total fallout 
from testing hewed relatively closely to that 60 megaton figure up until the end of the CASTLE 
thermonuclear series, a test program planned by the same Oppenheimer-led GAC that expressed 
concerns about pursuing the hydrogen bomb that this project argues were based in significant 
part on the potential threat posed by their fallout. Whether documentary evidence exists to 
support a connection remains unknown, but is among the many questions suggested by applying 
the known history of fallout in search of a more frank Cold War history. Subsequent to the 1954 
BRAVO fallout incident, fallout “budgets” were imposed, if not always strictly observed, in 
order to limit total fission yield of each series.
1199
 Strictly speaking, the United States did not 
exceed 60 megatons of fission yield aloft at any time. Only the 48 megaton total fission + fusion 
yield of the CASTLE series even approached the 60 megaton limit. The 10 megaton annual limit 
on fission product additions to the atmosphere the AEC announced in 1957 thereafter ensured 
fallout aloft stayed well under the 60 megaton limit conceptualized and calculated in GABRIEL. 
Correlation is not causation, but general insights can be drawn from the known facts. In spite of 
enormous pressures to test more, higher yield weapons, the American observance of this 
shadowy standard clearly was effectual because of the resulting CROWFLIGHT and other data 
that supported the low end of GABRIEL’s range of estimates as cautionary in practice, as well as 
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in theory. The portent of fallout contamination from testing showing up in the food supply at 
levels the government defined as troubling can remain subject to various interpretations of risk, 
but its factual existence and political impact cannot be denied. Only the foolhardy would now 
suggest any appetite for exploring life as we know it, plus thousands of megatons of fallout yield, 
as a justification for targeting others for any cause, since nuclear nations who did so would be so 
surely targeting their own populations. 
Eisenhower’s decision to commit to an atmospheric test ban was initiated by fallout’s 
contamination of American wheat in the upper Midwest in 1959.
1200
 Delayed in application by 
diplomatic contingencies, it was a decision upheld by the subsequent Kennedy administration 
against great odds once the restart of atmospheric testing brought on an even more acute crisis of 
iodine-131 contamination in milk. In that sense the decision to end of fallout came just a decade 
after the Soviet Union demonstrated nuclear capability, rather than the fourteen years it took 
until formal ratification of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.   
Nearly Conclusive
1201
 
The 1964 contest between President Lyndon Baines Johnson and Senator Barry 
Goldwater capped a decade of change in fallout’s meaning following the CASTLE BRAVO 
incident. Goldwater’s unrestrained enthusiasm sought to keep the myth of nuclear weapons as a 
useful instrument of national policy alive, but also made him the target of Johnson campaign 
commercial that ran just once. A girl plucked petals from a daisy, then her innocent schoolyard 
chant morphed into a countdown to a nuclear explosion.
1202
 A little over a week after it showed, 
and then was quickly pulled from the air, the president spoke at a dinner in Seattle, using the 
occasion to drive home the point – rejecting such ideas as conventionalization, Johnson argued 
fallout rendered nuclear war all but unthinkable, invoking an obvious reference to the cumulative 
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radiation effects produced by hundreds if not thousands of weapons detonated in a short period 
of time. 
Let no one think atomic weapons are simply bigger and more destructive than 
other weapons…A cloud of deadly radiation would drift and destroy, menacing 
every living thing on God’s earth, and in those unimaginable hours unborn 
generations would forever be lamed.
1203
 
 
Johnson noted that every American president since the bomb was unleashed drew the 
same conclusion, even if others had not specifically cited fallout to the public as the most 
significant reason why nuclear war was something to be avoided, not embraced. It was unclear if 
Johnson’s vision of a “cloud of deadly radiation” was prompted by the cultural influence of 
Ambassador DeSadesky’s reminder to General Turgidson that a “cloud of deadly radiation 
would drift and destroy” the world, a poignant scene depicted in Dr. Strangelove following its 
January 1964 release. It was clear this horrendous image of a fallout-shrouded world represented 
an overwhelming counterbalance to the seeming utility of nuclear weapons, not simply a 
misperception of the threat they posed. The hidden hand of fallout shaped the contextual reality 
that structured Cold War culture. Politically and personally, citizen-consumers largely refused to 
buy into it once fallout was no longer a deniable secret. By 1964, fallout clearly constrained the 
national security policy choices available to political leaders, limited the utility of nuclear 
weapons on the battlefield, and shaped the political fortunes of those who engaged with it. 
Fallout could not in itself eliminate nuclear weapons, but knowledge of its inevitable threat made 
contemplating their use nearly impossible.  
While fear of fallout has retreated from the vanguard of public anxieties, the best 
evidence of its explicit empirical role in limiting perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons 
remains locked behind closed doors. This “gap” perpetuates a telling ignorance about the Cold 
War capabilities of the U.S. nuclear intelligence program, as well as about the dubious prospects 
of anything like “victory” in a nuclear war. This missing Cold War history lesson, where 
empirical factors played a predominant role in ending fallout by secretly, fundamentally 
augmenting the external political pressures brought on by popular mobilizations in opposition to 
the nuclear weapons is one the public and their representatives need in order to construct wise 
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national security policy. Ignorance on these matters accounts for why diplomatic agreements and 
the well-proven arms control verification capabilities that support them often remain political 
shuttlecocks at the whim of the Senate. Writing in the always relevant Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Robert Nelson recently observed the 1999 Senate vote rejecting the CTBT’s 
ratification was based on an “opposition [that] mainly was driven by ill-founded concerns that 
the treaty was not sufficiently verifiable.”1204  Relating this narrative is crucial to begin removing 
the political stumbling blocks such manipulative ignorance poses to efforts to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and undertake other arms control measures that can be managed 
by the robust detection and verification capabilities honed by AFTAC over decades of effective 
and successful operation.
1205
 The role fallout played in establishing the vigorous Atomic Energy 
Detection System, making the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty eminently verifiable, was matched 
by fallout’s role in sparking science that provided technology to globally detect any nuclear 
explosion down to less than one kiloton, even when its fallout was contained underground. 
Knowledge of this consequential past is vital to a peaceful future. 
Conclusion 
It is risky to make assumptions about secrecy, yet it is a very rare history that proceeds 
without an array of small assumptions to color in between what is known with certainty. This 
conclusion is not dependent on the following assumption, even as the evidence points in this 
useful direction. If the trove of data represented by the massive fallout created in 1961 and 1962 
and collected by AFTAC provided exculpatory evidence that demonstrated a relatively limited 
risk posed by fallout, it would have been quite unlikely to still be secret and unexamined by third 
parties at this late date.
1206
 A 2003 follow-up review report by the National Academies of 
Science suggested efforts continue to identify and preserve relevant documents, while striving to 
“[e]nroll other government agencies, especially the Department of Defense, in the effort to 
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identify, preserve and publish information.”1207 Progress on this, if any, suggests the silence will 
continue. Given the passage of time, holding the materials to at least the natural lifespans of 
anyone alive during the era of atmospheric testing may be the goal. Such a result would largely 
frustrate attempts to relate the data to subsequent health outcomes at the individual level; it may 
not prevent epidemiological studies of cancer incidence. Perhaps fear of motivating legal or 
political action is the fundamental threat to national security implicit in the need to keep these 
materials classified and unavailable to researchers? Perhaps. More likely, it is at least as much 
fear of  the budget impacts on a nuclear force still struggling to maintain relevance a quarter-
century after the end of the Cold War. If many in Congress are still trying to fight the last war, it 
should be no surprise that the Pentagon does, too, while failing to prepare to better meet future 
national security needs.  
Fallout provides a “hidden transcript” of the Cold War that refashions a conventional 
narrative of a predominant American empire into one that is not just politically, but empirically 
far more ambiguous in terms of its dimensions than those posited by post-Cold War 
triumphalism about the “end of history.”1208 This partial transcript of fallout’s work was 
replicated “onstage” through the performances of the powerful, although “almost always in 
disguised form” to the vast majority of citizens.1209 Social actors found their actions constrained 
by it, but in the absence of war, only rarely directly impeded by fallout; yet political and military 
leaders were obviously forced to take it into account in making their decisions about a host of 
national security policy problems. In the same vein, fallout forced choices on consumers, whose 
reaction foretold the failure of any policy reliant on self-mobilization, like fallout shelters. 
Against a threat most saw as unlikely, but inevitably world-shattering if it did occur, they 
nonetheless endured a foretaste of it in the anxieties fallout from testing imposed on their lives. It 
was hard to get to “Sold” in fallout shelter sales, despite claims by Eisenhower that his policies 
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resulted in “construction of over one million family fallout shelters.”1210 The more they knew 
about the nuclear-enhanced version of national security, the less citizens and consumers were 
willing to buy in to such policy. 
Thus Eisenhower’s alarm about fallout, a wartime nuclear weapons effect that also 
occurred in peacetime due to testing, was directly related to his alarm at the idea of general 
nuclear war, an enormous disquiet the president shared with most Americans, indeed with most 
across the globe because of fallout’s inherently transnational nature.  
Superficially, fallout was also a major contributor to the paradoxical toxic brew of belief 
that deterrence represented a stable solution by dint of its capacity to leverage the power of 
thousands of weapons to dampen belligerent tendencies. Fortuitously, fallout became strongest in 
its effects during times of crisis as the prospect of confronting it loomed in the windshield. 
Paradoxically, fallout also acted to corrode the stability it seemed to provide to the deterrent 
value of nuclear weapons, because its threat undermined the credibility of their use. Deterrence 
depends on certainty; fallout made the potential response less certain, even more so in the 
numbers of deployed weapons standing at alert achieved by the mid-sixties. This fear of fallout’s 
creating hesitancy to use nuclear weapons kept those involved with the Oppenheimer hearing 
silent about it, including the famous scientist himself. Hesitancy became the crux of the problem 
of the strategic impasse represented by thousands of nuclear weapons; their existence continued 
even as the passions that drove their acquisition faded and the burdensome and limited utility 
they provided came into better focus. Nuclear weapons seductively provided a supportive basis 
of seeming stability to address national security concerns; at the same time, underneath this 
fragile crust, fallout lurked as a bottomless quicksand of despair and doubt in their effectiveness.  
Other than roping off this area with secrecy, by the late nineteen-fifties, the U.S. government 
concluded it had only one option to avoid significant constraints on its policies because of what 
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was publicly available and known about nuclear weapons – quit testing that created fallout in the 
atmosphere.  
Eisenhower and Kennedy understood well what was afoot, even when few others inside 
or outside their administrations were in position to see all of what was at stake because of 
fallout’s extensive insinuation into national security policy. Preserving the reassuring appearance 
of seemingly deterrent nuclear weapons sought to disguise a pit of public relations fallout/lava 
looming underneath, which festered in the face of national political leadership that beyond the 
apex of the executive branch did not fully understand the implications of fallout. With the Cold 
War long over and new political fears occupying the attention formerly given to far more 
consequential terrors, what is the president told now about fallout’s impact on his or her decision 
making if the time should ever come when that choice is thrust at them? In a sense, being oblique 
about fallout is way for the military to reassure the hand poised near the “button” that everything 
has been taken into consideration in choosing nuclear war as the best option among the bad. As 
J. Robert Oppenheimer reminded in 1950, it is not so simple. 
It is a grave danger for us that these decisions are taken on the basis of facts held 
secret…The facts, the relevant facts, are of little use to an enemy, yet they are 
fundamental to an understanding of the issues of policy. If we are guided by fear 
alone, we will fail in this time of crisis.
1211
 
 
Moreover, in a still unstable world, with far too many nuclear weapons out there, as well 
as those who persist in aspiring to make their own, more effort is badly needed on reducing the 
scope of destruction from a future failure of deterrence by emphasizing continued reduction in 
overall arsenal inventories among the nuclear states, as well as preventing further nuclear 
proliferation.
1212
 Given existing geo-political realities, there will be more than enough weapons 
available for a fine little war for decades to come. Drastic measures are needed to significantly 
reduce the threat of catastrophic mass nuclear exchanges that can serve no purpose beyond 
irreversibly damaging the planetary ecology, human health, and the common genetic legacy of 
Earth.  The best opportunity to do that may already have been missed in the quarter century since 
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the end of the Cold War. The danger fallout continues to pose remains a cumulative one. The 
only truly effective means of treating this threat are the sorts of reductions in frontline arsenals 
that limit the possibility any power could see an advantage in preemptively attacking others with 
nuclear weapons. In case of such verifiable reductions, fallout would tend to strengthen the 
deterrent impact of the remaining weapons by making their use more credible in extenuating 
circumstances. Yet, this, too, is an uncomfortable argument to make in a world better off entirely 
without such weapons – where less is more – and unlikely a goal that can be achieved in this 
century.  Education about how cumulative fallout makes use of nuclear weapons an implausible 
and suicidal scheme is an achievable goal, as well as a prerequisite in saving humanity from its 
own worst urges. Progress depends in part on changing the public perception of nuclear weapons 
from the ultimate weapon some prefer to see into the reality of failure their military utility 
represents. 
The hold of “terrorism” and its retail level threats on the political imagination pales in 
comparison to the elephant in the room of threats to the political order engendered by the 
looming prospect of massive fallout amid the destruction of a general nuclear war. The 
extraordinarily successful efforts of AFOAT-1/AFTAC should discourage any who might seek 
to acquire nuclear weapons from believing a nuclear weapons program can ever really be hidden. 
The full record of fallout’s secret life must one day become public in order to facilitate such 
conversations. Fallout sampling is just one among a number of relevant techniques developed so 
that any tree falling in the nuclear forest, no matter how small or far away, will attract the 
attention of the world. 
Oppenheimer’s Vindication: Hearing Now Seemingly without Explanation 
The Oppenheimer case was rendered far more complex than familiar by attending to its 
numerous intersections with fallout. The recently declassified and now nearly complete  
transcript of the 1954 hearing serves as a reminder fallout was a rather more significant and 
substantive issue in this matter, but remained largely concealed within the smokescreen of a 
political loyalty narrative that has drawn so much study over the last six decades. 
The 12 October 2014 New York Times headline read “Transcripts Kept Secret for 60 
Years Bolster Defense of Oppenheimer’s Loyalty.” Declassification by the Energy Department 
of a batch of thousands of pages of testimony and other evidence redacted from the trial records 
used in this project appeared to conclusively set aside the basis the trial was publicly premised 
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upon, as well as the central focus for historians in its aftermath, the question of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer’s loyalty. Richard Rhodes spoke directly to one of the premises of this project; 
Oppenheimer’s abiding belief low-yield tactical weapons should be prioritized over high-yield 
thermonuclear weapons.  
“Oppenheimer was worried about war on the ground in Europe,” Mr. Rhodes said 
in an interview. He saw the need for “a large stockpile of fission weapons that 
could be used to turn back a Soviet ground assault…” the security board found 
that Oppenheimer’s early views on the hydrogen bomb “had an adverse effect on 
recruitment of scientists and the progress of the scientific effort.”1213 
 
Left unanswered was what those “early views” were. If loyalty was not the answer and 
their cumulative fallout was the major problem Oppenheimer saw with thermonuclear weapons, 
then the answer to that question seems starkly obvious, based on the evidence here. The 
scientist’s conflict with General Curtis LeMay over the nature and scope of Air Force war plans 
was driven by the fact the general countenanced no limits on the use of thermonuclear weapons. 
The primary reason Oppenheimer objected to what he termed the Air Force’s “goddamnedest” 
plans for employment of these weapons was not fallout, per se, which he accepted as a limiting 
factor in the use of nuclear weapons, but not a bar to it, but reckless disregard for the cumulative 
threat posed by using these weapons in an unrestricted manner. He also encouraged research to 
answer basic questions about the global threat fallout posed if not managed carefully. Project 
GABRIEL promised to eclipse the value of what was learned from Willard Libby’s Project 
Sunshine and is likely the best lead to further unearthing the parameters of empirical risk that 
appeared to guide American atmospheric testing and the decision to end it. Essentially, the threat 
fallout posed to the global environment and human health from the massed employment of 
nuclear weapons as contemplated in SAC war plans meant that all but a relative handful of these 
weapons in the American stockpile lacked substantial and effective military utility despite their 
impressive yields.  
While this project can answer some of the questions raised by taking loyalty off the table 
as the source of the attacks on Oppenheimer, it remains at best a second draft of a history just 
now coming into view. As with some aspects of this effort, there are passages where informed 
speculation is reasonable, given how clearly contingency, ideology, science and revelations 
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about adjacent secrets all significantly narrow the possibilities of what decisions were made by 
who and why, as well as to account for places where events and facts beyond control of human 
actors shaped the choices and constraints they faced. What is on that missing puzzle piece can be 
described with considerable accuracy, if not yet with complete certainty. A new Cold War 
narrative where Russian capabilities were much better known, earlier, is balanced off against the 
Air Force’s pursuit of its institutional interests as much as the national interest and a largely 
hidden, still fundamentally misunderstood analytical intelligence failure better known as the 
bomber and missile “gaps.” This project helps close the “fallout gap” in Cold War history, 
perhaps the era’s least understood, but most important remaining systemic intelligence secret. 
Drawing Conclusions 
Beyond the stark lessons fallout’s history should teach are conclusions that are more 
subjective. Given previous rows over who owns the history of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and other 
Cold War narratives, a writer and researcher cannot help but be cautious with the evidence while 
being forthright about the need to draw obvious conclusions from it. 
. Was the 1954 hearing that sent Oppenheimer to the street the purely political hatchet job 
many on the left believed it to be? Politics were certainly involved, but the truth was a far more 
complex matter. Was Oppenheimer disloyal or attempting to destroy the Strategic Air Command 
as conservatives have often insisted? Those charges have all the substance of a smokescreen, 
which is exactly what they were. Fundamentally, the Air Force was out to protect the most 
important intelligence system most American have never heard of, the Atomic Energy Detection 
System, operated by obscure Air Force units with even more obscure acronyms. Air Force 
Technical Applications Center continues the outstanding legacy of an organization that 
reinvented itself several times, but has always remained unfortunately, perhaps permanently 
relevant. Paradoxically, the Air Force was also willing to sacrifice some part of the secrecy 
shrouding the AEDS for something even more important – keeping fallout out of the discussion 
at the 1954 hearing. In roughly 3,000 pages, the long-classified and nearly complete transcript 
did not record the term fallout even once. Fallout was certainly discussed, but saying it was 
rather obviously forbidden. There is no other reasonable explanation for this omission, given the 
subject matter examined at length in it. With only somewhat less certainty, the project argues 
that fallout points to why the hearing was held.  
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Ultimately, and somewhat mysteriously, it was someone in the Air Force who pulled the 
plug on fallout – or ordered AFOAT-1 to do so by cooperating with the Weather Bureau and the 
AEC in order to get to the bottom of the issues Lester Machta raised about residence time and 
uneven distribution of fallout debris in the environment. For those who believe this project is 
intended to smear the Air Force, this is hardly a conclusion that fits with that theory. Whatever 
the cause was, it was a remarkable change and one quite unlikely to have been inspired by public 
pressures to end fallout. The Air Force was and remains a remarkably data-driven organization, 
although one that is quite conscious of how data shapes a debate. Arguably, this is among the 
more substantive speculations present here. Speculation because there is no document pointing 
directly at this conclusion, but substantial in demanding something credible that would 
alternatively explain the policy change more substantially than this does in order to argue against 
this conclusion. If fallout was the lifeblood of the Air Force that I argue General Power claimed 
it was, 1958 meant plenty of breathing room and data before the ban caused Power to complain 
he was having trouble breathing in 1959.  Like a number of outcomes here, that the Air Force 
embraced an end to atmospheric testing was as surprising a result as many others during the 
course of this research, including discovering Eisenhower’s dogged, personal commitment to a 
more peaceful future. 
It was Lester Machta who was a hero here, if anyone were to make the case for 
exemplary effort. Thrust into the storm by luck of the draw and a modest ambition to earn a 
living doing science he enjoyed, Machta found himself at the center of one of the most 
confounding scientific quandaries of the twentieth-century – what happened to all that fallout? 
The research question itself was born of intelligence needs, because accounting for the bulk of a 
test shot’s fallout provided useful insights otherwise unobtainable in the days before computer 
modeling could provide them. Tracing the many paths fallout took opened up atmospheric 
sciences in much the same way that seismology found sustenance in the greatly expanded 
AFTAC seismic detection program that began in the late 1950s. Machta’s decision to go head-to-
head with soon-to-be Nobel laureate Willard Libby over the non-uniformity of stratospheric 
fallout and the failure of Libby’s theory of stratospheric residence to account for fallout’s 
recirculation knocked the last props away from the failing model of atmospheric testing.
1214
 In 
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the end, it was Machta’s data-driven argument that fallout deposition was concentrated over the 
most populous areas of the United States by stratospheric circulation that seems to have won the 
day. It is hard to trump data, so Machta’s approach turned out to be notably more successful than 
either Oppenheimer’s – or Hedley Marston’s for that matter. In an age before whistleblower’s 
found public acclaim, before Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, fallout inspired courage 
in speaking truth to frightening power. 
Still, this narrative of what really happened with fallout in the years from 1945 onward 
can also satisfy at least the curiosity of those on the other side of the field. The anonymous Air 
Force boosters of “The Clean Weapons Problem” from 1959 spoke to what might have been 
secret just a few years before – Or perhaps only Robert Oppenheimer could not say it? – which 
by 1959 was clearly common knowledge among Air Force officers and, most likely, officers in 
the other military branches.
1215
 This wider knowledge of fallout as a limit, if not always 
completely accurate and largely withheld as official confirmation of public fears, did confide 
much about the basic facts, while downplaying the meaning of a marked reversal in national 
security policy. Official or not, this was partly a result of the outreach the military itself did 
beginning in 1957 in explaining fallout, as well as was possible by simply reading the papers.
1216
 
Fallout represented a basic problem of nuclear warfare quite unlike the effects of conventional 
weapons, a fact that quickly became all but impossible to explain away. Five years after Robert 
Oppenheimer’s involuntary retirement from this important debate, this formerly secret fact was 
being published, if not quite openly attributed to its author, in the military press.  
As with any project of this extent, there will be room for criticism, even quibbling over 
details of interpretation. But the general conclusions established from the evidence presented 
herein are fundamentally the same as far less critical Air Force boosters reached in 1959 based 
on simply being briefed about the situation. More than half a century later, this suggests a search 
for solutions to the national security problems fallout created that essentially hobbled the 
                                                                                                                                                             
RG 326.73. One of the unanswered questions here is whether the uniformity of deposition that Libby insisted 
occurred despite Machta and Fine’s data showing significant non-uniformity was something inherited from the 
original British work at Harwell or something Libby hypothesized himself. This unattributed 1955 paper from the 
AEC’s Sunshine files argued that strontium-90 deposition was uniformly distributed for the most part except where 
surface bursts might keep the plume in the troposphere leading to more intense close-in fallout. Records of the 
proceedings of the 13 January 1954  AEC Conference on Radiotoxicity of Strontium held in Washington, DC may 
enlighten on this and other questions, including what the AEC expected of fallout from its upcoming CASTLE 
BRAVO test. 
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American military’s dependence on nuclear weapons remains an important and sorely neglected 
subject of considerable importance, historically and currently. Maintenance of effective 
deterrence requires a relatively small number of weapons. The current continuing maintenance of 
sizable, even bloated inventories of nuclear weapons undermines the certainties sought from 
pursuing deterrence, while making possible the destruction of the world as we know it through 
cumulative fallout. While there may still be time, time is something that the wise make good use 
of. It is hoped this account contributes to greater understanding and wisdom about the threat 
posed by fallout to humankind’s future – and how fallout as a secret shaped a historical past that 
is still not past. 
Fallout’s story also reminds that policy based on subterfuge of the intellectual process is 
essentially heavier-than-air; once the energy runs out, the contraption crashes. Factually-based, 
scientifically valid policy is like gravity, needing no outside energy to sustain a very inevitable 
pull. Surprisingly more than a half-century after the ending scenes of On the Beach reminded 
there is still time, there is still time to alter the socio-political calculations that blithely accept the 
inevitably of fallout by accepting that all past choices made on nuclear weapons were either wise 
or final, that insist there is no choice but to live with far too many of these horrid things as the 
price of security. That price is far too high for something that undermines national and personal 
security at least as much as supports it. Understanding fallout’s role during the Cold War is the 
first step to understanding the practical need to avoid nuclear war. To be sure, from such wisdom 
comes hesitancy, but there is no better way out of the labyrinth that otherwise ends in nuclear 
war should less wise leaders ever get access to such weapons.  
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Appendix A: Nuclear Intelligence 101 
Nuclear intelligence operations rely on a variety of sophisticated techniques, which were 
often at the cutting edge of science during the era they were adopted. However, many of the 
basic concepts of the most commonly used techniques were rather straightforward in 
explanation, if somewhat more complex in execution. Nuclear intelligence efforts in the 1950s 
grew to include thousands of personnel scattered around the world at dozens of detachments and 
associated supporting units, many in remote locations. This point was a reminder that secrecy 
about processes used for gathering and compiling nuclear intelligence was often employed more 
as a matter of avoiding confirming the obvious to reasonably well-informed observer-citizens 
and politicians than it was about concealing arcane knowledge from potential threat nations.
1217
 
As noted in the text, British-born Soviet spy Kim Philby, masquerading as the MI6 liaison to 
Washington DC, gained basic knowledge of AFOAT-1 operations when briefed by American 
security officials on the detection of Joe-1 in September 1949. Although the exact timing of 
when Philby passed this extraordinarily sensitive material to his Russian intelligence handlers 
and what he revealed remain uncertain, there was no doubt American intelligence agencies were 
aware the Russians understood fallout’s tell-tale nature. What was far less clear was why that 
same knowledge initially prompted little effort by the United States to conceal its own testing 
beyond token measures like the inland location of the Nevada Test Site and patrolling the waters 
near the Pacific Proving Grounds for Russian intruders.  
Aerial sampling of fallout isotopes is still considered to be the one method whose results 
provide unambiguous indications a nuclear explosion has taken place. With the Air Force’s fleet 
of dedicated samplers in the 1990s hovering around just one airframe, then none, AFTAC 
maintains fly-away kits allowing rapid field modification of KC-135 and other available or 
suitable aircraft to provide aerial sampling platforms.
1218
 Several other airframes continue to be 
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479 
 
similarly supported for use as samplers, likely including the venerable U-2 with its unique high 
altitude capability. With close attention continuing on several nations’ nuclear programs, 
including North Korea’s, retention of several options for capturing “hot” samples at various 
distances and altitudes remains an important part of AFTAC’s capabilities. 
Fallout sampling was considered the most reliable technique used by the Air Force during 
the period of intense atmospheric testing. Analysis of fallout samples covers a broad category of 
distinct radiochemical protocols for each isotope of potential intelligence interest, providing 
weapons design information, fissile material origin, and other assessments of the qualities of the 
source device by drawing on its microscopic debris, usually captured on specially treated filter 
paper.
1219
 Gaseous samples capture another range of isotopes in bottles using high-speed 
compressors. The goal was to describe the shape of the potential nuclear threat by drawing on 
chemical analysis to provide a nuclear “fingerprint” of the device that produced it.  
Another category of Cold War nuclear intelligence was not created in a critical mass 
explosion, like fallout; rather, it depended on the capture and analysis of isotopes created in the 
transmutation of uranium into plutonium to provide a direct insight into how much fissile 
material the Russians produced. For a number of technical reasons, centering on the fact that it 
can be chemically separated from the substrate of other elements found in fuel rods containing it, 
it is considerably less costly to produce plutonium-239 for use as fissile material in weapons. 
While uranium-235 is also used as fissile material, the fact that it is chemically identical, if 
isotopically distinct, from the natural uranium it forms a tiny percentage of in its natural state 
makes it far more difficult to separate. While weapons utilizing Pu-239 are necessarily more 
complex, the extra cost of design complexity is offset by the difficulties of obtaining sufficient 
U-235 as a fissile material required to make the relatively cruder and heavier uranium weapon 
designs feasible.
1220
 There was some experimentation with other such indicative isotopes, but by 
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1950 AFOAT-1 and the British settled on krypton-85 as the benchmark for monitoring Soviet 
plutonium production. Accuracy of this technique’s estimates to be within 5% of actual Soviet 
fissile material production was quickly reached.
1221
 This was also one process where stationary 
sampling proved as accurate as airborne capture. Krypton-85 apparently mixed fairly evenly in 
the atmosphere, due to its 9.4 year half-life, unlike the heterogeneous mixture of bomb debris 
found in fallout plumes. The relatively long half-life of krypton-85 and the additive nature of the 
resulting numbers provided a smoothing effect to the data that lent itself well to achieving 
accuracy within 5%. The method involved calculating total British and U.S. production of 
krypton-85 based on their own production of it in the course of obtaining fissile material for the 
West, then subtracting the Western total from the total volume. The remainder would represent 
the total volume of Soviet production, as the Russians were the only other known producers of 
fissile material in the early 1950s.  
Basics of Analytic Radiochemistry 
In the available, unclassified literature, there are scattered references which suggest the 
identity of the isotopes of interest for intelligence uses, but it is believed there is no single source 
which states explicitly the information summarized in this appendix.  
The first requirement for an isotope useful in detecting a nuclear explosion is an 
appropriate half-life. The half-life of an isotope is the length of time taken for one-half of the 
atoms of a quantity of a particular isotope to decay into its daughter isotope. Radioactive decay is 
a random process for any individual atom, with the half-life being essentially an average of the 
decay times for all atoms in a sample of an isotope. Thus, the time for any individual atom to 
decay can be either shorter or longer than what is known as the half-life of that isotope. 
During a nuclear explosion, many short-lived isotopes are produced, some lasting as little 
as a fraction of a second before they decay. Many of these are of interest in analyzing the design 
and efficiency of bomb design. This information was collected by samplers flying directly into 
nuclear clouds shortly after an explosion. Even for very short-lived isotopes, enough remaining 
atoms could still be captured within the sample to allow for accurate analysis. The need for speed 
                                                                                                                                                             
device, apparently considered so reliable that the extra U-235 required to test it was reserved for use in case of 
continued war need. 
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and accuracy in collecting these samples and returning them to the laboratory for analysis was 
one reason the Air Force chose to rely on manned aircraft for this mission over the primitive, 
cumbersome drones available during the period of U.S. atmospheric testing.  
For long range detection, what was desired as a marker useful for intelligence purposes 
was an isotope that persists for a period long enough to be detectable at great distances, yet is 
also one that decays quickly enough to give an accurate measure of the time span since the 
explosion which produced it. The location of the original Soviet testing grounds on the steppes of 
Kazakhstan near Semipalatinsk resulted in samples taking five days or more to drift on the 
prevailing winds before they became accessible to Air Weather Service aircraft on sampling 
tracks over the western Pacific north of Japan.
1222
 Later, the USSR established testing grounds on 
the Artic island of Novaya Zemlya. The access provided by international waters around it also 
provided quicker access to Russian bomb debris by U.S. long-range sampling aircraft. 
It is also important that isotopes of interest be produced in large enough quantities in a 
nuclear explosion to be detectable at long distances and that they are distinguishable from 
isotopes produced by other nuclear processes, such as natural decay and plutonium production. 
The major way in which samples from nuclear explosions and reactor operations are 
differentiated is by assessing the “birthday” of each isotope in a sample. Critical mass nuclear 
explosions produce samples in which all the isotopes have the same birth date. A sample in 
which the birth dates of the isotopes analyzed differ is produced in a reactor, which operates via 
a series of controlled chain reactions.
1223
 
Tables of isotopes and their commonly recognized half-lives are available from several 
sources. First, the CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics provides basic information, 
including a table of isotopes, giving their atomic mass, half-life, decay mode, and relative natural 
abundance (for naturally occurring isotopes.)
1224
 Second, and ultimately most useful, is the 
Trilinear Chart of Nuclear Species.
1225
 Given its early publishing date of July 1949, the edition 
used here provided insight into the database of commonly recognized isotope information 
available for use by AFOAT-1 just before the detection of Joe-1. In addition to basic information 
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as provided by the CRC Handbook, the Trilinear Chart showed the relationships between parent 
and daughter isotopes, allowing the researcher to quickly determine if particular isotopes of 
interest fit the general pattern of utility described above. 
A perusal of the literature provided additional clues for the researcher. Ziegler and 
Jacobson note that there are about a dozen isotopes which produce easily measured beta radiation 
and are of greatest interest in analysis.
1226
 A key piece of information in tracking down the 
isotopes of interest in nuclear intelligence was provided by William B. Scott, a former AFTAC 
Special Equipment Operator, who wrote a series of articles on AFTAC and its history which 
appeared in Aviation Week and Space Technology.
1227
 He mentioned that “[t]he gas of primary 
interest is a radioactive xenon isotope…[with] a 12-day maximum half-life, and is an 
indisputable signature of a nuclear detonation.” Comparing this information with isotope 
references shows that xenon-131m is the isotope which he alluded to in his article as it is the 
only xenon isotope with an 11.84-day half-life fitting his description. Interestingly, xenon-131m 
has the same atomic weight as a naturally occurring xenon isotope, xenon-131. The decay of 
xenon-131m into xenon-131 is by way of an isomeric transition, with an emission of gamma 
rays, but no emitted particle. The result is a change in the spin of the xenon atom which can be 
detected by means of gamma ray spectroscopy.
1228
 
Importantly, the parent isotope of both xenon-131m and xenon-131 is iodine-131. When 
iodine-131, with a half-life of 8.02 days, decays, it emits beta particles. Most of the iodine-131 
(98.91%) decays into stable xenon-131, but a little over one percent becomes xenon-131m. So 
far, it is undetermined whether this process produces both isotopes of iodine-131 in a reactor, but 
it may be that the transformation into xenon-131m is only possible for iodine-131 produced in 
the high energy flux of a nuclear explosion, since, by definition, an isotope subject to isomeric 
transition is one that is in an excited state containing excess energy.
1229
 This would account for 
the statement by William B. Scott that samples containing xenon-131m are uniquely identifiable 
as produced in a nuclear explosion. 
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By measuring the ratio of the parent iodine-131 to the daughter xenon-131m in a sample, 
the combined half-lives of the two isotopes provide a window of about 20 days in which the ratio 
between the parent and daughter isotopes in a sample changes constantly. This allows the age of 
a sample to be accurately determined. The identification of this specific decay chain used in 
nuclear intelligence is important, because it demonstrated that AFOAT-1 was closely monitoring 
iodine-131 continuously during atmospheric testing. The AEC did not identify this isotope as 
problematic due to its propensity to bioaccumulate in the thyroid gland, where its decay emits 
both beta and gamma radiation, until after the Windscale accident in 1957.
1230
 While the 
historical data AFTAC holds about iodine in fallout remains classified, access to it is important 
to assist the Centers for Disease Control in going forward with studies to determine the health 
impact of atmospheric testing on humans.
1231
 
One of the most comprehensive sources of information on the radiochemistry of isotopes 
is the National Academy of Sciences Nuclear Science Series: Monographs on Radiochemistry 
and Radiochemical Techniques, Elements. These volumes are available on the internet for most 
isotopes, but the one for xenon is missing from the collection.
1232
 
The history of isotopes relevant to nuclear intelligence remains to be explored in detail, a 
potential project of great interest for students with the suitable chemistry background. For 
instance, it is known that the efficiency of a particular nuclear weapon design can also be 
determined by debris analysis. Suggestive of which isotopes might be useful for this purpose is a 
reference by Richard L. Miller to strontium-90. This isotope was the first one considered 
problematic enough to be extensively studied by the AEC because it has a relatively long half-
life of 28.79 years and its propensity to being taken up by the body in place of calcium and 
deposited in bone. Strontium-90 emits beta particles as it decays into yttrium-90, another 
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radioactive isotope. Although Miller does not cite a source for his information, he remarks that 
“[f]or every 1,000 uranium atoms undergoing fission in an atomic device, there will be…about 
fifteen atoms of the radioactive gas krypton-90” formed. This is part of a decay chain which 
creates strontium -90 within a minute of a nuclear explosion.
1233
 The ratio of uranium to krypton 
could be evaluated along with other data to determine the efficiency of a weapon design in its 
use of fissionable material. Thus, strontium-90, of interest to the AEC for health reasons and for 
evaluating its designs of U.S. weapons, may, like iodine-131, be of interest to AFTAC for the 
insight it may give into foreign weapon design efficiency. 
For fusion weapons, the information is limited on what isotopes may be of intelligence 
interest. The only specific reference I have found so far is to the use of beryllium-7. This isotope, 
with a half-life of about 53 days, is formed by the fusion of lithium-6 and lithium-7 with 
deuterons in a thermonuclear reaction. Measurements of beryllium-7 were reported to have been 
used by Soviet bomb designers as a way to gauge the efficiency of the thermonuclear 
reaction.
1234
 Since the application of this method is so far unclear in its application to the author, 
I have omitted it from the table below. 
Summary of Isotopes 
The following is a summary of decay chains of primary intelligence interest, based on the 
half-lives of the isotopes involved. Approximate half-lives are listed underneath each isotope, 
along with the total of half-lives in each chain. 
tellurium-131  iodine-131  xenon-131m  xenon-131 
(25 minutes)    (8 days)      (12 days)         stable = 20 days, 25 minutes 
or alternatively 
tellurium-131m  iodine-131  xenon-131m  xenon-131 
(30 hours)          (8 days)      (12 days)         stable = 21 days, 6 hours 
 
bromine-86 krypton-90 rubidium-90  strontium-90  yttrium-90  zirconium-90 
(4.5 sec.)    (33 sec.)    (158 sec.)     (25 years)     (62 hours)  stable = ~25yrs+ 
bromine-85  krypton-85  rubidium-85 
(3 minutes)  (9.4 years)   stable = ~9.4+ years 
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Appendix B: Estimated Pu-239 Production, Stockpiles, and Warheads, 1945-1965 
Fallout and the very public political and strategic crises it fostered are the focus of this 
narrative, as it was vital to proving Soviet acquisition of first fission weapons, the original 
objective of the Air Force’s nuclear intelligence program, and then fusion weapons technology. 
While its importance in positively confirming the source of signals suggesting a nuclear 
detonation had taken place continued, it is arguable that a closely related krypton-85 atmospheric 
sampling program to detect and document Soviet fissile material production was even more 
important to justifying the growth of the Cold War U.S. Air Force.  
As discussed in Appendix A, a radioactive but inert noble gas isotope, krypton-85, is a 
by-product of the irradiation of uranium  to produce plutonium-239, the  essential fissile material 
that forms the core of most nuclear weapons, both fission and fusion. Given off in direct 
proportion to the amount of plutonium-239 produced in the transmutation of uranium, it built up 
in the atmosphere in limited, but detectable amounts. Initially, all such reactors were devoted to 
weapons production, so the assumption that the quantity of krypton-85 was directly related to 
military fissile material stockpiles was a valid one. As discussed in the text in relation to GREEN 
RUN, the United States began filtering reactor effluent gases in the late 1940s at Hanford, but 
this seems to have been an incomplete effort. Complete filtering was not necessary, as the 
Soviets obviously knew from press reports and test announcements the United States was 
producing large quantities of plutonium. 
The first Soviet civilian power reactor went online in 1954, but given the international 
situation at the time was likely considered by the Air Force to contribute to the Soviet stockpile 
in practice; there was nothing to prevent its fuel rods from being processed and the plutonium 
recovered for military use.
1235
 American plants presumably represented no issues in obtaining the 
relevant information to make adjustments to estimates of the atmospheric load of krypton-85 due 
to their production of it after the first U.S. civilian reactor went on line on 2 December 1957.
1236
 
Dwight Eisenhower’s proposal  for an International Atomic Energy Agency came prior to the 
Soviet civilian plant’s initial operation, but one of its goals was to document civilian applications 
of nuclear energy, a goal certainly compatible and likely not coincidental with AFOAT-1’s sub-
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rosa goal of measuring plutonium production via krypton-85 monitoring. Continuing U.S. 
support for the IAEA in its early years thus may have been predicated in part on the usefulness of 
the access it provided in documenting plutonium-239 produced in civilian nuclear plants. In 
order to adjust AFOAT-1/AFTAC’s calculations or at least contextualize the gross quantity of 
krypton-85 present in the atmosphere at the time due to ostensibly non-military production once 
the krypton-85 from Western production was discounted from the total atmospheric load of this 
rare noble gas isotope. Obviously, as civilian reactor operations increased, it complicated what 
began as a relatively straightforward process. The United Kingdom also played a role, 
coordinating with the United States on the covert effort to estimate Soviet plutonium-239 
production, while sharing information on its own production. The rapid increase in civilian 
power reactor operations in the late 1950s was likely another reason the British dropped their 
active support for what had been the bilateral MUSIC krypton-85 monitoring program.
1237
  
Despite years of denials, Canada shared to a limited extent in producing plutonium that 
went into American weapons, thus likely shared enough access to account for the plutonium it 
produced, a legacy of its participation in the Manhattan Project.
1238
 In France, civilian nuclear 
power came before military, but the nation’s weapon’s program quickly ramped up into the first 
major non-Soviet bloc target for AFTAC by the time of its first test in 1960.
1239
  The first Israeli 
reactor was an American one in 1960, but the French built another for Israel that began operating 
in 1962 and certainly raised concerns about the size of the “unofficial” Israeli stockpile in its 
nascent form. From there the problem of using krypton-85 to monitor Soviet weapons production 
became increasingly complex as many nations joined in building nuclear plants, often as much 
for the prestige as for the power. It was likely AFTAC’s use of the method continued even after 
its limitations were encountered, as this provided a baseline for comparison in case large, 
unexpected increases were detected. 
                                                 
1237
 The primary conclusion about the British exit, beyond the stated financial burden, was the British likely 
considered they learned all that was needed about the size and composition of the Soviet arsenal once it established 
that the USSR possessed sufficient fissile material to build hundreds of weapons. Once the additional problem of 
fallout from both East and West was accounted for, the strategic considerations for the British were virtually the 
same whether the Russians had 500 weapons or 5,000. 
1238
 “Canadian Plutonium Sold for American Bombs,” Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility,  
http://www.ccnr.org/DOE.html. 
1239
 The People’s Republican of China was already targeted, but the Air Force, like much of the rest of the 
intelligence community, mistakenly considered the Chinese nuclear program as primarily an extension of Soviet 
efforts. 
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While the analyses and estimates AFOAT-1 derived from its krypton-85 sampling remain 
classified, a number of estimates of fissile material production emerged after the end of the Cold 
War opened many other records. These form a fairly reliable and congruent record of what was 
available for AFOAT-1 to detect.
1240
 Combined with a fundamental accuracy of the technique, 
the general agreement of these estimates form a “virtual report” on the information made 
available to Cold War policy- and decision-makers by means of the AEDS as operated by 
AFOAT-1/AFTAC.  
For this project, the data provides an ongoing contextualization of other events as actors 
within the national security establishment pursued what they believed were the best available 
outcomes under the circumstances. In data-driven organizations such as the Air Force, as well as 
in politically-oriented ones like the White House, important metrics are closely and regularly 
observed, up to and including the president, whose signature, initials or presence at a meeting 
was noted on multiple documents of a similar nature. Thus, making them available to historians 
to use provides important context in evaluating the history and outcomes of policy decisions. The 
goal in creating this sort of reference is to identify trends over time, not to account for every 
pound of plutonium. The governments involved cannot account for their stockpiles that 
precisely, so any expectation that the available estimates, including these, should be able to do so 
represents a persistence of nuclear absolutism that is not particularly helpful. Obviously, if at 
some future point the actual intelligence reports generated from what was detected became 
available, an analysis would provide additional insight into their accuracy in relation to 
documented production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1240
 Being estimates, there are variations in the sources on annual and cumulative totals. While details vary, all are in 
general agreement on historic trends in Cold War fissile material production. For this project, the database generated 
by the International Panel of Fissile Materials was the primary source. The IPFM is an independent organization that 
draws on support from Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security and the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of Chicago.  http://fissilematerials.org/ipfm/. 
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Table 1: US/USSR Annual and Cumulative Pu-239 Production 
 
 
 
 
All data subject to rounding    
USSR data: International Panel on Fissile Materials. “Global Fissile Materials Report 2010, 
Balancing the Books: Production and Stocks,” http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr10.pdf  
(GFMR 2010), 49.  
US data derived from: GFMR 2010, 
http://fissilematerials.org/library/2010/12/global_fissile_material_report_4.html, 35;  
US production revised to reflect US DOE, Plutonium: The First 50 Years, 
http://fissilematerials.org/library/doe96.pdf. 
BEU = 6.2 kgs, the approximate minimum rough critical mass for Pu-239 device,  
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2015/04/10/critical-mass/  
Another source defines this approximate value as 4 kg: 
http://fissilematerials.org/library/2010/12/global_fissile_material_report_4.html, 29 n. 113. 
 
Note: For USSR, annual Pu-239 production averaged 4.5 metric tons/year from 1965-1990. 
GFMR 2010, 49.    
Note: For UK, total Pu-239 weapons grade production, 1951-1990, was only approximately 4 
tons, so not charted with above. GFMR 2010, 80.        
Note: This data omits uranium-235 stockpile data, which the GFMR 2010 includes. U-235 was 
not directly monitorable, unlike Pu-239, making it difficult to directly address knowledge of it 
during the Cold War.  
Year US Pu-239 annual kg USSR Pu-239 Annual kg US BEU Annual USSR BEU Annual US cumulative kg USSR cumulative kg US BEU Cum. USSR BEU Cum.
1947 0 0 11* 0 0 0 11 0
1948 400 17 64 2 40 17 75 2
1949 150 19 15 3 550 36 90 5
1950 250 40 40 6 800 76 130 12
1951 350 140 56 22 1150 216 186 34
1952 250 240 40 38 1400 456 226 73
1953 700 350 112 56 2100 806 338 130
1954 850 325 137 52 2950 1131 475 182
1955 1100 350 177 56 4050 1481 652 238
1956 2000 600 322 96 6050 2081 974 335
1957 3200 750 516 120 9250 2831 1490 456
1958 3900 850 629 137 13150 3681 2119 593
1959 4000 1250 645 201 17150 4931 2764 795
1960 5000 1250 806 201 22150 6181 3570 996
1961 6000 1700 967 274 28150 7881 4537 1271
1962 5700 2100 919 338 33850 9981 5456 1609
1963 6000 1900 967 306 39850 11881 6423 1916
1964 6400 3000 1032 483 46250 14881 7455 2400
1965 6600 3500 1064 564 52850 18381 8519 2964
* indicates Manhattan Project legacy stockpile
489 
 
Appendix C: Nuclear Intelligence Sources 
Any discussion of primary and secondary sources on the topic of fallout in the context of 
nuclear intelligence, as well as the historical legacy of the AEDS and its impact on Cold War 
policy and strategy must start by pointing out the difficulties of sufficient access to the 
documentary record to gain some narrative and argumentative traction. Yet, pioneering efforts 
made some two decades ago have finally resulted in a critical mass of historiographic work that 
in some sense rewards the personal research and writing struggle over the course of most of that 
time to discover, understand, and organize what was available on this difficult topic.  
First, a few words about the focus on empirical research here, as attention to the effects of 
fallout as recorded in the evidence presented is a major technique used to fill in still numerous 
gaps in the historical record.
1241
 This does not exclude subjective experience and narrative so 
much as it suggests the need for a broad and inclusive agenda of evidence. The argument here 
suggests that the predominance of models of subjective reactions to fallout was largely the result 
of an intentional effort by the Air Force to limit the availability of quantifiable data to examine, 
analyze and draw conclusions from for researchers. A concerted effort was made to conceal 
these fact sets for reasons that were mostly reasonable at the time (but which a half century or 
more later are less and less so); it is clear that the government was influenced by the secrets it 
held and denied to others in repeatedly changing its policy toward fallout. Ultimately, it chose 
the option of not creating more facts by suspending atmospheric testing entirely, suggesting it 
was not only public opposition and mere scientific interest in fallout that caused it to concede. 
Since so much of this highly relevant data remains classified, linking the familiar subjectivities 
of fallout to a coherent outline of what is known about the role fallout and other nuclear 
intelligence played in shaping Cold War policy is an important link in assessing the past, as well 
as dealing with a future that for now faces far too many nuclear weapons.  
Early in this project, given the sensitivity of the topic and the limited declassification of 
relevant primary documents, adherence to a subjective approach appeared the more productive 
path to follow. The volume of data remaining classified was daunting. However, it became clear 
that the policy decision to end fallout, while influenced by the subjectivities of public pressure, 
was primarily based on quantifiable data about accelerated deposition of fallout from testing 
                                                 
1241
 After Ellysa Stern Cahoy’s definition of empirical research: “Empirical research is based on observed and 
measured phenomena and derives knowledge from actual experience rather than from theory or belief.” 
https://www.libraries.psu.edu/psul/researchguides/edupsych/empirical.html. 
490 
 
back to the surface. No sustained attempt is made to analyze the relative merits of different 
theories of risk associated with radiation exposure or to evaluate the standards established in 
reference to those theories. However, given this is a historical narrative, the subjectivities of 
reactions to facts and data remain of interest and must not to be excluded. What was key here 
was that these numbers caused policy makers to act. While there may be different points of view 
on their meaning, there was ultimately a single set of facts, even if these may lead to differing 
conclusions about the meaning and significance of fallout. The absence of facts can also be 
telling, as Eisenhower and others worried when the United States halted atmospheric testing in 
late 1958, foregrounding the absence of fallout, but also calling attention to its threat. 
The seminal work here was 1995’s artfully accomplished Spying without Spies: Origins 
of America’s Secret Nuclear Surveillance System by Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson. 
Accomplishing exactly what its title describes, the authors left a note in the preface pointing 
toward their identification of Doyle Northrup’s official internal “History of Long Range 
Detection, 1947-1953” as a key document for those who followed them.1242 Unfortunately, 
despite the efforts of this project in prying loose AFOAT-1 and AFTAC official annual unit 
histories and a number of other documents in reasonably useful and complete form, it remains a 
document too sensitive in the eyes of the Air Force to disclose.  
For now, the limited comments in the now-extant unit histories and the secondary 
literature will have to stand in for Northrup’s frank views on the matter.1243 But an interesting 
light was thrown on Northrup’s still secret early operational history by declassification of the 
unit histories. The first unit history covers the years from 1947 to 1953 and is, coincidentally 
enough, entitled “History of Long Detection, 1947 -1953.” But there is no visible mention of 
Doyle Northrup, although the reproduction of the cover page is so poor and smudged that it is 
conceivably possible it was on the document, yet not visible.
1244
 A comment in the front matter 
                                                 
1242
 Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson, Spying without Spies: Origins of America’s Secret Nuclear Surveillance 
System (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), vii. 
1243
 The National Security Archive was the first to succeed at declassification of two year’s span of the AFOAT-1 
annual unit history, which Michael S. Goodman used to effect in his 2007 examination of the parallel British nuclear 
intelligence effort.  The NSA generously shared these, a debt hopefully repaid with adding to what was now in the 
public domain in the course of this project. The author’s mandatory declassification review (MDR) requests for all 
other years between 1947 and 1964 were eventually honored, with sizable, but not crippling redactions. Several 
years’ efforts required appeal of initial denials to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), 
which largely sided with disclosure suggesting optimism for more progress for future researchers. 
1244
 Comparison with the apparently identically formatted 1954 cover sheet indicates Northrup’s name was not on 
the 1953 cover as an author. 
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from AFOAT-1 Chief, Brigadier General Daniel E. Hooks, makes no mention of Northrup, 
referring only to the assistance of the Air University Historical Liaison Office. The total of 328 
pages instead of the Northrup document’s 330 pages also suggests a different document than the 
one the chief scientist authored. Publication date of the declassified unit history appears to be 
June 1954, which as noted in the narrative was subsequent to both CASTLE BRAVO in the early 
spring and the Oppenheimer hearing in the late spring, as it was signed by Hooks with that date 
appended; the publication date of Northrup’s history is uncertain, although a three-hour plus oral 
history interview from 1973 was discovered that also remains classified despite an entry stating it 
was unclassified.
1245
 Interestingly, the 1955 unit history described Hooks taking command as a 
colonel from the previous commander, Brigadier General William C. Canterbury, in June 1954, 
then being promoted to Brigadier General on 9 October 1954. Canterbury’s middle initial is even 
corrected to “M” above the erroneous “C” suggesting the document was subsequent to its 
publication reviewed and corrected. The evidence strongly suggests that the unit history was 
published later than June 1954 and then backdated for reasons that are not clear.
1246
 What this all 
means requires further investigation, as it would be interesting to confirm there were at least two 
secret histories, only one that was recently made available to the public. Patient readers may also 
wonder what Northrup said about Robert Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer was mentioned by name 
in relatively neutral terms at several points in the 1947-1953 unit history. At others, there was a 
more anonymous undercurrent of bitterness over seeming “lost opportunities” much as General 
Wilson described with such vague effect at Oppenheimer’s AEC security hearing. As Chief 
Technical Officer, Northrup closely interacted with Oppenheimer on a number of occasions, 
including defending the disputed Air Force requests to augment LRD efforts that went before the 
Research and Development Board’s review committee Oppenheimer chaired. Thus what the 
direction of the evidence suggests is now even more tantalizing, perhaps even suggesting why 
the Air Force has resisted release of such a seemingly dated document – and perhaps why there 
seem to be some chorological issues with the publication date of various histories of AFOAT-1. 
Ziegler and Jacobson were instrumental in pointing toward a number of ways at getting to 
usable evidence, so a thoughtful read of it is basic for any researcher in this area. Most important 
                                                 
1245
 A MDR for the oral history interview transcript with Northrup remains pending, with a letter indicating the Air 
Force was searching for the document. Document Detail for IRISNUM=00904802, www.airforcehistoryindex.org.  
1246
 AFOAT-1, 1947-1953 Unit History, iii; AFOAT-1, 1954 Unit History, 4. 
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for this project was their imparting the understanding how American testing served as a 
“laboratory with space” enough to research and develop methods of long range detection (LRD).  
Jeffrey T. Richelson was next into the fray. More than a decade after Spying without 
Spies opened the neglected sub-field, the dean of American intelligence history weighed in with 
the ambitious sweep Richelson is known for with his 2006 Spying on the Bomb: American 
Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2006.) The focus was on the more general overall view of the problem from the view 
point of the CIA and the period this work concentrated on was passed by roughly one-third of the 
way through as Richelson chose events to shape the overall thrust of the volume around topical 
areas of more recent vintage. The normally somewhat more succinct seemed as overwhelmed as 
this author by the richness of the subject. Richelson’s focus was also more exclusively on the 
intelligence angle, where the goal here is a broader one of fallout’s role in the policy formation 
process in a much narrow times frame. It is a work extraordinarily useful for the researcher, 
while retaining the accessibility Richelson remains justly famous for. 
Michael S. Goodman rounds out the trio of previous forays into this area by focusing on 
the efforts of British nuclear intelligence with his 2007 Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-
American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press). While 
Goodman does not read as breezily easy as Richelson, he nonetheless does a stellar job of 
presenting the English effort for its largely independent efforts. While the British would have 
liked a closer nuclear partnership with the Americans, the various missteps resulting from the 
Philby and other affairs left the “special relationship” in atomic tatters. The remnants left were 
the often ethereal ones associated with nuclear intelligence, which seems to inoculate the 
partners against a more permanent breach even as it served as a focal point for a steady nibbling 
away at the space between the two. 
The field of the published Cold War personal memoir is large and seemingly still 
growing. While the quality can be highly variable, the record of AFOAT-1/AFTAC in 
inculcating those assigned to it in security culture seems more than modestly successful and 
long-lived. To the author’s knowledge, any such publications are below the radar and most likely 
self-published, with very limited distribution. The Kelsey Wynns memoir on sampling IVY 
MIKE and another confidential one from a source who worked outside of fallout sampling for 
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AFOAT-1 represent the bulk of writing on this angle used here, along with some scattered 
communications here and there.   
Turning to nuclear testing itself, the literature is extensive, but tends to focus on the 
Western test series. A similarly useful literature may exist in Russian, which is merely suggestive 
of the potential for new topical orientations that might be achieved through  familiarization with 
the “three Hs” – Chuck Hansen, Bart Hacker, and Richard Hewlett, et al. These provide the 
researcher with a solid grounding in the milieu, as well as providing opportunities for the 
attentive reader to begin to see the role of nuclear intelligence research and development as it 
played out from multiple angles while concealed within the test organization.
1247
 The work of all 
three was colored by the lack of access in the era of their work to the relevant documentary data, 
but once one begins to look for real historical “gaps” where the absence of mention of fallout at a 
point where the reader concludes more must exist than is often depicted in these works. These 
points become increasingly obvious as one works with the topic. 
Depending on the specific starting point, the available evidence, and argument being 
made, the range of other secondary sources of potential value varies widely. Among these topical 
areas found most useful were works from the history of science, science and public policy, 
weapons testing, intelligence and military history, and arms control history. Gleaning a basic 
reading list from bibliography provides a good start if one chooses carefully. 
While a relatively recent development because of declassifications, there are a number of 
primary document collections whose holdings far exceeded my capacity to examine all in detail. 
The staffs at both the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and the John F. 
Kennedy Library in Boston, Massachusetts, were very solicitous and helpful in facilitating the 
work of a relatively inexperienced researcher. In particular, David G. Haight’s “Nuclear Testing: 
A Guide to Historical Holdings in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library” was invaluable in making 
the most of limited research time and is highly recommended.
1248
 My files now bulge with the 
harvest of valuable and insightful documents. As with many archives, these National Archive 
and Records Administration (NARA) facilities permit use of digital cameras; with good planning 
and discipline, plus lots of batteries, it is possible to walk away with literally thousands of 
document images with a week’s work. The primary NARA facility in College Park, Maryland is 
                                                 
1247
 See Bibliography for complete list of works used herein. 
1248
 Haigh’s guide is available by emailing the Eisenhower Library at the address in the following link: 
http://www.archives.gov/publications/presidential-materials.html. 
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notable for its absolutely essential, but rather limited AFOAT-1/1009
th
 SWS and Project 
Sunshine collections. NARA also holds the declassified CIA holdings there if one has the time 
and inclination, as this was an area where limited time and resources limited my own use of such 
documents. 
While not a government agency, the National Security Archive takes on policy and 
secrecy in the interest of creating a more complete and transparent historical record of 
government action. William Burr and others there were helpful and responsive. Much is 
available online, but researchers should inquire in case they are able to locate other documents in 
their vast holdings of declassified materials.  
The American Institute of Physics’ Niels Bohr Library has extensive holdings of oral 
history transcripts of physicists involved in nuclear intelligence research and development and 
arms control verification technologies like seismology. They were gracious and very helpful, as 
well as providing a view of the surprisingly active inside the Beltway wildlife outside on their 
campus.
1249
 
Experience in seeking documents from the Air Force varied from “sorry, no” in an initial 
foray and inquiry to the military records collection specialists at NARA College Park to very 
helpful. Mostly, it was somewhere in between, which has proven to be productive and certainly 
worth the time invested on both sides in the struggle to free a vital part of the Air Force’s history 
from the oblivion of the obscurity from which it was made. AFTAC itself remains singularly 
silent in most respects, although a nice, printed copy of A Fifty Year Commemorative History of 
Long Range Detection was forwarded gratis once they understood I was a serious researcher. 
Researchers will continue to knock on that door in the future, but the opportunities elsewhere in 
the Air Force will likely continue to be more fruitful. There is a historical unit at the Pentagon 
associated with Air Force headquarters that deals with issues like MDR requests and appeals, as 
well as distributing copies of declassified records. The Air Force Historical Research Agency is 
located at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama handles historical documents available for 
researchers. Access to the facility on an active military base was essentially closed after 9/11, but 
the current status may be different. AFHRA was able to provide a mass of microfilm at 
reasonable cost. Two primary topics of interest to researchers are available. The records of the 
                                                 
1249
 One rarely expects to see a fox while copying archive materials, especially so in an urban setting, but the AIP’s 
beautiful campus is situated in a park-like setting in College Park, Maryland that encourages contemplation of the 
natural world, along with science and history. 
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4080
th
 SRW and its U-2 operations provided considerable insight into one of the more significant 
“contractors” for AFOAT-1/AFTAC sampling operations, as well as further insight into the 
intelligence asset that replaced the AEDS as the most important strategic intelligence system. 
Nearly untouched in the microfilm is a far larger collection of Air Weather Service unit histories 
and other documents, along with insights into these units’ close relationship to nuclear sampling. 
It is hoped the focus of this science- and policy-oriented project will serve as a jumping 
off point for other projects by this author or others. Most obviously the “gap” needing filled is 
for a military history of AFTAC now that the basic pieces are declassified, including its early 
unit histories. Other potential projects include a revision of arms control history; a reexamination 
of the history of science and personal conflict through a fuller recasting of the Oppenheimer 
affair; polishing a lengthy article expanding on Roger Cross’s analysis of Hedley Marston’s 
cheeky “protest by science” of British testing in Australia; and a history of radiometric 
instrumentation proliferation in the lab, field, and fallout shelter. 
An aspirational goal of this project was to create a new holistic framework for Cold War 
history that forces reconciliation, if not agreement, between often competing and obviously 
historically incompatible narratives. Efforts were made here to take evidence and analyze from 
multiple perspectives in order that everyone with a dog in the fight had a chance to speak. In the 
end, regardless of the invaluable assistance of archivists, other scholars, and even friends over 
beer, the author takes full responsibility for the views and occasional opinions expressed herein. 
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Appendix D: Annual and Cumulative Test Yields 
Annual test yields varied greatly during the era of atmospheric testing, with the 
cumulative yield jumping sharply toward the end just before the Limited Test Ban Treaty ended 
the bulk of such testing in 1963.
1250
 
Table 2: Total atmospheric test yields
1251
 
  Fission          Cumulative Fission+Fusion Cumulative Total 
      Fission [% of total ’45 - ’62]   Fission+Fusion 
1945 to 1956 =  51.8 Mt (27%)   51.8 Mt   88.8 Mt (17%) 88.8 Mt 
1957 to 1958 = 40.0 Mt (21%)   91.8 Mt   85 Mt   (17% ) 173.8 Mt 
1959 to 1960 = temporary test moratorium, “No foreign nuclear explosions were detected 
in 1959.”1252 Only the first French tests were detected by AFTAC in 1960.1253 
1961 to 1962 = 101 Mt (52%)   192.8 Mt  337 Mt      (66%) 510.8 Mt 
 
The Federal Radiation Council (FRC) made several distinctions in its more complex table 
that better illustrate how the AEC and the Russians clearly were acting to address the need to 
limit fallout. By shifting the data into the yearly breakdown used here, it makes clear how 
important the shift in priority to avoiding fireball contact with the surface was in order to limit 
fallout. Between 1945 and 1956, 86% of all yield was detonated in proximity to the earth.
1254
 
The 1957 to 1958 test series saw a drastic change, with only 33% reported fired in surface 
contact. For total yield, the final cumulative numbers showed that 80% had been detonated in the 
air, with only about 20% in contact with the surface. The FRC was a bit optimistic in listing no 
surface contact yield in 1961 and 1962; the Davy Crockett tests that were among the last U.S. 
atmospheric tests were excluded, but relatively very dirty considering their limited yield (well 
                                                 
1250
 The French began testing in the atmosphere in 1960 and the Peoples Republic of China in 1964. 
1251
 Data derived from Federal Radiation Council, Estimates and Revaluation of Fallout in the United States from 
Nuclear Weapons Testing (Washington, DC: U.S.G.P.O., May 1963),   
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/federal/frc_rpt4.pdf, 5. More recent reconciliations of total yields produced by 
atmospheric testing are available, benefiting from the end of the Cold War. Here I thought it useful to look at 
contemporary sources that U.S. Senators who voted on the LTBT might have encountered. Some low yield shots 
were excluded from these totals as they made little difference once rounding was taken into account. For an 
insightful discussion of test yield estimates and fallout and fallout, see : United Nations. Scientific Committee on the 
Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation: Sources (New York: United Nations 
Publications, 2000), 158-177. 
1252
 AFTAC, 1959 Unit History, v. 
1253
 AFTAC, 1960 Unit History, vi. 
1254
 The distinction was between “air” and “surface” so fireball contact seemed to be the appropriate metric applied. 
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under 1 kiloton), with two being fired within a few feet of the surface.
1255
 However, this shift to 
limit fallout as testing proceeded clearly delineated a border between the dirtiest era of testing 
and one that seemed more clean at the time. 
However, “clean weapon” was a very subjective term. The U.S. military defined it as a 
weapon design producing no more than 5% of the fallout of a standard design weapon.
1256
 With 
thermonuclear weapons, this could nonetheless be a staggering amount of radiation, which the 
yield totals for later years suggest. The period from 1945 to 1956 produced about 17% of total 
fallout. Then 1957 and 1958 test yield totals roughly equaled the previous period of 17%. 
Following the temporary test moratorium, a profligate fit of testing followed in 1961 and 1962, 
thankfully carried out with no more than very limited fireball contact with the ground 
underneath, but still totaling some 66% of all atmospheric test yields. While the public made 
little distinction about fallout’s origins, simply wanting it to stop, the FRC took pains to note the 
U.S. generated a total of only 37 megatons of yield in 1962 (there were no U.S. atmospheric tests 
in 1961), while the USSR produced some 120 tons of total atmospheric yield in 1961 and 
roughly 180 megatons in 1962.
1257
   
In a sense, the Russians were pulling their punches during their massive 1961-1962 
series. The Tsar Bomb (56 megatons, 30 October 1961) was said to be a 100 megaton design 
purposefully reduced to about half its intended yield. Along with other multi-megaton shots in 
this series, the Russians seem to have taken pains to go for maximum yield even as they limited 
potential fallout production by following the American example of avoiding fireball-to-ground 
contact. The big numbers sent a message, albeit a somewhat muddled one about the dangers of 
fallout, but the Soviet Union made efforts to limit the fallout danger at least in comparison to 
lower efficiencies in its earlier test series. The jump in fallout exposures provided a final baseline 
for whatever was left of GABRIEL to consider. Thus the breakdown into four distinct periods, 
three passages of testing, increasingly intense, and the “coasting” period from late 1959 to 1961 
when new additions of fallout ceased during the temporary test moratorium. In between test 
series once the distinct plumes from individual shots dispersed samples taken from the upper air 
were most likely to yield a distinct pattern of generally increasing background radiation through 
                                                 
1255
 The FRC did not include data on devices with a limited yield and thus unlikely to make a contribution to 
stratospheric fallout. 
1256
 “The Clean Weapons Problem,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 42, No. 12 (December 1959), 37. 
1257
 FRC, Estimates and Revaluation of Fallout, 5, Table II. 
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1958. A plateau of sorts, then the beginning of a general fall in stratospheric fallout levels was 
likely what the 4080
th
 SRW U-2 samplers encountered in the stratosphere on CROWFLIGHT 
and other missions during the first temporary test moratorium from late 1958 to 1961. It was a 
lack of documented persistence that likely contributed to the overthrow of Libby’s optimistic 
elaborations adopted from the Harwell stratospheric residence time theories. While speculative, 
the March 1959 decision to end atmospheric testing by Eisenhower and his advisers may have 
reflected the much faster pace of deposition that General Loper argued exceeded Libby’s 
previous sharply shortening revision of his residence time estimates.
1258
 If evidence of such 
accelerated deposition emerged within three months, this data likely provided further strong 
impetus for Eisenhower’s actions following his conclusion that “nuclear testing is bad.”1259 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1258
 Letter from General Herbert B. Loper to Senator Clifford B. Anderson, 19 February 1959, reproduced in Special 
Subcommittee on Radiation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, “Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests, Volume 3” 
(Washington, DC: USGPO, 1959), 2537-2538; Helen C. Allison, “News Roundup: Radiation Problems,” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 1959), 223.  
1259
 James R. Killian, Jr., Memorandum for the President, “Technical Factors Relating to Arms Limitation and to the 
Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Cessation,” Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File, Administration, Box 23, 
31 March 1959, 3. 
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Table 3: US/USSR/UK Annual and Cumulative Test Yields, 1945-1965 
 
 
 
 
Year U.S. annual yield total U.S. cumulative USSR annual yield USSR cumulative UK annual yield UK cumulative Total annual test yield Cumulative test yield
1945 56 56 0 0 0 56 56
1946 46 102 0 0 0 46 102
1947 0 102 0 0 0 0 102
1948 104 206 0 0 0 104 206
1949 0 206 22 22 0 22 228
1950 0 206 0 22 0 0 228
1951 614 820 80 102 0 694 922
1952 10900 11720 0 102 25 25 10925 11847
1953 252 11972 441 543 18 43 711 12558
1954 48200 60172 122 665 0 43 48322 60880
1955 198 60370 1868 2533 0 43 2066 62946
1956 20820 81190 1976 4509 143 186 22939 85885
1957 342 81532 6243 10752 232 418 6817 92702
1958 36227 115759 16252 27004 5501 5919 57980 150682
1959 0 115759 0 27004 0 150682
1960 0 115759 0 27004 0 150682
1961 0 115759 83230 110234 83230 233912
1962 38246 156005 114275 224509 152521 386433
1963
1964
1965
Total Yield from Atmospheric testing by the Big Three original nuclear powers was ~386.233 megatons~386,433 kilotons or 86.433 megatons
Yields are stated in kilotons; numbers subject to rounding
Source: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/index.html
U.S. "test" yields for 1945 include yields for Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki weapons used in war and as the only 
wartime yields, were categorized as tests here for 
simplicity's sake.
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Appendix E: AFOAT-1/AFTAC Units and Aircraft 
This appendix is a compilation of working documents created in the course of fifteen 
years of research on this project.
1260
 It was designed as an aid to memory and organization of this 
complex narrative. Additions, clarifications, and corrections are welcome. 
AFOAT-1/AFTAC Associated Units, Detachments and Other Organizations 
These are generally divided into AFOAT-1/AFTAC and its subordinate units and those 
other affiliated units associated with support of the AFOAT-1/AFTAC mission.  
 
 
Figure 4: 1950 AFOAT-1 Organization Chart
1261
 
 
                                                 
1260
 This compilation remains a work in progress; what is presented here is an extract intended to aid other 
researchers. Additional brief notes are available on request for many but not all of the entries. 
1261
 Staff Memorandum 20-1C, “Organization of AFOAT-1,” 13 September 1950, Headquarters United States Air 
Force (Air Staff), NARA RG 341.10.6.  Note how the only place for “science” is in the library. 
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Aircraft Serving the AFOAT-1/AFTAC Mission 
General Dwight Eisenhower’s assignment of the long range detection (LRD) mission to 
the Air Force as an antecedent to the service’s independence in the formation of the Department 
of Defense under the National Security Act of 1947 was predicated on the Air Force’s unique 
global aviation capabilities. Over the years operating the AEDS as the mission of first AFOAT-1, 
then AFTAC, a wide variety of aircraft from a number of other commands served in support of 
sampling fallout and the atmosphere in support of LRD, along with research and development 
often associated with the U.S. testing program. A relatively fewer number were used for training 
and utility tasks.  
Generally, sampling aircraft were not assigned to AFOAT-1/AFTAC, but acted under 
orders as “contractors” for LRD sampling. Crewed by the owning command, they typically 
carried an enlisted AFOAT-1/AFTAC representative called a special equipment operator (SEO). 
Besides operating the various sample collection apparatus, filters for particulate debris and 
compressors and tanks for gaseous samples, the SEO utilized sensitive detectors to vector the 
aircraft toward fallout plumes. This was one of those rare exceptions to usual military command 
protocols, with officer/pilots taking direction from enlisted personnel; while technically not 
commanding the aircraft, the SEO represented the “customer” and following his instructions (all 
flying personnel during the period of this project were male) was paramount to successful 
mission completion. A few single-seat aircraft had no seat for a SEO, such as the U-2. In these 
cases, the pilot was trained to operate the detection and sampling equipment, directed by pre-
flight orders that provided the best estimate of where “hot” samples would be encountered. 
During the peak fallout years of 1961 to 1963, the total number of aircraft assigned in 
support of the AEDS peaked at 84 in FY62 and 74 in FY63. In FY62, this included 43 Air 
Weather Service RB-50; 23 AWS RB-57; 1 AWS RB-47; 8 Strategic Air Command B-52; and 9 
SAC U-2. In FY63, the mix was 31 AWS RB-50; 14 AWS RB-57; 4 AWS C-130; 8 SAC B-52; 
15 SAC U-2 and 1 each AFTAC C-47 and C-118.
1262
 
Thus, AFOAT-1/AFTAC itself “owned” relatively few aircraft and used them primarily 
for support tasks. Samples needed rapid transport to the appropriate laboratory, to ensure 
                                                 
1262
 AFTAC, 50 Year Commemorative History, 63. The small shrinkage in the fleet during the intense FY 63 fallout 
was due to the ongoing retirement of the long in tooth and increasingly dangerous RB-50 samplers in favor of 
younger airframes and an increased focus on high-altitude collections by the U-2. 
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documentation through testing that could identify some relevant isotopes before their decay 
made them undetectable.  
The unit flew two versions of the dodgy Lockheed Constellation. The first, obtained in 
1957, was one of only two YC-121F Super Constellations the Air Force procured. It was 
powered by four turbo-prop engines instead of the standard piston engines used on the standard 
model Constellation, providing impressive performance improvements.
1263
 It was equipped to 
conduct both debris sampling and training for up to four SEOs at a time. The high-performance 
and specialized nature of the airframe saw it grounded for excessive operational costs by 1959. 
The airframe was later sold with the other Air Force YC-121F to Flying Tiger, a freight airline, 
which used the parts to build two running cargo aircraft.
1264
 Another Air Force Constellation, a 
standard piston-engine model with tail number 51-3842, was obtained in July 1959 and 
converted to roughly the same sampling and training configuration as the first, but with an 
assigned nomenclature of TC-121C. This aircraft crashed on a test flight out of McClellan Air 
Force Base, California on 22 March 1961, killing an AFTAC crew of 5 and a Lockheed technical 
representative who was aboard.
1265
 A C-118, the military version of the reliable four piston-
engine powered Douglas DC-6, was then obtained and converted to similar configuration as the 
Constellations. 
The deaths in the 1961 crash were only a few of those suffered by those assigned to the 
LRD mission. More SEOs died on planes flying for the Air Weather Service. During the 1950s, 
the AWS performed the bulk of sampling operations in support of the LRD program. The AWS 
benefited by its inclusion in the priority funding status granted to those whose missions 
supported the AEDS. This hardworking, but frequently crashing collection of WB-29s was 
expanded by additional conversions from B-29s, resulting in a fleet that peaked at 80 aircraft in 
1954.
1266
 The AWS weather reconnaissance fleet was expanded to six squadrons by 1951 (and to 
seven by 1957), continuing to operate along its synoptic tracks, gathering data for weather 
                                                 
1263
 This aircraft was either 53-8157 or 53-8158. Extant information on the internet does not identify the specific 
aircraft involved, its assignment to AFOAT-1, or its connection to LRD operations. See: 
http://www.network54.com/Forum/213163/thread/1035998833/last-1051127865/Lockheed+R7V-2. 
1264
 AFTAC, 50 Year Commemorative History, 61; http://www.conniesurvivors.com/1-QandA.htm. 
1265
 AFTAC, 1959, 1961 Unit History; AFTAC, 50 Year Commemorative History, 61-62; Accident Report:   
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19610322-1. It should be noted that it was the TC-121C that 
crashed in 1961, not the YC-121F that was incorrectly attributed to have been the accident plane in AFTAC’s 50 
Year Commemorative History on page 61. 
1266
 John F. Fuller, Thor’s Legions” Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937-1987 (Boston: 
American Meteorological Society, 1990), 236. ©American Meteorological Society.  Used with permission. 
503 
 
reports while sampling for signs of radioactive debris. Aircraft flying “specials” began regularly 
carrying special equipment operators (SEO) assigned from AFOAT-1 who used a crude 
detection apparatus that was basically a Geiger counter rigged for airborne use. The detector was 
able to determine if they were within the usually unseen debris cloud, allowing the SEO to direct 
the pilot to obtain better quality samples than simply flying a surveillance synoptic track would 
obtain. Following the discovery of debris from Joe-4 on 12 August 1953, which showed that the 
Russians had again closed the lead the U.S held in nuclear technology by demonstrating its own 
thermonuclear design, a proposal to cut the number of weather reconnaissance squadrons to four 
was itself cut short as the Air Force structure expanded from 120 wings to 137 wings.
 1267
 
Replacement of the troublesome WB-29 fleet occurred, leading to use of the equally deadly (to 
their crews) WB-50, itself basically an improved version of the B-29. The WB-29s, wracked by 
engine fires and corrosion so severe that they were eventually banned from flying into typhoons, 
suffered 8 major accidents before their use ended in 1956, taking the lives of 58 crewmen. The 
replacement WB-50s had 13 major accidents by 1960, resulting in 66 deaths.
 1268
 Even in 
relatively peaceful circumstances, the crews of the AWS regularly risked their lives operating 
this portion of the AEDS. 
It is uncertain how many SEOs died in these accidents, but it looks likely that as many as 
two dozen were involved.
1269
 Page 54 of AFTAC’s Commemorative History lists sixty-four 
individuals recorded on a memorial plaque at its headquarters, but some are clearly those who 
otherwise died while serving, civilians, or both (Walter Singlevich for instance). Many of the 
losses reflected by contributions to this list were likely due to aircraft accidents over the years, 
most likely dying in ones and twos as the SEOs flying with the AWS.  
The only other mass casualty incident potentially believed to include multiple AFOAT-1 
personnel involved yet another Constellation. This C-121 was flying on a transport run for the 
Military Air Transport Service (MATS) with two other Constellations on a flight from Wheelus 
AFB in Libya to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia when it crashed short of the runway in fog on an 
                                                 
1267
 John F. Fuller, Thor’s Legions” Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937-1987 (Boston: 
American Meteorological Society, 1990), ., 234. ©American Meteorological Society.  Used with permission. Note 
that at the beginning of the Gulf War in 1990, a news conference was held in Saudi Arabia to announce the official 
entry of U.S. military forces into the desert kingdom. Ironically, this announcement was at least 40 years late. 
1268
 Ibid, 240-2. 
1269
 Since the earliest AWS missions did not always carry a SEO and later missions may have carried more than one, 
two dozen is a viable estimate of the SEO toll from these 23 aircraft losses. 
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approach made difficult because the local radar was out of service.
1270
 Dhahran was the location 
of AFOAT-1 Detachment 304 on a base that otherwise served primarily as a service stop for the 
shorter-ranged aircraft of that era.
1271
 With the isolation of the base, there was no other timely 
way to transport assigned personnel to and from it, so it was quite possible that several AFOAT-
1-assigned personnel may have been aboard when 54-0165 went down a mile short of the 
runway. With the relaxation of the most stringent secrecy that allowed veterans to openly 
celebrate the organization’s fiftieth anniversary in 1997, it seems axiomatic that a more complete 
accounting of the circumstances of those who died during their service with AFOAT-1 or 
AFTAC would eventually be forthcoming for public release, whether in-flight, in ground 
accidents, or other incidents. 
Moreover, the converted heavy bombers used by the AWS were limited in important 
ways that left AFOAT-1 with less than worldwide coverage. Due to budgetary and operational 
constraints, it was only practical to fly synoptic tracks in areas of greatest interest near the Soviet 
Union. Specials could be flown where needed, but this depended on detection by ground-based 
seismic, sonic, and, quite possibly, electromagnetic sensor systems.
1272
  
Additionally, the weather aircraft converted from heavy bombers were generally limited 
to altitudes below the stratosphere, when the power of thermonuclear weapons caused much of 
their debris to be flung above the tropopause. In the stratosphere, fallout was initially believed to 
linger for far longer periods. This was a mixed blessing, in that it allowed a longer period for 
radioactivity to decay. It also created the problem of estimating what exactly the atmospheric 
loading of fallout was and determining accurately what the rate of fallout disposition would be as 
it gradually moved down into the troposphere. Valuable intelligence could be gathered about 
larger thermonuclear explosions in the stratosphere just as it was gathered in the troposphere 
from fission explosions, but it would require a means to reach altitudes above 70,000 feet. Here 
is where, spawned as a project on the model of the AEDS program, the U-2 played an important, 
but heretofore little known, role in this narrative. The U-2 provided AFOAT-1 with the 
capability “to conduct strategic reconnaissance operations [including nuclear intelligence] on a 
                                                 
1270
 Accident Report: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19561230-0. 
1271
 The author’s father served at Dhahran’s Detachment 304 for a year during 1955 and 1956, missing the birth of 
his first child, but making his way home safely. 
1272
 A “special” was a mission flown at the direction of Headquarters, AFOAT-1/AFTA that was specifically 
vectored to confirm the location of and obtain a sample from an identified debris plume. 
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global scale,” and to eventually engage in test ban treaty verification, no matter what the height 
of a nuclear explosion.
1273
  
When Gen. LeMay was first briefed on the U-2 in April 1954, he walked out of the 
meeting, grumbling that the project was “wasting his time with a plane that had no guns.” The 
Strategic Air Command initially rejected the U-2, deciding to acquire converted B-57 light 
bombers for high-altitude reconnaissance, equipping them with cameras, EMP, electronic 
intercept, and nuclear sampling equipment. These RB-57 aircraft were operated as Project 
BLACKNIGHT by the 4025
th
 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (Light), another unit also part 
of the 4080
th
 Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (Light). The unit will not be otherwise discussed 
here, with one exception, because the RB-57s represented an evolutionary “dead end” that SAC 
soon retreated from in light of the spectacular, but secret, successes of the U-2. The 4025
th
 did 
serve briefly in doing R&D for nuclear intelligence by conducting sampling missions at the 1958 
HARDTACK I test series in the South Pacific.
1274
 The 4025
th
 was one of three planned 
squadrons of the 4080
th
 SRW(L). The other two squadrons, the 4028
th
 and 4029
th
 Strategic 
Reconnaissance Squadrons (Light) were to implement DRAGONLADY, the unclassified 
codename for a high-priority effort to add the U-2 to SAC’s inventory.1275 The first orders to the 
4080
th
 to initiate DRAGONLADY were issued in December 1956, fast on the heels of the U-2s 
initial success over the Soviet Union.
1276
 In regard to their AFOAT-1 missions, the U-2s initially 
operated in a separate compartment from the previously described AWS operations. LeMay 
apparently decided he wanted a piece of the CIA’s action, but he chose to concentrate the U-2’s 
mission in the Air Force at this time primarily on nuclear intelligence missions. 
The first Air Force U-2s came equipped to conduct photographic and electronic intercept 
reconnaissance missions, in addition to radioactive debris sampling. With the intent of further 
obscuring the plane’s work, the term “nephography” was coined to refer to the photographic 
system (Greek, meaning roughly “cloud pictures.”) For electronic intercept systems, the term 
“sferics” was adopted. A historian who joined the unit later had trouble figuring out for himself 
what all the jargon was about and decided to write a special report clarifying the terms for 
                                                 
1273
 4080
th
 SRW Unit History, August 1956, 1. AFHRA 959-1051. (Note: All AFHRA numbers refer to microfilm 
acquired from the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama 
microfilm reel and, if readable, frame number. All microfilm cited is in the possession of the author.) 
1274
 4080
th
 SRW(L) Unit Histories, April to June 1958, AFHRA 961. 
1275
 The 4029
th
 SRS(L) remained a paper squadron as far as the author knows and never was activated. 
1276
 4080
th
 SRW(L) Unit History, December 1956, 4. AFHRA 960-0013 
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posterity, although reading between the lines in the unit histories makes it clear what was 
involved in each of these mysterious terms.
1277
 During the early years of Air Force U-2 operation 
up until the Cuban missile crisis, “nephography” and “sferics” would play relatively minor, but 
essential roles, with the idea being that the U-2’s could provide electronic reconnaissance and 
provide post-strike damage assessment so that SAC’s bombers could find targets that might still 
require destruction. The unit was also tasked with “provid[ing] meteorological data from high 
altitude for operational forecasting,” i.e. nuclear sampling.1278 When the 4080th moved to 
Laughlin AFB, Texas (outside of Del Rio and just across the Rio Grande River from Mexico) on 
1 April 1957, it was feared that even mentioning that the unit was engaged in “weather analysis” 
was too forthcoming, so it was decided to tell the local media that it was only “a normal SAC 
light reconnaissance unit.”1279 The obfuscatory terminology, while partially tangential to the 
current subject matter, was yet another aspect of Air Force information management in the 
service of secrecy. While waiting for the end of the world, the U-2 would spend the majority of 
its first half-decade in SAC bolstering the AEDS by flying higher and farther afield than any 
other nuclear sampler, finally giving the aerial radioactive sampling capability of AFOAT-1 a 
truly worldwide reach. 
“Due to the high priority and classification of the mission of the 4080th SRW, operational 
control of the Wing was exercised by Headquarters Strategic Air Command direct to the 4080
th
 
SRW.”1280 It is hard to state more concretely LeMay’s direct, personal interest in the operations 
of the U-2 than his requiring the 4080
th
 to directly report to his headquarters. He was known as a 
“hands on” manager and the chain of command designated for the 4080th clearly reflected this 
fact. Information of this importance needed to flow directly to the top echelon, without being 
filtered by intermediary levels. LeMay, who had served as SAC commander since 1948, moved 
up the ladder to the Pentagon in June of 1957, so this order likely also indicated a desire that his 
successor, General Thomas Power, would retain priority access to the management and results of 
the 4080
th’s work.  
 
  
                                                 
1277
 Special Report of U-2 Systems, undated, but included in the 4080
th
 SW’s Unit History, May 1962. AFHRA 969-
453 to 460. 
1278
 4080
th
 SRW Unit History, June 1957, 3. AFHRA 960-679. 
1279
 4080
th
 SRW Unit History, April 1957, 6. AFHRA 960-637. 
1280
 4080
th
 SRW Unit History, April/May 1957, 5. AFHRA 960-636. 
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Table 4: AFOAT-1/AFTAC Units 
 
 
Unit# Location State/Country Year 
Begin 
Year 
End 
HQ Washington DC  1947 ? 
HQ Washington DC    
HQ Washington DC    
HQ Patrick AFB Florida   
 Eastern Filed Office Japan  >1958 
? Southern Field Office Wiesbaden, 
FRG 
<10 Jul 
53 
 
 Central Field Office Lindsey AS  >1958 
OL-A Patrick AFB Florida  <1993 
     
     
06X ? ?   
7 classified location ?   
45 Buckley AFB, Denver Colorado   
46 Falcon AFS, Colorado 
Springs 
Colorado   
57 Lowry AFB, Denver Colorado   
63 ? ?   
70 EL Adak Alaska   
? Annette Island Alaska 1951  
72 EL Bermuda Bermuda   
73 EL Argentia Newfoundland, Canada  
74 EL Midway    
79 ? ?   
101 McClellan AFB, Western 
Field Office 
California < July 
52 
 
102 Albrook AFB Canal Zone < 7 
May 54 
 
103 Hickam Hawaii < 7 
May 54 
 
104 Key West (Navy) Florida <Oct 
50 
 
105 March AFB California   
106 McChord AFB Washington   
OL106 Mather AFB California >April 1961 
107 Porto Alegre Brazil < 7 
May 54 
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Table 4: (cont’d) 
 
 
Unit# Location State/Country Year 
Begin 
Year 
End 
108 Puerto Montt Chile <Oct 
50 
> 7 
Apr 55 
109 Recife (became Det 
213) 
Brazil <Oct 
50 
> 7 
Apr 55 
110 Pole Mountain Wyoming < 10 
Jul 53 
30-
Dec-58 
112 Boston Tracerlab Massachusetts   
117 Roswell New Mexico  Mar-63 
122 Johnstown Pennsylvania  13-
Aug-51 
123 Santiago (see 214) Chile   
125 Pittsburg, then 
Edwards AFB 
Pennsylvania  13-
Aug-53 
126 Berkeley, assoc w/ F-
101 and G-101 
California   
132 Fairchild AFB Washington   
132 Kindley AFB Bermuda < 7 
May 54 
> 8 Jul 
55 
135 Centerville Beach California   
139 Laramie Wyoming < 10 
Jul 53 
15-
Dec-58 
140 Thule Greenland < 10 
Jul 53 
> 8 Jul 
55 
141 Douglas Wyoming < 10 
Jul 53 
> 8 Jul 
55 
142 Encampment Wyoming < 10 
Jul 53 
> 8 Jul 
55 
143 Ft. Sill Oklahoma < 10 
Jul 53 
> 8 Jul 
55 
145 St. Nicholas Island, Pt. 
Mugu 
California   
148 Lowry AFB, Denver Colorado  13-
Aug-53 
149 Williston North Dakota  13-
Aug-53 
151 Chanute AFB Illinois < 7 
May 54 
 
152 Chanute AFB Illinois   
152 Brookley AFB, Delta 
Field Office 
Alabama < 10 
Jul 53 
> 7 
Apr 55 
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 Table 4: (cont’d) 
 
 
Unit# Location State/Country Year 
Begin 
Year 
End 
153 ?  < 7 
May 54 
 
154 Dow AFB, Limestone? Maine < 7 
May 54 
6-Feb-
56 
154 Ethan Allen AFB Vermont 6-Feb-
56 
 
155 Larson AFB Washington < 7 
May 54 
>1963 
156 Williamson-Johnson 
Airport, Duluth 
Minnesota 13-
Aug-53 
1958 
157 Lowry AFB, Denver Colorado  > 8 Jul 
55 
158 BR  Sao Paulo Brazil > 8 Jul 
55 
>1958 
159 France AFB, Canal 
Zone 
Canal Zone > 8 Jul 
55 
 
160 San Angelo Texas >55?  
161 Lowry AFB, Denver Colorado >1956  
161 Rio de Janier Brazil 1958 >1958? 
162 Pinedale Wyoming 8-Dec-
58 
 
163 Flin Flon, Manitoba Canada   
165 Laramie Wyoming Apr-59  
170 see 201    
201 Adak Alaska <Sep 
50 
4-May-
53 
201 Ramey (formerly 170) Puerto Rico  1-Jul-
63 
202 Eielson AFB Alaska 1951 > 8 Jul 
55 
203 Northern Field Office Elemendorf 
AFB (Ft. 
Richardson) 
< 10 
Jul 53 
<Sep 
53 
203 Northern Analysis 
Laboratory 
Elemendorf 
AFB (Ft. 
Richardson) 
Sep-53 > 8 Jul 
55 
204 Ladd 
AFB/Fairbanks/Ft. 
Wainwright 
Alaska < 10 
Jul 53 
1963? 
 
510 
 
Table 4: (cont’d) 
 
 
Unit# Location State/Country Year 
Begin 
Year 
End 
205 Point Barrow, then 
Shemya 
Alaska   
206 Barrow, then to Shemya 
AFB in '58? 
Alaska Jun-52  
207 Thornborough AFB, 
then Eielson 
Alaska Jul-52  
208 Annette Alaska   
209 College Alaska   
208 Adak Alaska >1963  
210 Kodiak Alaska  <Apr 
52 
212 Albrook AFB Panama  >1963 
213 Recife {formerly 109) Brazil  Feb-64 
213 Ascension Island May-
05 
 
214 Santiago (see 123) Chile May-
63 
Feb-66 
215 Ascension Island Dec-63 Feb-66 
211 Thule Greenland Oct-52  
220 Thule Greenland Oct-52 < 1957 
244 Flin Flon, Manitoba Canada  >1958 
267 Kindley AFB Bermuda  >1963 
271  Alaska?   
301 Ankara/Belbasi Turkey < 10 
Jul 53 
> 1963 
? Teheran/DOORCHECK Iran <Aug 
51 
>1958 
304 Dharhan Saudi Arabia <1951? >1956 
305  Dharhan Saudi Arabia   
306 Hanau FRG > Fall 
53 
 
308 ? ?   
310 Langanes AB Iceland  May-
05 
311 "classified location" = 
Wheelus AFB 
Libya >1963  
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Table 4: (cont’d) 
 
 
Unit# Location State/Country Year 
Begin 
Year 
End 
313 Camp King FRG <15 
Mar 51 
Aug-56 
313 Sonseca Spain Aug-56 to 
Spain? 
316 Kirkenes Norway  >1958 
317 Keflavik Iceland < 7 
May 54 
> 1963 
318 Lajes Azores, Spain < 7 
May 54 
> 8 Jul 
55 
322 Wheelus Field, Tripoli, 
Central Field Office 
Libya < 10 
Jul 53 
> 8 Jul 
55 
323 Furstenfeldbruck FRG  1-May-
54 
323 Camp King FRG 1-May-
54 
 
324 Asmara Ethiopia >Apr 
1952 
 
325 Roberts Field Liberia   
327 Lahore Pakistan 15-
May-
55 
11-Jan-
63 
328 Karamursel Turkey <1958 >1963 
329 Spieka/Hohes Moor W. Germany <1958? early 
1970s 
332 Karachi Pakistan  >1963 
 BEAVER Pakistan <1958 >1958 
347 Caspian Seashore Iran  >1963 
360 EL Keflavik Iceland   
400 Hickam AFB Hawaii  >1963 
401 Clark AFB Phillipines < 7 
May 54 
> 8 Jul 
55 
402 Guam UST Jan-51  
403 Kadena Okinawa, 
Japan 
< 7 
May 54 
> 8 Jul 
55 
405 Seoul, "Rockpile" Korea 29-
May-
52 
16-
May-
58 
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Table 4: (cont’d) 
 
 
Unit# Location State/Country Year 
Begin 
Year 
End 
406 Tokyo, Eastern Field 
Office 
Japan < 10 
Jul 53 
> 8 Jul 
55 
407 Yokota AFB Japan < 7 
May 54 
> 8 Jul 
55 
? Chitose Japan   
? Camp Haugan Japan >Fall 
53 
 
408 ? (Fuchu AS, Itazuke 
AB, or Kyoto?) 
FEAMCOM < 7 
May 54 
 
412 Bangkok Thailand Oct-63  
413 ? ? < 7 
May 54 
 
414 Kwajalein Marianas 
Islands 
< 7 
May 54 
 
415 Chiang Mai Thailand  >1963 
416 Hilo Hawaii  Apr-63 
418 John Hay AFB Phillipines  >1963 
421 Alice Springs Australia >Apr 
55 
 
422 Misawa AFB Japan   
423 Del Monte Plantation, 
Cagayande Oro, 
Mindanao 
Phillipines   
423 EL Guam    
424 Haleakala/Hickam Hawaii  >1963 
426 Perth Australia Sep-63  
427 Melbourne Australia  >1963 
428 Anderson AFB Guam   
430 Woodbourne AS New Zealand 1963  
433  Pacific Technical Operations 
Area? 
452 Camp Long, Wonju South Korea   
459 Pinedale Wyoming   
460 Eielson AFB Alaska   
461 Shemya AFB Alaska   
471     
489 Pinedale Wyoming   
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Table 5: Associated Units 
 
 
Associated Unit Locations 
1009th Special Weapons Squadron  
1035th Field Activities Group  
1035th Technical Operations Group  
1110th Balloon Activities Squadron Goodfellow AFB;  
1155th Technical Operations Squadron (TCHOS)  
1156th Technical Operations Squadron  
1211th Test Squadron (Sampling)  
1212th Balloon Activities Squadron Goodfellow AFB;  
1970th Communications Squadron Woomera Air Station, Australia 
2059th Air Weather Wing Tinker AFB, OK 
2078th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Fairfield-Suisun AFB; Tinker 
AFB;  
20th Helicopter Squadron  
2143rd Air Weather Wing, FEAF  
2107th Air Weather Group Eielson AFB 
308th Weather Group Tinker AFB;  
312th Technical Training Squadron Goodfellow AFB 
3200th Drone Squadron  
3400th Technical Training Wing Lowry AFB 
3454th Technical Training Squadron (SPINSTRA) Lowry AFB 
374th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Fairfield-Suisun (Travis) AFB; 
Nellis AFB (for RANGER) 
375th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron  (375th 
SRS(M)W?) 
Eielson AFB; Yokota AFB 
4025th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron  
4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron  
4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Turner AFB; Laughlin AFB; 
Ramey AFB (Det. 3); 
Plattsburgh AFB (Det. 4) >  
4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing [extended]  TDY Ezeiza, Argentina; 
Australia (1960); Anderson 
AFB; Albrook AFB; Eielson 
AFB 
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Table 5: (cont’d) 
 
 
Associated Unit Locations 
41st Rescue and Weather Reconnaisance Wing  
4900th Air Base Group Kirtland AFB; 
4901st Air Base Wing  
4901 Support Wing (Atomic)  
4925th Test Group (Atomic)  
4926th Test Squadron (Sampling) Kirtland AFB; Indian Springs 
AFB; 
4935th Air Base Squadron Indian Springs AFB; 
4950th Test Group (Nuclear) Kirtland AFB; Indian Springs 
AFB; 
4950th Test Wing Wright-Patterson AFB 
4951st Test Squadron Wright-Patterson AFB 
4952nd Support Squadron (Test)  
512th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Very 
Long Range) 
Fairfield-Suisun (Travis) AFB; 
Yokota AFB; Misawa AFB;  
513th Reconnaissance Squadron , Very Long 
Range, Weather 
Tinker AFB; Dharan, SA;  
514th Weather Reconnasiance Squadron North Air Force Base, Guam; 
Kwajalein 
53rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron , Medium, 
Weather 
Bermuda 
53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron England ('54) 
54th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron , Medium, 
Weather 
Guam 
54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron  
55th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron , Medium, 
Weather 
Fairfield-Suisun AFB ('49); 
McClellan AFB 
55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Offutt AFB; Ladd AFB; Hickam 
AFB; McChord AFB;  
550th Gudied Missile Wing Eglin AFB; Eniwetok 
561st Fighter Squadron Bergstrom AFB; Sandia; Indian 
Springs AFB; Kwajalein; 
56th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron , Very Long Range, Weather 
56th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron  
57th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron , Medium, 
Weather 
Hickam AFB;  
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Table 5: (cont’d) 
 
 
Associated Unit Locations 
57th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron  
58th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Kirtland AFB; Alaska ('51) 
58th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Kwajalein 
59th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Very Long Range, Weather 
59th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Bermuda 
6th Strategic Wing Eielson AFB 
6th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Eielson AFB 
6091st Reconnaissance Squadron Yokota AFB 
6th Weather Squadron (Mobile) Rongerik, Eniwetok;  
7407th Reconnaissance Squadron Rhein-Main AFB 
865th Air Control and Warning Squadron  
9th Weather Reconnaissance Group  
AFOAT (Air Force Assistant for Atomic Energy)  
AFOAT-1 (Air Force Assistant for Atomic Energy)  
AFMSW-1 (AF DCS Materiel, Special Weapons Group, Section One) 
AFSWC (Air Force Special Weapons Command)  
AFSWC (Air Force Special Weapons Center)  
AFSWP (Armed Forces Special Weapons Project)  
AFTAC (Air Force Technical Applications Center)  
AFTAC, Western Field Office McClellan AFB 
AFTAC, Technical Operations Division McClellan AFB 
AWS (Air Weather Service)  
DASA Defense Atomic Support Agency  
DNA Defense Nuclear Agency  
DOD Effects Test Group  
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional #1  
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional #2  
WRSP-4  (as Det G > Edwards,  as Det G' 
> Takhli AFB, as Det. H 
>Taiwan) 
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Table 6: Sampling and Support Aircraft 
 
Type Mission Operations 
WB-26 weather recon tac recon Germany, Japan, ZI 
F6F drone sampler Crossroads 
F-84G sampler Tumbler-Snapper, Ivy, Castle 
RF-84F photo recon Galileo, Tenn. ANG 
C-54 courier AFOAT-1, AFTAC, Ivy to Hardtack II 
B-17 sampler drone Sandstone 
WB-29 sampler, wx recon AWS, Crossroads to Castle 
B-50 sampler Galileo  
WB-50D sampler, wx recon SAC; AWS, Ranger to 1964 Chinese 
Shot 
T-33 sampler FEAF, ANG, Buster-Jangle to 
Hardtack II 
WT-33 weather recon TAC 
F-80 drone, drone control Upshot-Knothole 
YC-121F sampler/trainer AFTAC 
TC-121C sampler/trainer AFTAC 
H-21 test support Hardtack II 
B-25 courier, sampler Galielo to Hardtack II 
L-20 security Hardtack II 
C-47 courier AMC, AFTAC, Galileo, SACRED 
COW 
RB-47E weather recon AWS 
RB-47K weather recon SAC 
WB-47E sampler  
HC-130 sampler ARRS 
WC-130 sampler AWS 
B-57B sampler AWS, Hardtack II 
RB-57D sampler AWS, Sunday Punch 
RB-57F sampler SAC, AWS, Crowflight, Quickdip 
U-2 sampler, war plan EMP SAC 
WC-135B sampler  AWS 
TC-135 sampler SAC 
WB-66D weather recon TAC 
RB-36 weather recon SAC 
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Table 6: (cont’d) 
 
 
B-52 sampler (w/pod) SAC SEA FISH high-altitude specials 
P-3 weather recon, sampler Navy 
VC-118A sampler/courier AFTAC 
C-118 sampler AFTAC 
F-4D sampler w/Genie Air-2A  
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Appendix F: Codenames 
A quick, if not comprehensive guide to codename identification follows below. 
Definitions are generally too short for a full description, but are intended as an aid to memory in 
navigating the text. A few key test shot names are included, but the various cited online 
references are the best source of complete information on United States, Soviet, British, and 
other tests. 
 
AQUATONE…………….….U-2 operation by CIA to capture imagery over “denied” territories 
BIG SAFARI……….USAF program for acquisition and modification of special mission aircraft 
BIT BITE……….program to sample wartime fallout over U.S. to produce fallout prediction data 
BLACKKNIGHT……4080th SRW RB-57 program that preceded the later availability of the U-2 
BLUENOSE…………….program to study detectable emissions from fissile material production 
BRASS RAIL...4080
th
 SRW mission to collect imagery over Cuba from OL X, McCoy AFB, FL 
BUDAPEST…..JCS study of impact of fallout from nuclear war on United States military forces 
CASTLE BRAVO………………Second U.S. thermonuclear test, fallout incident, 1 March 1954 
CODY……………...AFOAT-1 study of use of LRD techniques to assess bomb damage for SAC 
CROWFLIGHT………...high altitude sampling done with the U-2 for Project Sunshine, AFSWP 
DRAGONLADY…………………………………...SAC program to create operational U-2 units 
FITZWILLIAM………..R&D program at SANDSTONE test series, proved long range detection 
GABRIEL………………study of fallout’s global limits on maximum yield expended in wartime   
GENETRIX….drifting from west to east, a balloon-borne imagery collection project over Russia 
GREEN RUN..1949 test under BLUENOSE based on large release of reactor effluvia at Hanford 
IVY MIKE…………first United States thermonuclear test, conducted in secret, 31 October 1952          
JANGLE…………………………...AFOAT-1 test program to verify seismic detection capability 
LOON CHARLIE……...Air Weather Service synoptic sampling track between Japan and Alaska 
MOGUL……….balloon-borne sonic detection system, crash of one led to Roswell UFO incident 
MUSIC……………later name for joint US/UK NOMINATION krypton-85 sampling program 
NOMINATION………..joint US/UK krypton-85 sampling program, detected Pu-239 production 
SPECIAL…………...sampling mission planned to intercept suspected or identified fallout plume 
SPEED LIGHT……………..BIG SAFARI modification of KC-135 to observe “Tsar Bomb” test 
TRINITY………………….first ever fission nuclear test, plutonium-239 implosion, 16 July 1945         
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VELA…………...program to improve AEDS verification capabilities following a partial test ban 
VELA UNIFORM……………………………………...seismic improvement program for AEDS 
VERMONT………codename assigned to Alert 112, confirmed as Joe-1, first Soviet nuclear test 
WHITESNAKE………..Air Weather Service synoptic program for interim network before Joe-1                                                                                              
   
 
520 
 
Bibliography 
Adams, Chris. Inside the Cold War: A Cold Warrior's Reflections. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air 
University, 1999. 
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE). The Human Radiation 
Experiments: Final Report of the President’s Advisory Committee. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996. 
Air Force Association staff. “The Clean Weapons Problem.” Air Force, Vol. 42, No. 12 
(December 1959).  
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Little, 
Brown, 1971, second edition, with Phillip Zelikow, 1999. 
Allison, Helen C. “News Roundup: Radiation Problems.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 
15, No. 5 (May 1959). 
Alperovitz, Gar.  Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and 
the American Confrontation with Soviet Power. London: Pluto Press, 1995 edition. 
Amrine, Michael. “How to Build a Family Foxhole.” Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 158, No. 3 
(March 1951). 
Arkin, William M. Code Name: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in 
the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005. 
Bates, Charles C. and John F. Fuller. America’s Weather Warriors, 1814-1985. College Station: 
Texas A&M Press, 1986. 
Bethe, Hans. The Road from Los Alamos. New York: American Institute of Physics, 1991. 
Bernstein, Barton. “Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-Bomb?” 
International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Autumn 1989). 
Bernstein, Jeremy. Nuclear Weapons: What You Need to Know. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.  
521 
 
Bijker, Wiebe E., Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds. The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987. 
Bird, Kai and Martin J. Sherwin. American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer. New York: Knopf, 2005. 
Blumberg, Stanley A., and Gwen Owens. Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward 
Teller. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976. 
Bogle, Lori Lyn. The Cold War: National Security Policy Planning from Truman to Reagan and 
from Stalin to Gorbachev. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2001. 
Boyer, Paul. Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear 
Weapons. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998. 
Boyne, Walter J. “The Early Overflights.” Air Force, Vol. 84, No. 6 (June 2001), 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2001/June%202001/0601overfly.a
spx. 
Boy Scouts of America. Pattern for Survival: A Guide for Unit Leaders. New York: Boy Scouts 
of America, 1951. 
Boy Scouts of America. Family “Be Prepared” Plan. New York: Boy Scouts of America, 1951. 
Bradbury, Ray. Fahrenheit 451. New York: Random House/Del Rey, 1953. 
Buck, Alice. The Atomic Energy Commission. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 
July 1983, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/AEC%20History.pdf. 
Bulletin staff. “Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945-1995.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
Vo. 52, No. 3 (May/June 1996). 
Bundy, McGeorge. “Early Thoughts on Controlling the Arms Race: A Report to the Secretary of 
State, January 1953.” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn 1982). 
522 
 
Cabell, Charles P. “Memoirs of an Unidentified Aide.” Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/cabell.html. 
Cabell, Charles P. A Man Of Intelligence: Memoirs Of War, Peace, and the CIA: the Memoirs of 
General Charles P. Cabell, Charles A. Cabell, Jr., ed, Brigadier General, USAF (Ret), 
Boulder, CO: Impavide Publications, 1997. 
Carter, Donald A. Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962. Washington, DC: 
Center for Military History, 2015. 
Chernus, Ira. “The Word “Peace” as a Weapon of (Cold) War.” 
http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/4820-
ColdWarCulture/Readings/PeaceAsWeaponOfWar.htm 
Chernus, Ira. Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
Clark, Claudia. Radium Girls: Women and Industrial Health Reform, 1910-1935. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 
Clegg, Brian. Armageddon Science: The Science of Mass Destruction. New York: St. Martins 
Griffin, 2010. 
Committee to Review the CDC-NCI Feasibility Study of the Health Consequences from Nuclear 
Weapons Tests, National Research Council. Exposure of the American Population to 
Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests: A Review of the CDC-NCI Draft 
Report on a Feasibility Study of the Health Consequences to the American Population 
from Nuclear Weapons Tests Conducted by the United States and Other Nations. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003. 
Craig, Campbell. Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998. 
Cross, Roger. Fallout: Hedley Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Australia. Kent Town, 
South Australia: Wakefield Press, 2001. 
523 
 
Divine, Robert A. Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978. 
Dyson, Freeman. Weapons and Hope. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. 
Eden, Lynn. Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons 
Devastation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
Eliot, David C. “Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe.” International Security, Vol. 11, 
No. 1 (Summer 1986). 
Evangelista, Matthew. Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Evernden, Jack F. “Lies That Stopped a Test Ban.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 44, No. 
8 (October 1988). 
Farrell, Theo. “Nuclear Non-Use: Constructing a Cold War History.” Review of International 
Studies, 2010. 
Finston, H.L. and M.T. Kinsley. The Radiochemistry of Cesium (NAS-NS-3035). Upton, NY: 
National Academy of Sciences: National Research Council, 1961. 
Fontenot, Jon M. A New Era: From SAC to STRATCOM. Quantico: Marine Command and Staff 
College, undated, http://fas.org/spp/eprint/fontenot.htm. 
Foucault,  Michel. “Truth and Power.” in Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault. The Chomsky-
Foucault Debates on Human Nature. New York: The New Press, 2006. 
Fowler, John M., ed. Fallout: A Study of Superbombs, Strontium-90 and Survival. New York: 
Basic Books, 1960. 
Fradkin, Philip L. Fallout: An American Tragedy. Boulder: Johnson Books, 1989. 
Friedricjh, Jörg. The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006. 
524 
 
Fulghum, David A. “USAF Reconnaissance Comes into Focus.” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 24 July 2000. 
Fuller, John F. Thor’s Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937-1987. 
Boston: American Meteorological Society, 1990. 
Gentile, Gian P. How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to 
Kosovo. New York: New York University Press, 2001. 
Georgescu, Calin, with an introduction by Mick Broderick and Robert Jacobs. "United Nations 
Report Reveals the Ongoing Legacy of Nuclear Colonialism in the Marshall Islands." 
The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10 Issue 47, No. 1, (19 November 2012). 
Gerstell, Richard. How to Survive an Atomic Bomb. New York: Bantam Books, 1950. 
Getting, Ivan. All in a Lifetime. New York: Vantage, 1989. 
Glasstone, Samuel, ed. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Washington, DC: AEC, 1962, 592-5; 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-
ref/glossary/lethal-dose-ld.html. [Although often missing from extant copies, this book 
included a sleeve with a “Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer” inside the back cover. 
Among other calculations possible with this circular, slide rule-like device are Initial 
Nuclear Radiation and Fallout Dose Rates.] 
Goodman, Michael S. Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet 
Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. 
Greene, Benjamin P. Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1945-1963. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. 
Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political 
Development During the Early Cold War. New York: Routledge, 2001. 
Groves, Leslie M. Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project. New York: Da Capo 
Press, 1962. 
525 
 
Hacker, Barton C. Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation 
Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994. 
Haight, David G. “Nuclear Testing: A Guide to Historical Holdings in the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library,” Eisenhower Library, collection guide. 
Hales, Peter Bacon. Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1999. 
Hamblin, Jacob Darwin. Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the 
Nuclear Age. New Brunswick, NJ: The Rutgers University Press, 2008. 
Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. Arlington, TX: Orion Books, 1988. 
[cited here as Hansen I] 
Hansen, Chuck. The Swords of Armageddon, Version 2. Sunnyvale, CA: Chuklea Publications, 
2007. [cited here as Hansen II] 
Herken, Gregg. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. 
Hewlett, Richard G. and Francis Duncan. Atomic Shield: A History of the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990 edition (1962 
original). 
Hewlett, Richard G. and Jack M. Holl. Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and 
the Atomic Energy Commission. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
Hoddeson, Lillian, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall. Critical 
Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-
1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Nuclear Energy, 1939-1956. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 
526 
 
Hoyt, Edwin P. Inferno: The Firebombing of Japan, March 9-August 15, 1945. Lanham, MD: 
Madison Books, 2000. 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. “Global Fissile Materials Report 2010, Balancing the 
Books: Production and Stocks.” http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr10.pdf. 
Jacobs, Robert. The Dragon’s Tail: Americans Face the Atomic Age. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2010. 
Jacobs, Robert. “The Radiation That Makes People Invisible: A Global Hibakusha Perspective.” 
The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 31, No. 1 (4 August 2014). 
Kelley, Robin D.G. Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class. New York: 
Free Press, 1996. 
Kozak, Warren.  LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay. Washington, DC: 
Regnery, 2009. 
Kubrick, Stanley. Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. 
1964. 
Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Lehman, Michael, “Long Half-Life: Government Response to the Environmental Challenge of 
Radioactive Materials,” unpublished research paper, 2002. 
Lehman, Michael. “Perishable Secret: Science, Defense Policy, and the Metamorphosis of 
United States Nuclear Intelligence, 1949-1963.” unpublished undergraduate honors 
thesis, 2003. 
LeMay, Curtis. Mission with LeMay: My Story, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, 1965. 
Libby, Willard. Worldwide Effects of Nuclear Weapons: Project Sunshine. Santa Monica: The 
Rand Corporation, 6 August 1953 
527 
 
Lide, David R. ed. CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics (83
rd
 Edition). Boca Raton, FL: 
CRC Press, 2002. 
Lindstrom, Martin. buy·ology: Truth and Lies About Why We Buy. New York: Doubleday, 2008. 
Lowenhaupt, Henry S. “Mission to Birch Woods.” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 
1968). 
Lowenhaupt, Henry. “Ravelling[sic] Russia’s Reactors.” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 16, No. 4 
(Fall 1972), http://research.archives.gov/description/7283843. 
Machta, Lester. “Finding the Site of the First Soviet Nuclear Test in 1949.” Bulletin of the 
American Meteorological Society, Vol. 73. 
Malloy, Sean L. “A Very Pleasant Way to Die: Radiation Effects and the Decision to Use the 
Atomic Bombs Against Japan.” Diplomatic History, Volume 36, Issue 3. 
May, Elaine Tyler. Homeward Bound: Americans Families in the Cold War Era. New York: 
Basic Books, 1988. 
McEnaney, Laura. Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the 
Fifties. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
McClain, Joseph H. “Project East River: The Strategy of Civil Defense.” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, Vol. 9, No. 7 (September 1963). 
McMillan, Patricia J. The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Birth of the Modern Arms 
Race. New York: Viking, 2005. 
Meilinger, Phillip S. “The Early War Plans.” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 95, No. 12 (December 
2012), 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/December%202012/1212war
.aspx. 
Mikhailov, V.N., ed. “Catalog of Worldwide Nuclear Testing.” http://www.iss-
atom.ru/ksenia/catal_nt/intr.htm. 
528 
 
Miller, Joseph L. Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing. New York: Free Press, 
1986. 
Mitchell, Greg. “The Great Hiroshima Cover-Up—And the Greatest Movie Never Made.” The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/-Greg-Mitchell/3581. 
Moody, Walton S. Building a Strategic Air Force. Washington, DC: Air Force History and 
Museums Program, 1995. 
Moody, Walton S., Jacob Neufeld, and R. Cargill Hall. “The Emergence of the Strategic Air 
Command, in “Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, 
Bernard Nalty, ed. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, United 
States Air Force, 1997. 
Moore, Leroy. “Lowering the Bar.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58, No. 3 (May/June 
2002). 
Morgan, Karl Z. and Ken M. Patterson. The Angry Genie: One Man’s Walk through the Nuclear 
Age. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 
Morris, Errol. Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara. 2003 movie. 
National Academies of Science, Committee to Review the CDC-NCI Feasibility Study of the 
Health Consequences from Nuclear Weapons Tests, National Research Council. 
Exposure of the American Population to Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons 
Tests: A Review of the CDC-NCI Draft Report on a Feasibility Study of the Health 
Consequences to the American Population from Nuclear Weapons Tests Conducted by 
the United States and Other Nations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
2003, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10621/exposure-of-the-american-population-to-
radioactive-fallout-from-nuclear-weapons-tests. 
Nalty, Bernard. The Air Force and Nuclear Testing, 1958-1964, Washington, DC: USAF 
Historical Division Liaison Office, 1965.  
Needell, Allan A. Science, Cold War and the American State. New York: Routledge, 2000. 
529 
 
Nelson, Robert. “3 Reasons Why the U.S. Senate Should Ratify the Test Ban Treaty.” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 2 (March/April 2009). 
Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Ogle, Willaim E. An Account of the Return to Nuclear Weapons Testing by the United States 
After the Test Moratorium, 1958-1961. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 
1985. 
Oppenheimer, J. Robert. “Atomic Weapons and American Policy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 
4 (July 1953). 
Osgood, Kenneth. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and 
Abroad. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 
Peebles, Curtis. Shadow Flights: America’s Secret Air War against the Soviet Union. Novato, 
CA: Presidio, 2000. 
Pedlow, Gregory W. and Donald E. Walzenbach. The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974. 
Langley: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2004. 
Phillips, Thomas R. “Civil Defense.” Air Force, Vol. 38, No. 10 (October 1955). 
Pocock, Chris. 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete Illustrated History of the “Dragon Lady.” 
Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2005. 
Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate. New York, The Dial Press, 1982. 
Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. 
Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1995. 
Rhodes, Richard. Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race. New York: Knopf, 
2007. 
530 
 
Richelson, Jeffrey T. American Espionage and the Soviet Target. New York: William Morrow, 
1987. 
Richelson, Jeffrey T. Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to 
Iran and North Korea. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.  
Rose, Kenneth D. One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture. New 
York: New York University Press, 2001. 
Rosenberg, David Alan. “Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategy” in The 
National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960. Eric Graebner, ed., New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Rosenblith, Judy. Jerry Wiesner, Scientist, Statesman, Humanist: Memories and Memoirs. 
Boston: MIT Press, 2003. 
Ross, Richard. Waiting for the End of the World. New York: Princeton Architecture Press, 2004. 
Ross, Stewart Halsey. Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War Two: The Myths 
and the Facts, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2003. 
Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War Two. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Schake, Kurt Wayne. Strategic Frontier: American Bomber Command Bases Overseas, 1950-
1960. Trondheim: Historik Institut Det Historisk-Filosofiske Fakultet NTNU, 1998. 
Scheibach, Michael. Atomic Narratives and American Youth: Coming of Age with the Atom. 
1945-1955. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 2003. 
Scott, William B. “USAF Nuclear Detectives Assume New Roles.” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 3 November 1997. 
Scott, William B. “Sampling Mission Unveiled Nuclear Weapon Secrets.” Aviation Week & 
Space Technology, 3 November 1997. 
531 
 
Scott, William B. “Debris Collection Reverts to Ground Sites.” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 3 November 1997. 
Seaborg, Glenn. Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1981. 
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1987. 
Sherry, Michael S. In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995. 
Shibusawa, Naoko. America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Shirk, William L., Jr. “Atoms for Peace in Pennsylvania.” Pennsylvania Heritage, 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/history/4569/it_happened_here/
471309. 
Shute, Nevil. On the Beach, New York: Vintage, 2010, original publication date 1957. [Also 
produced as a 1959 movie by the same title.] 
Smith, P.D. Doomsday Men: The Real Dr. Strangelove and the Dream of the Super Weapon. 
New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2007. 
Snead, David L. The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower and the Cold War. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1999. 
Steiner, Barry H. Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1991. 
Stern, Philip M. with collaboration of Harold P. Green, and special commentary by Lloyd K. 
Garrison, Chief Defense Counsel for Dr. Oppenheimer. The Oppenheimer Case: Security 
on Trial. New York: Harper-Collins, 1969. 
532 
 
Sternglass, Ernest. Secret Fallout: Low Level Radiation from Hiroshima to Three-Mile Island. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. 
Steury, Donald P. ed, Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates. Washington, DC: 
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994. 
Strauss, Lewis. Men and Decisions. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962. 
Sullivan, William H. Trilinear Chart of Nuclear Species. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1949. 
Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, The CIA, and the Hidden Story of America’s 
Space Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. 
Taylor, Lauriston. Radiation Protection Standards. Cleveland: CRC Press, 1971. 
Taylor, Leland. History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling. Kirtland AFB, New Mexico: 
Historical Division, Office of Information, Air Force Special Weapons Center, Air Force 
Systems Command, 1963. 
Teller, Edward. Memoirs: A Twentieth-Century Journey in Science and Politics. Cambridge, 
MA: Perseus, 2001. 
Tibbets, Paul W. Return of the Enola Gay. Columbus, OH: Third Coast Marketing, 1998. 
Twining, Nathan F. “The Shadow of Air Power at Geneva.” Air Force, Vol. 38, No. 10 (October 
1955) 
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Sources and Effects of 
Ionizing Radiation: Sources. New York: United Nations Publications, 2000, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=57YmhD4ZBpQC&dq=atmospheric+test+yields&so
urce=gbs_navlinks_s. 
U.S. Air Force, Lookout Mountain Laboratory. Operation SANDSTONE: USAF Participation.  
Hollywood: USAF Lookout Mountain Laboratory, 1948 movie. 
U.S. Air Force, Lookout Mountain Laboratory. BUSTER-JANGLE: USAF Participation. 
Hollywood: USAF Lookout Mountain Laboratory, 1951 movie. 
533 
 
U.S. Air Force, Lookout Mountain Laboratory. Operation IVY, Joint Task Force 132, T.G. 132.1 
Task Unit Nine, United States Air Force. Hollywood: Lookout Mountain Laboratory, 
1952 movie. 
U.S. Air Force, Air Force Technical Applications Center. A Fifty Year History of Long Range 
Detection, The Creation, Development, and Operation of the United States Atomic 
Energy Detection System. Patrick Air Force Base, Florida:  Headquarters, AFTAC, 
September 1997. 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of 
Hearing before Personnel Security Board and Texts of Principal Documents and Letters. 
Forward by Phillip M. Stern, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971. [cited as ITMO] 
U.S. Atomic Weapons Training Group. Atomic Fundamentals. Sandia Base/Albuquerque, NM: 
Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency, 1962. 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and National Cancer Institute. Report on the Health 
Consequences to the American Population from Nuclear Weapons Tests Conducted by 
the United States and Other Nations. Washington, DC, USGPO, 2001, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/fallout/. 
U.S. Congress Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, 27-29 May and 3-7 June 1957, 
Washington, DC: USGPO, 1957. 
U.S. Congress Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Fallout 
from Nuclear Weapons Tests, 5-8 May 1959. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1959. 
U.S. Congress Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Fallout 
from Nuclear Weapons Tests, Volume 3. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1959. 
U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation DOMINIC II: Shots LITTLE FELLER II, JOHNIE 
BOY, SMALL BOY, LITTLE FELLER I, 7 July - 17 July 1962, Washington, DC: USGPO, 
1962. 
534 
 
U.S. Department of the Army. Atomic Weapons Employment, No. 39-1. Washington, USGPO, 
June 1956. 
U.S. Department of the Army. IVY FLATS Film Report (MF 20-9811). 1962. 
U.S. Department of the Army. Staff Officers Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment, FM 
101-31-3. Washington: USGPO, Department of the Army, February 1963. 
U.S. Department of Energy. J. Robert Oppenheimer Personnel Hearings Transcripts. October 
2014. https://www.osti.gov/opennet/hearing.jsp. [short title is ITMO2, the substantially 
complete declassified version of 1954’s AEC, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, 
ITMO] 
U.S. Department of Energy. Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to the Present 
(RDD-8). Germantown, MD: U.S.D.O.E, Office of Health, Safety, and Security, 2002. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “Other Modes of Radioactive Decay.” 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/understand/positron.htm. 
U.S. Federal Radiation Council. Estimates and Revaluation of Fallout in the United States from 
Nuclear Weapons Testing. Washington, DC: U.S.G.P.O., May 1963. 
U.S Human Effects Panel Report. “Report to the President and the National Security Council by 
the Panel on the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development,” Dec 1956. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d96. 
U.S Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs, 
Foreign Economic Policy. Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1977. 
U.S Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XIX, 
National Security Policy. Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1990. 
U.S. Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee. “Deterrence & Survival in 
the Nuclear Age.” Washington, DC: Office of Defense Mobilization, Executive Office of 
the President, 7 November 1957, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/nitze02.pdf. [Gaither Report] 
535 
 
Vandercook, William F. “Making the Very Best of the Very Worst: The ‘Human Effects of 
Nuclear Weapons’ Report of 1956.” International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 
1986). 
Voss, Earl H. Nuclear Ambush: The Test Ban Trap. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963. 
Walker, J. Samuel. Permissible Dose: A History of Radiation Protection in the Twentieth 
Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
Wassermann, Harvey and Norman Solomon. Killing Our Own. New York: Delta, 1982, 
http://www.nucleardemolition.com/Killing_Our_Own.pdf.  
Watson, Robert J. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume V, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  and 
National Policy, 1953-1954. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1986. 
Weart, Spencer R. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1988. 
Welsome, Eileen. The Plutonium Files: America’s Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold War. 
New York: Random House, 1999. 
Willis, Jay C. “Report on the History of Fallout Modeling.” Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: 
School of Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1979. 
Wittner, Lawrence S. One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament 
Movement through 1953. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
Wittner, Lawrence S. Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament 
Movement 1954-1970. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
York, Herbert. The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller & the Superbomb. San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1976. 
York, Herbert. Race to Oblivion: A Participants View of the Arms Race. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1970. 
536 
 
Ziegler, Charles A. “Waiting for Joe-1: Decisions Leading to the Detection of Russia’s First 
Atomic Bomb Test.” Social Studies of Science 18 (1988), 197-229. 
 
Ziegler, Charles A. and David Jacobson. Spying without Spies: Origins of America’s Secret 
Nuclear Surveillance System. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995.
537 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page intentionally left blank. 
